

BOOK IV

THE GROWING WORLD — THOUGHT AND
ASPIRATION IN THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

CHAPTER XVI

THE ROMANTIC PROTEST AGAINST THE AGE OF REASON

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF INTELLECTUAL COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE, AND THE DEMAND FOR ITS ORGANIZATION

IT IS possible to find in the eighteenth century a fairly definite, coherent, and systematically organized body of beliefs and ideals, to which the great majority of the intellectual classes gave assent. The history of thought in that age is largely the history of the spread to all fields of human interest of the method and aims of Newtonian science. This is not to deny that the culture of those times, like that of any other period in the ever-changing web of Western history, was still heavy with the persisting past, and already big with the future. The curious have not unnaturally found the seeds of all our surprising later growths already budding between the trim and ordered alleys of the Enlightenment gardens. The wise have rightly pointed out that the heavenly city the eighteenth-century philosophers worshiped, and even their adored reason itself, link them far more closely to the great classic tradition of ages past than to the manifold irrationalisms of the present and the earthly purgatory to which we soberly look forward. Yet we can discern a characteristic pattern of Enlightenment thought and aspiration, which is emerging the more distinctly as so much we had taken for an enduring legacy recedes into the background, made impossible for us by what we must do to meet our own problems.

In the restless inquiry and searching that have marked men's intellectual pursuits since those days, it is hard to find any such clear picture. Not only did men in the aftermath of the middle-class revolutions fail to reach a measure of agreement on fundamentals; even within particular fields it is not easy to trace any simple line of development. In many ways the last century seems analogous to those transitional generations that transformed the world and the mind of the Middle Ages into the world and the mind of the Enlightenment; though naturally

enough, since we are convinced the issues we are facing today are the most momentous ever confronting the human race, the period that generated them now strikes us as far more revolutionary. In this year of grace 1940 intelligent men are prophesying the imminent disappearance in Europe of anything remotely resembling the kind of civilization and culture we have known for over two centuries. Even the longer perspectives of recent years have spread the conviction that the Age of Liberalism and the Age of Capitalism are about over. If by "liberalism" we mean the gospel of the French Revolution and the classic economists, and by "capitalism" the economic arrangements of the late nineteenth century consecrated in our economic theory, this seems a safe assumption, even for our own land. But despite our passionate programs for to-day's crisis, we are as yet in no position to say with confidence what form or forms the organization of industrial society will eventually assume. Still less can we predict the nature of the new intellectual synthesis, if indeed we can expect ever again, save for brief periods of crisis, to arrive at any such unified body of knowledge and belief as both the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries exemplify.

Hence in the last hundred years it is exceedingly difficult to separate the important tendencies from the passing currents of reaction, revolt, and compromise. Another decade, in clarifying the tendencies destined to be accepted by the future, may well bring a quite new perspective on what has been important in the nineteenth century. But we can at least hope to analyze those movements of thought and action which have generated our present intellectual issues, and to examine the major problems faced and dealt with by the nineteenth century that led men to hammer out the ideas they left for our uses. Our picture of the maze of conflicting tendencies and cross-currents at work in the nineteenth century can hardly hope to achieve the unity we discern in those periods whose outcome we already know. Yet the course of events is rapidly producing a unification in terms of the problems that have eventuated and the intellectual instruments put at our disposal. The choices we must make and the allegiances forced upon us have already thrown into relief much of the pattern of nineteenth-century thought and values. Where formerly a large element of personal preference and

sympathy entered into any selection of what was important, today the issues have grown so pressing that they have brought to a common focus those ideas that are of enduring significance, and set them off from the mere surface eddies.

Back of the multiplicity and diversity of nineteenth-century tendencies lies the ever-accelerated rate at which the economic forces of social change have been proceeding. The triumphant middle class has itself split into a number of sections; the great body of industrial workers that emerged has been subdivided in a myriad of ways. Instead of a few simple classes among which an urban population was developing, for several generations we have had a society broken up into a great number of special groups, each with its own interests and ideals, and each conflicting with the others on important points. Nationalism too has entered in to cut across all such economic lines and create new divisions among men, and new groupings.

This splintering of Western society into a welter of ill-co-ordinated groups has provoked its own reaction, already far advanced in Europe. It is plain that the system of irresponsible sovereign states, with boundaries inherited from a simpler economy, is wholly incompatible with the demands and the promise of modern technology. It is equally plain that the unrestrained flow and expansion of trade and economic power, which alone made that system endurable, has broken down and cannot be restored. In the momentous events of to-day we are doubtless witnessing the first crude attempts to organize industrial society in terms of several great regional aggregates, with a kind of direction and unified control so far acceptable only as a war economy. The attendant struggles and brutalities are strikingly reminiscent of the age of religious wars in which the sovereign national state and the main features of early modern capitalism took form. They are the symptoms of an equally drastic revolution, the death-rattle of an old order, and the birth-pangs of a new. In the all-important problem of enlisting coöperative support for this reconstruction of industrial society, hard-pressed Europeans have resorted to a variety of great unifying social faiths, the like of which, with the need, had disappeared from our world since the Middle Ages. In those lands still euphemistically called liberal and capitalistic, the very complexity and conflicts of group ideas and interests —

their critics call it confusion, anarchy, and chaos — have also made clear the necessity for greater organization and integration. Even in America, hitherto preserved by its rich continental resources and its relative isolation from any very insistent pressure to bring more social efficiency into its industrial system, it should to-day be apparent that the choice has become, not whether we shall organize our economic life and aspirations, but what kind of socialized control and what kind of unifying faith we shall resort to, in order to live with modern technology, and with those peoples who have taken its demands more seriously. For us there still seems at least more choice than proved possible in Europe.

Nor did science and philosophy remain uninfluenced by the same nineteenth-century movement toward a splitting-up into a number of divergent tendencies and ideals. The various sciences that used to be embraced in the one comprehensive "natural philosophy" have gone their separate ways to goals that seem quite diverse; while instead of certain common principles and attitudes universally accepted in philosophy, the attempt to get some general view of the world and some clear distinction between the things that are worth while and those that are not worth while for a good life, has become more and more a group and even an individual task. In the generations immediately past we encounter conflicting and contrasting philosophies, rather than a widespread philosophy expressing the views and aspirations of a whole age, or even of an entire group. By the side of all the new ideas and ideals brought into the world since the days of Newton and Locke, there have remained all the old ones as well; and this has led to innumerable attempts at effecting some kind of compromise between the many diverse strands that go to make up the content of the modern mind.

As a counterpart to the desperate search for economic and political organization, the demand has been raised for some new intellectual synthesis that can draw together the various partial views of our competing groups and narrow specialists, and integrate them in terms of a common and shared set of social ideals and values. Unfortunately the unifying social faiths that have already appeared abroad to meet this widely felt need give little evidence that the kind of new synthesis likely to prove

popular and effective could ever satisfy a mind accustomed to the free and inquiring spirit of the recent past. They have notoriously been negative and intolerant, exclusive rather than inclusive, and bitterly directed against each other. They leave out so much that men have profoundly cherished, above all they set so little store by the scientific inquiry which is the very nerve of the industrialism they were created to serve, that though they be understandable as desperate resorts in times of acute crisis, it seems incredible that they can long endure in their present form. Like those other fanatic and narrowly intolerant Reformation theologies that unified men against the institutions of the decaying medieval world, they belong rather to the past that is being abandoned than to the new culture of an industrial society for which they are unwittingly preparing the ground. And like them also, our own secular theologies will doubtless be expanded, reinterpreted and enriched as the pressure grows less acute. The present appeal of such dogmatic and intolerant social creeds is but added evidence of the terrific pressure that makes men sacrifice all their other hard-won values to the need for social organization.

Yet it seems unlikely that even America can avoid a more unified social faith than was necessary in the laxer days of untrammelled economic expansion. The recent eager exploration of the American tradition and historic American ideals, crowning several decades of searching social self-criticism, gives hope that the synthesis we shall forge can preserve more of continuity with the core at least of the great values of our past than has seemed possible elsewhere. With our fortunate advantages there is the chance worth fighting for that out of American efforts at industrial organization we can build a synthesis that is comprehensive rather than exclusive, that is not narrowly chauvinistic and nationalistic, and that will focus its faith upon the critical methods of science and intelligence rather than upon empty slogans and hatred for other groups. American thinkers have already laid down the outlines of such a humane and enlightened faith. Whether their present formulations can ever prove widely popular enough, and by what measures that political education can be made effective, it is as yet too soon to speculate. But in the measure that the present analysis of the thought of the last hundred years in-

volves a selective choice of what has been important, it is concern with the problem of achieving such a goal that has furnished the criterion.

The one generalization about the period that will pass unchallenged is that every field of interest and knowledge has been undergoing a rapid growth and expansion. The one conception that all sorts and conditions of thinkers have accepted is that, whatever else the world may be, it is no static and finished thing, but is itself, as a whole and in each of its parts, in process of change and growth. This deep sense of the importance of time, of historical change, extending from stars and atoms to human society, beliefs, and ideals, is the common intellectual climate of recent times. As to what our world, cosmic and human, may be growing into, and whether this growth may properly be termed a progress or not, there is general disagreement. But few would doubt the basic character of temporal change itself. Hence if we are justified in viewing the eighteenth-century world in terms of the essentially timeless Order of Nature, we are right in distinguishing the universe in which men have lived ever since as a Growing World, in which time and temporal processes are of fundamental importance.

The recent shift of intellectual temper that sets our own generation off from the nineteenth century has only emphasized more strongly the fact of growth and evolution. The eternal verities that managed somehow to escape the onslaught of historians and evolutionists up to a generation ago have now all received dates in some epoch or some historical culture. It is rather our notion of the very nature of growth and evolution that has been profoundly transformed. The Divine Providence of the nineteenth-century evolutionists, which guaranteed an easy and automatic progress down the ringing grooves of change, and made of that progress a freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent, has gone to join the heavenly city of the eighteenth century. Growth, we now know, is anything but easy and automatic; it involves sweat and toil and blood and tears, conflict and struggle and bitter travail, and above all the most sustained kind of human effort. And the organization of the conditions of freedom is an even more perplexing task. Whatever kind of progress we still hope for to-day we regard not as the gift of God or evolution, but as the responsibility of

human intelligence and planning. We have far less confidence than our fathers that the results of what we do will be good; but we are far more convinced that whatever is done we shall have to do ourselves. Our human world is growing more rapidly than ever; but that very fact we now take as a challenge to direct, guide, and organize that growth. This new conception of temporal change accords well with our basic social need of organizing society around the instruments of technology. For several generations the Growing World seemed an exhilarating liberation, a promise of new enterprises and new freedoms. To-day it has become at bottom a problem of politics, of getting men to do things together in new ways.

In one sense there has been an indubitable progress during the whole period. Scientific knowledge has been piling up at an increasing rate. Every year we have learned how to do more things than we could do before, especially with the natural forces and materials our world so richly offers to our skills. But our very science itself has been transformed, like everything else in our culture, from a free growth into a problem of social organization. In the nineteenth century science was still an ever-broadening vision of Truth. To-day, in our theories as in our practice, it has become more ultimately a human instrument, to be perfected and used for human purposes. And the strategy of those purposes is the basic problem of these times.

REACTION AGAINST THE AGE OF REASON

The initial steps in the transformation of the eighteenth-century world into that in which men live to-day were marked by a strong current of reaction against the scientific methods and ideals of the Age of Reason. Toward the close of the century there developed in Europe a number of tendencies representing in part a reaction against the ideas of the Newtonian world, in part a recrudescence of forces that had remained present in Western civilization since the Renaissance. These tendencies, loosely grouped together as romanticism, emphasized the emotional rather than the rational side of human nature, a richly diversified development of individuals and groups rather than a mathematical uniformity, and, most significant of all, the genesis and growth of things rather than their mechanical ordering. The first half of the next century was marked by conflicting con-

ceptions, the struggle of the old society against the revolutionary ideals, the middle class notions against the rising forces of an industrial civilization, of romanticism against the steady advance of scientific knowledge. Out of these cross-currents there gradually was effected a fusion between the eighteenth-century ideals and the newer tendencies, an intellectual atmosphere favorable to the acceptance of the great nineteenth-century idea of Evolution. Supported by the rapid economic and social changes, and confirmed by the vast new body of experimental science, this idea of growth and development was broadened to include and color all man's interests; while at the same time scientific investigation pushed on until it could claim to have sketched out the broad outlines of a wholly naturalistic explanation of the entire realm of human experience. The resulting changes and readjustments in philosophic, religious, and social thought and ideals, diverse and often conflicting as they were, have probably exceeded in importance and extent those necessary to transform the world of Saint Thomas and Dante into the universe of Newton and Locke. To these changes we must now address ourselves.

It was inevitable that the Age of Reason should provoke men to a reaction. A comparison of the eighteenth- with the thirteenth-century synthesis cannot fail to-day to reveal that, however great the scientific formulation of the former, and however wide its extent and scope, it was a far less adequate vehicle for the expression of all the manifold tendencies and interests of human nature. Not only does the point of view of Dante seem far closer to the experience of the average man, and far easier for him to grasp and assimilate — science and a scientific temper of mind are at best rare and difficult things, to be acquired by much labor and exertion, and perhaps above the attainment of a considerable body of men — but an exclusive emphasis on reason and intelligence certainly fails to take account of much that is both eternal and valuable in human experience. It was no accident that the scientific age of the Enlightenment produced little that can rank with the world's greatest art and poetry. The palaces and gardens of Versailles, the artificial fêtes of Watteau, the heroic couplets of Pope, the sparkling comedy of Molière, and the wit of Voltaire — these were the natural fruits of the Newtonian world, and great as they are

they include but a small part of the experiences that have been expressed in the highest works of art. In spite of its many and just claims, the Age of Reason to-day is in disrepute; and it is in disrepute, not because its beliefs were not true, not because they were not sound, but because the ideal of life it offered men was thin and flat and meager. Man may be a rational animal, but his animality is more deeply rooted than his rationality; he cannot live by truth alone. In the nineteenth century most men were either not rational enough, or too rational, to accept the rationalism of the Enlightenment. They either went backwards, for example, to a frank supernaturalism founded on faith, or they went on to a naturalism that could see the greatness and the values of the religious traditions without falling into the pit of too naïve a literal-mindedness. To-day to both orthodox and "emancipated" alike the thin-bodied austerity of Unitarianism seems to make but a modest appeal.

Nothing so well illustrates the new spirit as the reception accorded by Goethe and his Strassburg friends in 1770 to that consummate expression of the Age of the Enlightenment, Holbach's *System of Nature*. It is romanticism standing face to face with Newtonian science, and finding it not so much wrong as irrelevant.

We had neither impulse nor tendency to be illumined and advanced in a philosophical manner: on religious subjects we thought we had sufficiently enlightened ourselves, and therefore the violent contest of the French philosophers with the priesthood was tolerably indifferent to us. Prohibited books, condemned to the flames, which then made a great noise, produced no effect upon us. I mention as an instance, to serve for all, the *Système de la Nature*, which we took in hand out of curiosity. We did not understand how such a book could be dangerous. It appeared to us so dark, so Cimmerian, so death-like, that we found it a trouble to endure its presence, and shuddered at it as at a spectre. The author fancies he gives his book a peculiar recommendation, when he declares in his preface, that as a decrepit old man, just sinking into the grave, he wishes to announce the truth to his contemporaries and to posterity.

We laughed at him; for we thought that we had observed, that by old people nothing in the world that is lovable and good is, in fact, appreciated. "Old churches have dark windows: to know how cherries and berries taste, we must ask children and sparrows." These were our gibes and maxims; and thus that book, as the very quintessence of senility, appeared to us as unsavory, nay, absurd. "All was to be of necessity," so said the book, "and therefore there was no God." But

might not there be a God by necessity too? asked we. We indeed confessed, at the same time, that we could not withdraw ourselves from the necessities of day and night, the seasons, the influence of climate, physical and animal condition: we nevertheless felt within us something that appeared like perfect freedom of will, and again something which endeavored to counterbalance this freedom.

The hope of becoming more and more rational, of making ourselves more and more independent of external things, nay, of ourselves, we could not give up. The word freedom sounds so beautiful, that we cannot do without it, even though it should designate an error.

Not one of us had read the book through, for we found ourselves deceived in the expectations with which we had opened it. A system of nature was announced; and therefore we hoped to learn really something of nature — our idol. Physics and chemistry, descriptions of heaven and earth, natural history and anatomy, with much else, had now for years, and up to the last day, constantly directed us to the great, adorned world; and we would willingly have heard both particulars and generals about suns and stars, planets and moons, mountains, valleys, rivers and seas, with all that live and move in them. That, in the course of this, much must occur which would appear to the common man as injurious, to the clergy as dangerous, and to the state as inadmissible, we had no doubt; and we hoped that the little book had not unworthily stood the fiery ordeal. But how hollow and empty did we feel in this melancholy, atheistical half-night, in which earth vanished with all its images, heaven with all its stars. There was to be a matter in motion from all eternity; and by this motion, right and left and in every direction, without anything further, it was to produce the infinite phenomena of existence. Even all this we should have allowed to pass, if our author, out of his moved matter, had really built up the world before our eyes. But he seemed to know as little about nature as we did; for, having set up some general ideas, he quits them at once, for the sake of changing that which appears as higher than nature, or as a higher nature within nature, into material, heavy nature, which is moved, indeed, but without direction or form — and thus he fancies he has gained a great deal.

If, after all, this book had done us some harm, it was this — that we took a hearty dislike to all philosophy, and especially metaphysics, and remained in that dislike; while, on the other hand, we threw ourselves into living knowledge, experience, action, and poetizing, with all the more liveliness and passion.¹

It is idle to debate the question whether the movement of romanticism was a step “backward” or “forward.” That it was to be expected, is clear; that it meant the overshadowing of some things of priceless importance is also as clear as that it brought into the world a new and needed emphasis upon sides of man’s variegated personality that in theory at least had been neglected. It may perhaps be said of the eighteenth century

ideal of a life from which all that is not rational and useful is excluded, what Rousseau said of pure democracy, that it is fit only for a society of gods; and men are not gods, nor would they wish to be. If we to-day find that science has pursued its path unmindful of whether its sacred fires purify or destroy the good life, and that men's strivings after better things are rarely illumined by the light of exact knowledge, much of that divorce must be attributed to romanticism. If we moderns can fairly claim that our aspirations rest on a sounder basis than did those of Thomas and Dante, and that we have tempered science with saving wisdom better than did the Age of Enlightenment, that too must be attributed to the more or less happy union we have managed to effect between Reason and Romanticism. For better or worse, the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are blest with a rich heritage from the romantic revolt; nor does it seem that that heritage can ever permanently disappear from human experience.

EMPHASIS ON THE LESS RATIONAL SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE

Fundamentally, that tendency or attitude to which we have given the name of Romanticism was a reaction against a too narrow construing of human experience in terms of reason alone. It was an emphasis on the less rational side of human nature, on everything that differentiates man from the coldly calculating thinking machine; and correspondingly a revolt against viewing the world as nothing but a vast mechanical order. It was the voicing of the conviction that life is broader than intelligence, and that the world is more than what physics can find in it. It was the appeal from science alone to the whole breadth and expanse of man's experience; its creed, if so formless a persuasion can be said to have a creed, has been admirably summed up by him who is perhaps the foremost living romanticist, Bergson: "We cannot sacrifice experience to the requirements of any system."² Experience, in its infinite richness and color and warmth and complexity, is something greater than any intelligible formulation of it; it is primary, and all science, all art, all religion, is but a selection from a whole that must inevitably slip through whatever human net is set to catch it. In this sense, even our science, in breaking from the narrow and fixed forms of eighteenth-century mechanics and mathematics, and becoming

frankly inquiring and experimental, has felt the romantic influence; while our knowledge of nature and human nature has been vastly heightened and deepened, and under its spur has almost added a whole new dimension. The virtues of the romantic attitude are its open-mindedness, its receptivity to whatever of truth and whatever of value any experience may reveal; as William James put it, although the past has uniformly taught us that all crows are black, still we should continue to look for the white crow. Its besetting vice is that it may lead men to disregard all standards of truth and value, to refuse to make any of the distinctions that are essential to an ordered life; like the drunken man, who accepts all things as of equal worth, the romanticist often fails to criticize his experience, and in the mere joy of living remains oblivious to the greater joys of living well.

Goethe, the great poet of romanticism, can serve as the best illustration of its strength and of its weakness. His indefatigable energies drove him into almost every path of life and every field of human endeavor; and in each he accomplished a few perfect bits and much that is of value. Yet aside from a few lyrics which, the crystallization of passing emotions, need no larger setting, he never produced, in poetry, in science, in philosophy, a perfect whole; superb in individual passages as is his *Faust*, it is not a finished work of art. Goethe himself, his mind, his genius, his life, remains far greater than anything he wrote. Though he aspired after the stars, he never really saw them; he never rose far enough above the level of human experience to criticize it, to discern clearly what is and what is not of worth. Hence while he throbs with the very pulse of life, in its infinite fullness, he never reaches the heights from which the Greeks and Dante and Shakespeare saw it as a whole with a definite meaning for man; he never found any other justification for life save life itself.

As Santayana puts it:

Goethe gives us what is most fundamental — the turbid flux of sense, the cry of the heart, the first tentative notions of art and science, which magic or shrewdness might hit upon. . . . In fact, the great merit of the romantic attitude is that it puts us back at the beginning of our experience. It disintegrates convention, which is often cumbrous and confused, and restores us to ourselves, to immediate perception and primordial will. That, as it would seem, is the true and inevitable

starting-point. . . . It follows, however, that one who has no philosophy but this has no wisdom; he can say nothing that is worth carrying away; everything in him is attitude and nothing achievement. . . . Here is profundity, inwardness, honesty, waywardness; here are the most touching accents of nature, and the most various assortment of curious lore and grotesque fancies. . . . How, indeed, should we draw the sum of an infinite experience that is without conditions to determine it, and without goals in which it terminates? Evidently all a poet of pure experience can do is to represent some snatches of it, more or less prolonged; and the more prolonged the experience represented is the more it will be a collection of snatches, and the less the last part of it will have to do with the beginning. . . . To be miscellaneous, to be indefinite, to be unfinished, is essential to the romantic life. May we not say that it is essential to all life in its immediacy; and that only in reference to what is not life — to objects, ideals, and unanimities that cannot be experienced but may only be conceived — can life become rational and truly progressive? Herein we see the radical and inalienable excellence of romanticism; its sincerity, freedom, richness, and infinity. Herein, too, we may see its limitations, in that it cannot fix or trust any of its ideals, and blindly believes the universe to be as wayward as itself, so that nature and art are always slipping through its fingers. It is obstinately empirical, and will never learn anything from experience.³

THE NATURAL NO LONGER EQUIVALENT TO THE REASONABLE

From this general attitude of romanticism there follow a number of more definite tendencies. In emphasizing the less rational side of human nature, the early romanticists accepted the eighteenth-century ideal of the Natural, but they gave to it a new interpretation. This is very clear in Rousseau, who is sometimes regarded as the fountainhead of the later movement, but whose importance seems rather to consist in his popular expression of tendencies that had already been germinating for some time. Rousseau went as far as any of the rationalists in deifying the "natural man"; but his conception of what is natural in human nature was derived, not from the Newtonian order of nature, but rather from his own personal experience. For him the natural man is not the rational thinker, judging everything by its usefulness to himself and his fellows, but rather the man of passion and feeling. Intelligence and reason, he believed, are largely the products of social environment, an environment that seizes upon the plastic nature of the child and dis-

³ From *Three Philosophical Poets*, by George Santayana. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

torts it by pressing it into a traditional mould that must remain alien to it. "Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the author of nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man." ⁴ "The whole sum of human wisdom consists in servile prejudices; our customs are nothing more than subjection, worry, and restraint. Civilized man is born, lives, and dies in a state of slavery; at his birth, he is sewn up in swaddling clothes, at his death, he is nailed in a coffin; so long as he preserves the human form he is fettered by different institutions." ⁵ "We must choose between making a man and a citizen; for we cannot make both at once." ⁶ Yet since man must live with his fellows, he must live his life in accordance with law; but if he is to remain free, if he is to retain in society the good tendencies which are his by nature, he must be governed and directed by the laws of his own nature. The whole aim of education should be thus to preserve the natural man, and ensure that the habits he forms are not the artificial ones of custom and tradition and reason, but rather those in which his nature will flower of itself. Rousseau's elaborate scheme of education, recounted in the *Émile*, is to preserve the child from any formal teaching by other human beings. It is primarily negative, consisting, "not in teaching the principles of virtue or truth, but in guarding the heart against vice and the mind against error." ⁷ If this endeavor is successful, the real education of the child will come from the free development of his own nature, his own powers, his own natural inclinations. "All instruments have been tried but one, the only one which can succeed — well-regulated liberty." ⁸ "The only habit which the child should be allowed to form is to contract no habit whatever." ⁹

What this means, of course, is that the instinctive judgments, primitive emotions, natural instincts, and first impressions are more trustworthy as a basis for action than all the reflection, the caution, the experience that comes from association with others. "Morality and religion are not matters of reasoned thinking, but of natural feeling. Man's worth depends not on his intelligence, but on his moral nature, which consists essentially of feeling; the good will alone has absolute value." ¹⁰ That is to say, the sentiments are the important element in our mental life, and it is not through the development of the intelligence that man becomes perfect, but through the development of feeling; for the ideal

man is he that is filled with sympathy for his fellows and is "inspired by religious feeling, gratitude, and reverence."¹¹

It is this conception of human nature as essentially feeling that forms the basis for all Rousseau's theories. He feels that the tenets of Deism are true, and therefore while he agrees in the doctrines of his religion with the rationalists, he founds them, not on reasoned demonstrations, but on the religious feelings that he finds natural to the human breast. Similarly, though he uses the machinery of the orthodox political thinking of his day, his fundamental conviction of the equal worth of all individuals is likewise founded upon what he felt in his heart to be true. And in his *Confessions* he sought to lay bare his soul, proclaiming that at last he would show the world a real man — a picture which certainly contains little of the rational.

Even before Rousseau the first efforts of novelists had succeeded in displaying the subordinate part played by reason in the average life. The French romances and the meandering portrayals of the female heart with which Richardson gained great popularity led to a large number of sentimental outpourings, of which Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling*, who floods every page with copious tears at the slightest provocation, is perhaps the most extreme example. On the other hand, writers of clearer vision, like Fielding and Smollett, in portraying "real men," had presented even more cogent reasons for doubting the complete adequacy of the popular psychology that saw the only motive of human nature as rational self-interest.

TRADITION FOUND TRULY NATURAL

Rousseau's emphasis on the original feelings and passions of mankind was revolutionary in intent: he wanted to transform social institutions until they conformed to these needs of human nature. But it is just as easy, if one takes feeling rather than reason as a criterion of truth, to feel that the accustomed and the traditional is natural to man, and that radical proposals for alteration are unnatural and even inhuman. On the whole, since the great French Revolution was so largely the outcome of eighteenth-century rationalism, the romanticists tended to align themselves on the side of the conservative opposition; and since feelings could easily change, romantic poets like Coleridge and Wordsworth passed rapidly from an initial enthusiasm to revul-

sion and repudiation when their hearts were hardened by the reign of terror and the Napoleonic attacks. Moreover, it is much easier for traditional beliefs in politics or religion to defend themselves by their "instinctive appeal to the human heart" than to elaborate a rational apology; and hence traditionalists in every field found in Rousseau's method, though not in his conclusions, a golden opportunity. That rationalism led consistently to criticism and reform, while romanticism was at the disposal of every sentiment, only reinforces what has been already said as to the lack of any standard in the latter attitude.

The conservative side of romanticism was clearly foreshadowed by a man who himself could hardly be claimed for the movement, Hume. In breaking down by his appeal to experience not only the rational defense of the religious tradition, but just as well the rational method itself in science, he showed with great force that human nature is largely a matter of habit and custom. What seems reasonable and axiomatic is really the effect of education and existent institutions. It was natural that this skepticism as to the power of reason should have led Hume to fall back upon custom and habit as the only foundation of beliefs; the genuine skeptic, who sees no certain truth anywhere, can hardly share the enthusiasm of the doctrinaire revolutionary, who has no experience but only reason to support him. After all, if we can find no secure truth in religion and politics, we had best adhere to the established church and the established government; it at least has the advantage of being established. Hence skeptical souls, from Montaigne to Lord Balfour, have often been convinced Tories and traditionalists; they see no reason for believing that anything else would be better. When to this distrust of reason is added the positive feelings for familiar institutions endeared by long association, it is easy to see how romanticism became the bulwark of beliefs that had seemed to crumble before the onslaughts of rational criticism.

EMPHASIS ON FAITH — AS A SUPPORT TO RELIGION

If the eighteenth century saw the rise of determined opposition to trust in reason, it saw also the positive counterpart of reliance upon faith. Naturally this complete denial of rationalism appeared first in the interests of religion, since it was in religion

that reason first revealed its destructive conclusions. As the century wore on, far-sighted religious leaders who understood the complete skepticism and the dogmatic atheism in which the Enlightenment was bound to end, and to whom the religious traditions of mankind were nevertheless important and dear, rejected completely the specious support which rationalism had seemed to offer to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and, following the advice of Bayle and Hume alike, turned to the impregnable foundation of faith. In mysticism, in the inner experience of the soul, they sought the surest bulwarks against disbelief and what seemed to them its attendant moral laxity. This movement of "pietism" first appeared on a large scale in Germany, as a reaction, not against the radical rationalism of the Deists and their successors, but against the equally barren and formal orthodox rationalism of seventeenth-century Lutheran scholasticism. Its influence was felt in England by Wesley, who made it the basis of the great evangelical revival against all degrees of rationalism. Finally the appeal to the inner experience was itself rationalized and systematically formulated by Kant, into whose thought the pietistic tradition entered as a powerful factor.

In Germany the theological and political controversies that culminated in the Thirty Years' War had accentuated the tendency to emphasize doctrinal orthodoxy and correct belief at the expense of the religious and moral life. The abstract Protestant scholasticism that had come to be the essential thing in both the Reformed and the Lutheran churches left many with the sense of a great lack. The man who raised the standard of revolt was a Lutheran pastor, Spener, who in a popular book published in 1675, *Pia Desideria*, called men to emphasize the "religion of the heart," a personal religion flowering in a purer moral life, rather than the formal and ecclesiastical religion then prevalent. Spener did not attack any part of the orthodox system, but he did claim that parts of it were much more important than the rest; and he wished to bring into special prominence those which had a direct effect upon the personal religious life, particularly the doctrines of salvation. The value of a belief for him was in its practical bearing. He emphasized the doctrine of regeneration, and insisted that the all-important thing was the transformation of character through vital union with Christ. Only

where the life is actually changed, and the spirit of Christ's love controls one's conduct, has a person any right to think that he has been born again and is among the saved. Not some external sacramental system administered by a church, but the inward experience of conversion and faith, is the kernel of the Christian life. Purity, piety, holiness of life — that is, moral character — these are the essentials.

Since our entire Christianity consists in the inner or new man, and its soul is faith, and the effects of faith are the fruits of life, I regard it as of the greatest importance that sermons should be wholly directed to this end. On the one hand they should exhibit God's rich benefits, as they affect the inner man, in such a way that faith is advanced and the inner man forwarded in it. On the other hand they should not merely incite to external acts of virtue and restrain from external acts of vice, as the moral philosophy of the heathen does, but should lay the foundation in the heart. They should show that all is pure hypocrisy, which does not come from the heart, and so accustom the people to cultivate love to God and to their neighbors and to act from it as a motive.¹²

Spener's followers emphasized Biblical study for practical and devotional purposes, depreciation of scholastic theology and its controversies, the feelings and will at the expense of the intellect, love for mystical and devotional literature, the necessity of personal faith and growth in Christian perfection, and the formation of *collegia pietatis* or lay groups for prayer and character-building. They stood for a reaction to some of the medieval tendencies, particularly in the need and means of salvation, and in the turning from the common worldliness of the average Christian to an asceticism fostered by group activity in the world rather than monastic withdrawal from it. But in its emphasis on these groups of laymen, and its hostility to ecclesiasticism, sacramentarianism, sacerdotalism, and in fact all dependence on the organized ministrations of the church, it was as profoundly individualistic and disintegrating in its way as rationalism itself. It substituted a new orthodoxy for the older correctness of doctrine; what it refused to tolerate was the impious life.

Most of the German pietists remained within the Lutheran fold, where they soon became the dominant party and founded a large number of institutions for the care of the poor, of orphans, for the education of the young, and for the promotion of missions to the heathen. But the most thoroughgoing pietists were the

Moravian Brethren, founded by Count Zinzendorf, who formed separate communities exemplifying the pure Christian life, and dispatched earnest and self-sacrificing missionaries to all parts of the world, from Greenland to Ceylon. Many of these Moravian groups settled in the congenial Quaker atmosphere of Pennsylvania, where, as the "Pennsylvania Dutch," they have exerted great influence on the religious life of America.

The same reaction against formal rationalism and moral laxity was led in England by John Wesley. Here, however, the movement was a revolt, not against scholasticism, but rather against Deism, skepticism, and religious indifference within the Church of England. Wesley was converted to the "religion of the heart" by a small group of Moravians in London, in 1738; and for fifty years he and his brother Charles and his friend Whitefield conducted evangelical revivals throughout England and America. In England as in Germany the bulk of the evangelicals remained within the State Church, where they formed the so-called "Low Church" party; but the more thoroughgoing also broke away to found the Methodist Church. Wesley found fertile soil for his message among the growing factory population of the North, which not even the rationalistic humanitarians had thought worth bothering about. It is not too much to say that until the factory legislation that began in the 1830's, the Wesleyan evangelicals were the only men who did much to relieve the suffering and to further the education of the working classes.

In opposition to the humanistic and rationalistic notion of the dignity and worth of human nature, Wesley insisted on the older doctrine of original sin and the Fall. "The fall of man is the very foundation of revealed religion. If this be taken away, the Christian system is subverted, nor will it deserve so honorable an appellation as that of a cunningly devised fable."¹³ Hence the divine power of grace, through faith in Jesus Christ, is essential to the leading of a moral and Christian life. The rationalistic theory that revelation merely makes clearer the knowledge of man's duty, seemed utterly inadequate; man needs not only knowledge, but power to act in accordance with it. Hence Wesley emphasized the whole traditional doctrine of Christ's redemption and atonement, and attacked the very conception of natural religion. He who trusts to his own virtue, who lives honestly and uprightly and purely, but does not depend for sal-

vation upon Christ alone, is the most dangerous of men. There is hope for the most abandoned sinner; he may be brought to a sense of his corruption and helplessness, and of his need of divine grace. But the righteous man who prides himself upon his own rectitude and moral strength, is lost. The religious man will not, like the rationalist, do his duty recognizing it as God's will, but will do it as the result of a vivid religious experience and an ever-present consciousness of the divine power and goodness.

Every good gift is from God, and is given to man by the Holy Ghost. By nature there is in us no good thing. And there can be none; but so far as it is wrought in us by that good Spirit. Have we any true knowledge of what is good? This is not the result of our natural understanding. The natural man discerneth not the things of the Spirit of God; so that we can never discern them until God reveals them unto us by His Spirit.¹⁴

Thus reason is impotent, and the only true knowledge comes by a special spiritual organ, Faith.

Faith is that divine evidence whereby the spiritual man discerneth God and the things of God. It is with respect to the spiritual world what sense is to the natural. It is the spiritual sensation of every soul that is born of God. . . . Till you have these internal senses, till the eyes of your understanding are opened, you can have no proper apprehension of divine things, no just idea of them. Nor consequently can you either judge truly or reason justly concerning them; seeing your reason has no ground whereon to stand, no materials to work upon.¹⁵

Faith and faith alone is sufficient; all rational argument either for or against religious truth falls away.

Thus the whole appeal to faith in the interests of the religious tradition resulted in a new orthodoxy, evangelicalism. It was this orthodoxy, and not the older Calvinism, that was spread in England and America through the great religious revivals of the beginning of the nineteenth century; and it is this evangelical orthodoxy, very different from the medieval doctrine and from the Reformation doctrines alike, that is strong to-day as "Fundamentalism." Its main features are primarily the result of the reaction against the eighteenth-century rationalism. What has been its general effect?

It put an end to the barren rationalism of the eighteenth century; it substituted immediate experience for reasoned demonstration, direct knowledge for indirect, in the religious sphere, and so circumvented the skeptics whom the apologists were impotent to overcome; it brought the

feelings once more into repute, and aided the nineteenth century reaction against the narrow intellectualism of the eighteenth; it gave a new meaning and an independent value to religion; it promoted individualism and emancipation from the bondage of ecclesiasticism; and, above all, it vitalized and revived religion throughout the length and breadth of the land. On the other hand, it brought back much of the old system, including many of its most obnoxious features which rationalism had relegated to oblivion, as it was supposed, for ever. It turned its face deliberately toward the past instead of toward the future in its interpretation of man and his need. It sharpened the issue between Christianity and the modern age, and promoted the notion that the faith of the fathers had no message for their children. Becoming identified in the minds of many with Christianity itself, its narrowness and medievalism, its emotionalism and lack of intellectuality, its crass supernaturalism and Biblical literalism, its want of sympathy with art and science and secular culture in general, turned them permanently against religion. In spite of the great work accomplished by evangelicalism, the result in many quarters was disaster.¹⁶

FAITH AS A SUPPORT TO REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES

But while the new appeal to faith as against reason found expression in these great popular revivals of doctrines drawn from the older religious tradition, it was just as strongly a radical force as well. The feelings, the passions, and the intuitions of the natural man, when made the ultimate source of all knowledge and aspiration, led as easily to principles and attitudes that were genuinely subversive of the whole established order. If a Spenser and a Wesley appealed to intuition and faith to support the old, a Rousseau could with equal facility use them to confirm a burning zeal for a new order. And when the spirit of romanticism had finally captured a large part of the intellectual classes, the orthodox realized with amazement that faith was an even more wild and wayward thing upon which to found an established system than dangerous reason itself. The inner experience of men by no means agreed in leading to the conclusions of Paul or Wesley, but gave birth rather to a host of strange and new religions and philosophies the like of which had never been on land or sea. At the height of the romantic period it almost seemed that every man's intuitions were a law unto himself, and even single individuals, as they ran the gamut of human life from youth to age, poured forth in inexhaustible profusion a kalei-

¹⁶ From *Protestant Thought before Kant*, by A. C. McGiffert. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.

doscopic gallery of new visions of the world and man, lovely and beautiful as the iridescent bubble, and as thin and impermanent. It is not for nothing that the Catholic Church has always preferred rationalism to the uncontrollable experience of the individual, tempered ever with an insistence upon authoritatively given premises; and has elevated her Thomases above her mystics, suspicious of even Augustine himself, the root of all heresies. When the really great apologies for the past were provoked by the French Revolution, Burke and De Maistre rejected alike the rationalism of a Bentham and the intuition of a Rousseau, and turned to the pure authority and appeal of a time-honored tradition.

The possible revolutionary implications of faith had already been made plain in the seventeenth century, when the Quakers George Fox and Barclay disregarded all customs and traditions in response to the clear vision of the "inner light." The Quakers, while remaining true to the Christian tradition — alone of all sects, they claim — in the name of their private experience of the voice of God stood up against kings and prelates as even the Calvinists never did. And both the German pietists and the English evangelicals, while they started as movements within the state churches, flowered in the independent organizations of the Moravian Brothers and the Methodist Church. When feeling and intuition made its appearance in the political and social field as well, it was until the Revolution nearly always on the side of the middle-class revolt against the old régime. For however much romanticists and rationalists might differ, they agreed in one thing: they were convinced individualists. Hence both equally served as the intellectual expression of the aspirations of the individualistic commercial classes. Rousseau and Bentham and Locke had one thing in common: they demanded freedom from governmental restrictions. The romantic attitude came in to reinforce the rationalistic critique of tradition, and to add fire to the clear light of reason; and if the rationalists were not always reasonable, neither were the romanticists always irrational. So long as there was a common inspiration, hatred of the old system, and a common interest, the demands of the middle classes, they could well coöperate.

In every land romanticism at first added fuel to the flames kindled by the rationalists. In France, Rousseau; in Germany,

the revolutionary poets of the so-called "Storm and Stress," the Goethe of *Goetz von Berlichingen* (1771), and the Schiller of *The Robbers* (1781), *Fiesco*, and *Kabale und Liebe* (*Plot and Passion*) (1784); in England, the Coleridge of the first part of the *Ode to France*, the Wordsworth of the *French Revolution*, and the more consistently revolutionary Shelley of *Queen Mab*, *Hellas*, and *Prometheus Unbound*, to say nothing of Byron; and in America the later Transcendental individualists Emerson and Thoreau — all sang songs of Promethean revolt under the inspiration of the radical social changes of the end of the century. The poets put into lyrical rhapsodies the emotions they felt for the principles developed by the rational scientists.

THE RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF FAITH

While these enthusiasms for faith and imaginative intuition were spreading among the lower classes and among the artists and poets, the educated men of the Enlightenment were rather reluctant to abandon reason: faith was not yet intellectually respectable. Before thinkers could desert the approved scientific method, some means must be found of proving rationally that reason must be supplemented by some further organ of knowledge. Hume indeed had seemed to subvert the rational method entirely; but the men who had seen a vast science of nature and of human nature grow under their eyes, however they might feel that the scientific method was inadequate to answer many important problems, were not prepared to do away with it entirely. What they wanted was some proof, in terms of their thought and interests, like that which Thomas had given in the thirteenth century for his, that reason was valid within limits, and that outside those limits it must halt impotent before faith. Such a convincing argument was finally put forward in 1781 by Immanuel Kant in the most famous and influential philosophical work in modern times, the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The details of this difficult and confused book are too intricate to recapitulate; suffice it to say that Kant, by an analysis of the nature of knowledge and of the powers of the human mind, sought to prove that science and the methods of mathematical physics and mechanics are quite valid in describing the world of which it is possible for man to have any *rational* experience, but that they are quite incapable of revealing to us what the world is

really like when not viewed through the highly selective instrument of the human mind. Science is a true description of *phenomena*, that is, of things as the structure and mechanism of our minds permits us to experience them, but it can justify us in neither affirming nor denying anything about the *real world*, the world as it is in itself, or as it would appear to a perfect mind, freed from all human limitations, like that of God. "We are brought to the conclusion that we never can transcend the limits of possible experience, and therefore never can realize the object with which metaphysic — i.e., rational theology — is primarily concerned." ¹⁷ We can know the world only in the peculiar and definite and imperfect way in which it is possible for us to know it, not as it really is.

This, of course, amounts to saying that our science does not and cannot include everything within its scope. But what reason have we for assuming that the world is in reality different from, as well as more extensive than, what the scientific method can describe? Here Kant stands as the spokesman for all the romantic tendencies we have been sketching: we have other experiences, those of conscience and beauty and of the religious impulse, which, while they are not properly speaking scientific or rational experiences at all, and while they cannot be fitted into the scheme of mechanistic physics, nevertheless are too strong and too important to be dismissed as mere illusions. They are quite unintelligible unless we assume that the world is really a somewhat different kind of place from what science can prove it to be; and since we can never *know* scientifically what the universe is really like, we are justified, for practical reasons, to enable us to live as it is inevitable that human beings will live, in assuming that somehow it is an appropriate setting for the complex of reason and feeling which we find human nature to be. We do and must act from a sense of moral obligation, we do and must feel a religious reverence for something in the world greater than ourselves, we do and must respond to a beauty in things that cannot be scientifically explained. Hence, since we can neither prove nor disprove by the methods of science that we must choose the right rather than the wrong, that we are free so to choose, and that the universe is governed somehow by a moral law, and since we are absolutely compelled, being the creatures that we are, to live as though these things were true,

we are justified in assuming that they are. Where science can neither prove nor disprove, we are justified in having faith.

Such a rational defense of faith has seemed cogent to multitudes of men; it was enthusiastically accepted by the romanticists who felt already that rational science was inadequate. By claiming that science is limited in scope, however valid within those limits, it opened the door to a host of other methods for arriving at religious, moral, and philosophic beliefs about the place and destiny of man. If you did not believe that truth can be attained by any other than the scientific method, you were an *agnostic*; if you did, nobody at least could prove that you were wrong. Far from thinking that these limits placed on the powers of the mind were discouraging, most men welcomed Kant's "critical philosophy," as it was called, as the open door to the freedom to believe almost anything they sincerely wanted to believe. In the next generation dozens of different proposed roads to reality were offered by enthusiastic poets, philosophers, and theologians. Kant's own road was not so important as the license he seemed to have given men to blaze new trails of their own through the irrational wilderness of faith and intuition. Kant summed up his great contribution to intellectual happiness in the words: "From the critical point of view the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of science may each be true in its own sphere; which could never have been shown had not criticism previously established our unavoidable ignorance of the real world, and limited all that we can *know* scientifically to mere phenomena. I have, therefore, found it necessary to deny *knowledge* of *God*, *freedom*, and *immortality*, in order to find a place for *faith*." ¹⁸ All the careful tests of truth which generations of scientists had built up went by the board, and men were free to believe anything which the interests of the whole of human nature impelled them to believe. Almost any kind of faith had been made intellectually respectable.

Kant's book stimulated romanticists to a flood of special systems founded on faith. Man, they claimed, is not fundamentally intellectual. Rather human nature is at bottom made up of instincts and feelings; and his instinctive and emotional life should dominate his career and paint for him both his conception of the world and his conception of human life. In other words, the poet or the saint is a truer and better guide on the

pathway of life and thought than the scientist. Religion, morals, art, literature, social and political philosophy, and education should recognize this fundamental fact and build upon it. Religion is not a science to be demonstrated, but a matter of the heart, a life to be lived. Morality is not a science, but essentially the good will and the performance of one's duties. Art is not a matter of form and structure, but of rich sentiment and feeling. Society is not a cold-blooded enterprise founded on self-interest, but a vast organism pressing onward to realize dimly seen ideals, in which all are members one of another. The whole universe is not a machine, but a living body, to be interpreted on the analogy of man's life.

Herder, for example, the father of the German romanticists, founded all truth upon the feelings, on faith rather than reason, described as an inner, unanalyzable certainty. Jacobi, perhaps the most popular and influential, though not the soundest, of these thinkers, frankly called intuition the source of ultimate knowledge, and abandoned any attempt to reconcile its certainty with the scientific laws of nature. The immediate certainty of the direct inward vision is far more certain than logical demonstration. He first called this faculty by which spiritual truths are perceived "*Glaube*" or "Faith," but later, to the confusion of many, dubbed it "*Vernunft*" or "Reason," in contradistinction to the scientific reason to which he gave the name "*Verstand*" or "Understanding." He was widely followed in this contrast between "Reason" or Faith, and mere "Understanding"; its reverberations were heard in Coleridge and Carlyle in England, and in Emerson in America. Schleiermacher adapted it with great originality to religion, Schelling to art, and Hegel to the whole of human history and thought. What differentiates these various systems is interesting, but not nearly so important as the fundamental principles and assumptions they held in common. The resulting religious philosophies and apologies were a strange but often beautiful mixture of elements that rationally at least seemed rather incompatible. David Friedrich Strauss, the great nineteenth-century rationalistic theologian, who went perhaps further than even Hume or Holbach had gone in the preceding century in assailing the truth of the Christian tradition, made a rather scornful comment on this sort of medley. "Not everybody can pulverize Christianity and Newtonian science so as to

mix them. Most men end up with sausage; the meat is orthodox, the fat is Schleiermacher, the spice, Hegel." ¹⁹

EMPHASIS ON THE INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITY AND ITS EXPRESSION

This complete liberty given to the individual to pick his faith where it pleased him meant, of course, that the individual character and personality became the all-important determining factor. As against the eighteenth-century disregard of everything not universal in human nature, the romanticists emphasized individuality and personality above all things. Their whole ideal for man was, not the spread of rational knowledge and science, but rather the fullest development of the unique potentialities of every man. We have seen how Rousseau built his educational program about such an ideal; it was eagerly adapted by the Germans Basedow, Pestalozzi, and Froebel, and introduced to the United States by Horace Mann. By the German poets and thinkers Goethe, Fichte, and Schlegel, by Coleridge and Carlyle in England, by Emerson in America, the whole aim of culture and of life was proclaimed to be the development of the freedom, individuality, and self-expression of the individual. "Be yourself; cultivate your personality; gain the largest possible acquaintance with all the rich heritage of the best that has been thought and said in the past; above all strive for the richest and most varied experiences with your fellow-man; only thus can you develop into a truly noble personality." By some poets and artists this was interpreted as meaning, "If necessary break all the laws of God and man in order to express yourself"; but on the whole this disregard of law and convention and complete trust in the insight and instincts of the individual justified itself in rich and noble and intensely fascinating lives. Though none of the real leaders went so far as to counsel disregard of others, and most saw in devotion and service to the welfare and the similar development of other personalities a most important means of self-development, it is indisputable that the markedly individualistic emphasis of the romanticists provided a powerful stimulus and a respectable justification for the economic individualism that was building the factory system and modern capitalism. A Goethe or an Emerson, in counseling self-reliance, may not have had the remotest idea of producing the self-made business man and "captain of industry" — the

phrase comes from the hero-worshipping Carlyle — but the influence has trickled down by devious channels until even to-day our magazines are full of appeals to “Cultivate your personality — make \$50,000 a year” — a horrible travesty upon the romantic ideal.

Here again the best example of the richness, the humanity, the strength, and the weakness of the romantic attitude is to be found in Goethe, who managed to include in his titanic output every divergent tendency of the movement. His adaptation of the old Faust legend is one long passionate yearning for the richness and the fullness of life. Into it he wrought his youthful passion and aspiration, and his mature wisdom, the distillation of his own varied experience. Faust, the weary student, has learned the vanity of all sciences; his years of toil have brought him nothing but barren learning. He turns in disgust to magic, in the hope that there, in the Macrocosm, the totality of all wisdom, he may find himself face to face with truth. He does; but he finds also, as the romanticists felt in rejecting eighteenth-century science, that not even perfect science, perfect truth, will suffice; it is life, not the picture of life, for which he yearns. Experience, the totality of human experience and life — that alone will satisfy him. But when he conjures up the Earth-Spirit and sees the monstrous vision of all life spread before him, he cringes; not at one leap, not the whole of life, is given to any mortal to enjoy. Such general experience bursts the bounds of any personality; Faust must content himself with a long and painful acquisition of those experiences which he can assimilate. So he summons Mephistopheles, the spirit of that growth and development which must involve the destruction of the old with the assumption of the new — of experience, in a word, in the only form that it can come to man. The latter confirms Faust in his belief that

Gray and ashen, my friend, is every science,
And only the golden tree of life is green.²⁰

Faust longs for life, in its pains and joys, its pleasures and sorrows; and that Mephistopheles can give him, growth and development through living. So the two go out into the world to live through the various events that can come to man, festivity, love, crime, remorse, power and wealth, beauty, the glory of the

past and its recreation in the present, artistic activity. Finally, in laboring ruthlessly for what he takes to be the good of others, Faust finds satisfaction; and in that moment his life is done and his lesson learned. But there is, there can be, no real end; growth may be cut down, but it can never stop, for him who is truly saved. In whatever heavens there be Faust will go on using the angels to develop his personality and tasting of the joys and sins of the Celestial City.

This is wisdom's final word:
Worthy alone is he of life and freedom
Who conquers them anew each day.²¹

He who strives, strays, yet in that striving and straying finds his salvation. And the angels, carrying Faust's soul to its new scenes of endeavor, sing:

Whose ceaseless striving never tires,
We have the power to save him.²²

NATURE INTERPRETED IN PERSONAL TERMS

But the romanticists did not stop with making personality the key to human life; they read its striving and growth into nature also, and behind the screen of mechanistic physics they saw the real world as at bottom a process of realizing ideals. In many ways they sought to interpret the universe in personal terms, feeling that will and aspiration, the deepest things in human experience, must be akin to the fundamental forces of nature. This faith-built doctrine is called idealism; its cardinal tenet is that the experiences of the heart and soul are safer guides, when once we seek to penetrate further than our science can go, than the reason that can find only a mechanistic order. Since faith is such an individual thing, and since what is deepest in the human soul can hardly admit of objective determination, the idealists naturally differed among themselves as to what in the heart of man must be taken as the true key to the riddle of reality in the world. For Kant, the feeling of moral obligation was fundamental, and he saw the world beyond the reach of science as essentially a universal moral order. For his follower Fichte, not duty so much as the ceaseless striving after perfection stirred his soul; and hence for him the world was a great moral struggle of the forces of good against the powers of evil, in which the great

Will of which individual men are but the members sets up obstacles that in overcoming them it may rise to ever higher levels. The poets saw the world as an activity of the creative imagination, the religiously minded saw it as a God calling unto men, the romantic scientists, as a superhuman reason unfolding itself in time and space. For Fichte, who gloried in the good fight, it was a Will that must ride on to victory; for Schopenhauer, who felt the sad futility of human aspiration, never resting, never satisfied, ever seeking that which it lacks, it was a dumb and aimless Will whose uneasy groping can bring only pain and sorrow and sadness. These far-flung imaginative visions of what life can mean to those who live it, will stand as undying monuments to those who conceived them; they can hardly be judged by the standards of rational and literal truth which their creators scornfully rejected. Whatever may be thought of them as literal descriptions of what nature is really like, it will remain true that they are sublime poetic insights into the possibilities of human experience. When Fichte proclaimed that the world, when looked upon as the scene of man's moral duties, does become for him such a place, he was speaking the truth; as he was when he said that the kind of world a man lives in, that is, what seems to him of worth and value, is determined by what kind of a man he is. There is a most important sense in which it is true that the reformer lives in a world of moral struggle, the poet in a world of poetic beauty, and the scientist in a world of scientific truth. The only error of romanticism would consist in believing that these self-made worlds are factually true in a scientific sense; as interpretations of human experience in terms of its significance they are true beyond question.

Romantic idealism, in a word, is poetry, not science, and it is the poets who give its best expression. To them the world is instinct with a spirit that answers to the call of man; nature is no dead machine, but a living force in whom we dwell and move and have our being. In communion with nature they find with Wordsworth the true wisdom, which is still a very human wisdom. Not in science, but in the poet's vision, lies truth.

One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach you more of man,
Of moral evil and of good,
Than all the sages can.

Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:
— We murder to dissect.²³

To one thus open to the universe in every sense, it is truly divine.

For I have learned
To look on nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth; but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity,
Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power
To chasten and subdue. And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.²⁴

Whatever their differences in interpretation, the romanticists all agreed in feeling behind phenomena some great will or force or super-personal personality to which the name God might not inappropriately be applied, and toward which the religious feelings might be directed. But for them God was a very different being from the God of the eighteenth-century rationalists. For the latter, he was the creator, the watch-maker, absolutely apart from his universe, with whose works man might become familiar but with whom in himself it was impossible to hold any communion. This external deity completely disappeared for the romanticists and idealists: the world was no machine, it was alive, and God was not its creator so much as its soul, its life. Of this universal life of God all things were a part, but man more particularly was its highest expression. This theory of the so-called "immanence" or indwelling of God approaches pantheism, from which it differs chiefly in interpreting the life of the universe through the soul of man rather than through the observed course of nature; and hence it was natural that Spinoza, who had similarly identified God and Nature, should attain wide popularity among the romanticists. The task of reinterpreting his scientific religion, of translating it from Cartesian science into romantic poetry, was accomplished by Herder in his *Dialogues*

on God (1787). From this little book flowed an increasing stream of faith in the immanence theory; the universe is divine, and to be open to its every influence, to live in closest harmony with it and develop in response to its development, is to know God and feel one's self a part of his spirit. It was on such a basis that, under the leadership of Schleiermacher, men rehabilitated and transformed the religious faith that the Age of Reason had seemed to make impossible for an intelligent man. In a word, romanticism *is* religion.

The reflection of the pious man is only the immediate consciousness of the general existence of all that is finite in the infinite, of all that is temporal in the eternal and through the eternal. To seek and find this in all that lives and moves, in all becoming and all change, in all doing and suffering, and even in immediate feeling to have and know life itself only as this existence — this is religion. And so religion is life in the endless nature of the whole, in one and all, in God; having and possessing all in God and God in all. . . . The usual conception of God as a single being outside of the world and behind the world, is not the beginning and end of religion, but only a way of expressing it that is seldom entirely pure and never adequate. ²⁵

THE ROMANTIC SCIENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The more intellectualistic of the romanticists carried their emphasis on individuality not only into the interpretation of human life and of nature as a whole; they tried to develop a new kind of science within the very realm which Kant had left for the undisputed sway of physics. Returning in some ways to the Aristotelian and medieval conceptions of the object of knowledge, they insisted that even science, to be adequate, must try to describe the individual in terms of its relations to the larger wholes of which it is a part, and not merely seek the general laws of the behavior of a multitude of individual things. Hegel, the most rationalistic of all the romanticists, if indeed he can be properly said to belong to that school in any strict sense, made this conception of knowledge exceedingly popular. For him, really to understand and explain any thing or event in the world meant to set it off from every other thing in the universe, and to show its particular place in the great totality of things. Not connection with some preceding cause, but connection with the whole of the great world process, gives true understanding. Philosophy, the highest wisdom, seeks thus to interpret phe-

nomena in terms of their significance, their purpose in the whole, their value in serving the great all-embracing ideal of the universe. To comprehend all there is to know about any object whatever, a watch, for instance, we must really understand the whole of nature, mechanics and time and motion, and the whole of human society and its life throughout history, in which time and time-keeping play so important a part. Nothing exists in and by itself, but only as a part of a total world of interrelated individuals into which it must be set and from which it must be distinguished. This conception is familiar enough from the lines of Tennyson,

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower — but *if* I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.²⁶

In one form or another this conception of a science of the individual has entered widely into the aim of knowledge, along with the Newtonian science of causal relationships.

INTEREST IN HUMAN HISTORY AND TRADITION

This tendency is closely allied to a still further attitude which, of all romanticism, most powerfully influenced the nineteenth century. If knowledge means fitting things into a larger whole, if nature is alive and growing, if the feelings that attach men to larger groups and to the past are more fundamental than reason, then human history and human traditions take on a new and vital significance. To understand any belief, any ideal, any custom, any institution, we must examine its gradual growth from primitive beginnings to its present form. The character of an individual and the civilization of a nation are the result of a long development; they are to be judged and evaluated only in the light of a thorough knowledge of their past. And if man's life is such a slow growth, the universe to which it is the surest key must also be a process of evolution. Time and history are of fundamental importance. Viewed in such a light, the eighteenth-century science of human nature was utterly transformed. Every one of the conceptions that had sprung from Locke and Newton gave way to a quite different set; the genetic and

historical method supplanted the analytical and mechanical, first in human affairs, and then in every branch of natural science, and from being the very model of science mathematics found itself reduced to an almost incomprehensible anomaly. The test of any institution or idea was no longer its reasonableness and its utility, but its origin and its history. From being the useful, the rational became the traditional. "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*," sang Schiller: history is the final court of appeal. Hegel, who founded his whole philosophy on this assumption, summed it up in the dogma, "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational," ²⁷ interpreting both as the great cosmic process of universal evolution.

The romantic conception of growth and expansion and development as the fundamental thing in human experience, and therefore in the universe at large, naturally coalesced with the rationalistic conception of progress, as typified by Condorcet in France and Lessing in Germany. Together they led to an emphasis on the ceaseless change of human institutions, on the value of each stage and on the necessity of further alteration. Crude attacks on the old and bitter hostility to the new were both deprecated; history revealed the steady march of mankind toward some far-off divine event. Every nation, every religion, every institution, every group, was essentially the embodiment of some ideal unfolding itself according to its own laws through time. The task of the wise man is to study the past to discover those laws of development, and then play his part in the further unfolding. Philosophies of history, purporting to reveal just such ideals and their laws of growth, were very popular. Herder, in his *Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind* (1774), and his *Ideas for the History of Man* (1784), set the fashion that was most systematically elaborated by Hegel.

For Hegel, the all-important thing in man is the growth of his spirit, the process of thinking that involves a continual revision and abandonment of the old. Hence the world itself, the whole of existence, is at bottom just such a process of thinking. Not reason, in the sense of some static organ for picturing the world, not logic in the sense of some system of fixed laws, but dialectic, the very process of thinking, is the supreme reality in man and nature. Being, the world, the totality of all things, the absolute — this is in essence a great process of Becoming. To exist means

to be always growing, always rejecting some of the old and combining it in new forms. Every institution is the march through time of the Absolute Spirit realizing itself. For the world, as for Goethe's *Faust*, life is continual striving after some never-attained goal; its meaning and significance lie in the striving itself, and hence, while to cease growing is to die, in reality every stage of the infinite attainment is valuable and good in its own place. For Hegel, as for Leibniz and Pope, whatever is is right; but this only means that everything that exists is a necessary moment in the advance to something further. It is for man to examine every institution, discover the particular ideal it embodies, and carry it forward in accordance with the necessary laws of its growth. To rebel at anything is the height of folly and unwisdom, but to attempt to stop the march of progress and evolution, to find satisfaction in the present stage, is, as in *Faust*, death.

Universal history is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of that history. . . . The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom. . . . The destiny of the spiritual world and the final cause of the world at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and *ipso facto* the reality of that freedom. . . . That the history of the world, with all the changing scenes which its annals present is this process of development and the realization of Spirit — this is the only true *theodicy*, the justification of God in history. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the history of the world — viz., that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not "without God," but is essentially his Work.²⁸

Valuable as was this emphasis on the continuity of tradition, so far as it gave a more adequate knowledge of the forces actually at work in society, it is easy to see how in the hands of conservatives shocked by the spirit of the Enlightenment enforced by revolutionary assemblies it could become a potent instrument of reaction. To this use was it put in Germany by the patriotic "historical school" that, starting from jurisprudence, sought to carry into all social action a new *laissez-faire* — a Hands Off! that was directed to the preservation of old forms and institutions. Law and society cannot be rationally guided; they must grow of themselves. Savigny became the official theorist of this

new traditionalist application of the romantic doctrine of development. "All law," he insisted, "comes into being in the manner which prevalent, but not quite exact, idiom designates as the *law of custom*; that is, it is first produced by custom and popular faith, then through jurisprudence; *everywhere, that is, through internal, silently working forces, not through the arbitrariness of a lawgiver.*"²⁹

If this is true, each age does not act arbitrarily and in an egoistic independence, but is entirely held to the past by common and indissoluble bonds. Each epoch then ought to admit certain previous elements, which are necessary and at the same time voluntary; necessary in the sense that they do not depend on the will and arbitrariness of the present; voluntary in the sense that they are not imposed by an outside will (such as that of the master in regard to his slaves) but that they are given by the very nature of the nation considered as a whole which subsists and maintains itself in the midst of its successive developments. The nation of to-day is only a member of this perpetual nation. It wills and acts in this body, and with this body, so that it can be said that whatever is imposed by the body is at the same time freely accomplished by the member.³⁰

On the whole this romantic faith in traditional growth was a conservative and anti-revolutionary force, especially in Germany; but its fundamental ideas of continuity and change brought with them a point of view that was destined to transform the face of thought. For these were to be the categories of the new evolutionary science; and from romanticism was received the greatest stimulus to a study of man and the world in terms of their genetic development. This is the inestimable debt science owes to irrationalism.

The romantic reaction which began with the invasion of 1794 was the revolt of outraged history. The nation fortified itself against the new ideas by calling up the old, and made the ages of faith and of imagination a defense from the age of reason. Whereas the pagan Renaissance was the artificial resurrection of a world long buried, the romantic Renaissance revived the natural order and restored the broken links from end to end. It inculcated sympathy with what is past, unlovable, indefensible, especially with the age of twilight and scenes favorable to the faculties which the calculators despised. The romantic writers relieved present need with all the abounding treasure of other times, subjecting thereby the will and the conscience of the living to the will and conscience of the dead. Their lasting influence was out of proportion to their immediate performance. They were weak because they wanted strictness and accuracy, and never perceived that the Revolution was

itself historic, having roots that could be profitably traced far back in the ages. But they were strong by the recovery of lost knowledge, and by making it possible to understand, to appreciate, and even to admire things which the judgment of rationalism condemned in the mass of worthless and indiscriminate error. They trifled for a time with fancy, but they doubled the horizon of Europe. They admitted India to an equality with Greece, medieval Rome with classical; and the thoughts they set in motion produced Creuzer's *Comparative Mythology* and Bopp's *Conjugations*, Grimm's enthusiasm for the liberty and belief of Odin's worshippers, and Otfried Müller's zeal for the factor of race.³¹

To live is to grow, to assimilate more and more of the riches of the world, to project upon the background of the setting of human life more and more of the infinite possibilities resident in human nature, and in so doing, to become more and more aware of the infinite ties binding all men to each other and to the great forces of the universe of which they are the noblest manifestation — in a word, to live is to bend all one's energies toward the creation of a higher, better, and richer world, to realize God himself in the universe. This was the sum of the wisdom and the aspiration of the romanticists. No wonder that Wordsworth could write,

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven!³²

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CHAPTER XVII

THE CONFLICT OF SOCIAL IDEALS TO 1848

HAVING traced the growth of the various romantic tendencies of revolt against the scientific methods and ideals of the eighteenth century, we are now in a position to turn to the conflict of social ideals that marked the first half of the next century. It must not be supposed that romanticism ever entirely displaced the spirit of the Age of Reason, or even that it claimed the undivided allegiance of its most devoted adherents. Outside of art and poetry and religion, for which rationalism seemed to have no message at all, the older appeal to reason remained side by side with the newer appeal to faith, sometimes reinforcing it, sometimes contradicting it, more often resulting in some kind of compromise and synthesis. Hence the characteristic of the philosophies that were developed to defend the claims of the different social groups produced by the Revolutionary period is a complexity of method and ideal; only rarely does a thinker remain uninfluenced by the mixture of attitudes.

Three main classes can be discerned. First there were the conservatives, those who opposed the Revolution during its progress and came back triumphantly to power in the years between 1815 and the revolutions of 1830. Secondly, there were the middle-class liberals who had engineered the Revolution, who were in the opposition until 1830 in France and until 1832 in England, and who definitely triumphed in the French Revolution of 1848 and in the repeal of the Corn Laws in England in 1846. Their rapidly increasing strength in all lands was primarily due to the spread of the Industrial Revolution throughout Europe; their assumption of power in any nation was coincident with the growth in that nation of the factory system and capitalism. Thirdly, there appeared a new group, the factory hands and their spokesmen. They become prominent in the second generation of industrialism, play a powerful part in the revolutions of the mid-century, but though increasing rapidly in numbers remain definitely in the opposition. The first half of the century witnesses the struggle between the conservatives and the

liberals, with voices of protest from the third group; the second half sees the conflict shift to the battle between the two classes of an industrial civilization. There are, then, three main philosophies to be considered: Conservatism, Individualistic Liberalism, and the theories of Industrial Society.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATISM

Throughout the long eighteenth-century attack upon the old régime, there had been no serious attempt at an intellectual defense of the existing order. Those who upheld it either considered it strong enough to stand by itself without any apology, or else, being in control, resorted to the readiest weapon of the entrenched conservative, force and suppression. But the outbreak of the Revolution at last raised up real opponents of the radical attack, and during the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods a few great men formulated a serious and systematic philosophy of opposition to the eighteenth-century spirit. Stung by their overthrow, they attempted a defense of their ideas that still stands as the ablest exposition of the philosophy of conservatism.

This philosophy was largely apologetic, and its main lines were determined by the nature of the attack to which it was the answer. It was developed to justify the position of the privileged classes under the old régime, the Court, the Church, and the great body of landholders. Its chief representatives were not reactionary; they were willing to accept as just most of the contentions of the middle class, providing they themselves were permitted to remain in the enjoyment of their most important privileges. They were even prepared to champion, within limits, the rights of the industrial workers against the more hated business men and manufacturers. Concerned as they were more with defending themselves than with maintaining the traditional principles, they were willing to incorporate such new changes and ideals as were already accomplished facts. Of blind reaction there can probably be no intellectual defense; but intelligent conservatism, however much it may rely upon prejudice and inertia, is certainly capable of a respectable apology.

This conservatism accepted the more important middle-class ideals. The absolute right of private property, especially in land, it warmly acclaimed, and was as zealous as any business

man in defending it against arbitrary governmental confiscation on the one hand and inroads by the masses on the other. The French *émigrés* nobles on their return were wise enough not to attempt to get back the estates that had been divided amongst their former peasants; the mere proposal to give them a compensation from the public treasury was enough in 1830 to precipitate their final downfall. The conservatives, too, gladly accepted the whole program of the economic liberals in commerce and industry; they had no interest in forcing the old guild and governmental regulations upon reluctant business men. Metternich in his most reactionary moments was an ardent upholder of *laissez-faire*, and his economic measures in Austria and Italy unwittingly went far to strengthen the forces that eventually overthrew him. His program was benevolent despotism in the sphere of business. The Tories in England, too, under Robert Peel and Huskisson, effected many *laissez-faire* reforms in the twenties; while in France the doctrines of Adam Smith, popularized by his follower J.-B. Say, gained wide adherence. The one point on which the conservatives drew back was their insistence on the retention of privileges for the agricultural interests; they finally consented to the abolition of the profitable Corn Laws only when betrayed by the commercial members who had crept into the Tory Party. Then in rage and desperation they listened to a few humanitarians like Lord Shaftesbury, and consented to pass factory legislation which they hoped would secure the gratitude of the workingmen and curb the manufacturers.

One other new and popular tendency the conservatives tried to make their own, in France and England, the rising tide of patriotism and nationalism. The recrudescence of this passion during the Revolutionary wars made it plain that it would serve as the strongest possible standard under which to rally a whole nation behind any government. By its means Napoleon I had united all groups in France; and when the cosmopolitan and business administration of Louis Philippe managed to identify profits with peace rather than with patriotism, it was sufficient to bring back his nephew to power for twenty-two years. The Tories kept back Reform for years by hurling the gallant Duke of Wellington into the breach and proclaiming the glories of Waterloo; they went even farther, and developed an enthusiasm for the principle of nationalism in any land where its advocacy would

restore the balance of power. Canning used it with great effect against Metternich, and Palmerston's bellicose notes — he was the outstanding conservative in the Liberal Party — aroused the enthusiasm of the nation and held the Austrians in check. In central and eastern Europe, where the Congress of Vienna had applied the principles of legitimacy and compensations rather than nationalism, conservatives still clung to the eighteenth-century upper-class cosmopolitanism, feeling that any group of men had the right to be made the subjects of a good prince. Only when nationalism meant territorial aggrandizement did they espouse it; and then, like Bismarck, they were careful to apply it with discrimination.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROMANTIC PROTEST AGAINST RATIONALISM THE APPEAL TO FAITH

But while the philosophy of conservatism accepted these elements from the theories of the commercial middle class, its main defense was rooted in the romantic protest against rationalism. Faith rather than reason could best rally men to the support of tradition; not the wayward faith of the romanticists, but the authoritative and social faith of religion, the faith in the tried wisdom of the fathers transmitted from generation unto generation through a great tradition. The two greatest theorists of conservatism, Joseph de Maistre in France and Edmund Burke in England, both shrank from the bold and blasphemous enlightenment doctrine that the reason of the individual should presume to examine and criticize the time-honored wisdom of the race. Both appealed rather to the lessons of experience, de Maistre to the experience of the Catholic Church, Burke to that of the British Constitution, and both assailed in no uncertain terms the whole eighteenth-century rationalistic social and human science. Their aim, as de Maistre put it, was "absolutely to kill the whole spirit of the eighteenth century."

Joseph de Maistre was a native of Savoy, the hereditary dominion of the King of Sardinia. He sprang from a family of magistrates, and in his youth he had the opportunity of observing the workings of the old feudal society at perhaps its best. Overwhelmed by the French Revolution, he was driven into exile, served as chief magistrate himself in Sardinia, and then spent fifteen years as Sardinian minister at the court of St.

Petersburg, where he had the opportunity of studying the most conservative government in the world at first hand. The key to de Maistre's thought is the indescribable fascination of power. Before strength, before what exists, no matter what reason or moral principle may say, he simply must bow down and worship. This humility before whatever is, this deep-seated reverence for traditional institutions, he did not, like Hegel, who shared his respect for facts however brutal, seek to understand; it was enough to accord to power unlimited admiration. It was the titanic force of the French Revolution that awoke him to reflection. He simply could not understand it; it was so utterly irrational, so powerful, so fascinating. Nothing could prevail against it, yet its leaders were rascals, foolish, mad. It must be the hand of God, the God of the cruel and ruthless universe, the God of things as they are! Generalizing from the Revolution, de Maistre saw all human history as the operation of great forces quite beyond all human control, playing with men as with puppets. His conception, in fact, was remarkably similar to that of Thomas Hardy in the *Dynasts*.

If de Maistre worshiped power above all things, it was in unity that he sought it, the unity that binds nations together and welds them into one whole. Appalled at the chaos and anarchy of the Revolution, like Hobbes in similar circumstances he felt that only some great cohesive force could bring men together. Human nature is dual: it sees the light, but it is evil and corrupt, and must be compelled to follow it. To attempt to found society on reason is the height of folly; to attempt, with Rousseau and the democrats, to found it on the corrupt wills of the governed, is worse. The problem is to find some force strong enough to check reason and control the evil wills of men. Individualism must be crushed.

Such a force can only be the mystic faith in religion.

If every man thinks out for himself the principles of government, civil anarchy and the destruction of political sovereignty must quickly follow.¹

Reason divides, only faith can unite.

The Revolution is the revolt of individual reason against universal reason, and consequently it is the most evil thing imaginable. It is the essential enemy of all belief common to many men, which makes it the enemy of the human race.²

The whole science of government, in fact, is fundamentally irrational.

Everything in this science which at the outset seems to common sense an evident truth is almost always found, when experience has spoken, to be not only false, but even pernicious. To begin at the beginning, if one had heard nothing of governments, and if men were called upon to deliberate, for example, on hereditary as against elective monarchy, he would be rightly regarded as mad who should vote for the former. The arguments against it come to mind so naturally that it is useless to recall them. Nevertheless history, which is experimental politics, demonstrates that hereditary monarchy is the most stable, most happy, and most natural of governments for man, and that elective monarchy, on the contrary, is the worst kind of government known. In population, in commerce, in prohibitive laws and in a thousand other important subjects, almost always the most plausible theory is contradicted and annulled by experience.³

Edmund Burke, the English Whig leader who defended the British Constitution of 1689 first against the attempts of George III and his party to subvert it at home and in the colonies, and then against the equally dangerous democratic doctrine in France, is just as disdainful of untried theory, however rational, and just as reliant upon the wisdom of past experience. He was primarily a utilitarian, a worshiper of the expedient, who was convinced that the mere fact that any custom or institution had grown up over a long period of time established an overwhelming presumption in its favor. The whole business of appealing from tradition to reason and nature was distasteful to him.

One sure symptom of an ill-conducted state is the propensity of the people to theories.⁴ The lines of morality are not like ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.⁵ No rational man ever did govern himself by abstractions and universals.⁶

To reason he opposed prescription, what has worked in the past. The presumption of wisdom is on the side of the past.

Prescription is the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but to what is to secure that property, to government. . . . The species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it almost always acts right. . . . Truth may be far better than prescription . . . but as we have scarcely ever that certainty in the one that we have in the other, I would, unless the truth were evident indeed, hold fast to peace, which has in her company charity, the highest of the virtues.⁷

Any change is apt to shake the all-important security. "We ought to venerate where we are unable presently to comprehend." ⁸ This reverence for all existing institutions led him to oppose vigorously the attempt to abridge, by new mercantilistic restrictions, the liberty which a policy of "salutary and wise neglect" had allowed to grow up in the colonies, to denounce Warren Hastings and the East India Company for their interference with the age-old society of India; and at the same time to resist every effort at Parliamentary reform. The oligarchical confusion of the British Constitution, its rotten boroughs and its lack of any representation for the growing towns, he thought excellent because it had worked for ages. "Our representation is as nearly perfect as the necessary imperfections of human affairs and of human creatures will suffer it to be. The machine itself is well enough to answer any good purpose, provided the materials were sound." ⁹ This temper was perfectly exemplified by the Duke of Wellington, who at the very moment that the country was seething with revolution and demanding a Reform Bill in 1830, solemnly announced:

The English Parliament answers all the good purposes of legislation, and this to a greater degree than any legislator has ever answered in any country whatever; it possesses the full and entire confidence of the people. . . . I will go further. If at the present moment I had imposed upon me the duty of forming a legislature for any country — and particularly for a country like this, in possession of great property of various descriptions — I do not mean to assert that I could form such a legislature as we possess now, for the nature of man is incapable of reaching such excellence at once, but my great endeavor would be to form some description of legislature which would produce the same results.¹⁰

Against any aims or criticisms of the individual the conservatives opposed the great living body of society. Society is no artificial creation of reason and interest, it is a vast living organism in comparison with which the present moment is as nothing, and the wisdom of any man or group of men of little worth. The nation is a mystic unity in which the individual must sink himself completely, as the soul loses itself in God. Thus de Maistre and Burke sought to fuse the old traditions and the new mystic religion of nationalistic patriotism; thus Napoleon succeeded. What, after all, is my country? Is she a group of discordant little men who have agreed to live together

to serve their own selfish interests? Is she founded on an artificial contract, on a man-made and written constitution? A thousand times No! She is My Country! She is something sacred, something living, something one and eternal, the central source of my life, my aspirations. She is greater than any man, than all men now living, than all generations of men: she is an organic whole, one and indivisible, a past, a tradition. "My country is an association on the same soil of the living with the dead and with those yet to be born."¹¹ Is France the thirty million men living between the Channel and the Pyrenees? No, she is all the Frenchmen who have ever lived and all those who will live in ages to come, welded into one great whole. Shall I then dare to alter their work? Shall I in my pride seek to tear down the edifice which they wrought with tears and blood? It is rather for me humbly and meekly to add my small stone to the great cathedral that has already been building for countless generations, and to spring to its defense against the mad and sacrilegious fools who would overthrow it. My country is everything, I am nothing. My king is her symbol, the nobles are her true knights, the Church is her guide and tutor. Let me then fight and die for king and nobles and Church and country!

This is not rationalism, not humanitarianism, not cosmopolitanism, not the eighteenth century. It is romanticism, it is the true religion of the present age, it is the one unfailing appeal to which conservatives have always been able to resort ever since the Revolution — it is modern Nationalism, the religion of irrational patriotism. De Maistre appealed to Frenchmen to save France and her king; Burke called on Englishmen to defend England and the British Constitution: and thus has every statesman called on his fellows to preserve the great traditions of their native land. Before such an appeal all reason, all criticism, all demand for reform, must shrink away abashed. Society is not to be judged by its serving of any rational interests; it is to be loved, to be worshiped, to be defended at all costs.

Thus wrote Burke:

Society is indeed a contract . . . but the State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee . . . to be taken up for a little temporary interest and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. . . . It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all

perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place.¹²

Gone is the right of revolution, gone is every right of the individual against such a mystic body of Christ. "The place of every man determines his duty."

In France the traditionalist de Bonald and in Germany a host of idealistic philosophers and jurists worked out elaborate theories of the State as an organism, a personality with a life and development and laws of growth of its own, interference with which would be sacrilegious. Most influential of all was the doctrine of Hegel, laid down in his *Philosophy of Right*. For him the State is the highest manifestation in the world of the great Spirit whose development through time is the purest reality and the supreme ideal. The World-Spirit has revealed itself in the past in the Orient, in Greece, and in Rome, and to-day it has reached its fullest development in the Teutonic nation, in the Prussian constitutional monarchy of the 1820's.

The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth. . . . It is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human will and its Freedom.¹³

The individual and his private development can only take place through his proper functioning in the existent State.

It is the moral whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the whole. And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common Will; as if this were a means provided for its benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation — the mutual constraint of all — might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, we affirm, are Law, Morality, and Government, and they alone, the positive reality and completion of Freedom. Freedom of a low and limited order is mere caprice.¹⁴

True Freedom, in other words, consists in finding one's station in the existing order and faithfully performing its duties.

The outcome of all such notions is clear; rational criticism of such a living organism, such a mystical embodiment of the Will and Purpose of God on earth, is entirely aside from the point. Accept the State God has given you, live in it, die for it; but do not presume to question its wisdom or alter its forms. Under the teachings of Savigny, an army of lawyers and jurists set to work to find the reason and the justification for the legal forms that have come down from the past, and to explain how any radical alteration in them would be unthinkable. The theory that legal and political institutions are the result of a slow and organic development, and that any great modification in them is contrary to all the experience and authority of the past, has been so well taught in American law schools that time and again it has been written into the decisions of the Supreme Court, to the disgruntlement of social reformers who have been in more of a hurry to change laws than the Spirit or Genius of the Law has seemed to be.

De Maistre and the French conservatives went further than national patriotism; if the mystic religion of the State be valid, then the further unity of the world, devotion to a World-State, is demanded unless nations are to perish in blood. Such a State exists: it is the Catholic Church, and its monarch is the Pope. But the philosophy of Ultramontanism, increasingly powerful in Catholic lands, made no appeal in Protestant Germany or England; they accepted nationalism without its logical crown of a universal religious society.

THE WORSHIP OF TRADITION

The substitution of faith and mysticism for reason, the notion of society as a living organism realizing spiritual and religious ends, led naturally to great emphasis on the conserving of tradition, and the slow and evolutionary development of those features, and only those, that could be discovered in the national genius. Do not break with the past; study it, find its principle of growth, and if you must change things, do it gradually, and do it only in such directions as are consonant with the whole national tradition. Everywhere the past was studied eagerly; new proposals were tested, not by their social utility, as in the Age of Reason, but by their inclusion in the course of national growth since the Middle Ages. And the more the past was

studied, the more men marveled at its wisdom, and the less they felt like interfering with it. Hegel, Savigny, and the German jurists in general revered history above all things; Burke and the English Tories swore by it. De Maistre wrote:

It does not belong to man to change institutions for the better. . . . All men feel this truth, without being able to explain it. Hence that automatic aversion of all good men for innovations. The word *reform*, in itself and before any investigation, will always be suspect to wisdom, and the experience of all the ages justifies this instinct. We know only too well what has been the fruits of the finest speculations in this field.¹⁵

But Burke is the true poet of the past.

Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? Your mob can do this as well at least as your assemblies. The shallowest understanding, the rudest hand, is more than equal to that task. Rage and frenzy will pull down more in half an hour than prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years. . . . At once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing. . . . A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper, and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors. . . . By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of nature, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed down to us, and from us, in the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the State, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete. . . . A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman.¹⁶

One of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and the laws are consecrated, is lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity, should act as if they were the entire masters; that they should think it among their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society; hazarding to leave to those who come after them a ruin instead of a habitation — and teaching these successors as little to respect their contrivances, as they had themselves respected the institutions of their forefathers. By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as much, and in

as many ways, as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men would be little better than the flies of a summer.¹⁷

In Burke's reverence for the past, and for the intricate beauty of the British Constitution, there is discernible a still further argument to which the conservatives successfully appealed. The past, viewed through the eyes that forget its struggles and its turmoils, its cruelties and its filth, is haunted with a romantic beauty that the real world can never know. Men, freed from the exclusive scientific ideal of the Age of Reason, turned back in æsthetic admiration to the Middle Ages, to the Renaissance, to whatever had put on the halo of familiarity, endeared by long association. Kings might be unjust, but they added to the pagantry of life; priests might be superstitious, and faith untrue, but they had built cathedrals and painted pictures of surpassing beauty. The romantic artists reveled in the dramatic color and the pathos of lost causes, and they carried millions with them. From the sensuous barrenness of the Enlightenment and from the present discontents men turned to the Middle Ages. Gothic art brought with it a longing for Gothic customs and Gothic beliefs. In Germany and in France Catholicism was reborn; it owed as much to the medieval revival as to any other factor, and its popular appeal was primarily æsthetic. Châteaubriand knew his public when he made his apology the *Beauties of Christianity*. The Catholic party in the Church of England, the Oxford Movement of Keble, Pusey, and Newman, owed its strength to the tender sentiment of romanticism. The novels of Scott led the way in awakening a childish enthusiasm for the Middle Ages and for the lost cause of the Jacobites. The whole body of romantic literature, outside France, was largely a support for the conservatives; and men who loved stained-glass windows found themselves marshaled under the Ultramontanism of de Maistre.

In fact, the positive ideal of the conservatives became, as it had for Montesquieu a century earlier, a kind of idealized and developed feudalism. There was to be an expert governing class, a tried body of generous knights; Metternich rang the changes upon the advantages of a trained and capable prince assisted by devoted nobles. The functional organization of

medieval society was, not without reason, extolled by de Bonald as far superior to the grasping competition of business life. Men should possess the rights necessary to play their part in the organism of society; they should be free to devote themselves self-sacrificingly to their high duties. Above all, the ideal of society as essentially the performance of some great spiritual purpose, the very core of the theory of the romantic idealists, possessed much in common with the medieval aim of the service of God by all estates of man. The conservatives hoped that they might retrieve their past errors and return to the noble mission of their ancestors as the stewards of God's kingdom, the knights of a new social chivalry. And yet — in spite of all their dreams and ideals, in spite of all that is appealing in the philosophy of conservatism as contrasted with the enlightened self-interest theories of the eighteenth century, the conservatives achieved none of their hopes. The typical conservative remained, in the classic picture of Morley, "with his inexhaustible patience of abuses that only torment others; his apologetic words for beliefs that may not be so precisely true as one might wish, and institutions that are not altogether so useful as some might think possible; his cordiality towards progress and improvement in a general way, and his coldness or antipathy to each progressive proposal in particular; his pygmy hope that life will one day become somewhat better, punily shivering by the side of his gigantic conviction that it might well be infinitely worse."¹⁸ Conservatism, like the poor, is always with us; but the conservatives of the Congress of Vienna have departed with all their works.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM

The conservatives developed what was essentially a new philosophy of society; the liberals and individualists could still rest on the theories of the eighteenth century, all the more appealing now that they represented both a glorious achievement and what seemed to be a lost cause. The heat of the Revolutionary days had worked out a practical program and creed for the enlightened business and professional classes, which only spread the more widely under the repressive measures of the British Tories, the French royalists, and the whole Metternich system of the Holy Alliance. The high tide of the reactionary movement

was reached in 1819 and 1820; in England, where the Corn Laws, the Enclosure Acts, and the Poor Relief Laws, all in the interests of the landlords, had reduced the peasantry to starvation and pauperdom, and brought the country nearer to a violent revolution than at any other time in its history, this climax is found in the suspension of habeas-corpus (1817) and the Six Acts (1819). In France the Ultra-Royalists gained control in 1820 after the assassination of the Duc de Berri; while in 1819 Metternich secured the Carlsbad Decrees, and the next year won the Czar from his dalliance with liberalism to a whole-hearted support of the reactionary system, a conversion consummated in the Protocol of Troppau against all revolutionary and reform measures in Europe.

But the Industrial Revolution was on the side of the liberals, and slowly but surely they gained control. The Revolutionary heritage, the faith of Condorcet, expressed the hopes of the business class, and gathered to it most of the ardent idealists and young patriots. For such men, liberty was no glittering generality; it meant a definite opposition to definite oppression, and because it was endangered became the great rallying cry. It stood primarily for economic liberalism, individualism, free competition, and *laissez-faire*; in politics it meant the actual assumption of control by the middle-class. Equality, too, meant a definite removal of specific privileges and inequalities; it meant the equality of opportunity for every man to rise to the top of the business scale. And above all the liberals stood for progress — progress through the advance of scientific knowledge and the growth of industry.

Two new forces and ideals had been added, however, to the eighteenth-century liberalism. The first was nationalism. Especially in central and southern Europe, where all progress of any kind seemed dependent upon breaking the domination of foreign despots, the "Young Italy" and the "Young Germany" movements were primarily patriotic in their appeal for the principles of the French Revolution against the Metternich régime. The liberals had no intention of allowing the conservatives to monopolize this burning issue. The second new idea was the common romantic belief in evolution and progress as rooted in the very course of nature. The stars, men thought, were on their side against the upholders of the established order; and the

idea became widespread that any institution which remained static must for that very reason be bad. The French romantic movement, coming later than in any other country, was almost alone largely on the side of the liberals; Victor Hugo raised the banner of literary and political revolt, while under the erstwhile traditionalist Lamennais and Montalembert an abortive attempt was even made in the thirties to align the Catholic Church behind the new doctrine. Perhaps in no book does the deep religious faith of the liberals come out so clearly and powerfully as in the *Words of a Believer* of Lamennais, with his Jeremiah-like curses upon the seven kings who had trampled upon man and God alike. His vision of their sinister plottings ends in their overthrow, where, wandering as ghosts through the fog, they meet and wail:

What avail have been all our plans? Faith and thought have broken the bonds of the people; faith and thought have freed the earth. We wished to divide men, and our oppression united them against us. We shed their blood, and it is on our heads. We sowed corruption, and it took root in us and devoured our bones. We thought we had throttled Liberty, and her breath has dried up the roots of our power. Christ has conquered: cursed be he! And with one voice all answered: Christ has conquered: cursed be he! ¹⁹

UTILITARIANISM

Three general formulations of this nineteenth-century liberalism are worthy of special note: the English utilitarianism, the new faith in progress and evolution represented by Herbert Spencer, and the liberal nationalism and internationalism of the continental "men of 1848." Utilitarianism is a direct continuance of the eighteenth-century reasonableness. Its patron saint is Jeremy Bentham; under his teachings a whole group of so-called "radicals" gathered, whose leader was John Stuart Mill, greatest of the utilitarians and without much question the outstanding English thinker from 1830 till his death in 1873. His method and approach, and his social ideal, remained those of the master Bentham; but he brought to his gospel of reason and utility a broader background, a knowledge of and a respect for history, and a more temperate wisdom than the great reformer had been able to marshal. He was a confirmed individualist, and a genuine believer in the value of liberty; but like Bentham he had no use for the eighteenth-century natural rights doctrine.

For him, the great argument for individual liberty was its social usefulness; and no more convincing support has ever been penned for the rights of the individual in all things than is contained in his famous book *On Liberty*, published in 1859. Without a trace of romanticism, without a single appeal to sentiment or feeling, he upheld a theory of the purpose and organization of government admirably fitted to express the aspirations of the rising Liberal party, and to strike the business man as common sense.

Government is a problem to be worked like any other question of business. The first step is to define the purposes which governments are required to promote. The next, is to inquire what form of government is best fitted to fulfill these purposes.²⁰ The first element of good government being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual. . . . The government which does this the best, has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the government depends.²¹

The foundation for the merit which any set of political institutions can possess

consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its action upon men, and by its action upon things; by what it makes of the citizens, and what it does with them.²²

Such ends the government can best attain, not by any positive action, but by providing for every man as large a scope as possible for the development of his own powers. Hence the jealous guarding of liberty in thought and action is the most useful task a government can undertake.

The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any one of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, **against**

his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. . . . The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. Here advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct.²³

Mill's *Political Economy*, which for fifty years superseded all other works on the subject, stands as the climax of the individualistic school. Yet his insistence on social utility as the basis of all liberty brought him to sympathize with many forms of economic collectivism; his method was flexible, not absolute. There are natural and immutable laws of production, he believed; but all distribution is man-made. "The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. . . . It is not so with the distribution of wealth. This is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like."²⁴ *Laissez-faire* does not necessarily bring true liberty with it; "the restraints of communism would be freedom in comparison with the present condition of the majority of the human race."²⁵ The social problem, as he saw it, is: "How to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor."²⁶ Thus the utilitarian method, in the face of changed conditions, was able to cope with the problems of an industrial society.

One other doctrine of the eighteenth century continued among the liberals of England, cosmopolitanism. The Manchester School of economists, McCulloch, Nassau Senior, and John Stuart Mill, were convinced advocates of free trade and of a world economic system; from them the leaders of the Liberal Party, Richard Cobden, the Quaker John Bright, and Gladstone, developed a hostility to the newer ideals of Nationalism and Imperialism and came to stand for peace, free trade, and the ideal of "little England." To them colonies were but a financial drain, and colonial warfare and rivalry a madness. Before the rebirth of imperialistic adventures in the seventies and eighties,

most of Europe had followed England's lead in abolishing protective tariffs and regarding colonies as unnecessary appendages. Cobden's ideas on peace and free trade are singularly modern in their ring.

Our Free Trade agitation and the Peace Movement are one and the same cause. . . . The efforts of the Peace Societies, however laudable, can never be successful so long as the nations maintain their present system of isolation. The colonial system, with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people, can never be got rid of except by the indirect process of Free Trade, which will gradually and imperceptibly loose the bands which unite our Colonies to us by a mistaken notion of self-interest. Yet the colonial policy of Europe has been the chief source of wars for the last hundred and fifty years.²⁷

THE WORSHIP OF PROGRESS

The second of the middle-class liberal philosophies grew naturally out of utilitarianism. As they saw industry growing and liberalism advancing by steady strides, with science building up an imposing edifice, it is easy to understand how the middle class should wax optimistic and actually come to identify material and political progress with the course of nature and the hand of Providence. Even more than the eighteenth, the nineteenth century was a century of hope. No longer was progress something to be effected by human endeavor; strive as men might, it was inevitable. Tennyson, who expressed the faith of his day in popular measures, might doubt immortality and even God; he never doubted progress, till age and sixty years had brought its disillusionments.

Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns. . . .
Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward let us range,
Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of change.
Thro' the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day;
Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay. . . .
For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,
Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;
Till the war-drum throb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd,
In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the world.²⁸

Herbert Spencer went further: he believed that progress was not merely a human phenomenon, but that it was the funda-

mental law of the whole of nature. The stars in their courses are for him no less certain than that the whole universe must advance from simple forms to complex and organically inter-related individuals. Individualism is the end of creation; nothing on earth can stop its steady advance.

Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes, down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which Progress essentially consists.²⁹ Progress is not an accident but a necessity. What we call evil and immorality must disappear. It is certain that man must become perfect. . . . The ultimate development of the ideal man is certain — as certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; for instance, that all men will die. . . . Always toward perfection is the mighty movement — towards a complete development and a more unmingled good.³⁰

The ideal society which must come about was for Spencer the Utopia of the utilitarians, the economic liberals, the business men.

The duty of the State is to protect, to enforce the law of equal freedom; to maintain men's rights, or, as we commonly express it, to administer justice. . . . Whenever the State begins to exceed its power of protector, it begins to lose protective power. Not a single supplementary service can it attempt without producing dissent; and in proportion to the amount of dissent so produced by it, the State defeats the end for which it was established. . . . And as the essential ought not to be sacrificed to the non-essential, the State ought not to do anything but protect. . . . Consider it then in what light we may — morally or scientifically, with reference to its practicableness, or as a question of political prudence, or even in its bearings upon religious faith — we find this theory, that a government ought to undertake other offices besides that of protector, to be an untenable theory.³¹

The romanticists of the Young Germany and Young Italy Movements, eager alike for liberty and for country, sought more or less successfully to make some adjustment between their dislike of governmental interference in thought and industry, and their love for the developing genius of their nation. The *Limits of the Activity of the State*, published in part by the German reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1792, and completely in 1851, tried to show that while the nation is a growing body, govern-

ment is only one of the means of aiding its welfare, a means whose sole aim should be to provide security for social development. "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity." ³² In practical *laissez-faire* he was at one with Mill and Spencer.

LIBERAL NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

The third of the new middle-class philosophies of the century, liberal nationalism, as opposed to the conservative nationalism of a de Maistre, was naturally strongest in Germany and in Italy, where the Vienna settlement aligned the patriots with the liberals. Taking its rise in the great wave of patriotic feeling that swept over the Germanies after the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806, it found many a protagonist among the professors and poets, and came to perhaps its most appealing expression in the passionate rhapsodies of the Italian idealist Mazzini. For Fichte, the fiery soul whose moral energies Jena turned against Napoleon, it was the nation, the German people, and not their divided and trampled governments, who embodied on earth the primordial, the divine, the eternal Will. Wherever a society of men reveals in its natural and spiritual life the progressive development of the divine in accordance with some special law, there is a Nation. The individual, through identifying himself with the Nation of which he is a part, can by word or deed incorporate his personality into the Eternal, and thus achieve a lasting immortality. Through patriotism men make themselves a part of God. After raising the German temper to a fever heat by his stirring *Addresses to the German Nation* (1807), Fichte devoted his life to just such self-sacrifice, and on the field of battle attained immortality.

This doctrine agreed with Hegel and Savigny in all but the particular group embodying the divine will. For the liberals, it was the German nation, in practice, the German-speaking peoples, and not any reactionary government. There was much discussion during the struggles against the Metternich system of what constituted the criterion of a nationality. Language, race, geography, and more and more a common culture, a common tradition, a common aspiration toward unity, were all made part

of the test of a nationality; the precise mixture was ordered in the interest of the specific nationalistic movement. Perhaps the best formula is that of the South German liberal romantic historian Bluntschli:

A union of masses of men of different occupations and social strata in a hereditary society of common spirit, feeling and race, bound together especially by language and customs in a common civilization which give them a sense of unity and distinction from all foreigners, quite apart from any governmental bond.³³

Of vital importance was the question, should nationality and state coincide? Should every national group be politically independent? A few reactionary upholders of the Austrian Crown answered in the negative; the great mass of the German historical theorists, even the conservative Prussians, who hoped to unify Germany under the Prussian monarchy, and the patriotic liberals everywhere, flocked to the banner of national independence. A nationality can become a People, in the full sense, only if it becomes an independent State, proclaimed Savigny and the jurists. The more liberal Bluntschli taught that a state became truly worthy of respect only if it was the organized government of a group already united by the bonds of nationality. Both schools had their eyes on the German situation. The subject nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy seized upon these ideas, and went up and down the land seeking to awaken the different language groups to a sense of their national unity. The past was diligently studied; each group found national heroes greater than Pericles or Cæsar, and national epics surpassing Homer. So long as the governing class of the Austrian empire remained truly cosmopolitan in spirit — so long, for example, as they were willing to utilize Latin as an universal language — there was a cogent argument, from the economic side, for the preservation of that cosmopolitan rule; but the administration itself became imbued with the spirit of German nationalism, sought to stamp out the other languages and movements, and in that moment its doom was sealed. Nationalism was to prove stronger than any possible argument based on mere peace and economic expediency.

It was in Italy that the nationalism of the liberals of 1848 proved strongest. It is enshrined at its best in the writings of the great republican statesman and dreamer, Giuseppe Mazzini,

who rose above the squabbles and hatreds of so many of the patriots of his day to the conception of a noble internationalism founded on the full recognition of the principle of nationality.

To one who sees in a Nation something more than an aggregation of individuals born to produce and consume corn, the foundations of its life are, fraternity of faith, consciousness of a common *ideal*, and the association of all faculties to work in harmony and with success towards that ideal. . . . The first condition of this life is the solemn declaration, made with the unanimous and free consent of our greatest in wisdom and virtue, that Italy, feeling the times to be ripe, rises with one spontaneous impulse, in the name of the Duty and Right inherent in a people, to constitute itself a Nation of free and equal brothers, and demand that rank which by right belongs to it among the Nations that are already formed. The next condition is the declaration of the body of religious, moral, and political *principles*, in which the Italian people believes at the present day, of the common ideal to which it is striving, of the *Special* mission that distinguishes it from other peoples, and to which it intends to consecrate itself for its own benefit and for the benefit of Humanity. And the final condition is to determine the methods to be employed, and the men to whom the country should delegate the function of developing the national conception of life, and the application of its practical consequences to the manifold branches of social activity. Without these, a *country* may exist, stumbling along from insurrection to insurrection, from revolution to revolution, but there cannot exist a NATION.³⁴ Our party is faithful to the ideal of our country's Traditions, but ready to harmonize them with the Traditions of Humanity and the inspirations of conscience.³⁵

What is true for one Nation is true as between Nations. Nations are the individuals of Humanity. The internal national organization is the instrument with which the Nation accomplishes its mission in the world. Nationalities are sacred, and providentially constituted to represent, within Humanity, the division or distribution of labor for the advantage of the peoples, as the division and distribution of labor within the limits of the state should be organized for the greatest benefit of all the citizens. If they do not look to *that* end, they are useless and fall. If they persist in evil, which is egotism, they perish: nor do they rise again unless they make Atonement and return to Good.³⁶

This is nationalism as a liberal and struggling force — the nationalism of a group that has not yet obtained an independent government and sovereign politicians. It is a far cry from Bluntschli and Mazzini to the "*Deutschtum*" of the *Alldeutscher Verband* or the "sacred egoism" of Mussolini. The tragedy of the last half-century is the capture of this noble nationalism of 1848 by the forces of reaction and chauvinism, and the almost complete disappearance of its complement of internationalism.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

We have seen the doctrines upon which the conservatives agreed; we have traced the liberal notions which opposed and overthrew them. There is no such unanimity in the tentative and exploring philosophies put forward by the champions of the rising new class, the industrial proletariat. These men, for the most part generous middle-class idealists, agreed in opposing the conservatives; they agreed also in attacking the *laissez-faire* individualism of the liberals. But they differed widely in the positive programs they advocated; the workers themselves had not yet become articulate, and it hardly occurred to their champions to ask them what they wanted. Two main groups can be distinguished, the paternalists and the democrats. The first advocated a benevolent industrial order; the second, some form of "social democracy."

From many quarters there came drastic criticism of the dismal science of the classic political economy. Its callous disregard of human suffering and woe in the face of early factory conditions, the disastrous financial crises and panics which the new industrial system underwent, in 1815, in 1818, and in 1825, and its general minimizing of nationalism and patriotic sentiment, led to a scrutiny of its underlying assumptions. From the standpoint of economic science itself the Swiss Sismondi criticized free competition and exclusive reliance upon the motive of self-interest or unlimited gain, advocating governmental regulation of competition to prevent overproduction and panics, and various forms of social legislation, including the encouragement of unions. The German Friedrich List criticized free trade and *laissez-faire*, demanding instead a national system of political economy that would build up a self-sufficient state, with social legislation for the improvement of working conditions. He became the founder of the modern theory of "neo-mercantilism," with its protection of agriculture and infant industries, and its government subsidies for shipping and commerce. His ideas were ultimately adopted by all the states which were striving to develop an industrial system rivaling England's; they powerfully influenced, first American policy, and later, after 1879, Germany and France.

Even more drastic attacks were made upon the liberals. Fourier tried to overthrow the rationalistic psychology upon

which the classic individualists had relied, and to substitute for it a sounder view of the multiplicity of human motives. Instead of an industrial system founded on gain, which could not fail to result in the antagonistic interests and mutual destruction prophesied by Ricardo and born out by the facts, he wished to found industry on the needs of human nature, and saw a means in the formation of productive units of free producers. Proudhon, following the Englishman William Godwin, pushed the logic of the liberals beyond their compromise, and claimed that the reigning *laissez-faire*, in its retention of the right of property, failed above all to secure for men liberty. For him, only the substitution of the rule of reason through voluntary agreement for all forms of compulsion, could hope to better the situation. Religious leaders, like Frederic D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley in England, Lamennais, Ozanam, Buchez, and Le Play in France, Ketteler, Moufang, and Hitze in Germany, and humanitarians like Carlyle and Ruskin, protested in the name of God and humanity at the results of unrestrained individualism. Even Mill, upholder of individual rights, was forced to admit that there was nothing in the nature of things to prevent some form of economic collectivism if conditions failed to suit men.

The one idea of a substitute common to all these critics was the notion of organization — “the organization of labor” came to be the battle-cry of the French workers in 1848. It was generally felt that liberalism and individualism had done a good and useful work in overthrowing the old system, but that it had lamentably failed as the basis of a new one. The need was for some kind of reconstruction and reorganization, in industry, in knowledge, in religion, in every field of human endeavor, some group control and regulation. The philosophy of Auguste Comte, developed in the thirties and forties, tried to lay a scientific foundation for some such reorganization of society. He felt that with the development of a genuine social science it would be possible to rebuild society on a new basis, to bend industry once more, as it had been bent during the Middle Ages, to the service of a spiritual end. “To generalize our scientific concepts, and to systematize the art of social life”;³⁷ “to reestablish in society something spiritual that is capable of counterbalancing the influence of the ignoble materialism in which we are at present submerged”;³⁸ to harmonize knowledge and aspiration,

to subordinate science and industry to human purposes, the mind to the heart — this was the aim of his endeavor. His "System of positive philosophy," culminating in a religion of humanity and altruism, became as popular in Europe as the individualistic philosophy of Herbert Spencer himself. But it remained an ideal, and failed to inspire the working class.

BENEVOLENT INDUSTRIALISM

Amongst the French romanticists and the English Tories there grew up the ideal of a benevolent industrial feudalism, a society run by captains of industry for the benefit of the working classes. In France this aim was upheld by the followers of the Count de Saint-Simon. Looking at the horrible results of uncontrolled industrialism in England, the Saint-Simonians conceived the idea of combining business enterprise and religious idealism, that the industrial revolution might prove a blessing rather than a curse. It seemed to them possible to organize a society under the leadership of industrial experts, creating material goods with a view to the best social conditions for all, taught and guided by a body of scientists devoted to discovering new truth and popularizing the old. They devised elaborate schemes for the proper functioning of the artist, the scientist, and the captain of industry in the new order. Under the Religion of Jesus, "religion should direct society toward the grand goal of the speediest amelioration possible of the lot of the poorest classes."³⁹ Their slogan was reconstruction, organization, and "Everything for the worker, nothing by the worker."⁴⁰

There is much that is fantastic in the theories of the Saint-Simonians — their combination of religious mysticism and shrewd business enterprise, their meetings in the back rooms of Jewish bankers to found the New Christianity and build railroads and canals, their appeals to Louis XVIII, to the Pope, to the great financiers Lafitte and Baron Rothschild to lead the new Christianity of social service for the worker; but they managed to enlist many of the men who were destined to build up French industry, and it is interesting to speculate what might have been the result if the industrial revolution in France had gone forward under their benevolent auspices. Later, vagaries with regard to free love broke up the school, and the industrial feudalism that was introduced was not quite so benevolent as they had hoped;

but their ideal was very influential under the Second Empire, and served to mitigate some of the worst features of the new régime.

Somewhat less doctrinaire and more fruitful were the doctrines of the English "Tory Socialists," who, from a mixture of humanitarianism and hatred for the liberal business interests, exposed in Parliament the iniquities of the factory system and forced through the first industrial legislation. They hoped to unite the old aristocracy and the working classes against the manufacturers, and carry on the best traditions of the country gentleman régime. Michael Sadler wrote books against Malthus, claiming that with a higher standard of living the birth rate would decrease; he served as chairman of the first Factory Commission in 1831-33, from whose reports can be gleaned most of the harrowing tales of early child labor in the cotton mills. Lord Shaftesbury, greatest of the benevolent Tories, opposed the Reform Bill and the repeal of the Corn Laws, and worked valiantly for factory legislation and improved housing conditions. Disraeli, in the course of his brilliant and checkered career from law clerk and dandy to Prime Minister, Peer, and society novelist, did much to break down the liberalism of the Cobden School, which bitterly opposed, in the name of individual liberty, all factory legislation and all labor unions. His crowning achievement, in the light of history, was his gift to the workers of the franchise in 1867, the political means of working out their own salvation. In this he was aided by the great Liberal John Bright, too much of a Quaker to be a good middle-class individualist, and by the rumblings of an unmistakable popular revolt.

To these apostles of a benevolent industrialism must be added the sincere Christians who shrank from the selfishness of enlightened self-interest. Maurice and Kingsley, the "Christian Socialists," championed the Chartist Movement in 1848, the first great awakening of the British working-class; they helped to popularize, in sermon and novel, the revolt against *laissez-faire*, and lent their prestige to the recently founded Coöperative Movement. From them can be traced such organizations as the Guild of Saint Matthew, a High Church socialist group in the Anglican Church, and much of the present-day tendency toward "social Christianity" in England and America. The French and German Catholics instituted similar societies for

more or less drastic curtailment of economic individualism. Lamennais and Lamartine, "Catholic Democrats" in 1848; Ozanam, founder of the charitable society of Saint Vincent de Paul; and Buchez, revolutionary and president of the Constituent Convention in 1848, all united in espousing trade unions under religious auspices, working for factory legislation, and helping the working classes in general. Later churchmen in France and Germany sought to revive the medieval guilds as the industrial units, and merged into the contemporary party amongst the continental clericals of the "Catholic Socialists."

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

These various groups, while they all opposed the philosophy of liberalism and individualism, were aristocratic in nature; they proposed to aid and guide the workers, not to trust them to their own devices. Their success was limited by their dislike of democracy. The same period saw the rise of numerous attempts at some sort of social democracy, industry organized and run by the workers as well as for them. Their common principle was the substitution of coöperative group enterprise for individual competition. Their specific proposals ran from the establishment of self-sufficient communities, of which great numbers were founded in Europe and America during the forties, to the guild socialism of Louis Blanc and the state socialism of Karl Marx. Robert Owen, a successful business man who ran model factories with profit-sharing schemes very much like those made famous by Henry Ford, and who like Ford found it paid handsome profits, devoted his energies to the establishment of Owenite communities in Great Britain and America. When these failed, he turned to organizing coöperative societies and labor unions. Fourier and Cabet put forth similar proposals in France, and their followers were for a time successful in America. Proudhon, the keenest critic of liberal economics, more ambitiously proposed to reorganize the whole of society upon the basis of voluntary association; his philosophic anarchism has made him the intellectual father of the French labor movement. None of these schemes of Utopian socialism or "communism," as they were then called, proved successful; but they left behind them a growing murmur of discontent with individualism as administered for and by the

middle classes, and specific proposals for profit-sharing, coöperative societies, and trade-unionism. They stand as the first attempts to formulate a working-class philosophy.

Perhaps the best statement of the general ideals of this whole industrial movement that centered about the revolution of 1848 is to be found in the writings of Louis Blanc, the leader of the proletariat in France. His actual attempt in the early days of the revolution to establish "national workshops" proved abortive; the middle class might use him, but it had no intention of putting his ideas into practice. The patriotic flag-waving of Louis Napoleon finished what the musketry and butchery of the middle-class republican General Cavaignac had begun, and put an end to all hope of the reorganization of industry in France. We quote from his *Socialist Catechism* of 1849.

What is socialism? — It is the Gospel in action. How so? — Socialism has as its goal to realize among men the four fundamental maxims of the Gospel: Love one another; Do not unto others what you would not have that they should do unto you; The first amongst ye shall be the servant of the rest; Peace to all men of good will.

What is Liberty? — It is the power given to man to develop his faculties completely, under the empire of justice and the safeguards of the law. What is Equality? — It is, for all men, the *equal* development of their *unequal* faculties, and the *equal* satisfaction of their *unequal* needs. It will only exist truly when each, following the law written in his heart by God himself, shall *produce according to his powers and consume according to his needs*. Does Liberty exist in society to-day? — No! for if the tyranny of individuals has been destroyed, at least in part, with the feudal régime, the tyranny of things remains, and many of our brothers are chained to poverty, which is slavery to ignorance and famine. Is this slavery a necessary consequence of the present organization of society? — Yes; for on the one hand, education being granted only to those who can pay for it, and the greater number being in no condition to pay, ignorance is an absolutely necessary fate for the greater number; and, on the other hand, work being neither sufficiently paid for, nor guaranteed to all, misery is an inevitable fact for the greater number. How does it come that work is not guaranteed? — Because present society has admitted the principle that every man must be left to his own resources; to pursue his own course, and to work out his own destiny. At the threshold of this human lottery, so much the worse for him who has not found in his cradle the winning number! The powers that be have as a maxim, let things go; and since those who go very often lack bread and have no means to earn it, *let things go* very often means *let men die*.

What do you understand by individualism? — It is the principle in

virtue of which each thinks only of himself, and hurries to the triumph of his own private interest, whether that be at the expense of the interests of others, or even of society as a whole. What is competition? — It is the effort of each to enrich himself by ruining others; among the proletarians who have to earn their bread, it is the effort of each to be employed in preference to the others. How shall we pass from the present social order to the one we desire? — By the intervention of the State. In summary, what society will follow from the principles you have just developed? — It will be a society where through a common, free, and compulsory education, all citizens will be able to raise themselves as high as possible by their intelligence and will; where the domain of industry, and that of agriculture, instead of presenting the spectacle of a battle-field strewn with ruins and with dead, will be made fertile by fraternal associations, bound to one another by ties of solidarity; where the distribution of work and the division of its fruits will be based on the principle which to-day regulates the family: From each man in accordance with his powers, and to each man in accordance with his needs.⁴¹

With the further growth of the industrial revolution, these three philosophies, of the landholders, of the liberal business men, and of the working class, were developed and modified: the business men came more and more to abandon portions of their liberalism, and to fuse their individualism with the conservative attitude, while the working class carried out their opposition in more constructive programs and ideals. But the rise of these contemporary doctrines must be postponed until we have made a further study of the growth and development of men's general beliefs during the nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE WORLD CONCEIVED AS A PROCESS OF GROWTH AND EVOLUTION

THE TWO SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

THE ideas that have formed the scientific world-view of our generation are the product of two major intellectual revolutions, two significant reorientations in scientific thought. The first, associated with the names of Darwin, Wallace, Huxley, and Haeckel, spread the notion of evolution, of change, growth, and development, from its focus in biological investigation to swift domination of the entire climate of opinion of the age. The second, carried through by the genius of Einstein, Planck, de Broglie, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger, introduced a novel set of fundamental concepts and principles into mathematical physics, and has puzzled our generation with the theory of relativity, quantum and wave mechanics, and the triumphs and mysteries of the structure of the atom. We have now lived for some four-score years with the evolutionary ideas, long enough to have got over the first shock of bewilderment or enthusiasm. We have explored with some thoroughness their further implications, both their more profound though less spectacular consequences and the limits an initial exuberance overlooked. We are still, however, in the midst of the first impact of the revolution in physical concepts. For all but the specialist, the novelty of half-assimilated paradox as yet obscures a more sober realization of their intellectual bearing.

When new scientific ideas, worked out to meet some specific difficulty, win wide popularity at the hands of speculative generalizers, it is their fate to be taken first as the answers to old problems rather than as stimulating new inquiry. We have seen how the Newtonian Order of Nature provided the whole eighteenth century with a new heavenly city, and how men realized but gradually that when carefully examined it made all heavenly cities irrelevant. In like manner the idea of evolution came as a godsend to Romanticists seeking a new cosmic faith sanctioning their optimistic confidence in human progress. The

evolutionary philosophers of the last generation expanded it as a new principle of cosmic explanation, a new primary cause. From Spencer to Bergson, evolution was spread far and wide as the greatest and most seductive of the Romantic faiths. Only recently have we begun to appreciate the real significance of the biological nature and setting of human life, and of taking time and temporal process seriously.

The new concepts of physical theory are suffering the same kind of career. Paradoxical popularizers find them completely demolishing the classical structure of nineteenth-century physics, and even the very notion of causal law; resolving the old controversy between determinism and free-will in favor of the latter; and enthroning strange new gods in our universe of light. Tempted by Gifford lectureships, some of our most eminent physicists have blossomed forth as the most daring speculative theologians of the day. It is too early to say how far these philosophical flights of the physicists will turn out to be justified, or whether professionally trained philosophers are right in construing the newer physical ideas as supporting their respective systems — and which. But it already seems that the most significant outcome of the revolution in physical theory is not these speculative and transitory conclusions about the universe, but rather the changed conception it is bringing of the nature and function of the scientific enterprise itself, and of the rôle of physical theory in the scheme of things.

The effect of the biological revolution of the last century was on the whole naturalistic: that is, it placed man and his enterprises squarely in the setting of a natural environment, and gave them a natural origin and a natural history. In the long run the outcome has been humanistic as well: man has been transformed from a being supernaturally divorced from and elevated above the rest of nature, and wholly dependent on his Creator, into a creature capable of interacting and coöperating with the other forces and resources in his natural environment, and in some measure bending them to his will. The effect of the present physical revolution seems primarily humanistic: it emphasizes the human factor in scientific interpretations, and it points to a world in which human life can be a natural life. Not only has it underlined the genuine intellectual creation involved in scientific theory — a creation that has seemed to

many to support some form of philosophical idealism. It has definitely removed from the structure of science those basic assumptions and speculative generalizations of nineteenth-century thought which seemed most clearly to conflict with the demands of human life, and which made the "scientific world-view" of physics an alien world in which man and his interests could find no intelligible place. Nineteenth-century physics, though far richer than Newtonian mechanics, clung to the same fundamental assumption of a closed mechanical and material order; it remained far closer to the crude and simple systems of the seventeenth century than to the tentative, cautious, and experimental science of today. Our electrical world of radiant energy is of a richness and complexity that does not seem so alien to the maze of human experience; the concepts to make it intelligible are not of a totally different order from those applicable to human life. To embrace both in a common scheme no longer involves an obvious distortion of one or the other.

Yet this gain has been mainly negative and liberating rather than positive. Its naturalism was really implied in, and had indeed been already derived from, the working out of the earlier biological revolution. The shift of popular interest from biological to physical concepts in the last two decades is somewhat misleading. It is still doubtful whether the new physical theory, revolutionary as it has been for our notions of nature, will have anything like the impact on man and his position in the world that the biological revolution has already exerted. Its chief lesson may well be the reminder that it was not physics that created the world or human life, but the world that brought forth both physics and physicists.

Nor must it be thought that these successive intellectual revolutions in any sense cancel out their predecessors. In its ideas the scientific enterprise has been cumulative as well as original—a fact abundantly illustrated in the progress of physical theory. The essential insights of the older views have been incorporated and reinterpreted but not discarded with each new advance. The seventeenth-century Order of Nature has been retained and pushed further in every field, even when profoundly modified, first by the historical and biological viewpoints of the nineteenth century, and then by the novel electrical conceptions of to-day. And though the newer physical

notions have been forced on investigators by the demands of their enlarged subject-matter rather than borrowed from other disciplines, the effect has been to push them independently to ideas and principles already suggested in the sciences of life. It is this convergence of the concepts of physics and of the biological and social sciences that has made possible the naturalistic philosophies of to-day, so much more adequate than the "naturalisms" of the nineteenth century which, bound by the dogmas of an earlier physics, did scant justice to the facts of human experience.

It is physics and not biology that has for a generation been providing the spectacular new ideas. Yet it is still true that the idea of Evolution, of change, growth, and development, has been the most revolutionary notion in man's thought about himself and his world in the last hundred years. This transformation of the setting of human life did not come about suddenly, overnight, it does not date from the justly epoch-making publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859. Rather that event symbolized the new attitude that had in many ways been making its progress in men's thinking since the middle of the preceding century. Darwin's book, in fact, stands to our present-day scientific synthesis much as Newton's *Principia* stood to the earlier mechanical synthesis, as the confident marshaling of evidence and the systematic formulation in strictly scientific terms of a view that had already been for some time gaining acceptance by the best intellects. Both the rationalistic thinkers of the Enlightenment, in their growing emphasis on progress, and the romantic reaction, in its singling out of a process of development in time as the fundamental fact in human experience, had paved the way for a successful biological formulation of Evolution. Only such a state of affairs can explain the almost instantaneous acceptance of Darwin's doctrine when it was put forth in 1859.

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY IDEAS OF PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION

Already in the full tide of the Age of Reason men had developed a conception of progress as no merely human movement, but as a great process of universal sweep and scope. Buffon, a member of the group of Encyclopedists, had published as early as 1749 his famous *Natural History*, which combined a

detailed exposition of what the naturalists had gathered about the species of animals and plants, with a great cosmic epic of the growth of nature from its beginnings in the formation of the earth to its culmination in man. Buffon saw a gradual ascent, with no sharp breaks, from the humblest beginnings to the summit; and though in good eighteenth-century fashion he regarded the whole process as divine, at no point did he have recourse to any supernaturalistic explanations. He wrote, too, in the spirit of the newer experimental science, rather than in that of the reigning mathematical physics; he proceeded at each step by patient investigation and observation. In the narrower field of biological evolution he raised all the questions that have remained unanswered to the present day. What is Nature? he asks. It is not a fixed thing, a static being, but "the system of laws established by the Creator for the existence of things and the succession of beings."¹ It is alive; it is an eternal process. "Time, space, and matter are its means; the universe is its object; motion and life is its goal."² The emphasis throughout is on the glory of Man, as the culmination of the whole process of Nature; Man is the revolutionary, changing the surface of the earth, uniting with his fellows to subdue nature and bend her processes to his own purposes. Buffon's bulky work remained for the eighteenth century a monument not unlike H. G. Wells' *Outline of History* to-day.

In Germany the great leader of the *Aufklärung* or Enlightenment, G. E. Lessing, gave powerful expression to much the same idea in the religious field in his *Education of the Human Race*, in 1780. He claimed that in the life of the race revelation occupies the same place as education in the life of the individual; that is, it is progressive and never-ending. The common conception of an original religious revelation from God, since obscured by the ignorance and the scheming of men, is all wrong; in its stead we should look upon the history of religion as a progressive revelation of God's truth, an advance from a primitive animism and superstition to the Christian religion. But even the Old and the New Testaments are but stages in this process of growth; Christianity is but one step in the evolution of the highest spiritual religion. Men by their own efforts receive from God one great truth after another as they are ready for it, and at no period is the revelation final and complete. The whole of human

history exemplifies the growth of humanity in knowledge and truth under divine guidance.

Herder generalized this notion of evolution into a theory of the whole of civilization. In his *Philosophy of History* (1774), he says:

Has there not been progress and development in a higher sense? The growing tree, the struggling man, must pass through various stages always progressing. But the striving is not simply individual and temporal, it is eternal. No one is alone in his age; he builds on what goes before. The past and the present are the bases of the future. This the analysis of nature and of God's works in general shows. Thus it is also with the human race. The Egyptian could not be without the Oriental; the Greek built on both; the Roman rose upon the shoulders of the entire world. Genuine progress, constant development, even if no individual gain anything thereby, this is the purpose of God in history.³

In an extensive work published in 1784 he recounted the history of human development from the very beginnings of life. His influence upon the whole romantic school in Germany, especially upon Schelling and Hegel, was very great indeed; they made the notion that civilization has been a slow development from small beginnings a fundamental principle for all educated men. From the revolutionary Condorcet in France and from the more conservative Hegelians in Germany there sprang a long line of historians concerned with tracing the laws and stages of social development and evolution.

THE IDEA OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN HUMAN SOCIETY

Many forces combined to popularize this conception. The very changes which in the Revolutionary period succeeded one another so rapidly gave to most men a new sense of the mutability of human affairs, and shook them from their belief that society was a mechanical and timeless kind of thing like the state of the solar system. Moreover, men of all faiths were led to appeal to the past in justification of their present policies: all the new social philosophers, from the traditionalist de Maistre to the radicals Comte and Fourier, felt it necessary to preface their own criticisms of the existing order and their recommendations of change with a philosophy of history explaining how they stood in the direct line of social advance. The whole romantic interest in human life and institutions as essentially the progressive realization of ideals, turned men to a preoccupation with the

past as the revelation and the condition of those ideals. The great age of historical investigation began, at first merely in justification of preconceived notions of what was desirable, and then increasingly, under Niebuhr and Ranke, as an objective and scientific research. The technique of historical research and historical criticism was refined and applied to every field of interest, religion, literature, institutions, science, philosophy, laws. From the Hegelian school in Germany and from its follower Victor Cousin in France proceeded an increasing army of trained historians. The eighteenth-century scorn of the Middle Ages as barbarous and "Gothic" gave place to an earnest investigation of the origins and roots of the present in those far-off days. The conservative or "right wing" Hegelians sought to display the continual growth of ideal forces in religion and social life; the radical or "left wing" group, accepting contemporary scientific principles of explanation, undertook a naturalistic and historical critique of origins. Instead, with the eighteenth century, of criticizing traditional ideas in religion and society as irrational and futile, a line of attack that could not reach romantics who rejected reason and utility as ultimate standards of what was valuable, they adopted the far more deadly weapon of explaining things in terms of their crude beginnings. They thus succeeded in showing that however reasonable and useful they might once have been, mankind had now outgrown them and was bound to advance to something further. Where it was easy to cling on faith to something that appeared merely irrational, and reverence what was not clearly understood, it was far more difficult to retain any veneration for institutions that were neatly "explained" as survivals from primitive animism or barbarism.

Hegel himself and his more orthodox followers had interpreted all institutions, particularly religious doctrines, in terms of their ideal significance, as symbols for spiritual truths about the eternal process of God. The radical theologians David Strauss, Baur, and Feuerbach went farther; for them such doctrines were not literal facts or truths at all, but only symbols. Strauss' famous *Life of Jesus* (1835), a pioneer of the "higher criticism" of the New Testament, denied the very existence of any supernatural events in the career of Jesus; the whole story was merely an imaginative and mythological embodiment of spiritual

truths about human experience. Feuerbach denied everything in religion not of naturalistic and human origin; the very conception of God is merely a changing ideal that men set up for themselves in response to the needs of the religious experience. The problem of religious investigation became, not to discover historical evidences of revelation, but rather to explain how supernatural beliefs took their rise and secured wide acceptance.

The same kind of naturalistic critique of origins was applied by Karl Marx to human society. A pupil of Hegel, he interpreted his master's theory of the advance of the world spirit through history by means of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in terms of the economic struggle of conflicting social classes. Where Hegel sought to show how history culminated in present-day institutions, Marx tried to prove that the same logic would drive society inevitably to assume new forms through the growth and the assumption of power of the proletariat. His combination of the rationalistic psychology of enlightened self-interest, on which the classic economic liberalism had been founded, and of the Hegelian idea of irresistible development through continual conflict — his famous "economic determinism" or "materialistic interpretation of history" — spread to many historians, and seems at the present day to be at the foundation of most historical investigation.

THE SPREAD OF NATURALISTIC UNIFORMITARIANISM

More and more this historical research adopted genuinely scientific principles: that is, it assumed that the laws and relationships observed and experimentally verified to-day have been operating in the same manner at every stage in the past development, and that the past is to be explained by a consistent appeal to such laws and such laws alone. This is the great principle of naturalistic "Uniformitarianism," which asserts the universal and uniform operation of causes and forces observable to-day. This conception, so basic in any scientific study of origins and growth, first gained popularity in the field of human affairs; from there it spread, throughout the nineteenth century, to all the fields of natural science as well. Many and diverse have been the developments in scientific knowledge, but they can all be summed up under two general principles: first, that all complex processes are to be explained as combinations of more

elementary processes discriminated as factors in them, and secondly, that causes observable to-day suffice to account for the origins of all present forms of activity. The universal application of the method of analysis into simpler elements and processes, and the idea of a uniformitarian evolution, were the two great dominating concepts of the science of the last century. They were at once the fundamental generalizations that emerged from the mass of detailed investigation, and the basic assumptions on which that investigation had been conducted. The steady pushing of the first of these principles has elaborated the Newtonian world-machine of mechanical motions into a much more complex and subtle structure of electrical processes expressible in the equations for radiation. And the application of the second has at the same time transformed it from something conceived on the analogy of a man-made mechanism, springing fully constructed from the hands of its Creator, into a system of energy that, following its own laws of development, has grown from simpler beginnings to its present complex structure. The character of the fundamental equations and laws has changed, the process of development has revealed new complexities. But these two principles still sum up the kind of explanation the scientist is seeking.

THE METHOD OF MECHANISTIC ANALYSIS UNIVERSALIZED AND BROADENED

Explaining complex phenomena by isolating simpler elements and processes whose behavior can be mathematically formulated and predicted, came to be known in the nineteenth century as the method of "mechanistic" analysis. Practically, it meant the search for the mechanism involved: by suitable manipulation and combination new ways of acting could be discovered, and the amazing technical triumphs of science achieved. Theoretically, it meant the drive toward formulating the basic natural processes in mathematical terms so general that the various types of observed phenomena could be exhibited as special cases. This search for elements with a uniform type of behavior is as old as the Greek atomists; its aim and method had apparently triumphed with the Newtonians. By the end of the nineteenth century the elementary substance was assumed to be the atom of "matter" with its fixed mass, and the

elementary process, the motion formulated in the equations of dynamics. Even phenomena like light that did not seem to possess the two characteristics of matter, inertia and gravitation, were conceived as wave-motions of an "ether" itself considered as a kind of substance. In view of what has since happened to the basic concepts of this closely-knit theory, matter, energy, and ether, it is well to realize that the method of "mechanistic" analysis is not bound up with the limitations of this older materialistic and mechanical view. Nineteenth-century science took the motion of matter as the ultimate process and form of energy. To-day periodic energy has become more basic than "matter"; hence our science is no longer, strictly speaking, "materialistic." And the laws of mechanical motion are not so universal as those of the behavior of a field of radiation, and may indeed be but a special form of that behavior. Hence our science is no longer, like Newton's, "mechanical." But its basic method has remained that of "mechanistic" analysis.

In one important respect this method and type of explanation have been broadened. Having found simpler elements and processes, men have gone on to investigate how they act when combined in a complex system. In the various analytic sciences from physics to psychology, it has proved necessary to consider the way in which processes function, not only in isolation, but also in the relevant context or "field" in which they normally operate. The structure of this field or system of interacting processes has thus assumed increasing importance; in the more mathematical sciences it is this structure which the fundamental equations have come to formulate. To the mechanistic analysis into component processes there has been added the functional analysis into the specific way they act in the total situation. The sciences no longer tend to "reduce" complex wholes to their atomic constituents, assuming that no modification of behavior takes place in the combination, and thus "explaining away" the systematic factor. They endeavor rather to discover its precise pattern. But on the other hand they are as eager as ever to find the elementary mechanisms that function in those structures. In consequence, the older issue, in sciences like biology, for instance, between a "mechanistic interpretation" and its denial has ceased to have much importance. Elements are elements of systems, and neither factor can be neglected.

Scientists to-day are more confident than ever of the validity of their general method, in this broadened form. But their earlier dogmatism as to the specific conclusions and generalizations they had achieved has been swamped under the mass of detailed observations and experiments those theories could not deal with adequately. Scientists are the first to admit that the sum of their knowledge is paltry compared with the domain still to be investigated, that their hypotheses are obviously too crude and inadequate on many crucial points, and that the basic theoretical concepts are at present in a highly unstable state of rapid flux. For all we know, whole new sets of forces as central as radio-activity may be revealed which will fundamentally alter our present scientific ideas. So far as complete "proof" is concerned, it is still possible in all fields to maintain that quite different factors are operating. Multitudes of men who, for one reason or another, do not want to accept the view of the universe being worked out by even the broadened method of mechanistic analysis, remain either sceptical and agnostic about the whole validity of natural science as an explanation of things, or advance against it other theories which seem to them equally well founded on the facts of human experience.

In recording the way in which the method of mechanistic analysis has penetrated every barrier set up to keep it out of privileged fields, we must realize that we are tracing the growth of a scientific faith in a certain method rather than of any final scientific knowledge. The body of believers is still far outnumbered by the masses of the infidels, and within the ranks of investigators themselves there are still heretics, as honest and as sincere as the more orthodox majority. But with the liberalization of that method the number of scientific heretics has been rapidly diminishing.

BASIC GENERALIZATIONS UNIFYING THE FIELDS OF PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY

Three main movements are discernible in the nineteenth-century spread of mechanistic analysis: first, the unification of the fields of physics and chemistry through fundamental generalizations; secondly, the introduction of such analysis into the realm of biology, of living beings; and thirdly, the application of the same viewpoint and method to the study of human

nature itself. This is not the place to enter into any detailed consideration of the progress of scientific discovery and theory; that fascinating story has been often told. But since it is beyond question the most important intellectual force in the last hundred years, it is worth while to present even a very inadequate summary of its significance. It was science, the mathematico-physical experimental learning of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that really wrought the changes from the intellectual world of the Middle Ages, changes that neither Renaissance nor Reformation had been able to bring about; and increasingly it has been the growth of scientific knowledge that has caused the steady spread of the naturalistic viewpoint in every field. Science remained unperturbed by the romantic reaction; and science has seen that tide reach its height and roll back, though its waves still beat incessantly upon the citadel of knowledge. What the scientists learned from the romanticists, in a broader and more flexible outlook and method, in a wider conception of the extent of human experience, in a conviction of the fundamental importance of studying origins and development, has served only to intrench more strongly the scientific method and the scientific criterion of truth in the minds of all educated men.

Those sciences, like physics and astronomy and chemistry, in which the Newtonian world had been rooted, witnessed a double movement: on the one hand, they became less confident of mathematical hypotheses unchecked by the most careful experimentation, and engaged in a great coöperative enterprise to bring to light the multitudes of detailed facts about the world; on the other, this very mass of observations led men to the formulation and verification of sweeping generalizations stating in mathematical terms the fundamental relationships between physical phenomena. Physicists, no longer content with the mechanics of gross bodies, carried their analysis further and further. In the kinetic theory of matter they worked out in detail a molecular mechanics that would draw together all the investigations of solids, fluids, and gases, together with the phenomena of heat and sound, and explain all so-called physical properties of bodies in terms of the energy of motion of their component particles. The vast sciences of electricity and magnetism, mere idle curiosities in the previous century,

opened up a new world of electro-magnetic energy following laws even more basic than those of mechanics; to explain these phenomena it became necessary to distinguish a further component factor within the atom, the electron. Chemists, bringing order into their science by a verifiable atomic theory set in mathematical terms, discovered the Periodic Law of atomic weights, and were led to the same analysis of the atom into electrons and a nucleus of varying complexity which had been necessary in physics. The two sciences merged in their roots into one, the study of the behavior of the factors within the atom and of the compounds it enters into; and to-day matter and motion together are dissolving into a common form of periodic energy, whose laws when completely formulated promise to include all physical and chemical laws as special instances.

In the achievement of such a mathematical synthesis of all physical phenomena, three main stages may be distinguished. The first was the work of the seventeenth century; Galileo and Newton formulated the universal laws of motion and gravitation. The second sprang chiefly from a study of the steam engine and the other heat-producing machines of the early nineteenth century; it is expressed in the great generalization of the Conservation of Energy. This developed from the determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat, undertaken by Rumford and Davy; but the final enunciation is due mainly to Joule in England and Mayer and Helmholtz in Germany. The latter phrased it:

The last decades of scientific development have led us to the recognition of a new universal law of all natural phenomena, which, from its extraordinarily extended range, and from the connection which it constitutes between natural phenomena of all kinds, even of the remotest times and the most distant places, is especially fitted to give us an idea of the character of the natural sciences. This law is the Law of the Conservation of Force; it asserts, that the *quantity of force which can be brought into action in the whole of Nature is unchangeable, and can neither be increased nor diminished.*⁴

This law is often called the First Law of Thermodynamics; the second law, formulated by Kelvin, is that of the Dissipation of Energy, that while the total energy in the universe is constant, the sum of useful energy is diminishing by its ultimate conversion into non-useful or dissipated heat: that is, kinetic

energy seems to be undergoing a degradation into purely molecular motion. These great generalizations, it should be noted, like the earlier Newtonian principle of the universal scope of the laws of mechanics, while marvelously valuable in uniting the varied phenomena of nature under a few fundamental laws, are assumptions rather than absolutely verified theories, assumptions necessary to science, but assumptions of the scientific faith none the less.

It still remained to bring the phenomena of light, electricity, and magnetism together, and to link them with the foundations of mechanics and of chemistry. As a result of the work of Thomas Young and Fresnel, it was definitely established that light is a form of wave-motion in some medium. Coulomb and Ampère in France, Ohm in Germany, and Faraday and Kelvin in England, discovered and formulated the laws of electrostatics, electro-magnetism, and of galvanic currents; and Faraday suggested, with brilliant intuition, though he did not work his theory out mathematically, that all these facts could be referred to the effects of motion in what he called an electro-magnetic field, and that this field possessed much in common with the medium, ether, which the wave theory of light made it necessary to assume.

Thus three great generalizations had been achieved by the middle of the century: Newtonian mechanics, the atomic theory in chemistry, and the kinetic theory of matter, light, electricity, and magnetism.

None of these three principles, however, appeared sufficient to cover the whole field. The law of gravitation embraced cosmical and some molar phenomena, but led to vagueness when applied to molecular actions. The atomic theory led to a complete systematization of chemical compounds, but afforded no clue to the mysteries of chemical affinity. And the kinetic or mechanical theories of light, of electricity, and magnetism, led rather to a new dualism, the division of science into sciences of matter and of the ether. The unification of scientific thought which was gained by any of these three views, was thus only partial. A more general term had to be found under which the different terms could be comprised, which would give a still higher generalization, a more complete unification of knowledge.⁵

This conception was electro-magnetic energy, and its definition and formulation, begun by Clerk Maxwell, Helmholtz, and Hertz, lies at the foundation of all subsequent study of the

electron and radio-activity, as well as of the mathematical synthesis of the other three principles.

Maxwell set to work to study the energy of the electro-magnetic field by applying the law of the conservation of energy. Where Faraday had been content with a mechanical analogy for his fruitful conception, Maxwell, a brilliant mathematician, reduced its properties to exact measurement. He succeeded in identifying all the various experimentally ascertained electric and magnetic phenomena, fixing their nature and quantities in conformity with experience, and arriving finally at the conclusion that the velocity of the transmission of electro-magnetic forces must be the same as that of light, light being but a special form of such wave-motion. "We can scarcely avoid the inference that light consists in the transverse undulations of the same medium which is the cause of electric and magnetic phenomena." ⁶ Hertz verified Maxwell's calculations by detailed experiment, proving the fundamental character of the electro-magnetic field and its energy. The equations expressing these systematic relationships, "Maxwell's equations," have remained the basis of the new mathematical synthesis. Einstein has described their formulation as the most important event in physics since Newton's time. They not only express the radiation of both electro-magnetic and light waves — the two differ only in wave-length — thus bringing both electrical and optical phenomena under the same formulae. They represent the structure of a field of radiation, and enable us to predict the changes in that field. All the newer developments in physical theory converge on the radiation of energy within a field of definite structure as the most fundamental type of process so far discovered in nature; and the field equations express the laws of this basic and universal type of activity.

THE NEWER CONCEPTS OF PHYSICS

At the close of the century physical theory seemed to be reaching a stable and perfected form. Whatever was not matter and its energy of motion — of which heat had been proved an instance — was the energy of motion of the "ether." The various forms of energy were mutually convertible without change of quantity. In this closely-related scheme of matter, energy, and ether, there was a place for every known physical phenomenon.

Then in 1895 Röntgen produced X-rays by bombarding a metal target in a vacuum tube with "cathode rays" or streams of electrons; and the next year Becquerel found the same types of emission and radiation in radio-active substances. The study of the radiation of energy, and of the structure of the atom in terms of the particles and waves it can be made to give off or absorb, took an immense spurt. Now energy had always been regarded as continuous, unlike matter with its atomic structure: bodies could absorb or lose it by smooth and gradual change. But in 1900 Max Planck was led to suggest that energy too must be atomic or granular in character, that in radiation it is transmitted in indivisible units or "quanta." Planck's quantum theory has proved of basic importance in the further study of radiation and of atomic structure. Applied to radiation of the frequency of light, it treats a light ray as a stream of quanta of light-energy, or "photons," rather than as a continuous wave-motion; it takes the different wave-lengths of the spectrum as different degrees of energy in the particular photons for each color. This quantum theory of light is a revival in much subtler form of Newton's corpuscular theory. It has been found to explain certain phenomena which the wave-theory does not; but it fails to explain others, like diffraction, or the bending of light rays around small obstacles, which first established the wave-theory a century ago. In certain relations, light behaves like a shower of photons; in others, like a wave. This situation, in which two mutually inconsistent theories are both needed to deal with the different aspects of light, in which, it has been said, we have to use the wave theory on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and the corpuscular theory on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, has been a standing challenge to find a comprehensive and unifying hypothesis. The same problem has developed with the quanta or units of matter: electrons behave not only like particles, but also on occasion like waves. This contradiction led de Broglie and Schrödinger to work out a wave or quantum mechanics, which tries to combine both aspects by treating the matter statistically. In this latest development of the quantum theory, the older classical mechanics of particles or masses appears as a special instance of a more general wave mechanics; and the units or quanta of matter — the electrons — are found to exhibit the same laws as the quanta of energy.

This development of the theory of energy has been intimately connected with the work on the theory of atomic structure. For our knowledge of atoms depends upon the different kinds of charged particles and radiation we can find emanating from them. On the basis of these emissions we try to work out mathematically a mechanism that will act in that precise way. We then employ that structure to suggest new experiments; when they fail to turn out as the theory predicts, we try to reconstruct the equations. Since we thus observe atoms primarily as sources of complex radiation — the lines in that atom's spectrum are a cardinal example — any advance in the knowledge of radiation at once suggests new facts about the atom. The most fruitful model so far devised, that of Bohr, was derived by applying the quantum theory to Rutherford's suggestion of 1911 that the atom consists of a positively charged nucleus with one or more negatively charged electrons revolving about it, like planets about the sun. In Bohr's hypothesis, the revolving electrons could radiate energy only when they jumped to a new orbit, and the number of possible orbits was limited by the quantum unit of energy. The ninety-two elements in the periodic table differed in possessing from one to ninety-two revolving electrons. For over ten years this hypothesis was remarkably successful in explaining the experimental facts. But Bohr's equations and planetary model proved too crude to account for all the observed facts; above all, its view of the electron as a charged particle could not explain why electrons at times behaved like waves. De Broglie, developing wave mechanics by applying the theory of relativity to the quantum theory, furnished Schrödinger with a more adequate mathematical expression for the events going on within the atom; the Schrödinger atom has superseded Bohr's. It is difficult to state its structure in non-mathematical terms, which may well be an advantage, for mechanical "models" are misleading as well as illuminating. In this view the atom is not a system of revolving particles, but a continuous electrical charge fluctuating in density with a complex frequency — a kind of pulsating sphere of electricity. The electrons emitted are treated as little bunches of waves or vibratory energy rather than as particles.

Thus wave mechanics, taking seriously the equivalence of matter and energy already calculated by Einstein, regards the

older particles or material points as narrow parcels of waves, systems of waves so interfering with each other that they cancel each other out everywhere except at the position occupied by the material point. Matter and energy are mutually convertible, and in place of the principles maintaining their separate conservation, there is the broader principle of the conservation of matter-energy.

An unexpected consequence of the quantum theory is that the position and the velocity of an individual electron cannot both be determined at the same time, and hence its behavior cannot be precisely calculated. To ascertain its position, we must direct rays upon it, and thus alter its velocity; to ascertain its velocity makes its position indefinite. The accuracy of the two measurements varies inversely, and is limited theoretically as well as practically by the quantum constant. We can no more follow the movement of an individual electron than we could see a colored picture whose dimensions were smaller than the wave length of its color. The impossibility of predicting the behavior of any individual electron was formulated by Heisenberg as the principle of uncertainty or indeterminacy. This principle has been made the starting-point for much dubious speculation about the absence of strict causality and determinism in nature, and has been extended far beyond the atomic field to which it is relevant. But methodologically it means that the physicist can deal only with masses of electrons, and in statistical terms. The equations of quantum physics consequently take the form of probability functions, and state the periodic changes or waves of the probability of certain events. Such statistical rules make prediction and verification possible under all conditions of observation. But they concern an aggregate, not individuals; and they are verified by a series of repeated measurements.

The major phenomenon so far left out of our account of the unification of physical science in terms of the energy of radiation is gravitation. To bring mechanics and radiation together, to unite both gravitation and electricity in a comprehensive "field theory," has been the basic drive of all Einstein's work. In formulating his special theory of relativity in 1905, he set forth a general scheme for the motion of bodies, including those with a velocity approaching that of light, for which classical

mechanics breaks down; Newton's laws appear as a special case for the slower velocities. Einstein's "special theory" was limited to events taking place in systems in uniform rectilinear motion, for which the Newtonian law of inertia holds. In 1917 he went on in his general theory of relativity to deal with systems in any kind of motion, and worked out the equations for the gravitational field.

Starting from the negative results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, which attempted to detect changes in the velocity of light due to the earth's absolute motion through the supposed medium of the ether, he laid down two principles: first, the velocity of light is constant, and unaffected by relative motion between the observer and the light's source; secondly and more generally, the laws of physics are not altered by the motion of the system in which the events are occurring; they are the same in all coördinate-systems moving uniformly relative to each other. This principle had been established for mechanics since Galileo; it was now extended to electro-dynamics as well. To be sure, various surprising things would seem to be happening on another system moving with a high velocity with reference to the observer: there would appear to be a contracting of everything in the other system in the direction of its motion, and clocks in it would seem to be running slow. To an observer on the other system, the same things would be apparent in the system of the first observer. But by taking account of the relative motion between the two systems, and applying the proper rules — the Lorentz transformation laws — the familiar physical laws, for example, Maxwell's equations, would be found obtaining in both systems after this translation. That is, the laws of physics would be invariant with respect to the Lorentz transformation. In just the same way the laws of mechanics are found to be the same in the two systems when the apparent motions in the one are suitably translated by the classical transformation rules. A further consequence of the special theory of relativity is that there is no essential distinction between mass and energy. Energy has mass, mass represents energy, the two are convertible, and their equivalence has been precisely calculated.

The general theory of relativity goes on to consider systems in accelerated motion with respect to each other. Such systems

are identical in behavior and structure with a gravitational field. Thus the equations for such motion will describe the operation of gravitational forces; they are formulated in the complicated mathematics of the tensor calculus. Gravitation is looked upon, not as an attractive force inherent in masses, but as the property of a field with a definite structure, in which masses tend to move toward the point of least stress. Einstein's problem was to find the coördinate system or type of geometrical "space" which would describe that structure. He worked out a non-Euclidean or "curved" system in which light rays, following the "shortest" path, are bent or deflected when passing near large masses like the sun. It is to be noted that the experimental consequences of the general theory of relativity differ on only a few points from those of classical mechanics, though on these points observation has confirmed it. Its main advantage is the mathematical simplicity and consistency of its fundamental assumptions.

Einstein's equations for the gravitational field are still quite different from Maxwell's equations for the field of electromagnetics. In that sense, gravitation has not yet been integrated mathematically with the electrical theory of matter and energy. Einstein has several times announced a general unified "field theory," based on a new coördinate system, or type of space, from which he hoped to deduce both the electromagnetic and the gravitational equations as special instances. But the task has proved more difficult than he anticipated, and the theory of a comprehensive "field physics" has not yet been constructed. That final unification remains to be accomplished.

The significance of these generalizations is obvious. Modern science began with the attempt to analyze all phenomena into the behavior of certain ultimate components uniting to form various combinations. In the Newtonian world, these elements were masses, and their laws were those of motion. To-day, the elements seem to be rather the waves of energy in an electromagnetic field, and their laws, the laws of the structure and behavior of such a field. The various portions of physical theory are all in a state of rapid flux: quantum theory still holds untold possibilities of further development, the analysis of the structure of the nucleus of the atom is proceeding apace, no atomic model is completely adequate to the facts, the inte-

gration of matter and gravitation into a unified field theory belongs to the future. Many inconsistencies are left, between theories, and between theory and experiment. But if the eighteenth-century vision of a universal mathematico-mechanical synthesis was far too crude, and failed to realize the complexity of analysis required to bring all facts within its comprehensive sweep, its fundamental principles of method and attitude, unswervingly maintained, deepened and broadened in recent years, have reaped their reward: our present-day Order of Nature may be far more intricate, but it is also far more comprehensive and far more solidly established than ever before.

It is hardly surprising that this revolution in physical theory and concepts has provoked an immense amount of philosophizing, both about the new pictures of the world suggested, and about the very nature of the scientific enterprise itself. On the one hand, speculative cosmologies have been erected, only to crumble with some new discovery or change in theory. On the other, both philosophers and scientists have undertaken a careful and critical analysis of the function and nature of scientific theory in general, and of the mathematical formulations of physical theory in particular. The older view that Newtonian science was a direct reading of the structure of nature is no longer tenable. Scientific theory and concepts, it is only too apparent, develop and change in time; and he would be hardy to-day who maintained that any of the present ideas express "the way things really are." The primary function of theory and hypothesis, it is now clear, is to organize discoveries already made and suggest new questions to put to nature. Whether and how far the coördinating ideas themselves represent anything to be found in nature is a minor matter, on which our philosophies of science differ. (That the equations for probability waves are highly abstract is obvious; and most physicists are now content with a set of mathematical formulae that will predict the events in the field of radiation, and have ceased to look for a mechanical model of the atom that can be pictured in the imagination.) This growth of a positivistic and functional attitude toward scientific theory is a major feature of our philosophies of science to-day; they are increasingly concerned with what science does and how it does it, with methods and procedures, rather than with its conclusions of the moment.

MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY

While physics and chemistry were thus formulating their generalizations, the same mechanistic principles of explanation were being introduced into the sciences of life. In biology, this has meant the interpretation of all the processes of living organisms in purely chemical terms. The German chemist Liebig was the pioneer in organic chemistry; he and his great pupil Johannes Müller, with the Frenchman Claude Bernard, initiated the study of the chemistry of the living being in its products and its processes. From this it was but a step to the conception and investigation of life as a series of especially complicated chemical reactions. Names are too numerous to mention; to Americans, Jacques Loeb will stand as the symbol of the achievements and the promise of experimental biology. Experiments seem to point to the conclusion that in the lower forms of life at least all the processes of the organism, both in its parts and in its behavior as a whole, are capable of explanation solely in chemical terms. In Loeb's words, "Living organisms are chemical machines consisting chiefly of colloidal material and possessing the peculiarity of preserving and reproducing themselves. . . . The essential difference between living and non-living matter consists in this: the living cell synthesizes its own complicated specific material from indifferent or non-specific simple compounds of the surrounding medium, while the crystal simply adds the molecules found in its supersaturated solution. This synthetic power of transforming small 'building stones' into the complicated compounds specific for each organism is the 'secret of life' or rather one of the secrets of life." All the actions of any organism, from lowest to highest, hold such biologists, can be analyzed into "chemotropisms"; that is, into chemical reactions of a specific type.

Life in its processes, then, is purely chemical; so it must be in its origins as well. Offspring have been produced in bisexual organisms by means of artificial fertilization of the egg-cell, without the presence of any male spermatozoa; by such means animals as complex as the frog have been developed from the female egg alone. Most biologists regard the actual creation of life from non-living matter as something to be accomplished in the laboratory, so soon as the regulative chemical or enzyme has been isolated and synthesized. "The beginning of life was not a

fortuitous event occurring millions of years ago and never again repeated, but one which in its primordial stages keeps on repeating itself all the time and in our generation. . . . Given the presence of matter and energy forms under the proper conditions, life must come inevitably." ⁸ "The ultimate aim of the physical sciences is the visualization of all phenomena in terms of groupings and displacements of ultimate particles, and since there is no discontinuity between the matter constituting the living and the non-living world, the goal of biology can be expressed in the same way." ⁹

It is true that there are a few dissenting biologists who feel that this confidence is somewhat premature; but since their theories are wholly negative, merely refusing to admit that living processes are completely explicable in chemical terms, and offering only the vaguest suggestions of what else is needed, it is only natural that the great majority refuse to listen to men who deny the possibility of a biological science. Mechanism seems to offer the only program of investigation, while "vitalism," insisting in addition on some "principle of life" as an explanatory factor, can point to no such impressive experimental achievements.

The newer ideas in physics have had as yet only incidental application in biology. The analogies between the electromagnetic field and the self-regulatory systems within which biochemical processes take place have indeed suggested that living beings may be fruitfully treated as complex electrical structures. Already experiments on the electrical states of the organism and its forms of radiation, like brain waves, have confirmed this hope. The future of biophysics seems very bright.

More generally, by emphasizing the systematic character and organic structure of its own field, recent physics has tended to break down the old distinction between the "inorganic" and the organic. And in method also it is joining biology: both are adopting a similar statistical procedure. Present-day naturalistic philosophies accordingly now find it easy to fit living processes into the new world of systems of energy: thus Whitehead, for example, can define biology as the study of the larger and more complicated organisms, physics as that of the smaller and simpler organisms. Just as the experimental biologist

analyzes biochemical processes not in isolation but as factors in the complicated medium of a living system or organism, so the physicist has now come to approach his processes as factors in their context of a field of radiation. Looking beyond the purely atomic limits of nineteenth-century mechanical physics and mechanistic biology, neither neglects the "organic" character of the system he is analyzing; but both are seeking with redoubled vigor the elementary processes or mechanisms which control that system. Thus in the face of a broader functional analysis, the need for a "vitalistic" protest in biology is disappearing. The organic properties and activities characteristic of living things are no longer perplexing anomalies with no intelligible place in a purely mechanical nature. They are merely special complications of traits found universally in all systems of natural events.

MECHANISTIC ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY

The last field into which naturalistic explanation on an experimental basis has entered has been that of human behavior, psychology. Men like Hartley in the eighteenth century had made a crude beginning, but the backwardness of biology had prevented much fruitful work. If biology is now regarded as a very complex branch of chemistry, psychology is coming to be treated by most of the experimentalists as a branch of biology or physiology. Experimental psychology as a natural science was developed by physicians who approached the whole matter from the physiological point of view. Wundt in Germany and William James in America were the pioneers. With James, the problem of a biological psychology became the discovery of the physiological changes in the nervous system which would serve as the mechanism of human behavior and of man's mental life. The American "behaviorists," under the leadership of John B. Watson, have pushed this biological approach in its most radical form. They have made of psychology the study of the physiological reactions of the human organism as a whole. Their science tries to analyze human nature, not, with the eighteenth century, into sensations and ideas, but rather into the biological reactions of the nervous system to specific stimuli.

The whole of mental life, even in its highest reaches of reflective thought, the Behaviorists maintain, can be studied and

its laws formulated solely in terms of the physiological structure and activity of the body.

Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science which needs consciousness as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics. . . . This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier which exists between psychology and the other sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms.¹⁰

To such a science, thought can be accounted for as a series of reactions of the larynx, the organ of speech, which in themselves are dependent on mechanisms in the central nervous system.

It is not different in essence from tennis-playing, swimming, or any other overt activity, except that it is hidden from ordinary observation and is more complex and at the same time more abbreviated so far as its parts are concerned than even the bravest of us could dream of.¹¹

On such a view the human being comes into the world a bundle of prepotent reflexes, ready to be set off by the proper physical stimulus. During the course of a lifetime various stimuli, from without and within, condition these mechanisms and build them into long trains of habits; the entire process is ultimately a physico-chemical modification of the nervous system. Perhaps the most extreme statement of such a chemical explanation of human actions is to be found in Loeb.

The highest manifestation of ethics, namely, the condition that human beings are willing to sacrifice their lives for an idea is comprehensible neither from the utilitarian standpoint nor from that of the categorical imperative. It might be possible that under the influence of certain ideas chemical changes, for instance, internal secretions within the body, are produced which increase the sensitiveness to certain stimuli to such an unusual degree that such people become slaves to certain stimuli just as the copepods (small crustaceans) become slaves to the light when carbon dioxide is added to the water. Since Pawlow and his pupils have succeeded in causing the secretion of saliva in the dog by means of optic and acoustic signals, it no longer seems strange to us that what the philosopher terms an "idea" is a process which can cause chemical changes in the body.¹²

Experimental psychology has to-day lost most of this brash self-confidence; the negative dogmas of the early Behaviorists have been forgotten. But their biological attitude, method, and viewpoint have won general acceptance, at least in America.

Most scientific psychologists to-day are "behavioristic" in using the methods of experimental science to study publicly observable human behavior. They have gone on from a primary concern with the elementary constituents of activity to the functional problems of their interaction and integration in the complex adjustments of the organism to its environment. Atomic analysis into minute segments of behavior has been unable to get very far without considering the larger patterns in which they coöperate. The same emphasis on the functioning of simpler processes within a complex system or field which we have seen emerging in physics and in biology has expressed itself here in movements like psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology. The latter group in particular have not been content, like most of the critics of an analytic method in the sciences of life, merely to attack the validity of a purely atomic or reductive analysis into elements. They have brought a mass of experimental evidence to support the view that organisms respond not merely to isolated stimuli but to complex structures or patterns of relation (*Gestalten*) in the field of behavior. Psychology is likewise broadening its methods to include a functional analysis of its field.

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE ORIGIN OF PRESENT FORMS

Upon these principles science attempts to explain the processes of nature observable to-day; long before they had been elaborated into their present forms, the endeavor was made to apply them also to the origin and development of the world and all the objects therein. Here the nineteenth century was doing more than extending the realm of the Newtonian Order of Nature; it was applying its methods to an entirely new field. The impulse came, as we have seen, from the realization of the importance of history in the social sciences; but it only became exact and fruitful when applied by scientists rather than romantic poets. Here, too, the order of advance was from astronomy, in which the mathematical interpretation of nature had begun, to the field of man. Because such a naturalistic explanation of origins was newer, and was carried on at a much more rapid rate, the consequent readjustment of the entire realm of men's beliefs was more difficult and led to more struggle and conflict. Hence it is probably true that the chief intellectual changes of the century

were brought about in the endeavor to adjust men's older beliefs to the new idea of a universal development and evolution. First in astronomy, then in geology, then in biology, and lastly in the social sciences, the conception of evolution altered the entire intellectual map of the world. The chief points of friction were at the outset in the adjustment in the field of religion, whose very acclimatization in the static Newtonian world made it all the more difficult to set up a new reconciliation; and then in economics and morals, which are still to-day loath to admit the full consequences of the new scientific beliefs.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM

The conception of a scientific theory of origins first reached definiteness in astronomy. Laplace, following directly in Newton's path, published in 1799 his *Treatise on Celestial Mechanics*, an infinitely extended and enriched version of Newton's *Principia*. His ambition was "to offer a complete solution of the great mechanical problem presented by the solar system, and bring theory to coincide so closely with observation that empirical equations should no longer find a place in astronomical tables."¹³ But he attacked also another problem that Newton had excluded, the origin and development of the solar system into its present form. Newton had believed that God made the solar system and its laws at a single moment in time; it was a machine, but a machine created by God with a definite purpose in mind. Buffon had already suggested that the sun originally existed alone, and that a comet falling upon it had started a swirl of matter from which the planets developed. Laplace, following the proposal of Kant, made in 1755, advanced the nebular hypothesis. The solar system existed originally as a great nebula, with a central kernel. Cooling caused this gaseous nebula to condense into concentric rings, which themselves formed new nebulae, from which the planets developed. This theory, while much modified in detail, and while supplemented by an alternative "planetesimal hypothesis" that seems to bear even closer resemblance to what we can observe in the various spiral nebulae in the heavens, has been accepted by astronomers in general. Its significance lies in its viewing celestial phenomena as essentially processes of development in time rather than as eternal recurrences; and, as the story goes, when Laplace was asked by Napoleon as to

where the Creator came in under his view, he drew himself up haughtily and replied, "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis." The stars, no less than the elements or than life, are the product of a process of growth.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EARTH

Laplace's hypothesis gave the geologists a basis for their work, to describe the stages in the emergence of the present form of the earth from its original incandescent state. Toward the end of the eighteenth century James Hutton and William Smith made patient, accurate, and detailed studies of fossils and their distribution, and of erosion and other work of water, collecting a mass of data from which a generalization could be drawn. Hutton especially insisted that the present is the key to the past, and that all past changes of the earth's surface are to be explained, not as due to great catastrophes, as was commonly held, but as the result of "causes now in operation." Just as the crust of the earth is being changed to-day by the action of rain, rivers, the sea, chemical decomposition and internal disturbances, so continents have always been altered and the various strata deposited. This doctrine of Uniformitarianism was seized upon by Charles Lyell and made the basis of his *Principles of Geology*, which, published in 1830, impressed upon the scientific mind the conception that the present state of affairs is due to the operation of constant natural causes over immense spaces of time. Upon the opening page of Lyell's book was inscribed this quotation from Playfair: "Amid all the revolutions of the globe, the economy of nature has been uniform and her laws are the only things which have resisted the general movement. The rivers and the rocks, the seas and the continents have been changed in all their parts; but the laws which direct those changes, and the rules to which they are subject, have remained invariably the same."¹⁴ Lyell proceeded to apply this principle to all the phenomena of geology, with the result that he brought order and harmony out of what had before been chaos.

The significance of this work was not only, as Darwin put it, that this principle of Uniformity, the explanation of the past as like the present in its natural forces, "altered the whole tone of one's mind," and made past development of cardinal im-

portance in science; "it was necessary for the supporters of this doctrine to take for granted incalculable periods of time, in order to explain the formation of sedimentary strata by causes now in diurnal action."¹⁵ The Newtonian conception that the world and its furniture sprang into being complete a few thousand years ago at the simple fiat of the Creator became impossible, and in its place was imposed the necessity of believing that untold ages of development have preceded the present. Where Bruno set the world in the midst of an infinity of other worlds, Lyell placed it in well-nigh infinite time. Modern geologists hold that the oldest rocks of the Azoic or Archæozoic Age have endured for anywhere from 500,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 years.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORMS OF LIFE

It was but a step to the most revolutionary change of all, the application of the uniformitarian principle to biology and the origin of present forms of life. Already in the eighteenth century men had revived the ancient Greek speculations that the existing species of life are the result of a long process of growth. But the accepted view was that of the Swedish naturalist and classifier Linnæus, that "We reckon as many species as issued in pairs from the hands of the Creator,"¹⁶ and that species have remained absolutely fixed from the period of their creation as described in Genesis, the only change being that of extension in numbers, not of variation in kind. *Nullæ species novæ* was a doctrine well fitted for the Newtonian world. Yet from many sources this theory was being attacked. Naturalists like Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles, and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, the opponent of Cuvier, an adherent of Linnæus's position; and romantic poets and philosophers like Goethe, Oken, and Schelling, attempted to formulate the evolutionary conception in various ways. Greatest of all was Lamarck, friend of Buffon, and zoölogist at the *Jardin des Plantes* in Paris. Lamarck attempted to develop a theory that would give some causal explanation of the evolution of species, in the absence of which such a theory must remain unintelligible. Refining upon the ideas of Buffon, who had held that the environment acts directly upon animals to produce new forms, he maintained that such changes were the result of an

adaptation to a changed environment, transmitted to the offspring.

1. Life by its internal forces tends continually to increase the volume of every body that possesses it, as well as to increase the size of all the parts of the body up to a limit which it brings about. 2. The production of a new organ or part results from a new need or want, which continues to be felt, and from the new movement which this need initiates and causes to continue. 3. The development of organs and their force or power of action are always in direct relation to the employment of these organs. 4. All that has been acquired or altered in the organization of individuals during their life is preserved by generation, and transmitted to new individuals which proceed from those which have undergone these changes.¹⁷

This was a uniformitarian principle, but Lamarck had no opportunity for extended observation and experiment; and many facts, especially the limited time then allowed to the history of the world — it was supposed to have been created 4004 B.C. — led to a rejection of his views by most naturalists. But when Lyell revolutionized geology, and destroyed all confidence in the Mosaic cosmogony, the notion of organic evolution came to the fore again. Two things remained to be established: first, a detailed investigation of the distribution of living and fossil forms of life that would paint the picture of the succession of species in time; and secondly, a verifiable theory giving some causal explanation of the process. These things were achieved by Alfred Russel Wallace and Charles Darwin, working simultaneously.

For thirty years Darwin painstakingly gathered evidence of all sorts for the fact that species have developed in time. The mass of evidence in his *Origin of Species* (1859), drawn from geographical distribution, from paleontology, from comparative anatomy, from embryology, and from experimental breeding, sufficed to convince the biologists that whatever its explanation, evolution is a fact. Perhaps even more important in gaining acceptance was his causal explanation of the process. He had been much impressed by Malthus's doctrine that the food-supply increases at a much slower rate than the offspring of animals. The bitter struggle for existence which Malthus found in man's economic life Darwin took as the key to the whole of nature; inevitably only the most favored individuals would survive. Since slight variations from the parent are

always occurring, "favorable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of a new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to work."¹⁸ Turning to the efforts of the breeders of domesticated animals, he saw the same factors at work, with the exception that in this case the parents were artificially selected by man. Substitute for the breeder the natural struggle for existence, and in natural selection and the consequent survival of those fittest to survive, lies the key to the *cause* of evolution.

Theologians might rage when Darwin applied the same ideas to *The Descent of Man*, in 1871, but biologists and scientists in general had no doubts. Nor from that day to this has a single fact been discovered to shake the conclusions of Darwin that all living beings have evolved from earlier simpler forms; rather the mass of cumulative evidence has grown mountain high, so that no intelligent man can possibly deny to-day the *fact* of organic evolution. Darwin's particular theory of the causal *factors* involved in the process, however, has not seemed so successful. It is obvious that for natural selection to operate certain variations in offspring are necessary. Darwin himself held that the common slight variations between parents and offspring are sufficient grist for the mill of natural selection; but a more detailed knowledge of the mechanism of heredity makes it difficult to believe that such variations could possibly be perpetuated. The theory of de Vries, that inheritable variations must be large and sudden, must be complete jumps or "mutations," which appeals to a few actually observed mutations and the impossibility of slighter ones being preserved, is that at present generally accepted.

But to take chance in large gulps instead of small dribblets really gives no more explanation of how and why such changes occur. Some biologists have revived the theory of Lamarck, that the individual adapts himself to his new environment, and that these new characteristics are then inherited; but investigations connected with the name of Weismann, which show that the germ plasm, the seed of the future offspring, seems almost from the formation of the embryo so completely shut off from the rest of the body that it is difficult to imagine how any such functional adaptations could possibly influence

it, have led the vast majority of biologists to deny that acquired characteristics can be inherited at all, and throw the whole problem of the origin of the new form back upon chance variation in the germ plasm itself. At present biologists admit that, strictly speaking, we do not know anything about the causes of the origin of new species: the scientific faith holds that they occur because of chemical changes in the germ plasm. Experiment has shown that an environment of different temperature, or treatment with X-rays, can directly alter the genes that determine heredity. This suggests that the X-ray-like "cosmic rays" that fill our atmosphere may be the immediate cause of novelty. But the words of T. H. Morgan still sum up the situation: "The causes of the mutations that give rise to new characters we do not know, although we have no reason for supposing that they are due to other than natural processes."¹⁹

On one other element in the process of evolution much light has been thrown: the work of the obscure Austrian monk Gregor Mendel has led to the formulation of the laws of normal heredity, and stimulated the search for its mechanism. In the germ plasm itself there have been discovered bodies called chromosomes, made up of strings of bead-like genes. These genes are found in pairs, one from each parent; each pair has a definite function in producing the new organism, so that a change in one specifically alters it. This mechanism of heredity rests upon an atomic basis: the genes that unite to form a given individual are the elements that determine its inherited characters. But here too it is a functional atomism: no single gene determines any particular character of the organism, except negatively, if it be defective; every feature is a product of the interaction of many contributing genes. Furthermore, each cell contains all the genes, and what it will grow into depends not only on them, but also on its cellular environment. But though we have observed plenty of mutations, this precise knowledge of heredity has hardly revealed their causes.

THE EFFECT OF THE NOTION OF DEVELOPMENT ON SCIENTIFIC IDEALS

But in spite of these difficulties, the beliefs of men to-day have become thoroughly permeated with the conception of evolution. The great underlying notions and concepts that meant so much

to the eighteenth century, Nature and Reason and Utility, have largely given way to a new set better expressing the ultimate intellectual ideals of the Growing World. Many social factors conspired to popularize the idea of development and its corollaries. The fundamental social fact of the Industrial Revolution, with its continually accelerated change in the technique of applied science, and the revolution in the life of man brought about by the growth of cities and the utilization of new inventions, has brought home to every man the realization that our whole civilization is in process of thoroughgoing reorganization. Ways of life that seemed firmly established a single generation ago now have by the very pressure of circumstance been made almost obsolete, and few are so blind as to escape the significance of this fact of social change for every human institution. Transformations of political, economic, religious, and moral life are now commonplaces; every idea and custom has to be dated if it is to be understood properly. All these elements in modern civilization have driven home the fundamental nature of the idea of Change and Continuous Development, and powerfully reinforced the purely scientific reasons for making it a basic idea. Just as in considering the eighteenth century we were led to trace the effects of the idea of the Newtonian Order of Nature in every field, with the consequent attempts to readjust men's older beliefs to the new scientific ideal, so in sketching the intellectual changes of the past century we shall be forced to regard them all as primarily reactions, in one way or another, to the idea of Evolution.

Perhaps the fundamental emphasis brought by Evolution into men's minds has been upon the detailed causal analysis of the specific processes of change. Instead of seeking to discover the end or purpose of the world-process as a whole, or to discern the ultimate cause or ground of all existent things — the fundamental task of earlier science and philosophy — men have come to examine just what the process is and just what it does in its parts. They have rejected the ultimate goal of both Thomas and Spinoza, the contemplation of a fixed and static structure of Truth, and adopted instead the aim of investigating all the little truths which experimentation can reveal. Not that Truth which is the source of all truths, lifting

man's soul above all human experience to the realm of the eternal, whether it be, with Aristotle and Thomas, the ultimate purpose of all things, or whether it be, with Spinoza, the universal mathematical system and structure of the world; but the patient, tireless, and endless search after an infinity of finite truths in our experience — this is the present-day goal of all scientific and philosophical endeavor. Men all agree to-day with Lessing:

Not the truth which a man possesses or thinks he possesses, but the steadfast task to which he has applied himself of striving after truth, is the true worth of man. . . . If God held concealed in his right hand all truth, and in his left only the ever eager impulse after truth, and said to me: "Choose!" I should reverently take his left hand and say: "Father, give unto me! The absolute truth is for Thee alone."²⁰

The new logic outlaws, flanks, dismisses — what you will — one type of problems and substitutes for it another type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them.

In the second place, the classic type of logic inevitably set philosophy upon proving that life *must* have certain qualities and values — no matter how experience presents the matter — because of some remote cause and eventual goal. The duty of wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all thinking that makes the meaning of special occurrences depend upon something that once and for all lies behind them. The habit of derogating from present meanings and uses prevents our looking the facts of experience in the face; it prevents serious acknowledgment of the evils they present and serious concern with the goods they promise but do not as yet fulfill. . . . The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy will doubtless not arrive by sheer logical disproof, but rather by growing recognition of its futility. Were it a thousand times true that opium produces sleep because of its dormitive energy, yet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the recovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not be thereby one least step forwarded. And were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where they now are. To improve our education, to ameliorate our manners, to advance our politics, we must have recourse to specific conditions of generation.²¹

Secondly, the success of evolution in the biological field brought a new emphasis on the methods and attitude of the biological and psychological sciences, rather than on those of

²¹ From *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, by John Dewey. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Henry Holt & Co.

physics and mathematics. Since Darwin the social and human sciences in general, which always turn for methods and viewpoints to the reigning natural science, have followed biology and psychology in politics, economics, and morals, just as in the eighteenth century they took their cue from mathematical physics. Slowly but steadily this new attitude has made its way in the fields which the "geometrical spirit" sought to conquer in the Newtonian world; and the conception of man as an organism reacting to and acting upon a complex environment is now basic. All ideas and institutions are to-day thought of as primarily social products, functioning in social groups and springing from the necessity of effecting some kind of adaptation between human nature and its environment. All the fields of human interest have undergone this general sociologizing and psychologizing tendency; the example of religion and theology will be a sufficient illustration. Whereas the eighteenth century thought of religion and theology as a deductive and demonstrative set of propositions, men now consider religion as primarily a social product, a way of life springing from the social organization of men's religious experiences, and theology as a rationalization of certain fundamental feelings and experiences of human nature. We no longer prove the existence of God, we talk rather of the "meaning of God in human experience"; we no longer demonstrate the future life, we investigate the effect of the belief in immortality upon human conduct.

Thirdly, evolutionary thought has brought a new emphasis on the complexity of organization in beliefs and society, and upon the various shades of differentiation. Not fixed and universal types, but infinitely varied individuals, are now the elements investigated; not "man," but the individual differences between one man and another, as developed in the wholes in which men function. This tendency is closely related to the realities of a complicated industrial system and an infinitely interrelated national and international life. Not universality, with the Age of Reason, not absolute individuality, with some of the romantics, but individuality within and between social groupings — this is the color of our thought.

Fourthly, evolution has introduced a whole new scale of values. Where for the eighteenth century the ideal was the rational, the natural, even the primitive and unspoiled, for us the

desirable is identified rather with the latter end of the process of development, and our terms of praise are "modern," "up-to-date," "advanced," "progressive." Just as much as the Enlightenment we tend to identify what we approve with Nature, but for us it is not the rational order of nature, but the culmination of an evolutionary process, which we take for our leverage in existence. The eighteenth century could think of nothing worse to call a man than an "unnatural enthusiast"; we prefer to dub him an "antiquated and outgrown fossil." That age believed a theory if it were called rational, useful, and natural; we favor it if it is "the most recent development." We had rather be modernists and progressives than sound reasoners. It is perhaps an open question if in our new scale of values we have not lost as much as we have gained.

Fifthly, the idea of evolution, as it has finally come to be understood, has reinforced the humanistic and naturalistic attitude. It has emphasized the part that human beings can and must play in social change, if that change is to eventuate in anything worth while. The earlier idea of the romanticists and of Spencer, that progress is an inevitable thing — a modern substitute for Divine Providence — has given place to the belief that if society is changing, its change must be intelligently guided. With the universalization of mechanistic law, we possess an immensely more potent tool in our science than men have ever had before; and with the conviction that society has not always been as it is to-day, and can well be quite different in the future, there is the promise that we can remould it in the directions in which we desire it to go. The conception of a social science no longer means for us, as it did for the eighteenth century, a static physics of society, a system of laws to be discovered and religiously obeyed. It means to-day a detailed study of the specific causes that produce specific results, and an intensive manipulation of our social heritage to produce what seems to us good.

Finally, the biological and psychological attitude of evolution has with curious irony reinforced the very irrationalism it has sought to combat. If beliefs are primarily means of adaptation to an environment, what becomes of truth, nay, of science itself? It can be only a specific form of biological adaptation, revered because of its successful functioning in maintaining life; truth in any other sense, the absolute truth of the older rationalists, is

meaningless in an evolving world. Cannot then any belief that works be true? To many the gate is opened to a new justification of their cherished faiths. Moreover, the analysis of the actual processes of the mind has led to the discovery of all the irrational elements that determine its thought and action, until it seems that amid the play of impulse, habit and emotion, and all those tendencies the Freudians place in the "unconscious," the still small voice of reason is quite drowned out. Are not all our beliefs but more or less concealed rationalizations, the reasons we invent for believing what we really believe because of quite different influence? Can intelligence do more than imagine such plausible justifications? Here is a disquieting question indeed! It has already destroyed the naïve faith of the Enlightenment in the unclouded reason of the average man, the very basis of liberalism and toleration; to many it seems the very suicide of science.

It is indeed a difficult problem; it is the old question of the freedom of the will in modern scientific guise. But however we solve it theoretically, it is evident that we must have faith in our ability to find truth; and if our early confidence has gone, a knowledge of the difficulties in the way must serve to make it easier to overcome them.

We close with a few words from a thinker who, probably more than any other man, has caught the vision of what the scientific method and the idea of evolution really means, John Dewey.

Thought can at least lighten the burden of humanity by emancipating mankind from the errors which thought has itself fostered — the existence of conditions which are real apart from their movement into something new and different, and the existence of ideals, spirit and reason independent of the possibilities of the material and physical. For as long as humanity is committed to this radically false bias, it will walk forward with blinded eyes and bound limbs. And thought can effect, if it will, something more than this negative task. It can make it easier for mankind to take the right steps in action by making it clear that a sympathetic and integral intelligence brought to bear upon the observation and understanding of concrete social events and forces, can form ideals, that is aims, which shall not be either illusions or mere emotional compensations.²²

²² From *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, by John Dewey. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Henry Holt & Co.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE GROWING WORLD

OF all the consequences that followed from the new evolutionary world of science, what seemed most momentous was the definite inclusion of man within the scope of the cosmic process. Not only was man an integral part of Nature, bound by her laws and subject to her forces; the eighteenth century had already learned that, but the knowledge had seemed to spread human reason throughout the universe rather than place man within a natural setting. Now after Darwin, however, there could be no further blinking of the fact that man was a product as well as a part of nature, that he had climbed to his present estate from lowly origins, and that all his works had been painfully acquired in the struggle against a hostile environment. While men had long recognized that man is a rational animal, they had perhaps not unnaturally emphasized his distinguishing mark of rationality; but now reason was well-nigh forgotten in the new realization of his common animality. Man was an animal species like any other, and he and his interests were the proper field of biology.

The social sciences, which for all their eighteenth-century pretensions to objectivity and precision had remained more rationalizations of contemporary demands than disinterested analyses, felt the full force of this new biological orientation. The revolution in the natural sciences effected by the emergence of the genetic viewpoint was as nothing to the transformations wrought in the human sciences. Indeed, it almost seems that nothing was left of the eighteenth-century science of man save its very conception, and the social sciences commonly date their birth from the coming of the evolutionary attitude. But a closer view reveals that far more of the spirit and method of the Enlightenment was preserved than evolutionists care to admit; while until the present generation the formulators of the new sciences of man were really much more influenced by the historical spirit drunk in from romanticist sources than by the smattering of biological terminology with which they veneered their systems. We have seen how the evolutionary attitude originated first in the social

field, as a part of the general romantic reaction to the mechanical ideal of the Enlightenment; and it must be confessed that long after the natural sciences had purified the genetic method of its idealistic and purposive husk, and turned to the experimental observation of the processes of change, theorists of society retained their romantic faith in great deductive systems and simple formulæ based on the slightest of observations.

Hence it can hardly be denied that, though the nineteenth century has seen an immense amount of intellectual energy devoted to the scientific study of man and his society, the results so far attained, as measured by verified and universally accepted knowledge, fall far short of the imposing edifice of physics, chemistry, and biology. The social studies have largely remained the playground of conflicting schools of thinkers, and an original formula still attracts much more attention than a careful investigation of fact. Bitter controversies rage about the basic methods to be employed; since each new theorist feels that he must overthrow the erroneous ideas of his predecessors and start from the ground up, there has been very little of the scientific spirit of coöperative building upon the achievements of previous investigators. Even where, as in psychology or anthropology, a great mass of facts has been painfully accumulated, the very observation of these facts has been so embedded in a host of premature hypotheses that it is doubtful whether they can be disentangled from speculative theory. In a word, the social sciences are just to-day emerging from a stage comparable to that of astronomy and physics in the days of Copernicus and Kepler; and unfortunately no such happy guess as the mathematical interpretation of nature has been hit upon for them.

Certain definite achievements, however, can be recorded. Whereas the science of man in the eighteenth century was almost entirely an apologetic and a practical program, in the evolutionary world it has come to be a relatively impartial analysis. There has been heaped up a mass of detailed investigations of the growth of particular institutions, the indispensable prerequisite to any sound generalizations. Various methods have been explored, their possibilities and their limitations discovered, and their valid claims assimilated. And despite the present confusion, it can be confidently asserted that though the science of man still awaits its Newton, though even its Galileo has not yet ap-

peared, special branches have already won their way to a sound method and fruitful categories. In the memory of the present generation, psychology has eschewed unchecked speculation and has settled down to experimental investigation and inductive generalization; while anthropology has come out of the jungle of evolutionary mythology and has achieved the most critical method of any of the social sciences.

THE SEARCH FOR AN ADEQUATE METHOD

The record of the growth of the sciences of man since the Age of the Enlightenment is primarily the search for an adequate method and valid categories. To the orthodox deductive analysis of Newtonian physics succeeded the historical method of the irrational and conservative Romanticists. For a time each field was divided between its "analytic" and its "historical" school. Then after 1859 came the impulse from biology, with all its Darwinian prestige, reinforcing the evolutionary viewpoint, though not so much changing method as introducing new concepts and new premises. But the early great deductive and speculative systems, which arranged the facts to fit their assumptions, like those of Comte or Spencer, collapsed under the attacks of the investigators they had themselves inspired. Ensued a period of more modest collection and classification of phenomena, with little pretence at formulating laws — a "natural history" of society, to which the more adequate picture of human nature furnished by the new psychology contributed. Gradually men turned from mere classification to experimentation on the one hand, and to the mathematical methods of statistics and correlation on the other. The social sciences seemed almost scientific; critical analysis was at last replacing dogmatism. To a closer scrutiny of these conflicting and vacillating methods we shall now turn.

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MECHANICAL IDEAL

The immense prestige of the deductive method of the Enlightenment, modeled on mechanics, which well suited theorists with few facts to go upon, gave it a dominating position to the present century. The ideal of a social physics, so strong at the beginnings of political economy, has remained entrenched in

economics longer than anywhere else; but it is just as deeply rooted in the pioneers of what purported to be an inductive science of society, sociology. Saint-Simon, Fourier, and the other Forty-Eighters in France searched for a Newtonian law of social gravitation, from which all social phenomena could be deduced; Fourier thought that he had found it. Quetelet entitled his epochmaking work on statistics *Physique Sociale*. Auguste Comte had an elaborate scheme of social statics and dynamics, with its laws of social action and reaction. Even such outstanding evolutionists as Herbert Spencer and the American Lester F. Ward, however much they might embroider their pages with biological terms, remained essentially deductive and apriori, starting from certain assumed premises and elaborating therefrom orderly systems.

This is abundantly clear in the case of Spencer, who approached evolution with the prejudices of the eighteenth century for mechanics in science and for *laissez-faire* in society. In his lengthy *Synthetic Philosophy*, appearing between 1860 and 1893, he tried to deduce the laws of every field, from astronomy to sociology and ethics, from the fundamental principle of evolution, defined in mechanical terms as "an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹ In other words, Spencer sought to force all the facts into a single harmonious cosmic evolutionary process, in which everything should develop from a simple and undifferentiated state to a highly individualized organic condition. In good eighteenth-century fashion he tried to prove that the whole weight of the universe lies behind the individualistic theory of society. Thus, important as was his prestige in introducing the general idea of development into the study of social institutions, it also carried over the deductive method and the model of physics into the concepts of evolution. It took a generation to free the social sciences from this heavy burden of misleading technique and dogmatic assumption, and long before he concluded his monumental task the pages of his work had grown yellow and antiquated.

In both law and economics deduction has remained to this day the orthodox method. The jurisprudence of Bentham, sys-

tematized and simplified by John Austin, gave rise in England and America to the analytical school of legal theory, in which the function of the court is seen as the purely deductive application of authoritative premises found in statute or constitution. Although modified or abandoned by leading jurists to-day, this technique is still in control of most of the courts; it has made exceedingly difficult the adaptation of legal principles to the unprecedented conditions of industrial civilization. Political economy, which in Adam Smith's hands was fairly close to the facts of commercial life, became increasingly abstract and deductive as it was made the dogmatic creed of the Liberals. In the Manchester school it seemed to lose all sight of economic facts in its endeavor to approximate the rigor of mathematics. John Stuart Mill, the great figure of the mid-century, in general an advocate of scientific induction, put the weight of his magisterial authority behind deduction as the only possible method for the social sciences. In the face of the humanitarian and working-class protests at the unreality and cruelty of the classical doctrines, orthodox economists turned only the more blindly to the mechanical ideal of the Newtonian world. The seventies saw a vigorous defense, in England, France, and Austria, of the abstract point of view, which, in the name of "pure economic theory," seized upon the antiquated and abandoned pleasure-pain psychology of a century before for its premises, and showered upon them all the resources of dialectics and mathematics. The mazes of the resulting marginal utility economics have only in the last decade seemed to the younger economists purified of all contact with the world of actual social processes; the revolt to a more realistic view is still led by a minority.

THE HISTORICAL METHOD OF THE ROMANTICISTS

Thus in countless ways the social sciences have retained their eighteenth-century legacy. But from Germany and romanticism there spread the second great stream of influence. Born of Hegelian idealism and the traditionalist reaction to the scientific views of the Enlightenment, the historical school turned to the record of the past, and sought to trace the slow and inevitable development of human society and institutions from immemorial antiquity. The newly awakened interest in history led to an indefatigable poring over of musty documents in the fervent

faith that somehow the exact determination of the long course of growth through which all things human have passed would of itself give a complete understanding of man and his society to-day. The romantic parentage of this historical method betrays itself in the ease with which history was itself deified and made into a sacred force with which mortal hands must not meddle; for the course of human events was held to be guided by some vague but purposive power, to interfere with whose designs were sacrilege. It was the prevalence of this teleological view of history that made it easy to assimilate the new evolutionary philosophy when it pressed in from biology; Darwin seemed only to have furnished an exact scientific confirmation of the presence of this cosmic power. History was strangely looked upon, not as a record of the effects of the interplay of complex forces, but as itself a force which produced things, and evolution, to the historical school, was objectified as both the preordained plan and the Great Cause which realized its hidden purposes.

In fact, the historical method, as applied to social institutions, means the abandonment of science, in the sense of experimentally verified causal principles, and the reliance instead for explanation upon a chronological survey of successive facts. It holds that to understand what the present is and how it came about, it is only necessary to know what has preceded it in time. To take an analogy from astronomy, it is as though men were to rest content with the careful record of the positions of the planets, and to feel no need of going on to celestial mechanics. It is not to be denied that a knowledge of historical development is of cardinal importance as enormously enlarging the range of observed phenomena, as suggesting the forces at work in society, and as giving a sense of the relativity of present forms and the omnipresence of change. But the historical method in the social sciences claimed more: it purported to give of itself a science of man. This overenthusiastic claim was perhaps but natural in the intoxication of the widened horizon; but just as biology has left the past to paleontology and itself turned more and more to experimentation, so the social sciences must not forget the present, the only field for genuine scientific investigation, in their wonder at the past. Social paleontology can never take the place of an analysis of contemporary forces; indeed, only as we understand the present in its own terms can we hope to find

the true key to the interpretation of past forces. Neither history nor evolution is itself a causal explanation; both are rather phenomena themselves to be explained.

The historical school marked, indeed, one great achievement; it perfected the critical methods for determining objectively just what the past had been. Scientific historical investigation arose first in Germany; Niebuhr and Ranke in political history, Baur and the Tübingen school in sacred history, A. F. Wolf in classical philology, laid the foundations for critical history. Men found the instruments for reading aright the past. In their delight at this discovery, the other social studies devoted themselves whole-heartedly to history. The science of society became the history of society; each branch saw itself swallowed up by its own past. Philosophy became the history of philosophy, jurisprudence the history of law, anthropology the history of social institutions, economics the history of economic institutions, politics, the study of constitutional development, ethics, the growth and development of human customs, theology, the history of religion. The promising utilitarian attitude of the eighteenth century was forgotten in the ridicule of its lack of historical sense.

Innumerable were the masses of detailed investigations eagerly undertaken to trace the development of particular institutions. Studies of the evolution of religion, of moral customs and beliefs, of marriage and the family, of social groups, of economic forms, and indeed of everything remotely connected with man's life, poured from the press in great profusion, to the enrichment of men's knowledge of the past and to the confusion of their ideas. Men sought everywhere simple and inevitable lines of development, with the result that they usually falsified, fully as much as had the earlier romanticists, the actual complexity and diversity of the past.

Moreover, the tendency grew to look to the origins of a belief or custom for its value to the present; and men thought that when they had displayed a course of development through centuries they had explained both the causes of that development and its present utility. For example, the historical method applied to the study of religion too often meant that men turned away from a fruitful investigation of human nature in its present environment, to a preoccupation with "primitive religion," and looked for the true explanation of religious phenomena in the

practices and beliefs of savage tribes. This is much like studying the oak tree, not in the forest giant, but in the acorn; and it becomes all the more confusing when it is remembered that such "primitive" tribes are themselves not the ancestors of our present civilizations, but the most rudimentary organizations existing to-day in out-of-the-way corners of the world. The genetic method bade men study the oak tree, not even in the acorn from which it grew, which is obviously impossible, but in some other seed which we are not even sure resembles that acorn in essential characteristics. And it is evident that no amount of study, even of the original acorn, will determine the present shade or timber value of the oak. Thus the historical attitude has bade fair to obscure the fruitful eighteenth-century attitude of investigating institutions primarily in connection with their relevance to human nature to-day and the needs they must now meet.

THE EVOLUTIONARY AND BIOLOGICAL METHODS

The establishment of biological evolution only reinforced this historical attitude, which, while retaining its romantic spirit, now dubbed itself the "evolutionary method," and borrowed prestige without enlightenment. Without the slightest regard for the mechanisms of change in biology, every history blossomed out into an "evolution." Sociologists and anthropologists, following Spencer, conceived elaborate schemes of the stages of social development, and with fine display of scientific erudition accumulated customs and ideas gathered from widely divergent times and places to substantiate their speculative theories. This hodge-podge of deduction and preconception they dignified as the "comparative method"; by its means it was easy to prove any theory whatsoever.

In fact, anthropology, sociology, and the social sciences in general have had in the last generation to retrace their steps painfully and found themselves anew upon psychology and an analysis of present conditions. Most of the contemporary literature in these fields is still concerned with pointing out the dangers of assuming any simple, single, and uniform line of more or less automatic development, and with emphasizing the manifold causal strains and influences that have entered in to transform ancient institutions into the present forms that, while bearing the same names, are patently much altered in structure and

function. Thus the science of man, already struggling with its traditional deductive method, was still further confused by the historical attitude of romanticism.

But Darwin did far more than merely reinforce the romantic strain in the science of man; in forcing biology into the limelight and giving it almost the prestige for the last half of the nineteenth century that mechanics had held during the eighteenth, he added a third biological strain to the two that already held the field. Biology was now the reigning science, hence to biology the social sciences now went for new concepts and analogies. In the conception of the social organism they found one that offered endless possibilities for elaboration. Society is not the product of a mechanical contract, as the Enlightenment had fondly believed; it is a genuine living organism, a unity of harmoniously functioning cells. This idea was already familiar from the romanticists, who had insisted that the State was far more than the sum of its members; indeed, the organism analogy, though it only came into its own with the rise of biology, like the idea of simple development owes most of its content to the idealistic impulse of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

A good example of the early fusion of idealistic and biological concepts is the political theory of Bluntschli, the German nationalist. The State is "by no means a lifeless instrument, a dead machine, but is a living, and therefore organic being. . . . It does not stand on the same level as the lower organisms of plants and beasts, but is of a higher kind. . . . When we call the State an organism, therefore, we are not thinking of the activity of natural beings in seeking, appropriating, and assimilating nourishment, and in reproducing their kind." The analogy consists in the three points:

(a) Every organism is a union of corporeal, material elements and vital, psychic forces — in short, of body and soul. (b) Although an organic being is and remains a whole, it is, nevertheless, in its parts endowed with members, which are animated by special impulses and capacities, in order to satisfy in various ways the changing life-needs of the whole. (c) The organism has a development from within outwards and an external growth.²

Bluntschli was so enamoured of his figure that he went on to attribute sex to his social organism, the State being male and the Church female.

Auguste Comte, in his *Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842), was the earliest thinker to maintain that the science of society must found itself explicitly upon biology. He saw a definite development through which every science had to pass, culminating, in the “positive stage,” in a unified science of society with definitely formulated laws of growth. As the highest science, sociology must seek its foundation in its immediate predecessor, biology. The laws of sociology are the counterparts of those of biology. But to Herbert Spencer is primarily due the introduction of the biological ideal into the science of man. He carried out in great detail the organism analogy, a speculation that was pushed to even more absurd lengths by later sociologists like Lilienfeld, Schäffle, and Worms, for whom it was no mere analogy but the literal truth. Far more important was his insistence on the notion of social adaptation to environment; that is, the categories of the mechanism of biological evolution. With the publication of Darwin’s theory, men vied with each other to interpret the development of social groups in terms of the struggle for existence, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest. These social Darwinists, among whom the most important were Bagehot in his *Physics and Politics*, and the Austrians Gumplowicz and Ratzénhofer, saw the conflict of racial, national, and social groups in purely biological terms, with war as the primary instrument of social evolution. For Bagehot, the struggle for existence amongst men takes place between groups, rather than individuals; but group competition is all the fiercer for this co-operation.

Whatever may be said against the principle of “natural selection” in other departments, there is no doubt of its predominance in early human history. The strongest killed out the weakest, as they could. . . . In every particular state of the world, those nations which are strongest tend to prevail over the others; and in certain marked peculiarities the strongest tend to be the best. . . . The best institutions have a natural military advantage over bad institutions.³

Gumplowicz, surveying the racial struggles of the Austrian scene, saw in group struggle the key to the origin of civilization.

Out of frictions and struggles, out of separations and unions of opposing elements, finally come forth as new adaptation products the higher socio-psychical phenomena, the higher cultural forms, the new civilizations, the new state and national unities . . . and this merely through social action and reaction, entirely independent of the initiative and will of individuals, contrary to their ideas and wishes and social striving.⁴

Groups, both racial and economic, have inevitably conflicting interests, and in the ensuing and unending conflicts the strongest will dominate the weaker. Everywhere such conquest leads to the subjection by an economically powerful minority of the economically weak majority; this subjection both creates and is maintained by the state and political institutions.

Such "social Darwinism" found many adherents. The philosopher Nietzsche gave it an idealistic turn; biologists like Galton and Karl Pearson applied it to the conflicts of racial stocks, deducing a practical program of national eugenics. Before 1914 it formed one of the mainstays of the "scientific" defense of war and militarism; latterly it has been used to bolster the various prejudices of Nordic supremacy, anti-Semitism, and nationalistic intolerance. Biological methods lent themselves as easily as mechanical to the special interests of various classes.

Darwinian biology contributed one further important strain to the science of man: it founded the classical or comparative anthropology of Tylor, Lang, Frazer, and Morgan. It set men to collecting specimens of primitive cultures and institutions, by the proper ordering of which great speculative systems of social development could be created. It was upon such heterogeneous material and hasty generalizations that the science of sociology was erected, with its absurdly simple social laws and its facile explanations.

In spite of the revolutionary emphasis on the biological nature of man, the methods and concepts borrowed by the social sciences from biology after 1859 thus introduced as much confusion as clarification into the science of man. The organic analogy drew men's attention from a fruitful study of actual society; the natural selectionists obscured the significant ways in which social evolution differs from organic; and the comparative method led to the distortion and falsification of facts. So much valuable effort had to be expended in criticizing these erroneous half-truths that the progress of the social sciences in the last generation has been largely the careful disproof of the great theories inspired by Darwinian evolution.

THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTALISM

Still another set of confusing ideas, however, has been introduced from psychology, which to-day has almost obscured

the prestige of the biological methods. In the *cul-de-sac* to which the historical and evolutionary methods seemed to lead, men turned eagerly to the new science of human nature slowly emerging at the end of the century, and sought once more to found the social sciences upon psychology. Obviously such an approach is far more fruitful of genuine scientific results; but unfortunately it was just the most hypothetical conclusions of the infant science that were seized upon as axioms. In economics, which felt the impulse first of all, the psychological school indeed turned back to the old ideas of the Enlightenment, and reached grotesque conclusions. In sociology, the old tale of biology was repeated: now this, now that factor was isolated and made an all-explaining principle, into which facts were fitted at will. Sympathy was the great key, as in Sutherland and Giddings; or imitation was deified, as in the school of Tarde and Le Bon. With the discovery of the irrational basis of human action, each of the great "instincts" could support a system. One school concentrated on the "instinct of the herd"; the Freudians spread sex over all life; still others, desiring a fuller palette, followed McDougall in composing lists of the elementary impulses from which society is built up. In each case the method was the same; the principle was first formulated on the basis of a few observations and then the search was started for further facts to make out a case against all rivals.

Thus the net result of a century of investigation, classification, and theorizing was that though the detailed knowledge of human societies had enormously increased, and though a host of new conceptions had been pressed into service, the discovery of any verified and established scientific laws in the social field was little nearer than it had been a hundred years before. If one sought a rigorous science of society, the eighteenth-century deductive method was still available; though to be sure the premises had multiplied into a swarm of conflicting principles. If one wearied of the fruitless task of adding system to speculative system, one could retire to history, and trace the stages in the development of the past. Even here it was almost impossible to avoid selecting one's facts by the touchstone of some preconceived theory. What the system builders had erected, the critics tore down; in economics, in anthropology, in sociology, in political science, in every field the best minds were com-

ing to feel that all theories were contradicted by more adequate knowledge, that the sciences so carefully erected and so confidently proclaimed in the seventies and eighties were but shams and impostures, and that every classification of the multitude of social facts was about as good, and as fruitless, as every other. One thing, and only one, seemed definitely won: men must find the facts, and let the theories suffer. Such was the general status of the social sciences at the beginning of the present century. From the presses there still poured new systems; but the abler men were modestly and often blindly studying minor segments of history or society.

Out of this methodological *impasse* men are just now struggling to emerge. They are seeking a sounder and more critical psychology, convinced that the science of human nature must be basic. They are critical of all one-sided and facile explanations, and demand a survey of all the facts. They are grasping at the possibility that statistics, first formulated by Quetelet in 1835, seems to offer an exact measurement of social forces, and pathetically they are trying correlation after correlation in the hope of stumbling upon something significant. Above all, they are seeking to become as experimental as possible; and where they still see hope in biology, it is the careful laboratory methods of the experimentalists that now attract them. By a criticism of past theories, to discover their germs of truth, by a patient analysis of existing institutions and their functioning, by the statistical testing of their tentative conclusions, and by the unrelenting insistence on investigation and experimentation, they are hoping that at last some general principles worthy of the name of a science may come to light.

While the progress of the social sciences in the growing world seems thus somewhat disappointing, in the light of their high hopes and higher pretensions, the special branches have slowly if somewhat fitfully blocked out their fields, laid firm foundations, and acquired both a critical sense and a promising technique. This process has gone farthest in the fields which are most limited in subject-matter and least exposed to the play of prejudice, above all which offer most scope for detailed investigation; psychology and anthropology have become genuinely scientific while economics, political science, and preëminently the general science of society, sociology, are still struggling to

free themselves from preconceptions and group prejudices. In turning to a brief survey of the individual sciences, we can best note the measure of advance over the pioneer efforts of the Age of Reason.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

We have already traced the spread of the mechanistic method of natural science to the field of human behavior, culminating in the behavioristic psychology of Watson and his followers. But this tendency has been neither steady nor unopposed, and in view of the widespread popularity of a new romantic psychology at the present day it is perhaps premature to maintain that the science of man has yet been embraced within the scheme of universal mechanism. During most of the century, two different attitudes held the psychological field. There was on the one hand the old eighteenth-century association school of Hartley and James Mill, which followed the Newtonian mechanical method but took as its elements the unique data of "sensations," reached by an analysis of the individual consciousness. This empirical school was dominant in England, where its alliance with the utilitarian philosophy and the psychological assumptions of the economists and liberals made it almost a party platform. Its natural corollaries were hedonism, that the sole motive of human action is the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and rationalism, that men act always consciously and rationally to attain these ends. It formed the background of English individualism almost to the World War, and was written into all political, economic, and social theory. Opposing it stood the psychology of the romanticists, dominant in Germany and widespread in France. This school rejected the idea that man's mind can be explained in mechanical terms, but retained the method of introspection. The romanticist found hidden springs of reality when he gazed within his own soul; it hurt him to subject this flow of life to definite analysis — he preferred to feel, to trust his intuitions. Amongst the more logical French introspection revealed all the traditional elements: soul, will, freedom, reason. When Auguste Comte came to classify the sciences, he felt so convinced of the metaphysical nature of this psychology that he found no place for such a science in his scheme. The impulse to a fresh analysis came

from neither of these rather barren schools, but from biology and physiology.

In his *Principles of Psychology*, published in 1855, Herbert Spencer made the first attempt at a thoroughgoing biological view of human nature. Though he could not free himself from the older ideas, he did envisage mind not as a substance set within the mortal frame, but as "an adjustment of internal to external conditions," a form of human adaptation to a biological environment. Slowly with the development of neurology came a more detailed physiological analysis of human action. At first men retained the older notion of purely psychic elements, which they endeavored to correlate with the newly discovered neural processes; the orthodox view was "psycho-physical parallelism," the doctrine that there were two realms, one mental and one physical, between which there was a close correlation but no causal relation. A nervous impulse was associated with a mental one, but men's actions would be the same without the running accompaniment of consciousness. This view freed the physiologist to perfect his mechanical analysis, while the psychologist could introspectively trace the correlated mental structure built up of sensations, volitions, and emotions. The chief work of such a structural psychology was to associate the various conscious discriminations of color, sound, taste, etc., with their physiological stimuli. On such a basis Weber and Fechner did much experimental work, and in 1879 Wundt founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig.

This experimental psychology was systematized by William James in his great *Principles of Psychology* in 1890. Though he still considered consciousness as something different and distinct from the body, he regarded it not as a fixed structure but as a flowing functional adaptation to the environment; and he consistently sought a physiological basis for all its activities. Most of the investigation that has since been done was inspired by his chapters on instinct, habit, the emotions, the will, and the self. But to the functional experimentalist the presence of this intangible and indescribable entity became increasingly useless, and James later came to question seriously the value of retaining the concept of consciousness or mind at all — a suggestion that has met with growing favor. With James must be placed as a

pioneer G. Stanley Hall, who fruitfully applied the genetic method with much the same results. An added impetus to a purely biological psychology came from the study of animal behavior, where introspection and its resulting mental structure are obviously not applicable. Following carefully controlled and statistical methods, James McKeen Cattell and Edward Lee Thorndike were able to approach human behavior in the same way, with the result that Watson took the inevitable step of discarding consciousness entirely and relying upon a completely objective laboratory study of human behavior.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

The behavioristic school saw as its fundamental problem the discovery of the simple physiological mechanisms out of which is integrated the behavior of the human organism as a whole, and the analysis of the details of the synthesizing process of habit formation. By a careful analysis of the reactions of human infants, Watson has determined the behavior patterns with which man starts life, and has explored the way in which these simple reflex actions are built up into more complicated forms. Basing his work upon the conception of the "conditioned reflex" investigated by Pavlov in Russia — a response acquired by associating a new stimulus with the one accustomed — he has shown how quickly the native reflexes and random movements are built up into learned reactions. Habit upon habit is formed by the conditioning environment, which, operating upon the given physiological patterns, thus literally moulds the integrated behavior of the adult.

While all agreed that these elements of behavior are physiological in nature, and that they are largely only dimly conscious to the individual, controversy has waxed furious over the question whether they are fixed in some simple inherited pattern at birth, so that the basic human traits can fairly be considered constant and unalterable, or whether they are chiefly habits formed by the environment out of a relatively plastic human nature of almost limitless possibilities. Thorndike in his *Original Nature of Man* and especially McDougall in his *Social Psychology* took the former view, and built up an imposing scheme of original tendencies or instincts. from the combination of which behavior atoms mature conduct arises.

Any man possesses at the very start of his life [said Thorndike] numerous well-defined tendencies to future behavior. Between the situations which he will meet and the responses which he will make to them, pre-formed bonds exist. It is already determined by the constitution of the two germs, that under certain circumstances he will see and hear and feel and act in certain ways. . . . The behavior of man in the family, in business, in the state, in religion, and in every other affair of life is rooted in his unlearned, original equipment of instincts and capacities.⁵

For McDougall these instincts were powerful forces resident in man, impelling him to action, the driving springs without which he would be limp and passive.

We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psychophysical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action.⁶

He found some eleven major instincts in man, chief of which are the instinct of flight, of repulsion, of curiosity, of pugnacity, of self-abasement, of self-assertion, and the parental instinct. This is, it must be observed, a logical and teleological classification, in which the instincts are defined in terms of the purposes they serve. Many were the social theories founded upon it.

A decade of careful criticism of this simple atomic conception of human nature has led to the general agreement that it is more fruitful to seek definite and specific reactions that can be experimentally isolated, and that in complex human behavior these reflexes are overlaid by habit after habit conditioned by the environment. Such a view does not give the facile "explanations" of action that come from reading it in terms of a few dominant instincts; but the suspicion has arisen that to attribute the cause, for example, of men's congregating in large cities to a "gregarious instinct" is much like the scholastic dormitive powers of opium, a labeling and not an explanation. In pointing out that the elements of behavior are exceedingly numerous and complex, it destroys a simple atomism, but it opens the way for a closer analysis of individual histories and for a genetic treatment of habit formation that will both predict and control.

The practical consequences of this shift from the vague and animistic "instinct" to the precise "conditioned reflex" as the

basic unit are to place a more adequate emphasis on the determining factor of the environment, minimized by the McDougall school, and hence to read human nature as a function of the cultural situation into which it is born rather than as a fixed entity inevitably flowering into the given society. It is no accident that the earlier theory of a fixed and simple human nature has been seized upon everywhere by conservatives opposed to social change, while the critics of that theory, like John Dewey, are hopeful of social amelioration through education and institutional reform. This is especially apparent in the problem of how far individual and group differences, which experiment has revealed and measured and which seem definitely to have overthrown the eighteenth-century theory of the equality of man, so basic in traditional social theory, are hereditary and unalterable, and how far they are environmental products and hence subject to control. Conservatives welcome the former view, seeing the existent order as pretty much biologically necessary, while progressives hope to push back the limits of fixed native endowment as far as possible. This tendency is reflected in the conflict between the biological and the cultural determinists in anthropology, politics, and sociology. But obviously the controversy between the inherited and the acquired can only be solved along the lines of Watson's experiments, with a much fuller knowledge of facts than we now possess.

THE PROBLEM OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTEGRATED PERSONALITY

But this attempt at a new atomic conception of human nature, like that of the eighteenth century except that biological processes have replaced passive sensations as the elements, has other problems to face than those of the nature of its elements. How are these fundamental units built up into their complex human manifestations? Is the process simply an additive one, in which the original units are clearly discernible, or does so much modification and assimilation take place that the value of the whole analytical treatment can be doubted? There has lately grown up a feeling of dissatisfaction with the results of this elucidation of behavior atoms, this "muscle-twitch psychology." The most important psychological phenomena are complex and

involve a total situation. Can such situations be reproduced under laboratory conditions? The analysis into behavior-segments gets along famously up to the decorticated rat, but with human actions, conditioned by the individual's entire past experience, it has not proved so fruitful. Can human psychology disregard the response of the whole person to a situation?

The Gestalt school of Wertheimer, Koffka and Köhler maintains that response is always to a set of related stimuli, and exhibits non-additive and transposable patterns subject to "wholeness laws" like those of the structure of an electrical field. Others have also tried to apply "organismic" concepts.

Being interested primarily in human conduct [writes J. R. Kantor], we are therefore required to investigate the actions of human individuals as distinct humanistic occurrences of very particular types. In effect this means that we must take account of the numerous human conditions and institutions which give rise to psychological phenomena and which condition their occurrence. Only by taking into consideration the intimate nuances and refinements of human interactions with things and persons can we hope to describe adequately human behavior and avoid worthless artifacts. We deem it to be the essence of valid scientific method thus to study any given fact as it actually transpires and not to reduce it to something else, not even to a simplified part of itself.⁷

Organismic psychology is based upon the premises that we must never admit anything into our scientific thinking but that which can be actually observed. Nor must we assume for our convenience that the part is the whole. . . . Basing our investigations upon this platform we consider the subject-matter of psychology to be the concrete reactions which an organism makes to its stimuli surroundings. Naturally all the varieties of surroundings are considered; so that organismic psychology considers as part of its subject-matter not only the simple behavior to natural stimuli but also the complex adaptations to social and human institutions. . . . The causes of the organism's reactions are not brain or mental conditions, but the needs of the organism as dictated by the surrounding objects and events. . . . For such a view the explanatory features of the science consist for the most part in the detailed study of the reactional biographies of individuals throughout their various contacts with their actual surroundings.⁸

As yet the elements of behavior are probably too little understood to make such an attempt other than vague, but with a genetic understanding of the more complex forms of habit forma-

⁸ From *Principles of Psychology*, by J. R. Kantor. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

tion it is inevitable that the higher organizations of behavior will come to be more and more central. The task will be infinite, as it involves the whole social setting; but only when it is accomplished will the science of human nature be able to furnish a fruitful basis for the other social sciences.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

It was precisely this attempt to deal with personality as a whole, especially in a practical way on its pathological side, that led to the development by psychiatrists of the theory of psycho-analysis. Out of their clinical experience they have erected a whole system of psychology that has little sympathy with the scientific mechanical analysis we have just traced, and arrogates to itself the title of "the new psychology." As formulated by Freud and his followers, psycho-analysis is a mixture of important experimental discoveries, of fruitful new concepts for attacking the behavior of integrated personalities, and of a general speculative background that can only be called romantic and fantastic in the extreme, made to serve an astonishingly successful therapeutic method. Its core is the principle that the great majority of human reactions are produced by impulses or motives that are below the level of consciousness, and that the precise nature of these impulses in any individual must be explained in terms of his past experience. In particular, most of the pathological disturbances of behavior are due to the unsuspected persistence of emotional drives or complexes occasioned by events or desires that were unpleasant or socially disapproved and hence repressed. It is in bringing to light the emotional consequences of such repression of fundamental impulses that psycho-analysis has most enlarged our knowledge of human nature: a lack of adjustment between the various tendencies in an individual may cause all sorts of disturbances when the cause has been long forgotten, if it was ever known. In cataloguing the emotional drives resulting from typical repressions, such as the Œdipus complex, the inferiority complex, etc., the Freudians have furnished a new set of behavior elements that offer control as well as understanding. They have added new facts to the contention of those who would understand behavior in terms of the building up of habits and associations in the individual's experience, and out of their clinical records have illuminated the

process of such formations. So far these behavior elements have been more fruitful in the social sciences than the more rudimentary conditioned reflexes of the behaviorists.

But these ideas have been projected against a conception of mind and a set of theories that, logically inconsistent, necessarily hypothetical and unverifiable, often deliberately involved and fantastic, and in conflict with much that is definitely established, is a recrudescence of the older psychology of the romanticists. The faults of the instinct theory are multiplied; not content with recording the presence of types of behavior that are "unreflective, non-discriminative, immediate and uncontrolled in operation, ineradicable, and affective,"⁹ the Freudians go on to explain this as the expression of an assumed "unconscious," thought of now as a definite realm, now as a mysterious and insistent source of psychic energy. In Freud himself this energy or libido is overwhelmingly sexual, though the limits of sex are so broadened as to rob the term of most of its meaning; in others, like Jung, it forces its way through the three channels of the sex instinct, the ego instinct, and the herd instinct. This energy is vaguely thought of as demanding a fixed quantitative expression, failing which it increases, constantly fed from the inherent energy of the instinct or complex, until it bursts through the obstacle or cuts a new channel. It can be drawn off in another direction by "sublimation." In addition to this mystical foundation, Freud's theory contains such sweeping, dogmatic, and wholly hypothetical elements as to have provoked dissent from most of his own followers; and his readiness to apply it in fields like anthropology where he was patently ignorant has not heightened his prestige among the scientifically minded. But it indisputably contains elements of truth that, interpreted in more objective and experimental terms, will do much to clarify the integration of human personality. The mutual assimilation of the behavioristic and the Freudian genetic attitudes is already proceeding apace.

THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

If we ask on just what points the modern experimental science of human nature has modified the views of its eighteenth-century predecessor, we find basic changes of revolutionary importance for the social sciences. First, the picture of man as a purely logical machine, who first thinks of some end which he desires,

and then calculates the means by which that end can be attained, has given way to the infinitely more complex creature of impulse and passion and emotional preference who occasionally directs his irrational desires to some intelligent end. Reason is but the umpire among often unruly and conflicting impulses.

The function of consciousness does not seem to be so much creative as selective and inhibitive. I cannot voluntarily create a wish to do something in my mind. I can only eliminate those wishes (or their expression in conduct) that seem to me inexpedient. Energy must then be directed unconsciously rather than consciously. Since instincts are the great directors of energy, it follows that unconscious instinct motivations must control most of the human organism's mental energy, and that the most important of these will be the permanently unconscious motivations. These will regulate the dominant streams of energy of the man's life.¹⁰

It is such a man who must take his place in any modern economic or political theory.

Secondly, though just what their limits are is still uncertain, it is clear that human behavior is largely determined by forces and energies which demand certain definite normal outlets, failing which they will give rise to disastrous conflicts and outbursts. Human nature, plastic as it is, cannot be distorted too far or changed too suddenly without danger. Rousseau's insight was sounder than Helvetius'. The environment must be so made as to give adequate scope to the more important impulses; asceticism, of either medieval or Puritan variety, can succeed only when directed to ends of extraordinary intensity.

Thirdly, men are individuals. They are not alike at birth, but differ widely in their capacities and aptitudes; and each man's character is a personal and unique synthesis, embodying distinctive traits. Social institutions must recognize that they are dealing with men, not man.

Finally, men live and develop in groups, and what they are is largely a product of the traditions and customs of the group. The group is the conditioning environment of all human action, without which all that is characteristically human would be lost. As Dewey puts it, "Anything which may properly be called mind or intelligence is not an original possession, but is a consequence

¹⁰ From *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*, by John T. McCurdy. Copyright, 1922, by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

of the manifestation of instincts under the conditions supplied by associated life in the family, the school, the market-place and the forum." ¹¹ Society comes first in point of time, and moulds individuals more or less successfully in its own image.

Dewey summarizes the consequences of the new science of man for all the social studies:

It transfers attention from vague generalities regarding social consciousness and social mind to the specific processes of interaction which take place among human beings, and to the details of group behavior. It emphasizes the importance of knowledge of the primary activities of human nature, and of the modifications and reorganizations they undergo in association with the activities of others. It radically simplifies the whole problem by making it clear that social institutions and arrangements, including the whole apparatus of tradition and transmission, represent simply the acquired transformations of original human endowments.¹²

THE SCHOOLS OF SOCIOLOGY

On the basis of such a science of man the various sciences of society have been gradually reconstructed. The most ambitious and universal of all, sociology, which claims to be "the science of human behavior in both its contemporary and its genetic aspects," ¹³ with the best of intentions has been successively the prey of all the social currents of the century — the historical method, the evolutionary method, the waves of biology and the winds of psychology. In the hands of its great pioneers, Comte, Spencer, and L. F. Ward, it has been well called "at once a philosophy and a faith — a cosmogony, a theology, and a religion." ¹⁴ After passing through these preliminary speculative phases, in which some method, some conception, some great principle was regarded as all important and fundamental, it has settled down to "approach knowledge of human experience as a whole through investigation of group aspects of the phenomena," ¹⁵ and to "account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution." ¹⁶ Though sociologists are still divided by their adherence to various cherished principles of explanation, for the last few decades their most important work has unquestionably been in the detailed investigation of institutions and their functioning; the newer psychology has hardly as yet developed a genuine social

science. There has been a marked falling off of system building, and a tendency toward the intensive cultivation of specialized fields. Sociology is still hesitant about its method. The physical and biological terminology and concepts have largely given way to psychological ones, and there is a growing demand for the development of specifically social categories, especially among the anthropological sociologists. More and more reliance is placed on the statistical technique, fed by the social survey.

In our introductory survey we have traced the main methodological developments in sociology; here it will suffice to point out the various explanatory principles that recent students have emphasized. There has been a strong tendency to investigate the effects upon society of its physical environment, especially topography, cultural contacts, climate, food, and natural resources. A whole new science of anthropogeography has revealed the fundamental limits to social activity imposed by these factors. Secondly, there has been the emphasis on specific biological forces at work; the earlier vague biological analogies have given way to the analysis of the social implications of actual biological processes, the organismic and the social Darwinist schools to eugenics, the effect of group selection, the racial factors in social development. Thirdly, all the psychological tendencies have had their sociological counterparts. The main influences of psychological concepts have been, first, to investigate the social bearings of the individual instincts and habits; secondly, to emphasize the moulding of the individual traits by the social heritage; and thirdly, to analyze the functioning of integrated groups. In the fourth place, the cultural determinists have emphasized the importance of the historical perpetuation and transmission of social institutions, especially economic. Each of these four sets of factors obviously enters into the determining causes of social forms, but as yet there has been no satisfactory synthesis with a critical adjustment of all the principles of explanation. Sociology, in fact, can hardly accomplish its object of founding a universal synthetic science of society until these preliminary investigations have been advanced far beyond the stage in which they now find themselves.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CRITICAL METHOD IN ANTHROPOLOGY

In the much narrower field of anthropology, the early history

of mankind — “the whole history of man as fired and pervaded by the idea of evolution”¹⁷ — after the play of speculation had had its day, there has been worked out the most impressive and precise methodology of all the social scientists, and the most reliable conclusions. Anthropology was created in the evolutionary faith by Herbert Spencer and E. B. Tylor, who generalized from a few observations simple and rigid schemes of institutional development which unrolled automatically by themselves, following the same order in all parts of the world. Everywhere society had to traverse the same rigid stages, from a primitive communism and promiscuity to the “higher” forms of present-day European civilization. Facts were cavalierly fitted into these formulæ, and little attention was paid to the means whereby the changes were effected: they came “by evolution.” Among these dogmatic evolutionists were Lewis H. Morgan, who found his scheme in the Iroquois Indians — unfortunately a unique group — and J. G. Frazer, whose *Golden Bough* so delightfully purveys third-hand misinformation.

After such a start, anthropology entered a period of the destruction of its cherished theories by cold facts. The idea of a fixed unilinear development had to give way before closer investigation. The “comparative method” was utterly discredited. There was no simple pattern of stages, and social change took place in part as the result of changed environment, chiefly through the diffusion of institutions through cultural contacts. It could be either gradual or cataclysmic, backward or forward, progress or decay. The only road to an understanding of social development lay through patient and intensive exploration of restricted local cultures in their historical and geographical setting.

After the rigid evolutionary formulæ had been disposed of, the cultural diffusionists proceeded to erect a new dogmatism. Every social change comes from without; original inventions are few. Similar customs necessarily imply historic contact, though the seven seas separate the tribes. Under Graebner, W. H. R. Rivers, G. Elliot Smith, and W. J. Perry, fantastic migrations of culture were spread around the world on flimsy evidence of similarities. It was quite forgotten that there are only a limited number of ways of responding to man’s environment, and that such adjustments may well arise spontaneously in more than one place.

The emergence of a more critical historical school is the achievement of a single American, Franz Boas. From physics and mathematics he brought exact technique and unremitting zeal for investigation. Concrete observation of each primitive culture in relation to its physical and cultural environment replaced sweeping generalizations, either evolutionary or diffusionist. Under his teachings a number of critical observers have collected facts on all the phases of primitive life, and given objective pictures of the functioning of savage societies. Thus anthropology, because the data for the refutation of *a-priori* systems were easily available, was able to emerge from the speculative stage to a due humility sooner than any other social science. A. L. Kroeber confesses the honest ignorance with which the anthropologist, remembering the disastrous past, is exceedingly critical of any pretension at generalized laws of human development.

The processes of civilizational activity are almost unknown to us. The self-sufficient factors that govern their workings are unresolved. . . . The historian as yet can do little but picture. He traces and he connects what seems far removed; he balances; he integrates; but he does not really explain, nor does he transmute phenomena into something else. His method is not science. . . . What we all are able to do is to realize this gap, to be impressed by its abyss with reverence and humility, and to go our paths on its respective sides without self-deluding attempts to bridge the eternal chasm, or empty boasts that its span is achieved.¹⁸

Slowly and tentatively anthropology is trying to build anew a social synthesis by means of a critical social method. This realization, indeed, that the social sciences, while borrowing much from biology and psychology, can find an adequate technique in no other science, but must work out method, tools, and concepts from the concrete subject-matter of society itself is the most important contribution so far made by anthropology, and places it in the van of the science of society. As against geographical, biological, and psychological determinists, it maintains that the forces at work in society are social and irreducible.

The cultural facts, even in their subjective aspect, are not merged in psychological facts. They must not, indeed, contravene psychological principles, but the same applies to all other principles of the universe. . . . But the principles of psychology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena of culture as is gravitation to account for architectural

styles. Over and above the interpretations given by psychology, there is an irreducible residuum of huge magnitude that calls for special treatment and by its very existence vindicates the *raison d'être* of ethnology.¹⁹

THE CREATION OF A REALISTIC, GENETIC, AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

In the science of economics, much the same development has taken place. The traditional method — in this case the mechanical deductive, not the evolutionary — with its sweeping assumptions and entrenched prejudices, is crumbling before the assault of facts; and most economists are, like the anthropologists, spending their time on detailed and specific investigations of society until a more adequate technique can lead to a new synthesis. We have seen how the Ricardian deductive analysis of the process of distribution, entangled with extraneous political and social interests, has remained the orthodox economic science to this day, despite the vigorous onslaught of social radicals of all schools and creeds. Pure economic theory of this type became more and more rarefied as the world from which it had first been generalized disappeared; but its exponents hardly troubled themselves with such new phenomena as corporation control of industry and centralized credit systems. They felt society already economically mature; all that remained was to analyze logically the presuppositions of the price-system. System after system repeated the main outlines of this "pecuniary logic," daringly modifying some minor point. When such theorists felt uneasily that their science should have some firmer basis in human nature, they turned to the antiquated hedonistic psychology of the eighteenth century — they knew of no other — and developed it dialectically with mathematical precision. Jevons in England, Menger in Austria, Walras in France, and John Bates Clark in America, explored the theory of value and the determinants of price, and rang the changes on marginal utility.

Utility analysis from these four sources impressed most economists as radically different from Ricardo's type of theory, because Ricardo had explained value mainly by cost of production, taking utility for granted. After due deliberation, lasting some twenty years, the economists became excited and began a lively controversy on the relative merits of cost analysis and utility analysis. Zealous spirits took

sides, as if the issue were of the either-or variety. But more cautious men, like Alfred Marshall, the most conspicuous of later English theorists, refused to subsume cost under utility or utility under cost, and held that both factors in conjunction determine values. Such men were dubbed eclectics for their caution.²⁰

But it was a tempest in a teapot: the issue made no real difference in the crystallized system, which had become explicitly "the science that treats phenomena from the standpoint of price."²¹

In Germany alone did economics refuse to follow this abstract form. Utterly alien to the strong bureaucratic tradition, out of harmony with the popular historical, romantic, and social spirit, classical economics in spite of its prestige could not become acclimated in Germany. For a century earnest students attempted to substitute the British cosmopolitanism and atomic individualism for the German particularism and collectivism, but oil and water would not mix. The second of the great nineteenth-century social attitudes, romantic evolution, found its way into economics with the rise of the Historical School in the 1840's. As in the other social sciences, the appeal to historical fact succeeded logical systems. The German critics of English political economy finally felt it necessary to discard the whole structure of abstract theory, and devote over a generation to the collection of historical materials, before making a fresh start at generalization. In 1843 Wilhelm Roscher issued the manifesto of the new method.

Our aim is an exhibit of that which, in economic respects, peoples have thought, willed, and felt, what they have attempted and accomplished, why they have attempted and accomplished it. Such an exhibit is possible only in closest alliance with the other sciences of collective life, especially with legal, constitutional, and cultural history. . . . The philosopher is after a system of ideas or judgments, as abstract as possible, utterly denuded of all the accidents of time and space. The historian wants a delineation of human developments and relationships, represented as faithfully to actual life as possible. The former has explained a fact when he has defined it, and when no idea appears in his definition which had not been already discussed in earlier parts of the system. The latter is presumed to have explained a fact when he has pictured the people by whom and upon whom the action came to pass. . . .

One sees that this method aims to accomplish for political economy what the Savigny-Eichhorn method did for jurisprudence. It is far from the school of Ricardo, though it does not oppose that school directly, and even thankfully appropriates its results.²²

Roscher was followed by Hildebrand and Knies, the latter of whom saw economic history as in itself the only material for economic science.

Like economic conditions themselves, so also the theory of political economy, whatever be its form and structure at a given time, whatever be the arguments and results which it urges, is an outcome of historical development. These conditions and this theory are in vital articulation with the entire organism of a human and historical epoch. They grow out of the peculiarities of the time, the place, the nationality. . . . They cannot exhibit the "universal laws of political economy" in any other way than as a historical explication and a progressive manifestation of the truth. . . . Neither in their totality nor in their formulation may they be regarded as something final.²³

On such a basis Gustav von Schmoller, in his *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre* (1900), made the historical position dominant among German economists, and carried its method, in Thorold Rogers, Cunningham, and Ashley, to England itself. From a relativistic and genetic point of view, he dealt with the facts and processes of economic evolution in relation to all the major departments of social life. For him there is complexity, change, and growth everywhere; a logical system is impossible. From Schmoller's followers there came a flood of detailed investigations; and far from supporting laissez-faire in the interests of the business man, they instituted a vigorous and successful campaign for state intervention in the interests of national welfare. The leaders in this "State" or "Professorial Socialism" of the seventies and eighties were Schmoller himself, Adolf Wagner, and A. E. F. Schäffle. Thus the historical attitude has resulted both in thorough surveys of the actual organization and functioning of human nature engaged in the satisfaction of all its needs, and in comprehensive programs for its more effective reorganization.

Abstract theory has reached a mathematical perfection in the pecuniary logic of a Davenport, Moore, or Hotelling; and at London Robbins and Hayek have revived a neo-classicism. But many economists have preferred to investigate the actual functioning of economic institutions. Thorstein Veblen's satirical criticism of existing practices, by a suggestive analysis of institutionalized habits, has turned men like Wesley Mitchell and Walton Hamilton to the newer behavioristic social psychology to clarify economic action. These American "institutional-

ists," with the Webbs and Hobson in England, and Sombart in Germany, claim that quantitative investigation of the evolution and operation of economic institutions must precede any attempt at generalization. For them, economics is the exact study of changing economic behavior. By combining statistical methods with an understanding of men's plastic social habits, they hope to forge tools adequate to the complex social regulation and organization now demanded by our economic life. In our crises of depression and war economy, the need for workable techniques has obscured concern with the formal theory of rapidly changing institutions. The present mood is — investigate and experiment. Experiment in any event we must.

INVESTIGATION IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

The tale is the same in law and political science. Jurisprudence too has had its mechanical, abstract, analytical school, still powerful in the courts; its evolutionary, historical school of Savigny and the Germans, Henry Sumner Maine and Maitland; its various philosophical schools, each magnifying some one principle and technique; and is to-day becoming sociological, that is, interested in investigating the social effects of legal forms and processes.

Sociological jurists look to the working of the law rather than to its abstract content; they regard law as a social institution involving both finding by experience and conscious making — an institution which may be improved by conscious human effort; they lay stress upon the social ends which law subserves rather than upon sanctions; they look on legal precepts and doctrines and institutions functionally and regard the form of legal precepts as a means only.²⁴

Political science, even more than economics the servant of group interests and ideals, has found it especially difficult to become descriptive and critical because of the religious sanctity which nineteenth-century nationalism has thrown about the state. Whether regarded as the guarantee of individual rights, with the Benthamites and Liberals, or as the highest expression of the Absolute, with the Idealists, or as the divinely ordained power for man's governance, with the Traditionalists, the state has shrunk from sacrilegious analysis. Political scientists at first tried to content themselves with the definition of political terms, the classification of political institutions, and the logical elucida-

tion of written constitutions. When such a systematic and deductive treatment had exhausted its possibilities, they turned to the historical method, at first with a romantic and idealistic veneration, then from the standpoint of biological evolution, and traced the stages of political and constitutional development. On the basis of the factual knowledge revealed by such studies, and of the sense of the relativity and constant change in political forms, men sought in the analysis of the actual functioning of political institutions an insight into the causal factors at work. The structure and operation of democratic government, especially party machinery, attracted eager investigators like Wilson, Bryce, Ostrogorski, and Michels. This led to the placing of political institutions in their broader social setting, as one of the means of social control; and politics found itself joining psychology, economics, and sociology. Particular political expedients have been statistically surveyed and analyzed, both genetically and functionally. The cloak of sanctity has been stripped from the state, which is now seen to be but the umpire among conflicting social groups, often the pawn of some dominant economic interest. In the laying bare of the facts of political control, the formation of public opinion, the genesis of legislation, the technique of party government, political scientists have ceased to care for logical systems. Their primary concern is the investigation of functioning and the devising of improved machinery for democratic government. Statistical surveys have taken the place of deductive analyses.

As a result, most of the eighteenth-century doctrines have crumbled, for the scientist if not for the politician and statesman. Natural law and natural rights, having served their historical purpose of bringing about an industrial society, have disappeared; in the face of the centralized and reasonably efficient action demanded by modern society, the separation of powers and checks and balances have in fact and theory gone into the discard. National sovereignty, so important a theory in creating the liberal state, has been attacked mercilessly; in place of omnipotence observers have found in democratic governments only a limited power of enforcement in conflict with many strong group interests. Indeed, political theory now insists on group action as fundamental, and has abandoned atomic individualism. The modern state deals, not with individuals,

but with groups; its control is exercised by and for specific groups. L. Duguit, H. J. Laski, and G. D. H. Cole, following Gierke and Maitland, have emphasized the fact of political "pluralism."

The wide-spread breakdown of democratic government in practice under the stress of just such group tensions has provoked a reaction. Communist and Fascist groups that have captured the state have no sympathy with pluralism, and even democratic theorists like Laski himself now desire to strengthen authority to prevent such a capture. Discussions of sovereignty have given way to analyses of political power and its techniques, from the psychological power of symbols and propaganda to the naked power of military force. Political science has left the tolerant age of Locke to return to Hobbes. Belated interest has been aroused in the social theories of the mathematical economist V. Pareto, and his predecessor G. Mosca, whose harsh Machiavellian "realism," so in accord with the present temper, analyzed the nature and operation of the "élite groups" who always control the state. Though with the revolutions of 1918 party government seemed to have conquered the earth, the pressure of events has since reinforced all the older criticisms of the democratic dogmas. Psychology has revealed the wide variation in individual abilities, and the ease with which group opinion can stifle individuality and originality. The difficulty of expert administration and of vigorous action in a democracy, and the facility with which party machines can govern in the interest of privileged economic groups, have impressed all observers. Even to its advocates, democratic control seems to-day rather a *pis aller* than a creed of promise.

Yet the faults of the democratic ideal seem primarily its failure to achieve social control over powerful groups in a rapidly changing economic structure. Hence the dominant note, in America at least, is the demand for more democracy, democracy in industrial as well as in political life, without which the latter remains a mere veneer for economic exploitation. What is needed is genuine education — the old democratic cry — and the invention of political machinery able to reorganize an industrial society. Above all, we need to know how to enlist the co-operative support of men in applying the social knowledge we already possess.

THE NEED FOR POPULARIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

More education — that is the insistent need of the science of man to-day. Systems have run their course, sound methods have gradually been found after many trials, and valid techniques have built themselves on an unparalleled knowledge of the facts of social life. But the social sciences, not being able to show any such impressive results as the imposing pile of mechanical inventions, have earned neither the wide dissemination nor the prestige of the natural sciences. The task of giving to all men their already established results, and above all a sense of their problems and their critical techniques, remains the greatest single objective of the science of man in the twentieth century. If what is already known by experts were actually incorporated into our social life, many of our pressing maladjustments could be at once alleviated. But far more important, with a sympathetic acceptance of their goal, the understanding of man and the bettering of his life, passionate prejudices and antediluvian ideas could be swept away, and the atmosphere created in which genuine advance in knowledge is possible. It is from experimentation that the science of man can hope to learn most; and in society, experimentation is only possible and successful if it can enlist widespread sympathy and understanding. Most important of all the achievements of the social sciences is the creation, in the minds of the few, of the experimental attitude and the critical technique when face to face with man in his group life; and before much more can be done, this attitude and this technique must be spread abroad. If man is ever to solve the social problems which his science, creating the growing industrial world, has brought upon him, he must place himself and his institutions squarely in the world of nature and subject them also to the play of scientific intelligence.

We have a long way to go before we shall be able to realize the dream of Auguste Comte and Lester F. Ward in making social science the basis and acceptable guide of practical statesmanship. In addition to the necessary improvements in social science, we have a much more difficult problem ahead in converting the mass of the population to the belief that we must rely for guidance upon scientifically ascertained fact instead of animism and rhetoric. . . . In spite of the fact that human conduct is the most complicated of terrestrial problems and, properly guided, calls for the collaboration of a greater number and variety of experts than any other human perplexity, this is, along with

religion, the one field which we reserve for the sovereign authority of the herd as expressed by the clergyman and the illiterate "man in the street." In short, it will avail little to go ahead with the very salutary process of improving the scientific level of the social sciences, unless we are able to parallel this development with the securing of a better connection between the social sciences on the one hand, and public opinion and practical statesmanship in business and politics, on the other.²⁵

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CHAPTER XX

RELIGION IN THE GROWING WORLD

WE left religion in the eighteenth century apparently helpless in the face of the onslaughts of the rationalistic attack. The very methods of reason, upon which men at the beginning of the century had so hopefully relied for a complete demonstration of the validity and the importance of religious beliefs, when pushed to their logical conclusion not only overthrew all faith in any supernatural revelation, but in the hands of skeptics seemed to make impossible the very religion of reason and nature itself. Every bit of the great Jewish and Christian tradition, it seemed to the leaders of the Age of Reason, had crumbled away, leaving only the appealing but fanatical figures of the prophets and saints of old, and the body of Christian ethics. When this very suicide of rational religion led to the rebirth of the religious spirit, it was upon faith and intuition that the attempt at reconstruction was based, and no compromise seemed possible with the scientific and naturalistic spirit of the day. The pietistic and evangelical movements, even the deeper poetry of the romanticists, seemed to have turned their backs squarely upon the modern world with its interests, methods, and ideals. If religion was to flourish and wax strong once more in the hearts of men, it must proceed, so it appeared, in complete disregard of all that men held dear in other fields of intellectual interest.

Naturally Catholicism, as the most complete antithesis to the spirit of the nineteenth-century world, gained most by this *volte face*; and in the Church of England the Oxford Movement, fostered by the University scholars Keble, Pusey, William Ward, and above all John Henry Newman, sought to bring that historic communion out of its Protestant wanderings into closer harmony with the spirit and doctrine of the Roman Church. The romantic reaction to all forms of rationalism, and the marked æsthetic interest among the finer spirits of the day, combined to give strength to this general tendency. When Newman's marvelously subtle mind finally convinced itself that adherence to the Church of England involved not only schism but heresy,

and he joined the Roman Catholics, the movement received a temporary setback; but his following soon gathered strength once more and as the High Church party has since steadily grown in power and influence. The Catholic Church itself, strong in its faith, has with few exceptions realized that compromise is the easy descent to Avernus, and has resolutely set its face against any truce with the intellectual tendencies of the modern age. Standing like the Rock of Ages against the successive waves of unbelief and modernism, it has again and again made all the more pointed its sharp dissent from modern ideas.

But while for many souls such a complete denial of rationalism and conciliation has seemed to offer the surest buttress against doubt and disintegration, for many more it has proved impossible to keep faith and knowledge in water-tight compartments. More or less unwillingly they have made one compromise after another with the ideas of the Growing World, until the form of religion which they cherish has come to be a quite different thing from the faith of the fathers — in their eyes a better and more precious treasure, in the eyes of those who cling to the older traditions a sham and a mockery. These so-called religious liberals, who have flourished amongst the more thoughtful as well as the more indifferent in every church body, amongst Protestants and Jews and even Catholics, contend that if religion is to be a living reality, if it is to remain a permanent expression of the religious needs of the human race, it must assimilate new truth and knowledge and adapt itself to the changed conditions, intellectual and social, of the modern age. What Augustine did for the Hellenistic world, what Thomas accomplished for the Middle Ages, must be undertaken once more for the world of modern science and industry — must be undertaken again and again, in fact, so long as man's knowledge grows and his social life is transformed. To a greater or less extent the more thoughtful conservatives in all churches have realized the existence of this problem, and even the orthodoxy of to-day has been influenced in divers subtle ways by the spirit and needs of the modern age; especially is this true in the increasing shift in every communion from the older individualistic preoccupation with saving individual souls to the social conviction that, as Canon Freemantle put it in a classic work, "the world is the subject of redemption." The lines of cleavage, in fact, are

drawn to-day much more sharply in matters of belief than in programs of social action; and High Churchmen and Catholics agree with liberals and modernists that it is a primary duty of organized religion to work for a social order more in accordance with Christian principles.

In the face of the modern world of science, then, men to whom the religious heritage is a precious possession of the human soul have had two alternatives: they could either cleave to the old with redoubled energy, or they could attempt the difficult and dangerous task of effecting a new harmony of knowledge and aspiration. There is, indeed, a third possibility, easier than either of the other two: they could relegate religion and religious problems more and more to the background, and find full scope for their energies in the complex activities of an industrial age. Unquestionably the last century has seen a growing indifference to the whole aim and purpose of religion, especially among two classes. The great body of industrial workers, for whose life religion has seemed increasingly to grow irrelevant, and to have no vital message, has for the most part directed its energies to making and enjoying a living; the majority without much serious questioning or searching of the heart or definite abandonment of religious beliefs, the more thoughtful minority with active antagonism, seeing little in religion but an "opiate of the people," a means of binding them to the existing social order with hypocritical promises of bliss to come. Among the professional and scientific classes it has been the inability of traditional religion to justify itself in the light of modern science, rather than its disinclination to cope with the problems of industrial society, that has led to the rapid growth of a tolerant indifference, a skeptical agnosticism, or a dogmatic atheism.

But there is much reason to doubt whether, after all, the modern age as a whole is much more indifferent to the appeal of religion than the centuries of the past. The so-called Age of Faith, when every man gave lip-service to the Church and took wise precautions against the perils of a future life, probably contained not much larger a proportion of genuinely religious souls, men to whom faith and aspiration and the service of God and man was a living reality, than are to be found in our Western world to-day. Public opinion has now made skepticism and indifference more respectable, and the old pressure for conform-

ity is no longer so strong. The very gropings and yearnings of so many of the "unchurched" to-day, not only the rise and spread of the various cults and groups deriving their inspiration largely from Oriental sources, which make their appeal mainly to the more leisured classes, but even more the intense religious fervor with which men throw themselves into the manifold social and humanitarian movements of the day, such as socialism, and above all the strength of the most universal religion of the present, patriotic nationalism, seem to indicate the continued presence in men of the needs and the aspirations which formerly were expressed in terms of traditional religion. Men's thought upon the whole subject is sadly lacking in clarity and precision, yet amidst all the confusion and cross-currents it is dubious whether religious needs and religious satisfactions are any less intense than they were when one great body of Christ embraced the whole of Christendom.

There seem to be, then, at least five great groups and tendencies in the religious life of the last hundred years. First, there is the Catholic Church, together with the Anglican High Church party, who owe allegiance to the main traditions of Christianity. Secondly, there is the orthodox party among the Protestants, the evangelicals, finding expression in the Low Church party among the Anglicans and in the recent movement known as fundamentalism among the various Protestant denominations; this rests its faith, not upon the Catholic tradition, nor upon the doctrines of the Reformation, but upon the new evangelical orthodoxy of the eighteenth century, a quite different thing. Thirdly, there is the body of liberals or modernists amongst the Protestants, forming the Broad Church party in the Anglican fold, and even penetrating, until stamped out, into the Catholic Church. Fourthly, there are the various more radical religious movements which have broken definitely with the Christian tradition, ranging from the eighteenth-century Unitarianism through the various exotic cults to humanitarian and agnostic movements like the Positivist Religion of Humanity, the German Monists, and the Ethical Culture Societies. And finally, there are the great body of the indifferent and the skeptical, to whom no form of what they would recognize as religion makes any appeal. It might be added that a similar division to that amongst the Protestants exists in Judaism, where the line is

drawn between the Orthodox and the Reformed congregations, in which latter body there flourishes a strong liberal party both in social and in theological tendencies. But before investigating the important stages in the development of these various groups, and their significant ideas, we must enumerate the chief tendencies which have influenced religious thought during the century.

CAUSAL FACTORS IN THE RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT

Superficially, it would seem that in view of the protracted warfare of "religion" and "science" for the last few generations the greatest single force in bringing about contemporary religious beliefs has been the growth of scientific knowledge. But it is probable that the discovery of new facts about man and his universe has operated only indirectly. For the average man, scientific knowledge in itself appears to be in no wise incompatible with a strong religious interest, even with traditional religious ideas. Indeed, it is surprising, if one is really concerned with believing both in science and theology, how little logical conflict there is between the faith of the fathers and the acceptance of scientific truth. To be sure, such a mind is apt only to "accept" science; and it is not by such acceptance that the great discoveries have been made. But the record is full also of plenty of examples of orthodox Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, who have been pathfinders in scientific truth. It is only when to the passive acquiescence in the results of science is added an active scientific faith — faith, that is, in the power and the method and the assumptions of science — that a genuine conflict appears. Even such a faith is not necessarily irreligious, but it is undeniably disturbing. It brings with it new attitudes, new viewpoints, new loyalties, and it is bound also to bring new conceptions of the nature and function of religion. Where this scientific faith is so strong as to seem sufficient unto itself, it may easily lead to a diminishing of all religious interest.

It is neither science nor this scientific faith, but rather the reflection of a changing social experience in new philosophies, that has been the chief intellectual factor in forming modern religious thought. By the eighties alert leaders felt the need of reconstructing the religious tradition, both to circumvent the

disintegrating effects of the growing science on literal-minded orthodoxy, and, more significantly, to embody better the humanistic values and progressive temper of the age. They found the already developed idealistic systems, and the more romantic of the newer evolutionary faiths, admirable instruments for these ends. As a result, the major liberal reinterpretations were worked out in terms of idealism, and deeply bound up with its patterns of thought; and most of what passed for "modern theology" in liberal circles down to our generation exhibited far more of the ethical values and monistic feeling of romanticism than of any scientific temper.

This is still largely true to-day. Though the original idealistic inspiration has been reinforced and given a scientific coloring by the speculative theology of certain recent physicists, it is the most romantic of our interpretations of science, like creative or emergent evolution, or Whitehead's philosophy of organism, that have appealed most to religious thinkers. Even the widespread resort to "religious experience," and the attempts to make of theology an "empirical science," owe far more to romantic ideas of experience than to any of our scientifically critical empiricisms. Only very recently have a few pioneers, chiefly in this country, tried to give a religious application to our more experimental and naturalistic philosophies.

But such intellectual factors have naturally operated only with the minority. The major influence affecting religious beliefs and attitudes has been the growth of our manifold secular faiths and interests. These new ways of life have corrupted orthodox and liberal alike; they have caused not so much an intellectual dissatisfaction with the faith of the fathers, as an unconscious but profound crowding aside of that faith as irrelevant in the modern world. Though men repeat the old phrases their real concern has turned elsewhere. To many observers there even seemed for a time a genuine waning of the religious need; the forces in human nature that had formerly demanded a religious faith now found sufficient expression in humanitarian activities and social idealism. The rapid rise abroad of powerful social faiths and cults has reminded us that the demand for a supreme and unifying loyalty is not so easily eradicated, but merely changes its object with a changing social experience. Still it is clear that a growing preoccupation with the secular life

of this world has pushed the traditional forms of religion further and further into the background, and that this shifting of men's concerns has been the basic force at work behind the modern religious scene. Organized religion, even where vigorous, has become more and more this-worldly; the appeal of a social gospel, often felt most deeply in theologically orthodox communities, has led men to lose interest in theoretical questions and turn to some form of moral and social idealism. And the strongest and most fanatically zealous religions in our world are those new secular faiths most narrowly focused on a social goal. All in all, the outstanding religious phenomenon of the century has been not so much the fading of faith, as its transfer from a theological and cosmic to a human and social object.

It is true that the mood of disillusionment and despair of man's moral powers that accompanied defeat in Central Europe, that reached even America with the depression, and that has been made well-nigh universal by the threatened collapse of our whole accustomed world in the present great revolution, has had a striking religious repercussion in sending Protestants back to new and sophisticated versions of Reformation orthodoxy. The pre-war humanistic liberalism is dead on the Continent, it has been losing ground in Britain, and is sharply challenged in America. It is hardly possible to speak with confidence to-day of realizing the Kingdom of God on earth; the kingdoms that are being realized are too clearly of this world. In times of failure and frustration and the apparent doom of ideals the more sensitive crave something beyond the goal of any human and social program. In the light of to-day's experience, the doctrines of St. Augustine, formulated to meet the decay of another civilization, no longer need drastic reinterpretation to make them convey our vision of man's estate; they once more express what men deeply feel, as they have recurrently in the past. Theologically speaking, many have come to realize afresh the transcendence of God. But it is after all a new conception of and concern with human nature that this Neo-orthodoxy expresses: it is a moral protest against the intolerable evils of modern life in time of crisis. And in America at least it has been coupled with renewed interest in radical social programs. It bids men pursue them with greater vigor, but with a more critical temper and in the light of a purer spiritual ideal.

OPPOSITION TO THE NEW WORLD AS CONFLICTING WITH
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

These new forces were destined to lead to marked hostility as well as to assimilation. The orthodox and conservative groups, who may even be called reactionary in comparison with the general attitude during the eighteenth century, found themselves throughout the century in ever-increasing opposition to whatever in the newer conceptions seemed to conflict with the time-honored religious traditions. In the Protestant churches, this led to a reaffirmation of the dogmatic and precise theologies and creeds of the Reformation and Puritanical era, as modified and transformed by the eighteenth-century evangelical revival. During the first part of the century there was, amongst the more educated members of these bodies, a carrying-on of eighteenth-century supernatural rationalism, expressing itself in much concern with the scientific "evidences of Christianity." The *Analogy* of Bishop Butler, despite its double-edged argument, enjoyed a great vogue in university and college circles, in England and America, where it was long used as a textbook in Christian apologetics. It vied in popularity with William Paley's *Natural Theology* (1802), which in the manner of Tillotson and Clarke a century earlier sought by appeals to the perfect adaptations of animals and man to their environment, notably by an analysis of the intricate structure of the eye, to prove that such evidence of design in the world was explicable only in terms of a Divine Creator. This argument, cogent in the Newtonian world, lost its force in the world of nineteenth-century science, and with the theory of evolution, rightly or wrongly, seemed exploded. A similar school of rationalistic supernaturalists existed far into the century in Germany. With this group may be placed the more radical and Deistic early Unitarians, greatest among whom was the founder of the American movement, William Ellery Channing; he was a high supernaturalist who insisted upon miracles as the chief proof of Christianity, but tempered his faith with a conviction of the fundamental dignity and worth of human nature.

By the side of this rational supernaturalism existed a pious and unintellectual evangelicalism, expressing itself in great emotional "revivals" emphasizing conversion and personal salvation in the Wesleyan fashion; such waves of religious feeling swept the

American colonies in the eighteenth century, captured the new West in the early nineteenth, and have lingered on to the present in the Southern and Western States. This is the type of religion with which we are familiar as involving "camp-meetings," "the sawdust trail," and the various other appurtenances of popular religion in the rural districts and small towns of the great American hinterland. In the form of the Salvation Army it has invaded the industrial centers of England and America, devoting itself to the conversion and rehabilitation of the lowest strata of the slums.

The growth of mechanistic science, of scientific Biblical criticism, and the bursting of the bombshell of evolution in 1859, brought the conflict between evangelical traditions and the modern world to a head. In all the churches the first reaction was one of bitter hatred and fierce denunciation of Darwin's ideas in any form. Sainly Bishops grew excited in calling men like Huxley and Darwin the worst names they could think of, and proclaiming their unalterable opposition to the idea that man is a monkey and to "science falsely so-called." Ministers arose in every pulpit to denounce the impious and ungodly books which they would not disgrace themselves to read, and to announce their undying adherence to a literal interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis. "Free-thinking" opponents denounced in turn superstition and antiquated obscurantism; and men like Robert Ingersoll toured the country, maliciously pointing out the "mistakes of Moses" and the cussedness of parsons in general. Theology and science seemed to thoughtful men to be in unalterable and eternal conflict.

PROTESTANT FUNDAMENTALISM

When the first shock had passed into history, and the smoke of battle cleared away, men commenced to wonder whether after all the opposition were really so complete, and whether the acceptance of the main facts of modern science were so incompatible with the essentials of the Christian tradition. It took over a generation to make the adjustment, but by the end of the century most thoughtful Protestants, either by reinterpreting Genesis in the light of evolutionary ideas, or by returning to the older Christian tradition of pre-Protestant days and not attempting to interpret the Bible as literal scientific truth at all, had

reached the point where they had no difficulty in reconciling faith and science. But the majority of uneducated church members, who had no means of assimilating what the scientific viewpoint really means, were content to remain oblivious to the advance of mechanism and evolution and historical research; and when the liberals, especially in the theological seminaries supported by the various denominations, seemed to be too radically transforming the faith of the fathers, they lent themselves to the support of a renewed attack upon the modern tendencies. The movement known as Fundamentalism to-day came into being just before 1914, as an attempt of certain ministers to counteract the effect of the liberal teachings of the theological seminaries. Powerfully stimulated by the partisan bitternesses of the post-war period, it has gained at least passive support among great bodies of church members in all the denominations. It represents primarily a reaction against modernizing tendencies, which to its leaders seem to be taking liberals into positions which involve not only much intellectual confusion, but also the definite abandonment of the central doctrines of the evangelical faith, the depravity of human nature, the need of supernatural grace for salvation, and the attendant faith in the literal miracle of the incarnation. In these contentions the Fundamentalists are correct: it is precisely the abandonment of such doctrines which the Modernists desire to effect in the Protestant churches; and to an impartial observer there does seem, in the liberal positions, much confusion and lack of precise thinking, as well as the appearance at least of a lack of frankness and a fondness for esoteric "reinterpretation" that may approach in its effects actual hypocrisy. The cleavage, however, seems to be more basic: the Fundamentalists do not, and the Modernists do, accept present-day philosophies, and without agreement upon these basic assumptions of thinking, it seems difficult to see how the two parties can even hope to understand each other. It is but natural that men who are sincerely convinced that the doctrines of evangelical Protestantism and the literal authority of the Scriptures are supremely needful, should make every effort in their power to prevent the teaching of such secondary matters as biological science and its consequent and very real winning away and "corruption" of the minds of the young from the truth in the possession of their elders. As was

pointed out in connection with the medieval inquisition, those who believe themselves possessed of absolute and necessary truth have no *right* to permit the dissemination of error, whatever laxity the kindness of their hearts may permit them.

CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO MODERN TENDENCIES

The reaction of the Catholic Church to nineteenth-century beliefs was in some ways more and in some ways less pronounced than that among Protestants. The Church, for example, while maintaining that certain dogmas, as defined in the Tridentine Confession of Faith, are divinely revealed and authoritatively imposed upon all communicants, has never insisted with the orthodox Protestants upon a literal interpretation of the Bible. Hence while the latter found their sole authority seemingly absolutely opposed to evolutionary ideas, the Church has so far made no dogmatic and authoritative interpretation of the Book of Genesis, and Catholics are free to take the story of creation in whatever sense seems to them most rational. The only point upon which Catholic dogma directly opposes biological views is in insisting that at a definite point in the process of evolutionary creation the body of man was informed with an immortal soul — a belief obviously incapable of biological disproof. It is true that many individual priests have taken the same position of complete opposition that has been held among orthodox Protestants, but these views have never had any binding power upon the faithful. It cannot be seriously contended that in the last century the clergy as a whole have warmly welcomed modern science, whatever they may have done during the Middle Ages or the Renaissance; but there is a long line of devout Catholic scientists, foremost among whom are Pasteur and Mendel and the Jesuit astronomers and mathematicians, who furnish a sufficient refutation of the charge that Catholic piety and scientific discovery are necessarily incompatible.

On the other hand, the Church has insisted on its absolute and divinely appointed authority in whatever it judges touches faith and morals; and the last century has seen a strengthening and a precise definition of these powers. Among Protestants there is nothing corresponding to this authority of an existing ecclesiastical institution. For the Protestant, the Scriptures constitute the sole authority, and in theory at least he is free to

interpret them in accordance with his individual reason. In many communions, notably the large body of the Baptists and the Congregationalists, there has never been any binding creed whatever; while even those churches founded upon a creedal confession in practice admit very wide variations in interpretation. In those churches with a congregational polity, like the Baptists, even the ministers are held only to the theological doctrines insisted upon by a majority of the members of an individual church; while even in those with a presbyterian or episcopal organization, there is no claim of an authoritative and divinely right interpretation of either Bible or creed. The central body which ordains ministers and can dismiss them for heresy is only using its powers of human reason to interpret the Scriptures aright, and is in theory always open to conviction by better reason. This amounts in practice to almost complete liberty of interpretation for the ordinary Protestant, and to very wide liberty for the ministers. In other words, if the Fundamentalists are strong to-day, it is because they voluntarily believe that their views are right, not because they are authoritatively told that they are.

THE REACTION OF PIUS IX

The conservative movement in the Catholic Church dates from the pontificate of Pius IX (1846-1878). Elected as a liberal, to bring the Church up-to-date, he was so frightened by the revolutions of 1848 and the temporary loss of his sovereignty over the Papal States that he became, under Jesuit influence, a confirmed conservative. He promulgated two new dogmas, the first since the Council of Trent, and did all in his power to oppose the contemporary tendencies in thought and action. In 1854, alone and without the aid of a council, he issued the bull proclaiming the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin (which has nothing whatever to do with the ancient doctrine of the Virgin Birth) a binding dogma — the first time a Pope alone had promulgated a dogma. In 1864 he issued his Syllabus of Errors, occasioned by the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy by the Powers, which explicitly condemned almost all the tendencies of the age, and concluded with the ringing words: "It is an error to believe that the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and

contemporary civilization." In 1869 Pius called the first œcumenical council since Trent, which in the next year, at the very moment that the Italian troops were thundering at the gates of Rome, proclaimed the new dogma of Papal Infallibility.

This dogma represents the irrevocable commitment of the Church against liberal tendencies. It was not a new doctrine, having been taught by Thomas and the Jesuits, but it had, strangely enough, never before been made binding. It is the logical consequence of the ancient dogma of the infallibility of the Church taken in connection with the actual monarchy of the Pope; and if there is to be infallibility anywhere in a religious system, the Pope seems the best place in which to seat it. It marked the final triumph of the Papacy over the episcopal and conciliar tendencies in the Church.

The exact significance of this dogma is not usually recognized. It does not claim that the Pope's opinions are infallible, nor that he is sinless.

Faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of Christian people, the sacred Council approving, we teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed: that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that his Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.¹

Thus infallibility is limited to matters of faith and morals, and to official decrees addressed to the Church at large and intended to bind the Church; only such decrees can become dogmas, and be absolutely final, irrevocable, and irreformable.

As a matter of fact, Catholics have found it very difficult to determine whether any given pronouncement is infallible or not. It is agreed that only two decrees in the whole history of the Papacy have been infallible, that on the Immaculate Conception, and the Syllabus of Errors; and there is much doubt about the latter's inclusion. The fears expressed in 1870 that the Pope

would promulgate new dogmas have proved groundless; indeed, the careful definition of infallibility has made many doctrines clearly not within its scope much less binding, and has naturally resulted in great caution on the part of succeeding Popes in view of their tremendous responsibility.

Still, in matters of faith and morals the Catholic Church had set its face resolutely against modern tendencies. To run over the Syllabus of errors condemned by Pius IX in 1864 is very instructive. Some of the errors are as follows:

I. *Pantheism, Naturalism, and Absolute Rationalism.* 3. Human reason, without any regard to God, is the sole arbiter of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; it is its own law to itself, and suffices by its natural force to secure the welfare of men and of nations. 5. Divine revelation is imperfect, and, therefore, subject to a continual and indefinite progress, which corresponds with the progress of human reason. 6. Christian faith contradicts human reason, and divine revelation not only does not benefit, but even injures the perfection of man.

II. *Moderate Rationalism.* 12. The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregations fetter the free progress of science. 13. The method and principles by which the old scholastic doctors cultivated theology are no longer suitable to the demands of the age and the progress of science.

III. *Indifferentism, Latitudinarianism.* 15. Every man is free to embrace and profess the religion he shall believe true, guided by the light of reason. 16. Men may in any religion find the way of eternal salvation, and obtain eternal salvation. 17. We may entertain at least a well-founded hope for the eternal salvation of all those who are in no manner in the true Church of Christ. 18. Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true Christian religion, in which it is possible to be equally pleasing to God as in the Catholic Church.

IV. *Socialism, Communism, Secret Societies, Biblical Societies, Clerico-Liberal Societies.*

VI. *Errors about Civil Society.* 42. In the case of conflicting laws between the two powers, the civil law ought to prevail. 47. The best theory of civil society requires that popular schools open to the children of all classes, and, generally, all public institutes intended for instruction in letters and philosophy, and for conducting the education of the young, should be freed from all ecclesiastical authority, government, and interference, and should be fully subject to the civil and political power, in conformity with the will of rulers and the prevalent opinions of the age. 48. This system of instructing youth, which consists in separating it from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and in teaching exclusively, or at least primarily, the knowledge of natural things and the earthly ends of social life alone, may be approved by Catholics.

X. *Errors having reference to Modern Liberalism.* 77. In the present day, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship. 78. Whence it has been wisely provided by law, in some countries called Catholic, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own worship. 79. Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every mode of worship, and the full power given to all of overtly and publicly manifesting their opinions and their ideas, of all kinds whatsoever, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to the propagation of the pest of indifferentism.²

CATHOLIC MODERNISM

But in spite of this official opposition, modern ideas could not be prevented from filtering into the more thoughtful minds in the Catholic hierarchy. Leo XIII, the successor of Pius IX, while not differing greatly from Pius in his own beliefs, possessed a much more liberal and tolerant spirit; he felt that error was to be combated with reason rather than with mere authority. He fostered a renewed study of the works of Thomas Aquinas in all Catholic seminaries, the upshot of which was to spread abroad that great rationalist's doctrine that between true science and true religion there can be no conflict. The very vigorous activity of the Neo-Thomists, in rejecting a mere blind appeal to faith, and setting men to effect some kind of an intellectual reconciliation between science and Catholic doctrine, greatly eased the strain. The Jesuits took the lead in their intellectual center at Louvain in restating scholastic philosophy in the light of modern knowledge, and in pursuing the sciences on Thomistic principles. Leo also, in his famous encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, issued in 1891, laid the foundations for a social program of the Church; we shall return to this later.

Encouraged by these liberal tendencies, there grew up in the Church a group of thinkers known as "Modernists," who followed the liberal Protestants in a number of their modifications of traditional doctrine in the light of recent science. The Abbé Loisy, Blondel, Labertonnière, and Leroy in France, Murri and Fogazzaro in Italy, Schell in Germany, and von Hügel and Father George Tyrrell in England, agreed in accepting the results of the historical criticism of the Bible, in accepting the principle of evolution, even as applied to dogma itself, in favoring the psychological approach to religion through experience and

personal faith, and in taking many ideas from the German romanticists, such as immanence, agnosticism, and mysticism. Above all, they were united in demanding more of liberty and less of external and absolute authority within the Church. They were not, however, Protestants: they clung to the social sense and the solidarity of the Church against what they conceived to be the individualism of Protestantism. This movement had attained large proportions among the younger priesthood when Pius X, in many ways returning to the methods of Pius IX, determined to extirpate it. In the encyclicals *Lamentabile* and *Pascendi Gregis*, in 1907, modernism was summarized and specifically condemned, a new and effective censorship was set up, Loisy and Tyrrell were excommunicated; and in a few years whatever modernism still existed in the Church was driven underground. The Modernists had attempted to combine solidarity and liberty within the Church; the latter was not prepared to give up its cardinal principle of authority.

It was in vain that the Modernists sought to appeal to the example rather than the authority of Saint Thomas:

Saint Thomas was the true Modernist of his time, the man who strove with marvelous perseverance and genius to harmonize his faith with the thought of that day. And we are the true successors of the scholastics in all that was valuable in their work—in their keen sense of the adaptability of the Christian religion to the ever-changing forms of philosophy and general culture.³

The Pope, impressed by his responsibility “of guarding with the greatest vigilance the deposit of the faith delivered to the saints, rejecting the profane novelties of words and the gainsaying of knowledge falsely so-called,”⁴ declared that

were any one to attempt the task of collecting together all the errors that have been broached against the faith and to concentrate into one the sap and substance of them all, he could not succeed in doing so better than the Modernists have done.⁵ It is pride which fills Modernists with that self-assurance by which they consider themselves and pose as the rule for all. It is pride which puffs them up with that vainglory which allows them to regard themselves as the sole possessors of knowledge. . . . It is pride which rouses in them the spirit of disobedience and causes them to demand a compromise between authority and liberty. It is owing to their pride that they seek to be the reformers of others while they forget to reform themselves, and that they are found to be utterly wanting in respect for authority, even for the supreme authority.⁶

THE CATHOLIC RENAISSANCE

Since the official suppression of this attempt to reinterpret the Catholic faith in terms of nineteenth-century romantic ideas, Catholic thinkers have tried to work with rather than against the classic tradition of European rationalism. The post-war years of confusion and disintegration saw a rapid growth in the appeal and the intellectual prestige of the Church, in France as well as in Central Europe. It seemed the one great Western institution that still attempted to oppose the corrosions of nationalism, the one bulwark of the older values of the European heritage in a rapidly dissolving world. Politically, this conservatism has involved it in bitter hostility to revolutionary movements, as in Mexico and Spain; in compromising concordats with the Fascists and the Nazis; and when it held power, as in Austria and Portugal, in clerical forms of the corporative state.

Intellectually the Church has been committed to the Thomistic synthesis, the most impressive achievement of rational integration in the Western tradition; and many in search of some clear pattern in the midst of relativities and confusion have turned to it, in the hope that principles once successful might prove so again. A generation of active study has borne fruit. Scholars like Pierre Duhem and Gilson have revealed the richness and variety of the medieval currents of thought that synthesis was able to embrace. Constructive thinkers like Jacques Maritain — originally a Protestant disciple of Bergson — have shown how to effect a present-day philosophic synthesis, retaining the old values and not running after the new gods of Moscow or Berchtesgaden, by reconstructing and expanding the rationalism of St. Thomas. In France this Catholic renaissance, all the more impressive in that its leaders have been largely lay scholars and writers, has been one of the most vital intellectual movements of recent years, well suited to express the enduring standards and principles of a stable and integrated culture. But Thomism has had an appeal in England and America far beyond the Catholic Church; to many, of the major unifying faiths competing to-day, it has seemed the least destructive of hard-won values. Certainly the Church has been the most vigorous defender of the older ideals of personal relationships, against the shifting pattern of sexual morality and the claims of political totalitarianism alike.

In pursuing its policy the Church has found itself in Catholic lands involved in a long series of conflicts with the increasingly nationalistic State. The *Kulturkampf* in Germany in the seventies, the long deadlock between the Papacy and the Italian State over the question of temporal sovereignty, adjusted in the concordat of 1929, and the pre-war crises between French ultramontanist and anti-clerical "radicalism," were dramatized as the struggle of patriotism against internationalism; the so-called Catholic "black international" has been as bitterly hated as the Socialist "red international." The rise of the new secular religions has only intensified the conflict. It has centered about the control of education and the youth, a point on which neither Church nor totalitarian State will admit compromise. In France the last generation saw the lines drawn between secular education on scientific and patriotic lines, and "freedom of instruction," which meant the freedom of the Church to control the schools. Even in America the Church has tended, where it had the power, to exert a veto over moral teachings. Where the liberal state has been overthrown, the struggle between two rival religions has proceeded nakedly, and so far no compromise, even in Italy, has proved more than temporary. The future of Catholicism in its ancient strongholds will depend on its ability to come to some kind of terms with the new faiths.

LIBERAL PROTESTANTISM

Turning now to the other main movement in religious thought during the century, the gropings of those who were willing to attempt a new reconciliation between tradition and modern life, we find that there has been, as an inevitable result of the contemporary scientific and philosophic thought and the new industrial conditions, a more or less conscious development of what seems to be virtually a new form of religion, "Liberal Christianity" or "Modernism." In the Protestant churches, in spite of the seeming present-day strength of Fundamentalism, there is little question but that the majority of Christians have entered upon this difficult path. Whether or not this new expression of the religious life is so different from that of the past as no longer to deserve the name of Christianity at all, is a moot question which cannot be here decided; it is precisely the basic point of conflict between the conservatives and the liberals. It is

certainly a far more radical break with the medieval tradition than anything produced by the Reformation; but it is no more complete a change than was the rational supernaturalism that passed as sound orthodoxy in the eighteenth century. It is obviously a development of Christianity; and those who think in evolutionary terms are profoundly convinced that it is the present-day heir of the past. There is a great deal to be said for preserving historical continuity even when much that is new is assimilated; and if it be once admitted that the primitive Christian communities, the Medieval Church, and the various Protestant churches, are all forms of a common Christianity, it is difficult to see just where to draw the line between development and transformation.

DEFINITE ABANDONMENT OF PARTS OF THE RELIGIOUS TRADITION

The effects of the newer nineteenth-century ideas seemed to be at first primarily negative; they meant the destroying of traditional beliefs and religious philosophies. But men later began to see that the leaders in the liberal movement were justified in asserting that they came to liberate rather than to destroy, that in dispensing with some beliefs they were fostering the vital growth of others. There are thus two sides to the liberal religious development of the century: it meant first the definite abandonment of parts of the old tradition, and their final rejection, and secondly a new approach and emphasis capable of supporting a strong religious life. Many have accepted the first alone, and have joined the swelling numbers of the indifferent or skeptical; but many have also given expression to a newer and freer religious faith unhampered by the constricting bonds of outgrown ideas.

The historical attitude, inspired by the romantic movement, was the first of the ideas of the age to make its way into religious thought. In eighteenth-century Germany there grew up a school of historically minded theologians who applied the newer methods of historical study, based on the assumption of the principle of uniformitarianism, to the Bible and to religious history. When these were judged by the same canons of investigation that were being applied to the study of Virgil, of Homer, of the medieval chronicles and records, the conviction was forced

upon men that the Scriptures embodied the experience and the early myths and the later spiritual discoveries of the Hebrew people over a long period of time, and that to attempt to look upon Holy Writ as all of one piece, and as all equally inspired and valuable, was impossible. A careful study of the texts to determine the authorship and date of the various parts — the so-called “higher criticism” — revealed fundamental discrepancies with traditional beliefs. Differences in style, contradictory accounts of the same event, conflicting commandments purporting to come from God, made the older Protestant view that every word and every point was divinely inspired and literally true, exceedingly difficult to reconcile with faith in the wisdom and rationality of God. On the other hand, if the Scriptures were taken as the work of human minds profoundly moved by a sense of divine things, all difficulty vanished; and the sacred books became the record of early mythological and imaginative attempts to understand the world and its meaning, of sacred poetry, of religious and civil laws, and of the prophetic messages of noble souls. A more comprehensive view of comparative religions and of anthropology seemed to indicate that in all respects the Christian Bible was analogous to the early literature and the sacred books of other peoples and religions.

For example, present-day Biblical scholars are agreed that the first five books of the Old Testament, instead of being all written by Moses, are really the selected literature of an ancient, developing people; the selective criterion, used more or less subconsciously, being that of religious and patriotic value. They have distinguished various sources from which the Pentateuch was compiled: the oldest being songs, such as those of Miriam, of Moses, and of Deborah, embodied in at least four distinct documents that can be traced in our present text. In the main the Pentateuch is a synthesized and edited collection of parts of three historical writings, parts selected by a fourth and later hand, a hand which added no little material of its own and thus became the final editor of the Pentateuch as a whole. These sources are known as the Elohist, or E, the Jehovist, or J — the first a chronicle, the second prophetic in tone — Deuteronomy, largely legalistic, and the work of the Priest-editor, P, who lived much later, in the fifth century B.C. Fundamental contradictions exist between the writings from these four sources. No one can

read with an open mind, for instance, the two accounts of the Creation, that of P, Genesis I, 1, to II, 3, and that of J, Genesis II, 4 to 25, without realizing that, judged by human logic at least, *both* could not possibly be true.

The effect of this historical viewpoint was to make it impossible for those who accepted it to retain the belief that the Bible is literally and verbally inspired, in the sense that God dictated it to the scribes who wrote it down — the traditional view. Taken in connection with the nineteenth-century romantic theory of the immanence of God, however, that man and God are not two distinct substances — the Platonic philosophy at the foundation of Christian theology — but that the life of God indwells the universe and expresses itself in the souls of noble men, this meant, not that the Scriptures are not inspired, but that divine inspiration is a different kind of thing from such a "dictation-theory." It is rather a thing to be judged by its moral and spiritual fruits, as we say that Shakespeare or Goethe is inspired. For those who clung to the traditional dualism, the Scriptures seemed to lose their value; for those who believed in the newer philosophy, they took on added significance and worth. Men could now disregard the horrible bloodthirsty cruelties of much of the Old Testament, and learn from it rather the lofty morality of the prophets; its divine message could be discerned by ethical criteria rather than by a literal following out of unrighteous commandments.

This view, in fact, while it seemed very radical to orthodox Protestants, is really far more in line with the main body of Catholic interpretation of the Bible than the verbal inspiration theory. All the fathers of the Church, from Augustine down, turned to the Scriptures primarily for their spiritual and ethical value, and had no hesitation, as we saw when we were considering medieval beliefs, in quite disregarding the literal meaning of texts that in themselves seemed unimportant. Hence the Catholics have found it, on the whole, more easy to accept the results of Biblical scholarship than have orthodox Protestants, and have made important contributions to such study.

Historical study meant the abandonment of many beliefs; mechanistic science destroyed still more. Since Hume's critique of miracles in the eighteenth century, religious liberals have refused to believe in any such interferences with the order of

natural law. The records they explain as the product of the natural causes of human credulity, imagination, and legend; while even those who have some doubts about abandoning all belief in these supernatural events seek religious truth in the validity of its doctrines themselves, rather than in any external buttressing by miracles. In the eighteenth century, miracles were the chief support of faith; in the next, they became the chief problem to be explained.

Modern geological and biological accounts of the world's past have of course meant giving up any literal belief in the events recorded in the first chapters of Genesis. This does not mean that, for liberals, the world was not created by God; it means only that the process was much longer and more complex than the simple tales of Genesis. This is, incidentally, the orthodox Catholic view, expressed even in Thomas himself. Genesis takes its place, with the Greek and other primitive legends, as a beautiful and poetic mythology.

Finally, the nineteenth century definitely abandoned the belief in God as a scientific principle. The watch-maker Creator of the Enlightenment has vanished, with the advance of rational scientific accounts of how the world came into being; and if religious men still believe in a Creator behind those long processes, they do it on religious rather than on scientific grounds. To them, evolution is merely a more exact description of the way in which God's creative acts took place.

THE NEW FAITH OF THE LIBERALS

While modern ideas were forcing the liberals to give up these old beliefs, they were also leading them to a new approach and a new emphasis upon the enduring verities of the religious life. Instead of seeking the object of religious aspiration and worship in another realm, in some distant heaven beyond the stars, quite remote from and external to the universe, they sought God rather in the very life of the universe itself, in the world and its processes. Natural law was no longer for them an exclusion of God from his world, it was the fundamental expression of his power and will. While the eighteenth century had seen the harmony and order of the universe as a proof of its being God's handiwork, the shift from a purely mechanical nature to one that was alive, that developed and grew and passed from one form to

another, seemed to make it much more easy to regard the world-process as inherently divine in its own right. On one point all the romantic and idealistic philosophers agreed: they rejected the traditional dualism of the natural and the supernatural, and united in the monistic belief that the world is the expression of one great principle permeating all its parts and including all events in its cosmic process. Man is one with nature, and man and nature are one with God — not, perhaps, the whole expression of the divine life, but existing as essential parts of it. It was easy for religious souls to see in the whole long story of evolution itself the unfolding of the hand of Providence, and in its goal of a perfected human society “the one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves.”

Indeed, there can be no scientific objection to interpreting the course of nature as a divine process, provided that does not lead to a falsification of the specific parts of that process. The one great objection to such an interpretation, the age-old problem of evil: how, then, can the ways of God to man be justified? how, if nature be red in tooth and claw with the blood of the struggle for existence, can men without blasphemy call the work of nature the work of God? has not been made more difficult by anything modern science has discovered. It existed as acutely for Job of old as it does to-day; and if the ancient Hebrew faith could still affirm that God is the mystic union of power and goodness, in spite of the pressing evils of existence, religious faith can even yet make that bold assertion, in the very face of common-sense. Indeed, if evolutionary conceptions lead men to look on all things as the working out of some great purpose, it is perhaps even easier to-day to make an intellectual adjustment by explaining how an all-powerful and all-good God can bring good to pass from evil.

If God is to be sought in the processes of nature, and not apart from them, then in man himself is to be found the divine spark. Human nature at its best can rise to the highest manifestations of God in his universe; in the search of the scientist for truth is God's mind, in the yearning of the artist for beauty is God's longing for perfection, in the love of man for man is God's love at its highest. If the heavens proclaim his majesty, and the everlasting hills his steadfast power, if the splendor of the sunset reveals his loveliness, and the night

his mystery and awe, surely in the depths of the soul of man, in his never-ending striving and aspiration after a good dimly glimpsed from afar, in his devotion to an ideal cause and his sacrifice for his fellow man, there dwells a haunting suggestion of the perfection the universe can bring forth that is unmatched by circling planet or stupendous thunderbolt. What matters it that the scientists can analyze into electrons and describe in terms of mechanics? If this be the goal of the processes of nature, if man himself is the child of natural forces and the individualization of universal power, then those forces and that power must be divine, must be God's very will; and faith in God is faith that man will go forward, will attain the unutterable blessedness of creating the Kingdom, of seeing God at last face to face.

A typical expression of this modernist faith that God is in his universe and that all will be right with the world, can be found in the pages of Father Tyrrell:

If the love of God comprehends and unifies, it also endlessly transcends and is uniquely distinct in kind from every sort of personal affection towards our fellow men and fellow creatures individually or collectively; from all devotion to, and enthusiasm for, the Ideal — for the Good, the Fair, and the True; even from the love of God's will and kingdom upon earth. For it is the love of That which is the *prius*, the source, the explanation, the end of such affections; the root of all values, the foundation of all realities, the complement of all imperfections; of That which alone possesses what they singly and collectively lack, and by lacking are unsatisfying apart from It — infinitude, eternity, sovereign independence and reality. As an affection, our love of the Absolute is more than generically distinct from all our other loves; for it is not "one of them," it is not alongside, but over and through and behind them all, implicit from the very first, explicit only at the very last. On its negative side it might be described as a sense of incurable dissatisfaction with anything that is less than infinite and eternal, with the utmost conceivable extension of finite good; a sense that is deepened and enriched just in the measure that we push out experimentally in all directions vainly seeking the Absolute in the plane of the Relative, the equivalent of the Creator in terms of the creature. . . . For, the sense of the Absolute is given not *beside*, but *in* and *with* and *through* the sense of the Ideal in every department; it is the sense of That over against which every conceivable Ideal is felt to be infinitely inadequate, since something greater must always be thinkable; of That which draws us to the center of a sphere whose surface we must traverse forever in pursuit of the Ideal; of That which is the source of an incurable spiritual restlessness till we learn to rest in It. It is the sense of that ultra-reality.

which lies behind all finite reality as an ever invisible Sun whose form and splendor is hid from us by cloud-barriers of varying density, and whose light is known to us only as luminous mist. In the Ideal, in the True, the Good and the Fair, we have the Finite variously transfused and transfigured by the rays of the Infinite, forcing upon us the conception of an illuminating source beyond, whose precise form and nature lies shrouded in mystery.⁷

If this faith be accepted, it means that the approach to religion and to God is to be made primarily through the soul of man. There is to be found the most divine thing in human experience, there is the pathway to faith in an even larger and more cosmic divinity. In a host of ways the last century has seen a complete shift from the Enlightenment's approach to God through the order of external nature, to the contemporary human approach. These facts of aspiration and love and vision, the best man knows, are the key to that in life which is most real. The whole of nature is to be judged, not in its origins, but in its fruits in man at his highest, and in the still higher things which he can foreshadow. Religion, with its striving and its worship and its conviction of an unseen reality, in adjustment to which lies man's highest blessedness, is thus an entirely natural thing, rooted in the deepest and most enduring experiences of human nature. What that reality is, whether it be the Ideal man sees, or the still further Ground of that ideal; whether it govern the course of nature independently, or impinge upon the world only through the spirit and energies of man — these are all in a sense secondary. Man's rational interpretation of these facts of experience, his successive theological beliefs, his definitions of God, have developed and changed with all else in the world; but this attitude, this feeling, these experiences, are permanently rooted in human nature. Man has worshiped God under many symbols and striven to do his will in many ways; in ages to come he will grow still further in wisdom and understanding. But religion, as an enduring aspect of human life, and God, as the object of man's aspirations and vision, cannot but remain amidst all changing forms so long as human nature itself is unaltered.

Psychologists have studied these religious experiences and recorded them; romanticists have based their faiths upon them,

⁷ *Lex Orandi*, by George Tyrrell. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green & Co.

mystics have through them come face to face with God. Interpretations vary, symbols conflict; but in some such way many have come to rebuild their religious life upon the firm foundation of human experience and human nature.

MONISTIC EVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGIES

This fundamental change in philosophy and attitude has found expression in a great variety of new monistic and evolutionary theologies. Some of the more radical of these have broken entirely with the Christian tradition, and attempted to formulate the relation of man to man and to God, and of God to the world, in an entirely fresh and new reliance upon the pure facts of the religious experience. But for the most part the Modernists have not been willing to wipe the slate clean and start afresh; they have preferred to take the fundamental concepts and doctrines of traditional Christianity, which grew up in the Neo-Platonic philosophy and are only intelligible in the terms of that philosophy, and reinterpret them in the light of the newer evolutionary and monistic philosophy. Retaining the old words and the old phraseology, they have sought to penetrate behind these intellectual symbols by which the past represented its religious experience, to the enduring experience itself, and to reinterpret the old symbols in terms of the modern Growing World. It is this process of reinterpretation that has made the Modernists appear insincere to their opponents; for they use the traditional language without always making it plain that they are taking it in a quite different sense from that in which, say, Augustine, or Thomas, or Calvin, or Wesley, took it. Their justification for this lies in the contention that each one of these men took it in a quite different interpretation; that the meaning of the ancient doctrines has been continually undergoing a change and an adjustment to the new intellectual world; and that not only in theology, but in every branch of human knowledge, from physics to economics, terms and expressions have been defined and re-defined in the light of the newer knowledge. Such basic concepts in mechanics as force, motion, and power, have been progressively reinterpreted for each new generation from Thomas down; psychology is full of the use of older terms in newer senses. The Modernists contend that theology too must pour the new wine of modern knowledge into the old bottles of the classic creeds.

These new theological reinterpretations have taken many forms. Some have emphasized the notion of immanence in the relations between God and man and the world. Some have stressed the idea of creative evolution, that the whole evolutionary process has been a working upward to man and his divine nature. Some have emphasized the humanistic approach, that God and the divine are to be sought and found primarily in the soul of man. Whatever their form, however, they have involved a radical break with the traditional theological conceptions. The monistic doctrine of divine immanence has obliterated the old distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Every event that occurs, and the whole order of nature, is divine, for it is an expression of God; yet there are no miracles in the sense of isolated instances of divine power. "Miracle," says Schleiermacher, "is only the religious name for event. Every event, even the most natural and common, is a miracle if it lend itself to a controllingly religious interpretation. To me all is miracle. In your sense of the word only something inexplicable and strange is a miracle, which to me is none. The more religious you are the more miracles you will find everywhere."⁸ Life, aspiration, love, are the supreme miracles, and the supremely natural events in the world. To be natural is to be real; and to be real is to be divine and hence supernatural at once. This means, of course, that the Modernist has accepted the present-day humanistic emphasis on the inherent dignity and worth of this life.

Applied to the idea of revelation, immanence makes all noble words and lofty messages, from whatever man they come, alike revelations of the divine nature. The difference, if difference there be, between the Bible and other sacred books, indeed the very difference between sacred and profane literature itself, lies in the value of its insight rather than in any distinction of origin. Isaiah, the Sermon on the Mount, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Carlyle, Goethe — all have been alike vehicles of the divine revelation.

Applied to the idea of immortality, this attitude obliterates the older spatial distinction between earth and heaven, and makes it one of the spirit only. This is God's world, and in man's heart can dwell God's heaven. Immortality is not a continuation of existence beyond the grave, but a deathless quality of

life men may achieve here and now — a reversion to the original Platonic conception, incidentally. “Not immortality outside of time and behind it, or rather in time but only after the present; but the immortality which we can have immediately and now in this temporal life, and which is a problem in whose solution we are always engaged. In the midst of the temporal to be one with the everlasting, and to be eternal every moment, this is the immortality of religion.”⁹

The old theology had looked upon man as a fallen and corrupt creature, whose nature had to be radically transformed by supernatural grace. To be human was to be undivine, to be divine was to be unhuman. The conception of divine immanence makes man's very nature in itself divine, at least in its human possibilities; man needs for salvation, not a regeneration of substance — the Neo-Platonic idea — but an awakening to his potential divinity. God is in human nature, not external to it; man needs no magical or sacramental grace, but simply the determination, born of his recognition of his divine sonship, to live as a son of God should.

Perhaps the most striking change is the reinterpretation involved in the conception of the person of Christ. The orthodox doctrine, adopted at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, meant that the one person, Jesus Christ, possessed two wholly distinct and alien natures, the divine and the human. With the identification of divinity and humanity, all point in the ancient controversies over the supernatural origin of Jesus, the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth, is lost; Christ is recognized as divine, just as all men are divine, and his leadership rests on the completeness of his consciousness of his expression of God. He was no more divine than other men, but he was more fully awake to his own divinity, and brought his life more completely under its control. Hence the Modernists' abandonment of the Virgin Birth as a crude though poetical attempt to account for Jesus' preëminence in terms of his origin rather than in terms of the awakened divinity of his life and teachings.

ÆSTHETIC NATURALISM

This fundamental point of view, with its attendant theological reconstruction, has stimulated two main tendencies in present-day liberal Christianity. On the one hand, it has led to an

æsthetic naturalism: religion is an imaginative and poetical embodiment of man's relations to the universe, and God is the symbol for the unified human ideal. On the other, it has found expression in an ethical theism: God is conceived as the Ideal or final cause of man, religion as "morality tinged with sentiment," and the essence of the performance of one's obligations to God consists in making his will to prevail and laboring to realize his Kingdom upon earth. The one tendency is exemplified by men who find the religious experience and the religious feelings primarily a matter of appreciation of and communion with the great religious leaders and systems of the past; they see in religion the highest of the arts, the noblest imaginative embodiment of human ideals, and seek in the great religious traditions, in their rich fruitage in storied cathedral and ancient ritual and poetic doctrine, the satisfaction of their natural yearning for beauty and piety and æsthetic adjustment to human life. The other tendency is rooted rather in the moral life, and in the struggle to make righteousness prevail in the social order; for it religion is the inspiration and the driving power of progress in moral ideals, both in their revision and criticism and in their application to the life of man. The one group makes worship central, and is priestly in its general attitude: it looks toward the past, finding there elements of the spiritual life so precious that it cannot bear to suggest any alteration. It reverences primarily the fundamental aspirations of human nature as they have been beautifully clothed in the great traditions. The other makes moral inspiration central, and is fundamentally prophetic in outlook: it is impatient of the past, the dead hand of tradition, and views the spiritual life as a thing of continued progress and endeavor for the future. The one finds satisfaction in the beautiful symbolism of ritual and religious services, the other in the moral striving to make all things new. Both tendencies relegate theology and doctrine, that is, rational interpretation of the significance of the religious experiences and of man's place in the universe, to a secondary position: the one regarding creeds as poetic hymns, and doctrines as mythological symbols, the other viewing them more literally as mixtures of outworn science and primitive superstition, and concentrating upon programs of social and humanitarian action. The one tendency leads naturally to an esoteric Catholicism and High Church Anglicanism, the

other to a new Puritanism of ethical endeavor; both more or less fully admit that the main outlines of the picture of the world as pieced together from modern science are a sufficient philosophic basis for human life. The one tendency in practice is exemplified by the men who attend church for the beauty of the music and the ritual and the feelings it inspires, the other by those to whom religion is a stimulus and a motive for various attempts to secure social justice.

Both interests have, of course, united in the past of Christianity, the one to build the cathedrals and paint the pictures of the saints, the other to flower in the Isaiahs and Francises and Savonarolas of the moral life. But with the disintegration of the bond of doctrinal belief that has held them together, they seem to-day to be diverging more and more, until each group finds it increasingly difficult to sympathize with or even to understand the other. On the whole, the æsthetic tendency seems backward-looking and conservative, while the moral and social emphasis seeks to imbue society with a more humane spirit and proclaims the visions of the prophets of old to the present day and generation. The former can degenerate into a sentimental and complacent attachment to old achievements that remains indifferent to present needs; the latter, into a no less complacent faith in social "service" and social reform as an end in itself, with no more ultimate sense of direction or spiritual vision. The æsthetic attitude appeals to a small and selected class, while ethical religion has behind it generations of American faith. The latter is unquestionably the most vital force to-day in liberal Protestantism and Judaism. But a religion of consolation and security is deeply rooted in human nature. Our social crisis promises to lend it new strength. It may be that the eternal vision of ultimates will once more bind priest and prophet together in the service of the living God.

Æsthetic naturalism in religion has found its best expression in the writings of Catholics who have abandoned a literal belief in the historic dogmas. It is to be found in its more radical form in Comte's Religion of Positivism, dubbed rather unkindly by Huxley "Catholicism minus Christianity"; and in varying degrees in artists like Renan and Santayana. The latter well expresses its spirit:

The only truth of religion comes from its interpretation of life, from

its symbolic rendering of that moral experience which it springs out of and which it seeks to elucidate. Its falsehood comes from the insidious misunderstanding which clings to it, to the effect that these poetic conceptions are not merely representations of experience as it is or should be, but are rather information about experience or reality elsewhere — an experience and reality which, strangely enough, supply just the defects betrayed by reality and experience here. Thus religion has the same original relation to life that poetry has. . . . Like poetry, it improves the world only by imagining it improved, but not content with making this addition to the mind's furniture — an addition which might be useful and ennobling — it thinks to confer a more radical benefit by persuading mankind that, in spite of appearances, the world is really such as that rather arbitrary idealization has painted it. This spurious satisfaction is naturally the prelude to many a disappointment, and the soul has infinite trouble to emerge again from the artificial problems and sentiments into which it thus plunged. The value of religion becomes equivocal. Religion remains an imaginative achievement, a symbolic representation of moral reality which may have a most important function in vitalising the mind and in transmitting, by way of parables, the lessons of experience. But it becomes at the same time a continuous incidental deception; and this deception, in proportion as it is strenuously denied to be such, can work indefinite harm in the world and in the conscience. . . .

We may therefore proceed to analyze the significance and the function which religion has had at its different stages, and, without disguising or in the least condoning its confusion with literal truth, we may allow ourselves to enter as sympathetically as possible into its various conceptions and emotions. They have made up the inner life of many sages, and of all those who without great genius or learning have lived steadfastly in the spirit. The feeling of reverence should itself be treated with reverence, although not at a sacrifice of truth, with which alone, in the end, reverence is compatible. Nor have we any reason to be intolerant of the partialities and contradictions which religions display. Were we dealing with a science, such contradictions would have to be instantly solved or removed; but when we are concerned with the poetic interpretation of experience, contradiction means only variety, and variety means spontaneity, wealth of resource, and a nearer approach to total adequacy.¹⁰

ETHICAL RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

Ethical religion, on the other hand, is found at its best among those Protestants and Jews in whom the prophetic Puritan and Hebraic strain is prominent. Its chief exponents have been, among the Protestants, the great German theologian Ritschl,

¹⁰ From *Reason in Religion*, by George Santayana. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.

and in America Walter Rauschenbusch; and in more radical form the outstanding moral leader Felix Adler, founder of the ethical culture movement. Its central interest is the Kingdom of God, the vision of an ideal society which man shall strive to realize upon earth. Ritschl, following Kant, abandons the attempt to obtain theoretical knowledge of reality; we can only know how that reality acts in our experience. What God may be in himself must remain for ever unknown; this divine reality in our experience acts like a Father toward his children. Religion is not theoretical, dealing with knowledge; it is an intensely practical endeavor. Man discovers himself as a part of the world, but also as in a sense above it, capable of controlling it to his purposes. The essential religious problem is to win a victory over the world, to assert ourselves as free spiritual beings who can bring better things to pass. In this striving we need a higher religious principle to which we can appeal for help: we need to merge ourselves into some larger force, in oneness with which we can conquer and control the world. This force man inevitably symbolizes as personal; and for him it is in truth a larger self of which he can make himself a part, with whose purpose and will he can bring his own strivings into line. Man is consciously religious if he has a moral purpose to which he commits himself; by adhering to the hypothesis of a God working with him, he can make the world a means to his own spiritual growth, thus verify that hypothesis, and actually find God.

For Ritschl, Christ embodied the highest expression of this moral victory. We must make his will, which is the embodiment of God's purpose, our very own; we too must work for the reign of the divine purpose on earth, for the Kingdom of God. In seeking to realize the sway of Christian love on earth we become one in purpose with Christ and with God, and thereby attain here and now to eternal life. God is that power which brings the victory to pass, and since we find such a principle and power in Christ's gospel, for us he is divine, is very God. To know God is to work with him for the Kingdom.

This basic attitude is familiar in Matthew Arnold's faith in that "something not ourselves which makes for righteousness"; in various forms it has become widespread to-day, as the "social gospel of Christianity." In laboring for the Kingdom, in striving with Christ to bring about the reign of justice and love, we veri-

tably create God. Religion becomes a matter of moral aspiration, of the divine will; all problems of the relation of this will to nature are unimportant compared with the fundamental reality that it can and does work through the social purposes of men.

At the turn of the century a number of socially-minded leaders, most notably Rauschenbusch, had a powerful influence in spreading this conception of the aims of religion in this country. Through the work of their disciples most liberal Protestants have come to identify Christianity itself with "the religion of Jesus," interpreted as a force for realizing a society built upon individual worth, human brotherhood, service, and love of mankind.

Christianity was pure and unperverted when it lived as a divine reality in the heart of Jesus Christ. But in his mind its purpose was summed up in one great word: the Reign of God. To this he dedicated himself in baptism. This set him the problems which he faced in the wilderness temptations. This was the center of his parables and prophecies. This explains the ethical standards which he set up in the Sermon on the Mount. It was the Reign of God on earth for which he consumed his strength, for which he died, and for which he promised to return. The Kingdom of God is the first and the most essential dogma of the Christian faith. It is also the lost social ideal of Christendom. No man is a Christian in the full sense of the original discipleship until he has made the Kingdom of God the controlling purpose of his life, and no man is intellectually prepared to understand Jesus Christ until he has understood the meaning of the Kingdom of God. The Reformation of the sixteenth century was a revival of Pauline theology. The present-day Reformation is a revival of the spirit and aims of Jesus himself.¹¹

The Kingdom of God is a collective conception, involving the whole social nature of man. It is not a matter of saving human atoms, but of saving the social organism. It is not a matter of getting individuals to heaven, but of transforming the life on earth into the harmony of heaven. . . . That was the faith of Jesus. Have his followers shared it? The Church has never been able to get entirely away from the revolutionary spirit of Jesus. It is an essential doctrine of Christianity that the world is fundamentally good and practically bad, for it was made by God, but is now controlled by sin. If a man wants to be a Christian, he must stand over against things as they are and condemn them in the name of that higher conception of life which Jesus revealed. If a man is satisfied with things as they are, he belongs to the other side. For many centuries the Church felt so deeply that the Christian conception of life and the actual social life are incompatible, that any one who wanted to live the genuine Christian life, had to leave the world and

¹¹ From *Christianizing the Social Order*, by Walter Rauschenbusch. Copyright, 1912, by the Macmillan Co. Reprinted by permission.

live in a monastic community. Protestantism has abandoned the monastic life and settled down to live in the world. If that implies that it accepts the present condition as good and final, it means a silencing of its Christian protest and its surrender to "the world." There is another alternative. Ascetic Christianity called the world evil and left it. Humanity is waiting for a revolutionary Christianity which will call the world evil and change it. . . . For fifteen hundred years those who desired to live a truly Christian life withdrew from the evil world to live a life apart. But the principle of such an ascetic departure from the world is dead in modern life. There are only two other possibilities. The Church must either condemn the world and seek to change it, or tolerate the world and conform to it. In the latter case it surrenders its holiness and its mission. The other possibility has never yet been tried with full faith on a large scale. All the leadings of God in contemporary history and all the promptings of Christ's spirit in our hearts urge us to make the trial. On this choice is staked the future of the Church.¹²

The creed of this social gospel is all summed up in the words of Bernard Shaw, so widely and so approvingly quoted by liberal Christians, "The only trouble with Christianity is that it has never yet been tried."

BEYOND MODERNISM AND LIBERALISM

As the attempt to interpret the religious tradition in terms of prevailing ideas and social experience, modernism is inevitably unstable and ever-changing. Nothing seems so completely outmoded as the modernities of yesterday. The religious compromise worked out in the pre-war generation, and spreading rapidly in America in the first post-war decade — both now so incredibly remote — has not escaped the demand for further reconstruction. The liberal movement in German Protestantism which in the nineteenth century showed the way succumbed after 1918 to other ventures in faith; symbolically enough, its last great leader, Ernst Troeltsch, died of starvation. In America Protestant modernism, thrown on its own resources, has shown little consistency in thought, but a sensitivity remarkable even for a mediating movement to the passing winds of doctrine and currents of feeling. The waning of the idealistic systems of the last generation removed the support of the integrated philosophy in terms of which its central doctrines had been formu-

¹² From *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, by Walter Rauschenbusch. Copyright, 1907, by The Macmillan Co. Reprinted by permission.

lated. Without abandoning these convictions, alert liberals have eagerly and indiscriminately turned to whatever tendencies in the welter of contemporary thought gave promise of satisfying the practical and emotional requirements of moral and religious living. Thus they have drawn on mysticism, on the various theories of religious experience, on each new philosophy as it rose into prominence, from James to Whitehead, on the new psychology, on the new physics, especially the religiously reassuring if theologically heretical pronouncements of the more speculative of its popularizers — often all at the same time. The result has doubtless been practically helpful and satisfying, but intellectually it represents an open-minded confusion. Convinced that Martha chose the better part, American Protestantism has directed its energies to an amazing number of practical social enterprises. In its deep and sincere devotion to the possibilities of associated living and to coöperative striving for a better world, it has turned away from interest in doctrine and theology. It is little wonder that its leaders have been content to rest with the older intellectual reformulations by which their fathers gained entrance into this busy modern world.

This lack of intellectual clarity has naturally provoked in critical minds the attempt to go beyond the nineteenth century idealism in terms of which most liberal religion is still rationalized, and to restate its common faith more consistently in the light of present-day scientific philosophies. Naturalistic philosophers like M. C. Otto, R. W. Sellars, and John Dewey have sketched the main outlines of such an enterprise; a group of religious teachers, E. S. Ames, A. E. Haydon, and H. N. Wieman, have tried to work out the details. These men differ philosophically in their precise interpretation and evaluation of traditional religious concepts, like "God"; in their literal-minded devotion to an experimental method in religious knowledge, or their willingness to admit imaginative and symbolic ways of thought; and most significantly, in whether they limit religion to man's social concerns, or include his relations to his natural environment as well — that is, in whether their philosophy is humanistic or more broadly naturalistic. But all would view religion as devotion to the ideals discoverable in human experience, and all would rely solely on man's efforts, in coöperation with the natural resources in his world, to bring them into existence.

Such an interpretation puts the ethical devotion to moral and social values on an intellectually consistent and philosophically tenable basis. It represents that real coming to terms with science and scientific philosophies of nature and human experience at which liberal religion has always aimed; and in that sense it can be fairly called its logical outcome. But as yet it has proved too drastic a reinterpretation of the Christian tradition even for hardened liberals. Its chief practical application has been with the radical Humanists among the Unitarians and Universalists. Though it may point to a future synthesis of knowledge and aspiration, so far its appeal has been limited to those whose religious interests are severely intellectual and philosophical. From a living religion most men continue to want other things more than intellectual clarity. Far more widely felt is the need to reconstruct liberal religion's central faith itself in man and his moral powers, in the face of the present collapse of his most cherished efforts and hopes.

That faith was hardly challenged in America until the depression years. For the main body of educated Protestants religion had come to be a comfortable middle-class social and ethical idealism, with a cosmic sanction guaranteeing the ultimate success of all forward-looking movements. Sensitive spirits, especially among the younger religious leaders, went further in pushing the social gospel into a mildly socialistic opposition to the "unchristlike" character of capitalistic civilization; just after the war, and again in more radical if no less sentimental form after 1929, this Christian socialism enlisted many of the more earnest and militant. Its best-known leaders have been Sherwood Eddy, Kirby Page, Harry F. Ward, Jerome Davis, and Reinhold Niebuhr. With the exception of the last, none of these high-minded social idealists has attempted to add much to the earlier theoretical foundations of the social gospel. Most of them threw themselves into practical work in secular social movements, like labor organization and the drive for peace, some into great enthusiasm for the achievements and promise of Communist Russia. Indeed, the uncritical ease with which many earnest liberals identified the winning of such temporal goals with the establishment of the Kingdom of God has been a prime cause of the growing dissatisfaction with so truncated a form of religion.

With the collapse of optimistic hopes in Germany after 1918, the reaction began, under the leadership of Karl Barth — a prophetic figure, a liberal by training, and a Christian Socialist. In the disillusionment and despair of the war, and inspired by the salvation found by the tortured souls of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, he rediscovered the transcendent God of Calvin and His liberating Word — the message of man's impotence in the face of Supreme Righteousness. God is not the indwelling divinity in man, the goal of human thinking and striving. He is the stern Judge condemning all human works, all human thought and morality, all man's most earnest social efforts, as not enough. The Eternal is infinitely different from all things temporal and human. His Word is wholly other than our labored reading of the Bible, dogmatic or critical; yet, in one of those insoluble paradoxes that is the highest Christian truth, He speaks in the Bible as the living God.

Barth is a prophet bringing the conviction of sin to modern man and modern civilization: man in his crisis needs repentance in fear and trembling. The liberal religion of the Ritschlians was the expression of the prosperous bourgeoisie of the Bismarckian empire; that of Troeltsch, the ethic of the new German economic civilization hurtling to its doom. Man cannot hope to "follow Jesus," or to achieve a better world by his own efforts. The Christian can only follow attentively what is done by God.

Few even of his own disciples have been able to accept this stern condemnation of all human works, even of the intellect; the less extreme dualism of Emil Brunner and the Swedish "theologians of crisis" has proved more influential. Yet so well does the condemnation of man's self-sufficiency suit these disillusioned times, so obvious is it that the social manifestations of human nature to-day are neither Christlike nor divine, that forms of this "crisis theology" or neo-orthodoxy have for some years dominated Continental Protestantism, and have introduced a tragic note into the former complacency of British theology.

NATURALISM WITH VISION

The first stirrings of this same temper, appearing in America during the depression and growing by leaps and bounds of late, have already dissipated the uncritical optimism of the earlier

liberalism. Many professed liberals now mark this change by insisting on their "realism" in facing the problem of evil. European Barthianism is still alien to the American temper. But a small group of religious leaders, led by Reinhold Niebuhr and the former German Christian Socialist Paul Tillich, have crystallized the growing dissatisfaction with the original sentimental liberalism in terms of a similar tragic and pessimistic view of modern society, and a similar insistence on the transcendence of God, the Unconditioned. Many of the more sensitive and thoughtful of the younger ministers and teachers are "bearing theologically to the right and politically to the left."

This militant post-modernism attacks the older liberalism at its weakest point, its naïve faith in man and his capacity by collective moral effort to realize the Kingdom of God on earth. It represents in truth another of those recurrent swings of the pendulum from Christian humanism to Christian pessimism as to the potential goodness of man. Its vision is centered on human nature, on man's pride and weakness. Especially does it proclaim the eternal contrast between the Christian ideal of a society of perfect love, and the inherent compulsions and immoralities, the inevitable passions and resort to brute force which every social effort of collective man must exhibit. With only too abundant illustrations at hand, it bears witness to the sins, not only of the relatively evil forms of collective life, like capitalism and nationalism, but also to those of the relatively good movements to change and revolutionize them. The corruption of the better is indeed the worst; and the worst of sins is to rest content in the goodness of any finite and human goal. This reaches its height and depth when religion itself sets up some human ideal, some social reform or utopia, some possible form of existence, as the supreme objective of aspiration and devotion. True religion passes judgment on all such self-sufficient finitude, all such "demonic" living and "demonic" religion, in the light of the transcendent Unconditioned; the Infinite is forever beyond human grasp and comprehension, beyond all possibility of existence, and yet forever calls to the spirit of man, bidding his reach exceed his grasp. The aim of religion is just this eternal striving for the vision of perfection, this divine discontent, stronger in frustration and failure than in demonic success. In this vision of the Unconditioned men gain absolute

perspectives on historical relativities, attain an objectivity and detachment which enables them to criticize the limitations of every finite goal, impels them to work valiantly for that which is relatively better, yet gives them a sustaining reality above all the vicissitudes of time when efforts are doomed to frustration and failure and even the virtues of the saints are corrupted by power. History is no scene of progress: every increase in human knowledge brings greater evil as well as the possibility of greater good. The Christian ideal is always relevant, but never reached; how far society will ever approximate it we cannot tell, but we shall never reach more than an approximation.

This vision of man's estate, despite its claim to "realism," is patently as much the emotional expression of a current temper as was the earlier faith in man's potential divinity. Disillusionment bred of revulsion from former illusions hardly affords objective truth. Above all, this return to an Augustinian conception of human nature is content with crude symbols for certain aspects of man's behavior under certain historical conditions; it cares little for the hard work of closer analysis that might reveal something of the causes — and the cure. Yet it has a salutary freedom from sentimentality that suits the temper of the times, and it does not blink the more disagreeable facts — only the brighter ones. In insisting on the relativity of all human values and ideals, in sternly criticizing all pretended moral absolutes, it incorporates much of the wisdom of our scientific philosophies of human experience; and in interpreting Christian doctrines not literally but as myths with symbolic value, it maintains nothing such philosophies would reject. Indeed, Niebuhr recognizes three main conceptions of human nature, the naturalistic, the humanistic and liberal, and the Christian; and while scornfully rejecting the second, he defines the third as naturalism with a vision of the Eternal — a conception close to that of the naturalistic critics of liberal religion already mentioned.

Yet this vision of life set forth by Tillich and Niebuhr, with its infinite striving toward an unattainable goal, is the very quintessence of romantic pessimism; and it is rooted in an ultimate irrationalism, both intellectual and practical. The myths of religion are symbolic expressions, but of higher truths too transcendent for human science and reason to grasp. Rational discourse is incompetent to deal with God and human destiny; on

such themes one can speak only in "dialectical" paradoxes. Whatever one says is true and yet it is not true, for its contradictory can also be said. And practically these romanticists distrust any appeal to reason. Passion and self-interest must be met, not by education and enlightenment, but by conviction, faith, and ultimately by the naked force that can alone settle social problems. As always, the confidence that while human they possess a knowledge, however dim and paradoxical, of absolute standards properly reserved to angels tends to reconcile men to the supposed necessity of acting like the devil. The genuine religious insights of these pioneers leading modernism beyond its humanistic limitations will doubtless be incorporated. But unless the whole course of American religion is destined to a sharp reversal, it is difficult to imagine it expressing itself for long in such an irrational and pessimistic form of romanticism. We still await further formulation of the saner, less sentimental, and more intelligent temper of the times.

EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS CHANGES ON THE CHURCHES

The attempt to reinterpret the Christian tradition in the modern world of science and industry followed two major types of religious expression, æsthetic naturalism and social religion, with or without its overtones of transcendent vision. Sometimes both are combined; usually the emphasis is laid heavily on the one or the other. The effect of such modernist ideas in Protestantism has been to cause a realignment of religious groups. The traditional sectarian lines, based on earlier theological controversy, are practically gone with the theological interest that caused them; the various denominations linger on largely for historic reasons alone. The real divisions among Protestants are between the philosophies of fundamentalism and modernism, between social conservatism and social radicalism. There is consequently a growing trend toward church union through the acceptance of common programs of action rather than common theological beliefs. In many a town and village the various Protestant churches, often under economic pressure, have pooled their interests in community churches which minimize sectarian beliefs; while many urge an organic union between the national organizations of Protestant churches, the better to further the common task of the Christian in these

troubled times. The outstanding denominational union already effected is that in Canada between the Methodists, the Presbyterians, and the Congregationalists; various others are under consideration.

The suppression of "modernism" in Catholicism redirected but did not destroy in the Church the spirit of conciliation with the modern world. Its vigorous devotion to a rationalistic critique and synthesis of modern ideas is aimed at a need increasingly felt to-day. Practically, it has given renewed attention to its own Christian social program for modern problems. In almost every country of Europe the Catholic or clerical party contained a large group committed to Social Catholicism and specific programs of social reform. Opposition to the newer social faiths has provoked a positive emphasis on the Catholic alternative. This in fact seems the one ground of agreement between all the religious groups in the Western world to-day; and if the dream of a reunited Christendom, which in the face of modern assaults fills many an earnest soul, is ever to take place, it will probably occur through such a common labor in the Lord's vineyard. Whether, with the religious æsthetes, men will unite on common symbols for what are intellectually different conceptions, ranging from orthodox supernaturalism through humanism to a realistic naturalism, or whether such an attempt will be frankly abandoned, and a common program of social action made the connecting bond, present tendencies seem to be bringing together the members of each of the major religious groups, Catholics, Protestant Fundamentalists, Modernists, and free religious organizations.

The religious adjustment to the Growing World is still far from completion; and the outcome of our social crisis now hangs in the balance. The present pessimistic temper will doubtless wax in strength in the bitter conflicts of the near future; and many will seek escape into some realm of absolute security above the battle, finding emotional strength and personal salvation in the confident possession of the Word of God or of insight into the Unconditioned. There will be much religious concern with the problem of adjustment to the tensions and hardships of social transition, of achieving emotional stability in the midst of change. The danger is that this genuine demand will result merely in the provision of a religious refuge and consolation.

So long, however, as men experience religious emotions and religious aspirations, it is clear that some form of organized expression for the religious life will find a place. And so long as men are living in the world, and have faith in intelligence and science, it is to be expected that they will try in some way to harmonize and synthesize their knowledge and their aspiration. In an age of social conflict, such a synthesis may well take a fundamentally social form. It is to be hoped that all the insights and the values of the past will not be forgotten in the face of some new, crude, raw and uncriticized secular faith. But if the masses of men are ever given the opportunity to develop their latent powers of mind and spirit, if a democratic society, in other words, ever comes into existence, it is at least safe to expect that it will contain a religious life on a naturalistic basis in which scientific knowledge, æsthetic feeling, and moral aspiration are blended in one whole. If such a state of affairs ever comes to pass, then and only then will the modern age have achieved a spiritual unity comparable to the heights of the thirteenth-century synthesis.

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- man Abbott, *Evol. of Christianity, Theology of an Evolutionist, Christianity and the Social Problem*; Washington Gladden, *How Much is Left of the Old Doctrines?* H. C. King, *Reconstruction in Theol., Theol. and the Social Consciousness*, gave it a Ritschlian emphasis; W. N. Clarke, *Outline of Christ. Theol.*, grounded it in religious experience. M. J. Savage, *The Passing and the Permanent in Rel.*, T. R. Slicer, *The Great Affirmations of Rel.*, Unitarians. **The Liberal Faith:** A. Harnack, *What is Christianity?*; W. Herrmann, *Communion of the Christian with God*; A. Sabatier, *Rels. of Authority and the Rel. of the Spirit*. A. C. McGiffert, *Christ. as Hist. and Faith*; G. B. Foster, *Christ. in its Modern Expression, The Finality of the Christ. Rel.*; W. A. Brown, *Beliefs that Matter, God at Work*; Shailer Mathews, *Faith of a Modernist*; H. E. Fosdick, *As I See Rel.*; W. Lawrence, *Fifty Years*; K. Lake, *Rel. of Yesterday and Tomorrow*. **Cosmic Theism:** A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making, Process and Reality*; A. S. Eddington, *Science and the Unseen World*; J. E. Boodin, *Cosmic Evolution, God*; W. P. Montague, *Belief Unbound, Ways of Being*; E. W. Barnes, *Scientific Theory and Rel.* **Contemporary "Modernism":** F. R. Tennant, *Phil. Theology*; W. Temple, *Nature, Man, and God*; J. Baillie, *Interp. of Rel.*; A. E. Taylor, *Faith of a Moralist*. E. S. Brightman, *Personality and Rel.*, *Phil. of Rel.*; D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science, Religious Realism*; W. M. Horton, *Theism and the Mod. Mood, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, Realistic Theol.*; J. S. Bixler, *Rel. for Free Minds*. **The Aesthetic Tendency:** Schleiermacher, *Speeches on Rel.*, *Der christliche Glaube*; Selbie, *Schleiermacher*; Cross, *The Theol. of Schl.* J. R. Seeley, *Natural Religion*. A. Comte, *Positive Politics*. E. Renan, *Life of Jesus. Études d' Hist. Rel.* G. Santayana, *Reason in Religion, Poetry and Religion, Winds of Doctrine*. B. Brownell, *Earth is Enough*. **The Ethical and Social Tendency:** A. Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theol.*; G. B. Stevens, *Christ. Doctrine of Salvation*. The social gospel enunciated in W. H. Fremantle, *The World as the Subject of Redemption* (1885). W. Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis, Christianizing the Social Order, A Theol. for the Social Gospel*. Harry F. Ward, *The New Social Order, Our Economic Morality, Which Way Religion?* R. Niebuhr, *Does Civilization Need Religion?* E. B. Chaffee, *The Prot. Churches and the Industrial Crisis*; C. C. Morrison, *Soc. Gospel and the Christ. Cultus*; W. M. Horton, *Realistic Theol.*; J. Bennett, *Social Salvation*. See also Felix Adler, *Ethical Phil. of Life, Reconst. of the Spiritual Ideal*. **Beyond "Modernism": Humanism and Naturalism:** E. A. Burtt, *Rel. in an Age of Science*; H. E. Barnes, *Twilight of Christianity*; J. H. Leuba, *God or Man?* R. W. Sellars, *Rel. Coming of Age*; M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals, The Human Enterprise*; A. E. Haydon, *Quest of the Ages*; C. W. Reese, *Humanist Religion*. E. S. Ames, *Religion*; John Dewey, *Quest for Certainty, Common Faith*; H. N. Wieman, *Rel. Experience and Scientific Method*, (with W. M. Horton) *Growth of Religion*; H. A. Bosley, *Quest for Rel. Certainty*. — **The New Orthodoxy:** Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man, The Doctrine of the Word of God, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*; studies by W. Pauck, P. H. Monsma, R. B. Hoyle. E. Brunner, *Phil. of Rel.*, *Man in Revolt, The Divine Imperative*; N. F. S. Ferré, *Swedish Contribs. to Mod. Theol.*; A. Schweitzer, *Decay and Restoration of Civilization, Christianity and the Religions of the World*; N. Berdyaev, *Fate of Man in the Modern World*. Paul Tillich, *Kairos, Das Dämonische, The Rel. Situation, The Kingdom of God and History, The Interp. of Hist.* Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society, Reflections on the End of an Era, An Interp. of the Christ. Ethic, Beyond Tragedy, Gifford Lectures*. H. R. Niebuhr, etc., *The Church against the World*.

CHAPTER XXI

PHILOSOPHIC REACTIONS TO THE GROWING WORLD OF MECHANISM AND NATURALISM

It has been pointed out that for the last century the fundamental philosophy of life which a man shall adopt, which shall color his thinking and guide him in discerning what in life is of chief worth, has become primarily an individual and a personal matter. No longer can it be said, as it could during the Middle Ages and again in the Age of Reason, that all thoughtful men share a common view of the universe and a common judgment of what constitutes the good life. At the present day practically every one of the great intellectual adjustments which man can effect with his total environment, painfully worked out by outstanding thinkers or whole generations, enjoys a considerable body of adherents; truly the modern age is the philosophic heir of all the past! Nevertheless, one thing remains a matter of common property, an irreducible datum with which all thinking upon these ultimate problems of human life must begin: in some fashion or other every modern-day philosophy must recognize the existence of the vast body of scientific knowledge that has been accumulated about man and the universe in which he finds himself. Some, to be sure, merely recognize science to combat or transcend it, while others glorify it and adore; but whether it be by way of whole-hearted acceptance, or by relegating it to an unimportant place, or by complete rejection and opposition, every thinker who hopes to gain a wide adherence for his gospel of deliverance must start with the picture of the world that can be put together from the various fragmentary views of the different sciences. It is from a common scientific knowledge that men set out, and it is only on a common scientific method that men can hope to agree as the object of a genuinely inclusive social faith.

Nineteenth-century philosophy is primarily the story of varying reactions to this new science. Other groupings are possible: present perspectives would suggest economic alignments. But it was a revolutionary science that first forced the revision of the

Romantic faiths. The century began with all human interests and values deeply bound up with an anthropocentric world-view that gave them cosmic significance. Steadily and surely the advance of science was undermining that view, and making the older theological sanctions for man's ideals seem untenable. Hence to the century's end it was the religious issue that furnished the starting-point for most philosophizing, and the characteristic problem remained the old conflict between familiar faith and new knowledge. How were men to defend their religious faith against a hostile science? or how were they to find a new faith that would need no such defense? On the one hand stood the apologists for the hopes and aspirations of tradition; on the other stood militant denial. Most thinkers tried compromise; but none of the brave attempts can be said really to have succeeded. Hence while the eighteenth century found its keynote in hope, the nineteenth expressed, in its philosophy at least, either disillusionment and pessimism, or a hectic whistling to keep its courage up. It was too soon to realize that, in adjusting the precious human values of their heritage to the new world of science, men were facing merely another reconstruction of their cultural tradition.

The emotional reaction to the scientific world as a whole was not the only problem that drove men to philosophy. Science itself was rapidly changing its character; profoundly influenced by the critiques of the Romanticists, it was becoming far more concrete and rich, and for the first time adopting a genuinely experimental method. How were men to understand this new kind of science? How were they to interpret the implications of the idea of evolution, of the biological attitude? How are they now to grasp the significance of the revolution in physical theory? Here is a type of philosophic problem that will persist so long as science grows and alters its methods. The vast majority of evolutionary philosophers were so busy trying to find in the evolutionary process a new religious faith, a substitute for God and His providence, that they failed to inquire seriously what evolution and biology might really imply. They accepted and elaborated the idea of evolution because it seemed to help in their basic problem of religious compromise. But the nineteenth century also worked out new philosophic analyses of the nature and function of science itself which are the direct forebears

of our own present-day naturalisms. They have given us the tools for the critical understanding of science with which our more technical philosophies are approaching the new concepts of relativity and quantum theory.

If nineteenth-century philosophers were so busy trying to adjust men's religious and moral beliefs to the new world of evolutionary science, why were they not equally concerned with the harder adjustment to industrial society? Why were not social rather than religious issues more central, as they have become in our present perspective? As compared with the eighteenth century, when political interests dominated even science, and the characteristic philosophies of rationalism and empiricism had so direct a social motivation, it is indeed surprising how little the profound economic changes affected philosophic thought. Of course, men had social philosophies, and social considerations did color the adoption of general viewpoints. But for practical guidance men went mostly to the older philosophies, not to the new evolutionary gospels. Liberalism found its official philosophy in Utilitarianism, a continuance of eighteenth-century empiricism; while collectivism, both conservative and radical, found idealism congenial, especially some form of Hegelian rationalism.

But in that complacent age social views were more or less irrelevant to the central religious problem; and at best their philosophic expressions were woefully inadequate makeshifts for dealing with the complex problems of the industrial era. Witness the fact that the three most popular philosophies of the century, those of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Karl Marx, held completely divergent social programs. Comte preached the enlightened despotism of the old order, Spencer, a business man's individualism, and Marx an industrial socialism. Yet all three agreed on the burning issue of accepting science; and each stood, in France, England, and Germany, as the great exponent of the negative answer to the religious problem — or rather, for finding a religious faith in science itself, and taking evolution as a new and up-to-date providence working for man.

Only in the last decades have the social questions raised by the industrial revolution replaced the religious problem as the major incentive to philosophizing. This need surprise only those who forget that philosophy is primarily a means of criti-

cism, a leverage for attacking, defending, or reconstructing tradition; its attention is first turned to problems when a bitter conflict has already arisen. Till the last generation industrial society seemed to demand opportunity for growth and expansion rather than criticism; it is only to-day that insistent maladjustments have made its organization the central intellectual issue. Now that the cosmic religious problem — as contrasted with that of the philosophic understanding of the nature and function of religion — is no longer central and dominating, and philosophers largely accept the naturalistic position, industrialism has at last begun to influence philosophy seriously. The center of attention is shifting from the cosmic problems of the nineteenth century to the human and social problems of industrial civilization; and it is clear that in the future social rather than religious issues will be the basis of philosophic divisions. The task has broadened from the adjustment to science to the larger adjustment to all the cultural and institutional changes forced upon us by our allegiance to technology.

But this shift could take place only after men had already made their peace with the scientific picture of the world. This was in itself a tremendous task, and its accomplishment remains the outstanding philosophic achievement of the century.

THE PICTURE OF THE MECHANISTIC WORLD GENERALIZED FROM SCIENCE

What was this picture which science purported to give? The idea of evolution, its most novel and revolutionary concept, has come to stand as a symbol of the scientific faith. But it was really not so important in forcing that faith as the patient working out of mechanistic explanation; the latter seemed less of a shock because it had been in the world since Descartes. Science was advancing and filling in the details of the Cartesian picture; by the 1860's the results were so impressive they could no longer be disregarded. The fundamental dogmas of the scientific faith now served to organize a vast body of facts that could not be gainsaid. In the nineteenth century they took the form of sweeping generalizations: the conservation of energy, the laws of thermo-dynamics, natural selection, the mechanistic theory of life, above all an unyielding mechanical determinism. The laboratory had not yet unearthed so many facts that no general-

ization could embrace them all; the recent breakdown of traditional physical theory had not yet occurred. The idea that all such general statements are leading principles of scientific investigation, instruments to guide inquiry rather than laws governing the universe, had as yet little support. The Newtonian framework was not yet burst asunder; the most speculative assumptions, either abandoned or modified to-day, were seized upon to complete a "scientific world-view." With this framework, with these dogmas and assumptions, shaken believers felt they must come to terms.

This "scientific world-view" of the turn of the century was of course a faith, a negative faith, not to say an obsession. The dark picture fascinated our fathers. They loved to paint the alien elements as black as possible, even as they shuddered in delicious horror before it. It struck terror because they had just left the warm affection of the Christian tradition and the optimism of the Romantic faiths. Many believed it because it was so dreadful; they prided themselves on their courage in facing facts. More fled from it as from a nightmare, and used it as a springboard for a faith *quand même*. It surely needed little of the will to believe to maintain that it could not be the whole story: it was so obviously a work of sheer faith, an imaginative rendering of men's gloomiest forebodings. That "alien world" has vanished to-day; the speculative assumptions of nineteenth-century physics on which it was based have given way to others more astounding if less hostile to man's interests. Our newer naturalisms have annulled that divorce of man from nature.

One such picture of the mechanistic and evolutionary world of the last generation, from the master pen of Anatole France, has already been introduced to serve as a striking contrast to the world of the Middle Ages. Another is from the hand of that conservative sceptic, Lord Balfour:

Man, so far as natural science by itself is able to teach, is no longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which first converted a dead organic compound into the living progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a race with conscience enough to feel

that it is vile, and intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. We survey the past, and see that its history is of blood and tears, of helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which for a moment has disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. "Imperishable monuments" and "immortal deeds," death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that is better or be worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to effect.¹

Lord Balfour does not believe that this is the final story; but Bertrand Russell does:

That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labor of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins — all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.²

These pictures are, to be sure, but the expression of moods rather than of scientific verities; and all the gloomy predictions of a few decades ago, seeing the ultimate extinction of our sun as the inevitable deduction from the second law of thermodynamics, have been sadly shaken, both by the discovery of radio-activity, and by the reflection that a universe which has existed from all eternity should have run down ere this if that was destined to be its final goal. But without reflecting on this ultimate cosmic death, the picture science presents of man and his destiny is

¹ From *Foundations of Belief*, by Arthur Balfour. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green & Co.

² From *A Free Man's Worship*, by Bertrand Russell. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green & Co.

sufficiently different from that of his earlier hopes to give ground for pause. Turn to the astronomer, and he answers:

The Universe itself may be only another single unit, among a multitude of other universes; and if at this point we cease to speculate, it is not because there is no further scope for speculation, but because we have already far outstripped the last shred of solid evidence that our instruments can provide for us. Complete and absolute darkness reigns beyond. If we learn nothing else for certain, we learn at least this: that the farther we travel, the more obscure and insignificant does Man appear. And three points also emerge. Firstly, the uniformity of natural "law" remains as absolute in these regions of infinite greatness as in our own world of human dimensions. Secondly, no sign of purpose can be detected in any part of the vast Universe disclosed by our most powerful telescopes. Thirdly, this great new sphere of experience affords not the smallest trace of evidence for the existence of any spiritual entity. We find nothing but unimaginable tracts of space and time, in which move bodies by fixed laws towards ends which are wholly fortuitous, and have not the smallest relation to the advantage or requirements of Man.³

Turn to the psychologist or biologist, and he answers that man is a complex physico-chemical organism, the lineal descendant of some bit of primordial slime; all his hopes and aspirations, all his loves and fears, all his self-sacrifice and knowledge, are the result of the peculiar laws governing the chemical reactions that ultimately go to produce his behavior. Turn to the physicist, he who investigates these fundamental units out of which man and his universe are composed in their entirety, and he answers:

Penetration into the secrets of atomic structure has opened up to us a vast new sphere of phenomena whose very existence was previously unsuspected, and which differ *toto cælo* from all kinds of phenomena with which we were previously acquainted. Yet throughout this new continent of knowledge we find the axioms of materialism as unquestioned as ever. The electrons and the positively charged nuclei of atoms have their unchangeable laws, and illustrate afresh the inviolable relation of cause and effect. Nor, as we approach the very foundations of existence, do we see any more signs than elsewhere of a *purpose* at the basis of the universe. Harmony and order, certainly; that arises from the universality of natural law; it is the same kind of harmony and order that prevails in the larger material masses of the Universe. Even if the Universe is running down to a final doom of extinction, there is no suggestion of purpose there. A clock also runs down, but not by previous intention — not for what we understand by a purpose. Finally,

* From *Modern Science and Materialism*, by Hugh Eliot. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green & Co.

in this new field of discovery, there is no place for any kind of spiritual agency. We know at length what is the basis of matter: it is not spirit, it is energy, a factor exclusively objective in character, and residing on the materialistic, not on the spiritualistic plane. . . . Furthermore, one thing is certain. Whatever matter may ultimately be resolved into, it certainly cannot be resolved into spirit. The wildest speculator in science has never suggested *that* possibility.⁴

Following, then, the methods and the principles of scientific investigation, the modern philosopher can arrive at nothing in the universe aside from man that appears to have human interests and human aspirations at heart. In all the reaches of our telescopes and our microscopes there is nowhere discoverable the slightest trace of anything like man, any Friend behind phenomena, any God who cares, any principle that guarantees man success in his struggles and endeavors. So far as the eye of science can see, man is alone, absolutely alone, in a universe in which his very appearance is a kind of cosmic accident. How, then, if this be the very truth, has it come about that he has always, to the present day, in some form or other felt himself at home in his universe, felt that he was the child of the watchful forces of nature, the Son of God whom the Father lovingly cared for? To even this question the scientist has a devastating answer. Turn to the anthropologist, and he will calmly reply:

It is very important in this matter to realize that the so-called belief is not really an intellectual judgment so much as a craving of the whole nature. It is only of late years that psychologists have begun to realize the enormous dominion of those forces in man of which he is normally unconscious. We cannot escape as easily as these brave men dreamed from the grip of the blind powers beneath the threshold. Indeed, as I see philosophy after philosophy falling into this unproven belief in the Friend behind phenomena, as I find that I myself cannot, except for a moment and by an effort, refrain from making the same assumption, it seems to me that perhaps here too we are under the spell of a very old ineradicable instinct. We are gregarious animals; our ancestors have been such for countless ages. We cannot help looking out upon the world as gregarious animals do; we see it in terms of humanity and fellowship. Students of animals under domestication have shown us how the habits of a gregarious creature, taken away from his kind, are shaped in a thousand details by reference to the lost pack which is no longer there — the pack which a dog tries to smell his way back to all the time he is out walking, the pack he calls to for help when

⁴ From *Modern Science and Materialism*, by Hugh Eliot. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green & Co.

danger threatens. It is a strange and touching thing, 'his eternal hunger of the gregarious animal for the herd of friends who are not there. And it may be, it may very possibly be, that, in the matter of this Friend behind phenomena, our own yearning and our own almost ineradicable instinctive conviction, since they are certainly not founded on either reason or observation, are in origin the groping of a lonely-souled gregarious animal to find its herd or its herd-leader in the great spaces beyond the stars.⁵

The Friend is gone, and man is alone in a cold and alien universe.

That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic weather, though many a jewelled shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats away, long lingering ere it be dissolved — even as our world now lingers, for our joy — yet when these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely *nothing* remains, to represent those particular qualities, those elements of preciousness which they may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone utterly from the very sphere and room of being. Without an echo; without a memory; without an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care for similar ideals. This utter final wreck and tragedy is of the essence of scientific materialism as at present understood. The lower and not the higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last surviving forces within the only cycle of evolution which we can definitely see.⁶

No scientist, of course, can claim that he has *proved* that this is the whole story, and that the vast edifice man has built for his spirit, with its foundations of Godhead, its walls of a loving Providence, and its airy pinnacles of human immortality, may not dwell somewhere beyond the reach of his instruments. On the other side of the moon, indeed, there may stand the Heavenly City with its golden gates and pearly walls and alabaster turrets; and there the saints may be gathered in glory, chanting never-ending hymns to the Eternal Father upon his throne. But, so far as the scientist can discern, there is not one shred of evidence that it is aught but a dream-castle in the clouds; and his knowledge of the mythopoeic faculty in man is such as to make him strongly suspect that such is indeed the case. If man continues to believe to-day in what his forbears trusted, it is by faith, and by faith alone, that he can justify himself. And by the side of the solid edifice of scientific verity, such faith seems, and cannot but seem, a slender reed upon which to rest such momentous

⁵ From *The Stoic Philosophy*, by Gilbert Murray. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, G. P. Putnam's Sons of New York and London.

hopes. The more man actually learns of himself and his universe, the less prone he is to trust to such an unaided faith. If he have faith, it is a faith *quand même*, a faith that can remove mountains, a faith stronger than knowledge, stronger than reason, strong as life itself.

By the middle of the last century this seemed so clear to men that they were convinced that they must take it as a fundamental, an irreducible datum. Only on such a firm foundation could they build a habitation for the human spirit; only in a world set in such terms could they hope to achieve whatever measure of the good life was destined to fall to their lot. For those not willing to rest in traditional beliefs, for those who felt that human reason and human intelligence must work out its own destiny and salvation, the great problem was presented, what shall man do about it? What possibilities does such a world offer? How may a good life be led in such a world? Three general types of answer may be distinguished; together they make up the body of modern philosophies. When this realization came like a cold shock to men, the first reaction was one of disillusionment and despair. Mindful of their past hopes, they either lamented their lost dreams in lugubrious measures, or took refuge in the ivory tower of art, where for a while at least the soul might dwell amidst beauty; or, refusing to recognize the picture as more than partially and inadequately true, they retreated to a perfection elsewhere, and in some structure of philosophic idealism found consolation for the emptiness of the world of science. Stronger souls, unable still to envisage humanity as utterly alone in the wind-swept wastes of the universe, turned with pathetic eagerness to the one great process and purpose that science seemed to leave in the world. For them, evolution took the place of Providence; and, reflecting that after all man has been the outcome of the cosmic forces, they sought in the very worship and deification of evolution, in the vigorous acceptance of and rejoicing in the ends of nature, a worthy ideal for human life, and a guarantee that, if man but made his own the ends of cosmic power, he could still triumph with the course of nature. A third group, from the generation that had no longer cherished the fond hopes of the past, and hence had never experienced disillusionment, looked about itself upon the world depicted by science, and saw it neither as an alien world, nor as a great process to be glorified as realizing

ideals to which man must adhere; but rather as the natural scene of human life and human striving, a dwelling-place in which man can accomplish his human purposes and bend the materials that are given him to his own will. The various reactions to the alien world — complete pessimism, Promethean defiance of nature, retreat to an idealistic faith behind and beyond the world of science; — the evolutionary faiths in the cosmic process, Progress, Creative Evolution, Pragmatism, the revaluation of values; and a Greek or a Baconian naturalism — these are the main philosophies of the modern world, together with such philosophies as have persisted, like Thomism, relatively untouched by the scientific viewpoint. The mass of mankind, uneasy but unwilling to follow out any viewpoint to its logical conclusion, have more or less successfully adopted portions of some or all these philosophies, combining them with whatever of the traditional beliefs it still seemed possible to adhere to. But every man, whatever his intellectual beliefs, who lives in the modern world, has been influenced by one fundamental notion: whatever may be man's ultimate destiny, his life is to be lived and his salvation worked out in this life and this world, and with the materials it places at his disposal. All modern philosophies are this-worldly, rather than other-worldly; they are humanistic in their emphasis, and social in their ideals.

DISILLUSIONMENT — PESSIMISM IN THE FACE OF THE ALIEN WORLD

Many were the attitudes bred of the initial disillusionment with the mechanistic world of science, and the conviction that man's true interests and ideals find no place or scope in the universe. There was, first of all, a wave of pessimism that swept over tender souls. Men stood, like Matthew Arnold, upon the shore of the sea of faith, that

Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.⁷

Like Tennyson, they paced the Dover cliffs in agony of mind over

the question of a future existence, crying aloud, "If there is no immortality, I shall hurl myself into the sea!" The long vacillation of the laureate's mind, so irritating to the modern reader, expressed the very essence of the struggle through which many passed, as traditional beliefs first crumbled.

How sweet to have a common faith!
 To hold a common scorn of death!
 Thrice happy state again to be
 The trustful infant on the knee.
 O weary life! O weary death!
 O spirit and heart made desolate!
 O damned vacillating state!⁸

The world with Tennyson passed through the long and bitter travail of *In Memoriam*:

O, yet we trust that somehow good
 Will be the final goal of ill,
 To pangs of nature, sins of will,
 Defects of doubt, and taints of blood. . . .
 Behold, we know not anything;
 I can but trust that good shall fall
 At last — far off — at last, to all,
 And every winter change to spring.
 So runs my dream; but what am I?
 An infant crying in the night;
 An infant crying for the light,
 And with no language but a cry.
 Are God and Nature then at strife,
 That Nature lends such evil dreams?
 So careful of the type she seems,
 So careless of the single life. . . .
 I falter where I firmly trod,
 And falling with my weight of cares
 Upon the great world's altar-stairs,
 That slope thro' darkness up to God,
 I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope
 And gather dust and chaff, and call
 To what I feel is Lord of all,
 And faintly trust the larger hope.⁹

Evolution seemed to men at first a dull despair:

Not only cunning casts in clay:
 Let Science prove we are, and then
 What matters science unto men,
 At least to me? I would not stay.

Let him, the wiser man who springs
Hereafter, up from childhood shape
His actions like the greater ape,
But I was *born* to other things.¹⁰

Clough is the very epitome of this nineteenth-century disillusionment:

To spend uncounted years of pain,
Again, again, and yet again,
In working out, in heart and brain
The problem of our being here;
To gather facts from far and near,
Upon the mind to hold them clear,
And, knowing more may yet appear,
Unto one's latest breath to fear,
The premature result to draw —
Is this the object, end, and law,
And purpose of our being here?¹¹

Only a despairing Stoicism kept such minds in the struggle:

It fortifies my soul to know
That, though I perish, Truth is so.

Say not the struggle naught availeth,
The labor and the wounds are vain,
The enemy faints not, nor faileth,
And as things have been they remain.
If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars;
It may be, in yon smoke concealed,
Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers,
And, but for you, possess the field.¹²

In Thomson's *City of Dreadful Night* is perhaps the deepest expression of this pessimism in the face of the alien world:

The chance was never offered me before;
For me the infinite Past is blank and dumb:
This chance recurreth never, nevermore;
Blank, blank for me the infinite To-come.
And this sole chance was frustrate from my birth,
A mockery, a delusion: and my breath
Of noble human life upon this earth
So racks me that I sigh for senseless death.¹³

The philosophic expression of this pessimism in the face of the utter aimlessness of nature and the futility of human striving is

to be found in Schopenhauer. For him, the essence of Nature and of life alike is a dumb, blind, restless activity, an utterly irrational force whose gropings have produced the world and all that lives therein. This cosmic force — too meaningless, indeed, to merit the name of "process" — Schopenhauer called "Will," and saw in its very nature the necessary and inevitable defeat of all human striving after happiness.

All Will springs from need, that is, from lack, that is, from suffering. Fulfillment puts an end to this; but for every wish that is fulfilled there are at least ten denied. Furthermore, craving lasts long, demands are infinite; fulfillment is short and finite. But finite satisfaction itself is only apparent: one wish fulfilled gives way to another: the one is a recognized, the other a still unrealized error. Lasting satisfaction that will not vanish no wished-for object of the Will can give: it is like the alms thrown to the beggar, that sustain life to-day only to increase his torture to-morrow. . . . Therefore, so long as our minds are filled with Will, so long as we are the prey of the press of desires with their unceasing hopes and fears, so long as we are the subjects of Will, we shall never find lasting happiness nor peace. Whether we pursue or flee, whether we fear impurity or strive for enjoyment, is in essence the same: care for the everlasting demands of the Will, in whatever form the same, fills and endlessly moves the mind; but without peace there can be no true well-being. Thus the subject of the Will lies ever bound to the revolving wheel of Ixion, fills forever the sieve of the Danaïds, is the ever thirsty Tantalus. . . . The inner being of nature is a striving without rest and without respite, a willing and a striving that may well be compared to an unquenchable thirst. But since the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain, the nature of brute and man alike is originally and of its very essence subject to pain. If on the other hand it is deprived of objects of desire through too easy satisfaction, such void and ennui fills the heart that existence becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus life swings like a pendulum from pain to ennui, from ennui to pain. . . . Life is a sea full of rocks and whirlpools which man avoids with the greatest care and solicitude, although he knows that even if he succeeds in getting through with all his efforts and skill, he comes thus but the nearer at every tack to the greatest, the total, the inevitable shipwreck, death. . . . Thus, between desiring and attaining all human life flows on. The wish is in its nature pain, the attainment satiety: the end is an illusion and possession takes away charm. The wish, the need, presents itself under a new form, or when it does not, follows desolateness, emptiness, ennui against which the conflict is just as painful as against want. Every human being and his course of life is but another short dream of the endless spirit of nature, the persistent will to live; is only another fleeting form which nature carelessly sketches in its infinite pages, allows to remain for a time so short it vanishes into nothing, and then obliterates to make room for others.¹⁴

In science, in art, in devotion to his fellow sufferers, man can indeed find temporary solace in self-forgetfulness; but these oases are at best not worth the suffering involved in reaching them.

If we compare life to a course which we must unceasingly run — a path of glowing coals, with a few cool places here and there; then he who is entangled in illusion is consoled by the cool places, on which he now stands or which he sees near him, and sets out to run the course. But he who sees through the illusion and thus recognizes the whole for what it is, is no longer capable of such consolation; he sees himself at all places at once, and withdraws.¹⁵

The only remedy is by asceticism and mortification of the flesh and spirit to still the restless striving of the will.

If we turn our glances from our own needy and embarrassed condition to those who have overcome the world, then instead of the useless striving and effort, instead of the never satisfied and never-dying hope which constitutes the life of the man who wills and desires, we shall see that peace which passeth understanding, that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest, that inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere reflection of which in the countenance as Raphael or Correggio has represented it is an entire and certain gospel; only knowledge remains, the Will has vanished. . . . What remains after the abolition of the Will is for all those who are still full of desires certainly nothing; but to those in whom the will has denied itself, this world which is so real, with all its suns and milky ways — is nothing.¹⁶

Such a cosmic pessimism is familiar to English readers through the pages of Thomas Hardy.

What of the Immanent Will and Its designs?
 IT works unconsciously, as heretofore,
 Eternal artistries in circumstance,
 Whose patterns, wrought by rapt æsthetic rote,
 Seem in themselves Its single listless aim,
 And not their consequence.
 Still thus? Still thus?
 Ever unconscious!
 An automatic sense
 Unweeting why or whence?
 Be, then, the inevitable, as of old,
 Although that SO it be we dare not hold!

“O Immanence, That reasonest not
 In putting forth all things begot,
 Thou build'st Thy house in space — for what?

O Loveless, Hateless! — past the sense
 Of kindly eyed benevolence,
 To what tune danceth this Immense?"
 "For one I cannot answer. But I know
 'Tis handsome of our Pities so to sing
 The praises of the dreaming, dark, dumb Thing
 That turns the handle of this idle Show!
 As once a Greek asked I would fain ask too,
 Who knows if all the spectacle be true,
 Or an illusion of the gods (the Will
 To wit) some hocus-pocus to fulfill?"
 "Last as first the question rings,
 Of the Will's long travailings;
 Why the All-mover,
 Why the All-power
 Ever urges on and measures out the chordless chime of Things." ¹⁷

CONSOLATION SOUGHT IN ART AND BEAUTY

To many for whom science thus seemed to establish the essential meaninglessness of all existence and all striving, the ivory tower of art furnished the only solace and refuge. Only in discerning beauty in the passing show, since all action is beyond our power, and we must do as the eternal laws of nature bid us, can man find that which will make his existence worth while and lift him above the brute. For many a despairing soul during the last few generations, it has seemed that man's hopes can rest only in the ideal world of beauty; and æstheticism has proved the natural way of life in the Alien World. Says Walter Pater, in the creed of his new Cyrenaicism:

This at least of flamelike our life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways. . . . Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us — for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy? To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. . . . Not to discriminate every moment some passionate

¹⁷ From *The Dynasts*, by Thomas Hardy. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London.

attitude in those about us, and in the very brilliancy of their gifts some tragic dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening. With this sense of the splendor of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. . . . We are all *condamnés*, as Victor Hugo says: we are all under sentence of death but with a sort of indefinite reprieve: we have an interval, and then our place knows us no more. Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among "the children of this world," in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time. Great passions may give us this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, the various forms of enthusiastic activity, disinterested or otherwise, which come naturally to many of us. Only be sure it is passion — that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake.¹⁸

Ernest Renan in France preached the same gospel to the artists and the poets of his day.

The pearl-bearing oyster seems to me the best image of the universe and of the degree of consciousness we may suppose in things. At the bottom of the abyss, obscure germs create a mind singularly ill-served by organs, and yet prodigiously able to attain its ends. What we may call a disease of this little living cosmos brings about a secretion of ideal beauty, which men value as fine gold. The general life of the universe is, like that of the oyster, vague, obscure, singularly troubled, and hence sluggish. Suffering creates spirit, intellectual and moral motion. The disease of the world, if you will, in truth the pearl of the world, spirit, is the end, the final cause, the last and certainly the most brilliant result of the world in which we live.

The government of things here below belongs to forces quite other than science and reason; the thinker can claim but a very feeble right to direct the affairs of his planet, and, satisfied with his lot, he accepts his impotence without regret. A spectator in the universe, he knows that the world belongs to him only as an object of study; and even if he could reform it, he would perhaps find it so curious an object that he would lose all desire to do so.¹⁹

To-day the philosopher of this æsthetic naturalism is Santayana. For him, the mind and the soul of man and all their aspirations are but a lyric cry in a world of relentless and blind matter. Consciousness itself is like the rainbow playing on the fountain, a beautiful iridescence; but the drops rise and fall in mechanical

order, with no heed to the wishes of the mind. The part of wisdom, then, is to play the critic, the connoisseur.

Sweet are the days we wander with no hope
 Along life's labyrinthine trodden way,
 With no impatience at the steep's delay,
 Nor sorrow at the swift-descended slope.
 Why this inane curiosity to grope
 In the dim dust for gems' unmeaning ray?
 Why this proud piety, that dares to pray
 For a world wider than the heaven's cope?
 Farewell, my burden! No more will I bear
 The foolish load of my fond faith's despair,
 But trip the idle race with careless feet.
 The crown of olive let another wear;
 It is my crown to mock the runner's heat
 With gentle wonder and with laughter sweet.²⁰

He who does not seek thus to discriminate life's golden moments, and enters whole-heartedly into the conflict, is but the rustic at the play.

Our youth is like a rustic at the play,
 That cries aloud in simple-hearted fear,
 Curses the villain, shudders at the fray,
 And weeps before the maiden's wreathed bier.
 Yet once familiar with the changeful show,
 He starts no longer at a brandished knife,
 But, his heart chastened at the sight of woe,
 Ponders the mirrored sorrows of his life.
 So tutored too, I watch the moving art
 Of all this magic and impassioned pain
 That tells the story of the human heart
 In a false instance, such as poets feign;
 I smile, and keep within the parchment furled
 That prompts the passions of this strutting world.²¹

This æstheticism, no matter how refined, is but the part of wisdom applied to the old cry, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die." This Epicureanism, whether of the scholar and critic or of the humble daily toiler and the tireless business man, has entered deeply into the very spirit of to-day. In a sense, all our modern philosophies, from Socialism to the

²⁰ From *Sonnets*, by George Santayana. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.

²¹ From *The Hermit of Carmel and Other Poems*, by George Santayana. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.

worship of business success, are but elaborations of the means for eating, drinking, and being merry in the most satisfactory way. Whether we acknowledge it or no, the modern age has been in fundamental agreement with the Omar who so captured the imaginations of the last generation.

Come, fill the Cup, and in the fire of Spring
Your Winter-garment of Repentance fling;
The Bird of Time has but a little way
To flutter — and the Bird is on the Wing.
Then to the Lip of this poor earthen Urn
I lean'd, the Secret of my Life to learn:
And Lip to Lip it murmured — "While you live,
Drink! — for, once dead, you never shall return."²²

The highest reaches of such a wise and tolerant Epicureanism, that is yet alive to the pathos of human aspiration, are perhaps to be met in the pages of Anatole France. Life is meaningless for him, too.

It resembles a vast workshop of pottery where some one is fashioning all sorts of vases for unknown purposes and where many, broken in the mould, are rejected as vile potsherds without ever having been used. The others are employed only for absurd or disgusting uses. The pots are ourselves.²³ The mystery of destiny completely envelops us in its powerful shades, and it is necessary to avoid thinking altogether if one is not to resent the tragic absurdity of living. It is there, in the absolute ignorance of our reason for being, that the root of our sadness and of our disgust is to be found.²⁴ Ignorance is the necessary condition, I do not say of happiness, but of existence itself. If we knew all we could not support life an hour. The sentiments which make it sweet, or at least tolerable for us, spring from a lie and nourish themselves on illusions.²⁵

Yet with wisdom even disillusionment is bearable.

Irony and Pity are two counselors: the one in smiling makes life amiable; the other in weeping makes life sacred. The Irony which I invoke is not cruel. It does not mock either love or beauty. . . . As believers who have attained to a high degree of moral beauty taste the joys of renunciation, so the sage, persuaded that all about us is only appearance and deceit, is intoxicated with this philosophic melancholy and loses himself in the delights of a calm despair.²⁶

²²⁻²⁶ From *The Garden of Epicurus*, by Anatole France. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Dodd, Mead & Co.

PROMETHEAN DEFIANCE OF THE MECHANISTIC WORLD

Yet such renunciation and acceptance of the Alien World could not be the only reaction to the scientific cosmos. The will to live and struggle is too strongly rooted in human nature to be stilled forever by the contemplation of human beauty and human folly. More stalwart souls gritted their teeth and, by sheer pluck and courage, engaged in the Promethean task of defying the universe and all its works. If man's birth took place in the mud and dust, he nevertheless can build for himself a heaven; and even if he fails, it is enough that he has so nobly striven. Let us fight the good fight;

'Tis better to have fought and lost,
Than never to have fought at all.²⁷

For many a man, the essence of humanity seemed to be its self-imposed task of creating a worthy life, though all the forces of nature beat relentlessly upon man and his endeavors. In a famous essay, *Evolution and Ethics*, Huxley, the great popularizer of Darwinism, voiced this heroic creed. Civilization may be compared to a garden created by man in the midst of a forest wilderness. Only by constant care and foresight can man keep the garden from being over-run by the weeds which nature causes to spring to life, and from being killed by the infinite parasites which nature contains. Just so, all man's endeavor must be directed to counteracting the forces of nature, and turning them to his own purposes. Man's standards of good and evil have nothing in common with the course of nature; they are discoveries or achievements which he alone in all the universe has made.

Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before.²⁸

Man may have come into being through the struggle for existence; the heart of civilization consists in eliminating that struggle between men.

The practice of that which is ethically best — what we call goodness or virtue — involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands self-restraint; in place of

thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. . . . Laws and moral precepts are directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process, and reminding the individual of his duty to the community, to the protection and influence of which he owes, if not existence itself, at least the life of something better than a brutal savage. . . . Let us understand, once and for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think that the great intellectual difference between ancient times and our own day lies in the solid foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success. The history of civilization details the steps by which men have succeeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos. Fragile reed as he may be, man, as Pascal says, is a thinking reed: there lies within him a fund of energy, operating intelligently and so far akin to that which pervades the universe, that it is competent to influence and modify the cosmic process. In virtue of his intelligence, the dwarf bends the Titan to his will.²⁹

The same attitude is expressed by Matthew Arnold:

“In harmony with Nature?” Restless fool,
Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee,
When true, the last impossibility, —
To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool!
Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good.
Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood;
Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore;
Nature is fickle, man hath need of rest;
Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave;
Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.
Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends;
Nature and man can never be fast friends.
Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!³⁰

Most Promethean of all, Bertrand Russell confesses *A Free Man's Worship*.

The world of fact, after all, is not good; and in submitting our judgment to it, there is an element of slavishness from which the thoughts must be purged. For in all things it is well to exalt the dignity of Man, by freeing him as far as possible from the tyranny of non-human Power. When we have realized that Power is largely bad, that man,

with his knowledge of good and evil, is but a helpless atom in a world which has no such knowledge, the choice is again presented to us: Shall we worship Force, or shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God exist and be evil, or shall he be recognized as the creation of our own conscience?

The life of Man, viewed outwardly, is but a small thing in comparison with the forces of Nature. The slave is doomed to worship Time and Fate and Death, because they are greater than anything he finds in himself, and because all his thoughts are of things which they devour. But, great as they are, to think of them greatly, to feel their passionless splendor, is greater still. And such thoughts make us free men: we no longer bow before the inevitable in Oriental subjection, but we absorb it, and make it a part of ourselves. To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things — this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship. And this liberation is effected by a contemplation of Fate; for Fate itself is subdued by the mind which leaves nothing to be purged by the purifying fire of Time. . . .

Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.³¹

ESCAPE FROM THE ALIEN WORLD INTO PHILOSOPHIC IDEALISM

All such men accepted the scientific picture of the Alien World as in the main true; but many were not prepared to abandon so easily their traditional beliefs and hopes. They turned to those theories that had been developed by the romanticists to get behind Newtonian science, discredit its rational scientific method, and substitute some other principles for the interpretation of the reality of the world. Various systems of philosophical idealism grew greatly in popularity during the century: they seemed the sole intellectual weapon whereby to prove that

³¹ From *A Free Man's Worship*, by Bertrand Russell. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Longmans, Green & Co.

science does not tell the whole story, and that somewhere, somehow, the world is like man, is working for what man is working for and cares for the objects of his care. Men unwilling to give up what was dear to them, yet also unwilling to appeal to blind faith or authority, eagerly grasped at idealism as a prop and a stay. The idealist had the advantage that, like Kant, he could freely admit that everything the scientist discovers is true in its own realm, while at the same time he possessed in addition a method of proving that that world of science is a mere show world, and that behind it, underneath it, permeating it, lies the real world, a very different kind of thing. The real world is not mechanical, not a blind and aimless process; it is spiritual and moral, and guarantees the outcome of man's endeavors. This was to many a man a very comforting doctrine; and philosophy, indeed, became so overwhelmingly idealistic in color that to many it means, to the present day, a way of proving God, freedom, and immortality in the face of negative scientific evidence. Such idealism was, on the whole, as we have pointed out in connection with the romantic movement, a conservative force, both religiously and socially: it sought to prove that there really is a God, though science cannot find him, and that society really is serving the highest ends, although it certainly does not seem to. In the last years of the century, various types of neo-Kantianism dominated German thought, and a modified form of Hegelianism served in England as the orthodox religious and social apologetic; while in this country idealism was taught in all the colleges and theological seminaries, and became what has been called "the genteel tradition in American philosophy."

As has been pointed out, when once faith in scientific methods has been displaced by faith in either speculative reason, uncontrolled by reference to the world of experience, or by faith in pure faith alone, such speculative reason and such faith will be apt to reach any conclusions desired. Hence idealism, while agreeing in disregarding science as "merely empirical," or "merely relative and phenomenal," has found the real world to be a great many different things. Men with a fierce passion for logic and consistency, like F. H. Bradley, relentlessly pursued it with dialectic until it vanished, through a maze of logical contradictions, into thin air, leaving only the pale ghost of the Absolute endlessly crooning, "In me all things are made perfect.

In me it is seen how all evil is necessary for my good." Others found the real world a more pleasant and substantial place, somewhat like the last act of a play in which everything is explained and accounted for, the hero and heroine reunited after hardships, and the villain turns out to be no villain at all, but only the hero's father trying to develop his character through opposition. More technically, this is stated "the reality known in experience is not something that merely is or possesses bare existence, but, as existing concretely, it forms part of a permanent system of relations and values."³²

Carlyle and Emerson popularized these idealistic views during the last century. "Then sawest thou that this fair Universe," rhapsodized Carlyle, "were it in the meanest province thereof, is in very deed the star-domed City of God: that through every star, through every grass-blade, and most through every Living Soul, the glory of a present God still beams. But Nature, which is the Time-Vesture of God, and reveals Him to the wise, hides Him from the foolish."³³ "We live in succession," wrote the confident Emerson, "in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE. And this deep power in which we exist and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is not only self-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object, are one. We see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining parts, is the soul."³⁴

Here is an absolute optimism to confront the pessimism of the disillusioned; and it numbered its many adherents and does today. The universe is not only divine, it is perfect here and now, could we but understand it aright.

On the view here accepted, finiteness, pain, and evil are essential features of Reality, and belong to an aspect of it which leaves its marks even on perfection. . . . If we knew everything and could feel everything we should see and feel what finiteness, pain and evil mean, and how they play a part in perfection itself.³⁵

Applied to a social ideal, this means, we should understand how this is the best of all possible worlds.

The social process is greater than any one's formula; and what we have to think of is how causation is working, and how we can throw ourselves into it in union with the real forces of the day. . . . We shall, as a great writer has said, remember "What the world is, and what we are." We shall try to understand it, and coöperate with it, rather than to remould it. We shall seek for what is deepest in it, knowing we shall find there a power which will respond to what is deepest in ourselves. And by taking these things as our guide and criterion, we shall always be working in a direction which will at once be practicable and good.³⁶

To many, such wholesale acceptance of evil as a necessary and therefore justified part of perfection seems an even greater violation of the moral conscience than the somewhat similar doctrine, flourishing in Christian Science and similar cults, that evil is non-existent.

In justice to such idealism, however, it should be pointed out that it is not necessarily a wholesale justification of existence. To Fichte, reality was the moral will struggling to overcome evil, and man's salvation consisted in flinging himself wholeheartedly into the never-ending fight. In our own day Josiah Royce, with the deep moral sense of his Puritan forbears, combined faith in a spiritual principle in the universe with a profound realization of finite evils.

A genuine synthesis of optimism and its opposing pessimism, a spiritual idealism that does not deny the reality and the gravity of evil, a religion that looks forward to the day of the Lord as to something very great and therefore very serious, and that accepts life as something valuable enough to be tragic — that is what we need. . . . If I find in myself an evil impulse, I find what in itself considered is, indeed, something hateful, lamentable, possibly horrible, something which regarded for itself can apparently form no part of a good order. If I tolerate the impulse, if I declare it to be just the nettle of sin, if I call its evil illusory, then my moral optimism is indeed open to condemnation. But suppose I resist the evil impulse, hate it, hold it down, overcome it, then, in this moment of hating and condemning it, I make it a part of my larger moral goodness. The justification of the existence of my evil impulse comes just at the instant when I hate and condemn it. Condemning and conquering the evil will makes it part of a good will. . . . There are elements in a good world which, individually regarded, ought not to be there, which are in themselves hateful, regrettable, the just object of wrath. Yet they become part of the world of the good will just in so far as they are in fact hated, condemned, subdued, overcome. The good world is not innocent. It does not ignore evil; it possesses and still conquers evil.³⁷

Yet such idealism is by no means so widely held as it was a generation ago. The men who first experienced the plunge into the chill Alien World have gone; their successors no longer feel that they have to justify a cherished faith against science. Not behind, but in this scientific world of naturalism, are to be found our present-day faiths. This generation has grown up in the world of evolution, and it feels at home there; it can carry on its enterprises without fleeing for refuge to another realm. Yet idealism emphasized things of great value; and its position, if honestly followed out without religious bias and in the scientific spirit, leads directly to a naturalistic metaphysics. It found the world intelligible once more, and possessed of a logical structure accessible to mind; from "objective idealism" to present-day logical and functional realisms was an easy step. And it maintained also the reality and objectivity of values; sensitivity to values was always idealism's strongest point. All these positions are basic in our enlarged naturalisms.

GLORIFICATION OF THE GROWING WORLD

In these various ways men sought to adjust themselves to the vision of the Alien World. But not to all men did it come as a nightmare: to many it seemed a veritable creed of hope and promise. The disillusioned were disheartened because nature no longer offered them what they demanded; the stronger souls were willing to take what it did offer and make it their own. If the forces of nature are otherwise than has been thought, if the cosmic processes are working for other than traditional ends, then we must revise our ideals and bring them into harmony with the forces and possibilities of nature. Men in the past have worshiped the Creator and Sustainer of the Universe in ignorance of his true ends; these have at last been discovered, and man can take his proper place in the van of evolution, rather than continue to oppose his petty ideas to the cosmic sweep of things.

FAITH IN THE INEVITABILITY OF PROGRESS

Those liberals whose faith in Progress was unlimited naturally saw in Evolution a cosmic guarantee of human perfectibility. A few, like Gladstone, remained blind; others, like Tennyson, after many a struggle accepted it, and sang:

One God, one law, one element,
 And one far-off divine event,
 To which the whole creation moves.³⁸

Still others, like Spencer, found their earlier faith in progress but confirmed and strengthened by Darwin's discoveries. Spencer believed that human pleasure is the ultimately worth while thing in life, and that a society representing a maximum of life and development for each one of its members will contain the greatest amount of pleasure — that is, a society organized upon free competition and *laissez-faire* and individual initiative. To him, evolution meant that the whole process of the universe is working to achieve just such a society. The future evolution of society, in accordance with the great cosmic law of evolution, will be toward a more and more complete adaptation of human institutions to the natural and biological environment of man; and of every man's pleasure to every other's.

From the laws of life it must be concluded that unceasing social discipline will so mould human nature, that eventually sympathetic pleasures will be spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and all. The scope for altruistic activities will not exceed the desire for altruistic satisfactions. . . . An ideal social being may be conceived as so constituted that his spontaneous activities are congruous with the conditions imposed by the social environment formed by other such beings.³⁹

Such a society will be completely evolved, and, *ipso facto*, perfect.

Spencer welcomed the cosmic process because he read it as bringing about the individualistic society he wanted; Karl Marx approved of it for a similar reason. But Marx read the cosmic law somewhat differently from Spencer: for him society was evolving, not toward individualism, but toward collectivism and socialism. Orthodox or "scientific" socialism, springing from Marx, has glorified the mechanistic universe and evolution because it believed that it was bringing about inevitably the day of revolution, when the workers should capture the instruments of production and administer them for their own interests. Marx, whose conception of evolution was materialistic and Hegelian, rather than biological, saw the process as the successive struggle of classes for dominance and control, and closed his outline of past social development with the dogmatic hope:

The development of modern industry cuts from under its feet the

very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.⁴⁰

The significance of the fact that both the individualist Spencer and the collectivist Marx read the evolutionary process as favoring their respective ideals, is the light it sheds on the way in which men could convince themselves that the growing world of mechanism was not bad but good, and that belief in it led not to despair but rather to infinite hope.

CONFIDENCE IN CREATIVE EVOLUTION

After a generation, however, men came to see that acceptance of the world of science and approbation of its ends involved, not identifying those ends with preconceived notions of their own, but seeking new aims and goals by a further analysis of the process itself. Various thinkers have come to the conclusion that the only end actually revealed in the course of nature is change and growth itself, and they have therefore made of growth their own ideal. The world is a process of development, a continual growth towards diversification and variety; hence richness of life, multiplication of its forms and possibilities, is both the law of nature and the goal of man. Life is its own excuse for being, and a world that produces the rich pageantry we see about us and promises an even more variegated future to human society, must be inherently good. Nature is ever producing novelty and variety; evolution, in a word, is creative, and man, standing at the summit, possesses in his intelligence the most creative factor in the world. Let him then live, act, produce, create; in devoting himself to action for action's sake and growth that there may be more growth, he will be at once most natural, most human, and most divine.

Such a philosophy well accords with the restless and unceasing activity of modern industrial society; it idealizes just that aspect of the present Western world that sets it off most from the Middle Ages and from the ancient civilizations of the East. In countless forms men seek productivity, energy, expansion, growth; the very word "business" which best characterizes our social ideal reveals what it at bottom is. We desire above all to be busy, and for the most part we rarely question the ends of our

activity; one form of business will lead to another, and so on into the glorious future. In a sense all the great spiritual movements in Western history, like the Renaissance and Romanticism, have embodied some form of this restless ever-striving Faust-spirit, so different from the finitude of Greece and the very definite aspirations of the Middle Ages. Modern literature is full of this note. Freedom, the joy of life, self-expression and self-development, fullness of life, progress — these are the dominant notes of our age. And the idea of evolution has powerfully reinforced this our native bent. Peer Gynt in his exuberance cries:

This is life! Every limb grows as strong as a bear's.
(Strikes out with his arms and leaps in the air.)
To crush, overturn, stem the rush of the foss!
To strike! Wrench the fir-tree right up by the root!
This is life! This both hardens and lifts one high!⁴¹

The superabundance and fecundity of life, as an adequate ideal in itself, has been well stated by the poet of evolution, Guyau:

Life has two faces: by the one it is nutrition and assimilation, by the other production and fecundity. The more it acquires, the more it must give: this is its law. . . . Life, like the flame, is preserved only by giving of its substance. And this is true of the intelligence no less than of the body; it is as impossible to restrict the intelligence to itself as the flame: it is made to give light. The same force of expansion is in our emotions: we must share our joy, we must share our sorrow. . . . It is our nature to be social; we are not sufficient for ourselves, we have more tears than we need for our own sorrows, more joy in reserve than our own happiness justifies. We must go out to others, multiply ourselves by the communion of thought and feeling. . . . Life is fecundity, and reciprocally fecundity is life at its fullest, it is true existence. There is a certain generosity inseparable from existence, without which we die, we dry up inside. We must flower; morality, disinterestedness, is the flower of human life. . . . The ideal does not indeed oppose the world, but simply surpasses it: it is at bottom identical with our thought itself which, while springing out of nature, goes before it, foreseeing and preparing perpetual progress. The real and ideal are reconciled in *life*; for life, as a whole, both is and becomes. Whoever says life, says *evolution*.⁴²

In another form this ideal of growth has been adopted by John Dewey and the instrumentalists.

Growth is regarded as *having* an end, instead of *being* an end. . . . In reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth. . . . In any social group whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find some

interest held in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and coöperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association? . . . The second means not only freer interaction between social groups but change in social habit — its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. . . . These more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial.⁴³

In the words of J. H. Tufts,

Moral progress involves both the formation of better ideals and the adoption of such ideals as actual standards and guides of life. If our view is correct we can construct better ideals neither by logical deduction nor solely by insight into the nature of things — if by this we mean things as they are. We must rather take as our starting-point the conviction that the moral life is a process involving physical life, social intercourse, measuring and constructive intelligence. We shall endeavor to further each of these factors with the conviction that thus we are most likely to reconstruct our standards and find a fuller good.⁴⁴

But the most complete expression of this ideal of growth for growth's sake is the philosophy of Creative Evolution, in which Bergson has taken the basic idea of modern science and from it created a new romanticism. The world itself is a process of infinite growth in time; evolution is not a mere mechanical process, but life itself, a cosmic life that embraces all. It is forever giving rise to that which is supremely good, because supremely spontaneous, supremely alive and growing.

Let us imagine a vessel full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in its sides a crack through which the steam is escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air is nearly all condensed into little drops which fall back, and this condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something, an interruption, a deficit. But a small part of the jet of steam subsists, uncondensed, for some seconds; it is making an effort to raise the drops which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding their fall. So, from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasingly, of which each, falling back, is a world. The evolution of living species within this world represents what subsists of the primitive direction of the original jet, and of an impulsion which

⁴³ From *Democracy and Education*, by John Dewey. Copyright, 1916, by The Macmillan Co. Reprinted by permission.

continues itself in a direction the inverse of materiality. . . . There is a center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display — provided, however, that I do not present this center as a *thing*, but as a continuity of shooting-out. God thus defined, has nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely. . . . From our point of view, life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which, starting from a center, spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation: at one single point the obstacle has been forced, the impulsion has passed freely. It is this freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself. . . .

On flows the current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into individuals. This subdivision was vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created, which, nevertheless, in a certain sense pre-existed. They are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity. Such a doctrine gives us more power to act and to live. For, with it, we feel ourselves no longer isolated in humanity, humanity no longer seems isolated in the nature that it dominates. As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organisms, from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance, and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.⁴⁵

A NEW EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS — WORSHIP OF THE FUTURE

One great thinker of the last generation, really assimilating the new conception of evolution, and not content with reading into its goal the traditional ideals of the past, or of taking from it merely the vague and formless aim of growth and development, that so easily lends itself to a myriad of interpretations as the habit-ridden mind sees growth as growth towards what it instinctively feels to be good, Friedrich Nietzsche, realized that

⁴⁵ From *Creative Evolution* by Henri Bergson. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Henry Holt & Co.

if we take evolution seriously as furnishing a moral standard for life, we must develop a whole new set of specific ideals and values. The traditional aims inherited from Christendom cannot endure unchanged in the growing world of to-day. We must advance beyond our past standards of good and evil, and set about a complete revaluation of all values. What was good in the world in which Providence ruled for the salvation of every human soul, can, to the emancipated mind that sees the bitter travail of evolution, the fierce struggle to bring about higher types of life, no longer appeal as good at all. Our ideals must be adjusted to the newly revealed conditions of their fulfillment; and if we are to bring about upon this earth a nobler race of men and a society more able to cope with the forces of nature and bring a worth-while life to pass, we must abandon the meek and docile codes of the past, with their glorification of submission and weakness. We must labor and fight for the future, we must be strong, and, if need be, ruthless, lest the other forces in the cosmic combat gain the day. We cannot rest in the idle dream that mere change, mere novelty, mere submission to the play of instinct, will of itself automatically produce a noble humanity. That task involves iron discipline and stern self-direction, else will man never rise to be a God, but instead will sink back to the dull monotonous level of the ant and the bee; we must adapt ourselves, not, like those blind insects, to our present environment, but to the conditions of further success and power over nature.

Almost alone in his age, Nietzsche abandoned, with the Christian scheme of the universe, the Christian scheme of human life as well. Such a morality is well enough for slaves, content to live for the present alone; but for the free man who has resolved that the future shall surpass the present, only the utmost of assertion against the weak, only the strong self-reliant will to power, will avail to lift man to new heights of nobility. Hence Nietzsche sought to pit himself against the whole moral tradition of the Western world, and to become, in the truest sense, the Anti-Christ. Naturally he was misunderstood; naturally his fiery idealism and devotion to the future seemed to his contemporaries a mere justification of brutality, rather than the prerequisite of future divinity. Yet his ideals are sufficiently in accord with the underlying spirit of the modern age, however

it may conceal itself under lip-service to the Christian virtues and their modern democratic embodiment, to be fraught with great significance.

Nietzsche started with the philosophy of Schopenhauer, nor was he ever able to emancipate himself from that thinker's gloomy picture of nature and life. To the end, the world for him was a scene of unceasing struggle, of the never-ending assertion of the will to live. His originality lay in his refusal to flee in disgust from that struggle, in his brave conviction that in the struggle itself must be found the enduring values for the present and the hope of loftier things to come. "I preach the Superman," he proclaimed; and the Superman will come, not through any craven renunciation of the fight, but through throwing oneself with zest into the struggle itself. The army of humanity must steel itself, grasp sword and buckler, and disregarding the wails of the wounded and the cries of the disheartened, march onward into the glorious future. Its virtues must be those of the fighter, the hero; tender compassion and humility and love will never win the promised land. Not to the past, not to the present, but to the future we must give whole-souled devotion, be the sacrifice what it will. Life for the pessimist is meaningless, the sooner over the better; for the optimist, whose ideal is guaranteed, it is also without essential significance. For Nietzsche, it is hard, it is cruel, it is tragic; but in its very tragedy he found supreme joy. To fight, to lose, perhaps, against great odds, to win for our children; that is the lesson of Nature and Nature's processes.

One who like me [he writes] has long busied himself with curious interest in thinking out pessimism to its bitter end, has probably in this very pursuit — without precisely having willed it — turned his eyes toward the opposite ideal: toward the ideal of the most domineering, the most living, the most aggressive of men, toward him who has not merely reconciled and adjusted himself to things as they are and have been; but who wants more of them, just as they are and have been — more in all eternity, crying insatiably *da capo* not to his own life only, but to the whole scene and all the play.⁴⁶

If life is tragic, it at least has a human goal.

I bring you a goal [cries his mouthpiece Zarathustra]. I preach to you the Superman. Man is something to be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All things before you have produced some-

thing beyond themselves, and would you be the ebb of this great flood? Would you rather go back to the animal than transcend man? What is the ape to man? A jest or a bitter shame. And just that shall man be to the Superman, a jest or a bitter shame. You have traveled the way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. . . . Lo, I preach to you the Superman. The Superman is the meaning of the earth.⁴⁷

If we set out seriously to realize the Superman, that loftier race, we must abandon all pity and all compassion, and find joy in the struggle and the heroic virtues. "I sit," says Zarathustra, "with old shattered tables of the law around me — and with new tables, too, half made out."⁴⁸ Christian love is a slave-morality, a code of submission and weakness and disease. The modern world has imposed it even upon its strong men, and with it stifled their strength and all further strength to come. If life is a fight for the future race, the meaning of good and bad must change.

What is good? All that heightens in man the feeling of power, the desire for power, power itself. What is bad? All that comes from weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that our strength grows, that an obstacle is overcome. Not contentment, but more power; not universal peace, but war; not virtue, but forcefulness. The weak and ineffective must go under; first principle of *our* love of humanity. And one should even lend one's hand to this end. What is more harmful than any vice? Pity for the condition of the ineffectives and weak — Christianity.⁴⁹

Many misunderstood Nietzsche; they thought he was deifying the commercial greed, the warring nationalism and patriotisms, the strife of combat between country and country. Nothing was further from his thought. Above all he despised the captain of industry, the statesman and the clanking general. Patriotism and national commercial expansion he thought the worst of evils; not through them will the future be made more bright. With the Supermen of the future, our children who, thanks to our struggles, have far surpassed us, the free souls who know and create and live — there lies our true Fatherland. Let the strong men of to-day abandon their internecine struggles, and work together for the true aristocracy of the future, which shall be world-wide, the very flower of humanity. "Let us fearlessly style ourselves good Europeans, and labor actively for the amalgamation of nations."⁵⁰ Only thus shall the world know in the ages to come a select band of heroes who by their excel-

lence can justify humanity's never-ending struggle, a veritable society of gods like Nietzsche's great passions, the Siegfried of Wagner, the Brand of Ibsen, and, highest of all, the great cosmopolitan and aristocratic intellect of Goethe.

If life offers this promise to the strong man, it is worth all its cost. Forward, into the battle! "Tied to the wheel of things," said India and Schopenhauer and all the disillusioned, "therefore, let us give up." "Tied to the wheel of things," bravely cries Nietzsche, "therefore, let us keep on."⁵¹ "Courage is the best of them that kill. Courage kills even pity. Now, pity is the deep abyss: deep as one sees into life, just so deep does one see into pain. But courage is the best of them that kill; courage that lays hold on things; courage puts even Death to death, for it says to life: 'Was that Life? Forward, then! Once more!'"⁵²

THE NEW NATURALISM

With Nietzsche, the acceptance of life and evolution means turning their opportunities to use in a great romantic struggle for the better days to come, and in that struggle itself finding the very zest of living. Less impassioned and more reflective, present-day thinkers have come to feel that in the world as science now displays it man can yet achieve through intelligence a worthy individual and collective life. The world of science is not to be wept over, nor rejected, nor blindly glorified. It is to be accepted, with all its compulsions and all its promise, soberly, but with ever-renewed hope, as the natural setting within which human life must be lived if it be lived at all, and as the material out of which man can with sweat and tears construct a human habitation. If man be a very part of nature and the product of its activity, then his life is a natural life, in fruitful as in bitter interaction with nature's sustaining and imperative forces. His vital interests and ideals are as much the natural flowering of the nature that gave them birth as are his criminal follies and his ruthless passions; and he can hope to turn those forces to his own advantage through his nature-sent gift of intelligence. It is equal folly to think man the darling of the gods, and to think him a homeless outcast wandering on the face of an earth that provides nothing to sustain his cherished enterprises. A sound naturalism eliminates the need of such a choice. Nature does permit us to work and struggle; it is not irrelevant to our ideals

and values. They are not idle dreams, but are rooted in the very conditions that nature — and human nature — imposes. This is an alternative alike to the complacent confidence of the supernaturalist, with his egoistic assertion of human power, doomed to early disillusionment and defeat; and to the paralysing despair of the “moral atheist,” who sees no possible perfectings of things as they are, no values implicit in nature and human nature that human striving can hope to realize.

What are the problems for philosophies which in some sense accept this naturalistic attitude? There is first the development of an adequate philosophy of nature and of natural science, drawing on all we have learned about both in our generation. A nature of which life and human experience are integral parts is far different from the mechanical “alien world” of the nineteenth century: it is a nature which a chastened and revolutionized physics no longer forbids us. That alien world has gone, and the naturalistic philosophies of to-day bear little resemblance to those travesties, founded on a reductive analysis and the mechanical dogmas of an earlier physics, which went by the name a generation ago. And a science which is essentially a human method of inquiry, an institutionalized technique by which a society deals with its problems, is vastly unlike the simple discovery of the laws governing nature — the terms in which men read the scientific enterprise before their new sophistication.

Secondly, there is the problem of developing an adequate philosophy for industrial society; and this means a philosophy of cultural change. For in industrial society, cultural change is the ultimate challenge to philosophic thought, the ultimate context and subject-matter of all our thinking. We sorely need an understanding, an intellectual attitude and technique, to replace the emotional reactions which now prevail. This involves an exploration of the possibilities of industrial civilization — a clarification of the content of the good life in a technological age — and a formulation and criticism of the techniques of social control. Our greatest intellectual need to-day is for a genuinely experimental philosophy as the background and drive, a philosophy that will emphasize investigation and inquiry into the actual materials of our society, both technological and human. What can be done, and by what means? What are the obstacles?

Which are too hard to remove, and must be accepted? which are most easily controlled? In particular, such a philosophy would foster an experimental attitude toward the problem of enlisting the coöperative support of men in doing what has to be done; of determining what can be accomplished with men, and how to get them to accomplish it. It would regard this all-important political problem as itself a matter for scientific inquiry and technological invention. It is childish to convert what is an intellectual problem into a mere fight, especially in America, where the very lag behind Europe, as well as the freedom from intolerable pressure, gives an opportunity to learn the bitter lessons of European experience. Such a philosophy would teach the patience of the experimenter, willing to try and try again, not cast down by a few failures, not demanding that every problem be solved overnight. And like all genuine experimentation, such a philosophy would have the courage to act, would have a faith in intelligence, and a willingness to fight, intelligently, if need be, to enable it to function.

The religious problem is still present, but in the changed form of the adjustment of the values of the philosophies of human experience, of the great cultural traditions and the religions that clarified and expressed them, to the critical knowledge of our scientific naturalisms. Romanticism has persisted, even among physicists, because so far those naturalisms have been so meager and bare, have failed to include important elements in experience. Till we have a naturalism as rich as the idealistic philosophies, because it provides a place for their visions, romanticism in some form will keep alive its eternal call back to the wealth and variety of imaginative experience. As a part of this adjustment, we can perhaps look forward to a further *rapprochement* between Western and Oriental thought.

NEW PHILOSOPHIES OF NATURE AND OF SCIENCE

The development of an adequate philosophy of nature and of science is to-day of central concern, for we are in the midst of the most fundamental scientific revolution since the seventeenth century. The concepts and methods involved in the actual procedures of the sciences have been so basically altered, and our psychological and sociological knowledge of the processes and function of science is so extensive, that the very notions of

reason and of experience, and of their relations, on which all modern philosophy has been based, are no longer tenable. Present-day naturalistic philosophies seem split on technical questions, ultimately, on which of the sciences are to furnish the basic categories and methods. Those that start from physics and mathematics make the logical structure of scientific knowledge fundamental; those that start from biology, psychology, and the social sciences emphasize the further context of the process of inquiry within which that structure is discriminated.

Yet both sides seem to be drawing closer together: the concepts developed by the philosophers of mathematical physics, like Whitehead, are approaching those of biology and the sciences of man. Face to face with its world of radiant energy, it is physics to-day that is suggesting the novel ideas; but they in turn are finding application to the sciences of life. There is, first, the common adoption of time as a basic category; both are now taking time and temporal process seriously. The biological and social philosophies have worked out temporal concepts which physics is now deriving from its own subject-matter. The older emphases in physics on structure and in biology on activity and process are being merged in a new synthesis of both. There is a tendency to employ a new language — many call it a new logic — the space-time continuum, events, processes, and activities, rather than things or substances; the subject-attribute relation has given place to functional series and correlations.

Secondly, there is a common emphasis on systematic structure, on the organic wholes and patterns within which simpler processes are discriminated. Those elements have been found by analysis, and when found are discovered operating from the start in an interrelated system. This change we have traced in physics, in biology, and in psychology; in each case the concept of a field, organism, or situation has assumed basic importance.

Thirdly, there is an emphasis on knowing and science as itself an activity, a process — ultimately, an institutionalized way of acting. The data of science are no longer passive sensations, but measurements, activities performed, depending on complicated space-time systems of coördinates and schemes of measurement. Science involves creation, the invention and employment of elaborate theoretical constructions. Knowing is no longer

taken as an immediate seeing, either intellectual or sensible; it is mediate and instrumental, not inherently, in its values — men still find it good to know — but in its nature and character. This functional conception is supported by psychology, by the history of science, and by all analyses of the techniques of scientific procedure and of the actual formation of scientific hypothesis and theory. From the side of the process or functional philosophies, Dewey has elaborated this most clearly; from the structural side the logical positivists, working with the mathematical formulations and procedures of physics, have reached the same conclusion.

The major practical issue still left between the two types of naturalism concerns the treatment of values. The philosophies starting from physics tend to exclude all questions of value from the field of science and the scope of scientific method. They either leave them to traditional non-scientific treatment, handing them over, with Russell, to the poet and mystic; or else with the logical positivists they dismiss the whole matter as "meaningless," maintaining, with Ayer, that any judgment of value is an expression of mere personal feeling. The philosophies of human experience — all the heirs of Hegel, from dialectical materialism to Dewey — subject them to the same scientific methods of criticism and testing as other beliefs; and thus offer the hope of using all we have learned of scientific procedure to erect at last a science of values comparable to the science that was the glory of Greek thought.

NATURALISM — GREEK AND BACONIAN

Two ages in the past have in their leaders stood for the frank and honest acceptance of man's natural environment as furnishing the materials for a good life. In classic Greece, men spoke who believed that the world was primarily a thing to be enjoyed; and that this enjoyment was to be ordered and harmonized and enlarged through the intelligent direction and control of the natural tendencies and feelings of man. In the dawn of modern science, Bacon preached a gospel not of enjoyment, but of achievement; of bending the forces of nature to the service of human desires, and creating an environment in which man could build through science an empire of power over nature. This Greek and this Baconian naturalism have been revived and

blended in the present day; and in spite of the incurable romanticism of the Western peoples, it seems not unlikely that with this faith lies the future. The modern world takes what nature offers it, and builds a structure in which it may hope to find enjoyment and power. A frank acceptance of the goods of life, and an intensification and multiplication of them through scientific knowledge — this is, perhaps, what is already emerging from the welter of conflicting faiths and pathways of salvation incidental to so profound an intellectual readjustment as the West has been making, since the Renaissance, to science and to industry. What enjoyments are most enduring, and what power will most truly attain them, is a problem to be worked out still; but in countless ways, however reluctantly, men seem to have set about the task. They are blundering, and long will blunder; but they are gradually realizing the conditions of their achievement, and the instruments of its furthering. For the critic, the connoisseur, the scholar, the Greek aim of enjoyment, as illustrated in a Renan or a Santayana, will still be the part of wisdom; for others is the dust and grime of toil and labor. But for those who cannot rest content with past achievements, nor with the exclusion of the mass of mankind from the satisfactions that they crave, the task and the joy of humanity must lie in the working for the further empire of man over nature and over his own passions and lusts. The modern expression of this widespread ideal of power through science, and the good life for all through the intelligent exercise of power, is the philosophy of pragmatism or instrumentalism — intelligence is the instrument of social well-being and advancement. For the gifted individual, perhaps, such a philosophy offers no such heights of ecstasy and self-abandonment as the ways of deliverance that have flourished in the past; but for humanity in its painful toil and struggle, it may well offer the sanest and surest road to greater satisfactions. And in the labor of bringing it to pass there is surely enough scope for whatever of sacrifice and fervor men may demand.

This change of human disposition [writes John Dewey] toward the world does not mean that man ceases to have ideals, or ceases to be primarily a creature of the imagination. But it does signify a radical change in the character and function of the ideal realm which man shapes for himself. In the classic philosophy, the ideal world is ce-

entially a haven in which man finds rest from the storms of life; it is an asylum in which he takes refuge from the troubles of existence with the calm assurance that it alone is supremely real. When the belief that knowledge is active and operative takes hold of men, the ideal realm is no longer something aloof and separate; it is rather that collection of imagined possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts and realizations. It still remains true that the troubles which men undergo are the forces that lead them to project pictures of a better state of things. But the picture of the better is shaped so that it may become an instrumentality of action, while in the classic view the Idea belongs ready-made in a noumenal world. . . .

When the identity of the moral process with the processes of specific growth is realized, the more conscious and formal education of childhood will be seen to be the most economical and efficient means of social advance and reorganization, and it will also be evident that the test of all institutions of adult life is their effect in furthering continued education. Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his possibility. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society.⁶³

Santayana thus sums up the intellectual temper of the age.

The present age is a critical one, and interesting to live in. The civilization characteristic of Christendom has not disappeared, yet another civilization has begun to take its place. We still understand the value of religious faith; we still appreciate the pompous arts of our forefathers; we are brought up on academic architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music. We still love monarchy and aristocracy, together with that picturesque and dutiful order which rested on local institutions, class privileges, and the authority of the family. We may even feel an organic need for all these things, cling to them tenaciously, and dream of rejuvenating them. On the other hand the shell of Christendom is broken. The unconquerable mind of the East, the pagan past, the industrial socialistic future confront it with their equal authority. Our whole life and mind is saturated with the slow upward filtration of a new spirit — that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy.

These epithets may make us shudder; but what they describe is something positive and self-justified, something deeply rooted in our animal

⁶³ From *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, by John Dewey. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Henry Holt & Co.

nature and inspiring to our hearts, something which, like every vital impulse, is pregnant with a morality of its own. In vain do we deprecate it; it has possession of us already through our propensities, fashions, and language. Our very plutocrats and monarchs are at ease only when they are vulgar. Even prelates and missionaries are hardly sincere or conscious of an honest function, save as they devote themselves to social work; for willy-nilly the new spirit has hold of our consciences as well. This spirit is amiable as well as disquieting; liberating as well as barbaric; and a philosopher in our day, conscious both of the old life and of the new, might repeat what Goethe said of his successive love affairs — that it is sweet to see the moon rise while the sun is still mildly shining.⁶⁴

Continuing with Dewey,

As the new ideas find adequate expression in social life, they will be absorbed into a moral background, and will the ideas and beliefs themselves be deepened and be unconsciously transmitted and sustained. They will color the imagination and temper the desires and affections. They will not form a set of ideas to be expounded, reasoned out and argumentatively supported, but will be a spontaneous way of envisaging life. Then they will take on religious value. The religious spirit will be revived because it will be in harmony with men's unquestioned scientific beliefs, and their ordinary day-by-day social activities. It will not be obliged to lead a timid, half-concealed and half-apologetic life because tied to scientific ideas and social creeds that are continuously eaten into and broken down. But especially will the ideas and beliefs themselves be deepened and intensified because spontaneously fed by emotion and translated into imaginative vision and fine art, while they are now maintained by more or less conscious effort, by deliberate reflection, by taking thought. They are technical and abstract just because they are not as yet carried as a matter of course by imagination and feelings.

While it is impossible to retain and recover by deliberate volition old sources of religion and art that have been discredited, it is possible to expedite the development of the vital sources of a religion and an art that are yet to be. Not indeed by action directly aimed at their production, but by substituting faith in the active tendencies of the day for dread and dislike of them, and by the courage of intelligence to follow whither social and scientific changes direct us. We are weak to-day in ideal matters, because intelligence is divorced from aspiration. The bare force of circumstance compels us onwards in the daily detail of our beliefs and our acts, but our deeper thoughts and desires turn backwards. When philosophy shall have coöperated with the course of events and made clear and coherent the meaning of the daily detail, science and emotion will interpenetrate, practice and imagination will embrace.

⁶⁴ From *Winds of Doctrine*, by George Santayana. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.

Poetry and religious feeling will be the unforced flowers of life. To further this articulation and revelation of the meanings of the current course of events is the task and problem of philosophy in days of transition.⁵⁵

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CHAPTER XXII

SOCIAL IDEALS IN THE GROWING WORLD

How are we going to bring a workable organization into our economic life? And how are we to adapt our whole liberal, humanistic, democratic heritage of Western culture to the harsh demands and the eventual promise of industrialism? In the nineteenth century men feared that science would undermine the church. To-day we tremble lest the measures we must take to meet the insistent call of our industrial machine for a more efficient integration destroy our whole legacy of painfully acquired intellectual and moral values, as they seem to be doing in many lands to-day; to say nothing of forcing fundamental revolutions in our political and social structure if the possibilities of our technology are to be realized, if it is even to continue functioning, or indeed if it is to remain ours at all. So pressing is the need for economic reconstruction that we often forget we are really facing the problem of reconstructing our entire culture. But however important the former task may seem to-day, however basic the economic organization we work out in determining the limits and the conditions of the eventual rebuilding of our culture, the latter will prove far more important, difficult, and complex. Even in its own terms it is hard enough; it is made well-nigh insoluble if it be wholly subordinated to the problem of economic organization. The experience of Central Europe has made it clear that the method of getting men to agree to a necessary economic integration can easily effect a total cultural revolution. While there is still time for us to choose, we must be sure that the method by which we meet our economic problems will bring a cultural reconstruction we can live with.

After the depression of the thirties, and in the midst of the present struggle between two rival political methods, these facts should be clear to any reflective man. But for several generations it has been apparent that the industrial revolution of the last century has altered the complexion of human society far more radically than anything else since the beginning of recorded history. To find a comparable disruptive force, we must turn

back to the invention of fire in the dim ages when man was just becoming man, or to the change from a hunting and nomadic pastoral life to a settled existence founded on agriculture. More rapid social changes now take place in a single decade, or in a single year, than in whole centuries in the past; and this continual acceleration is swifter to-day than ever.

The effect upon man's mind and man's beliefs has naturally permeated every fiber of his intellectual being. Yet for all the rapid changes in his institutions, they have by no means kept pace with the growth of his industrial system. Never did the ideas and beliefs upon which men attempt to order their actions reveal so wide a discrepancy with the demands of their situation. In view of the appalling need to adjust their social structure to its technological basis, men have been driven to devote more and more of their intellectual energies to the problems of human and social relationships. Those who in another century would have taken their particular social order as a matter of course now bring all their problems to the focus of the maladjustments between group and group. We are still perplexed and confused when we find we can no longer order our political life through beliefs and institutions conceived in terms of the problems of the rural and frontier colonial civilization. Multitudes would still like to direct an economic society in which the giant corporation and centralized finance are the chief features, by ideas developed to meet the needs of eighteenth-century commercial and agricultural England and France. We still feel we ought somehow to adjust our conduct and our human relationships by an ethical code that originated in ancient Palestine over two thousand years ago. In our international relations we have fallen back on the naked power that four centuries ago won emancipation from another outgrown and constricting system, the universal dominion of the Church. Small wonder that these beliefs and institutions have proved inadequate, and have led to mutual confusion and destruction.

This, at bottom, is why religion and philosophy have to-day set themselves primarily a social task; this is why man's deepest reflection is concerned with social ideals and methods. Long before the present crisis became acute, the cardinal and characteristic expression of the mind of the present age had come to be its preoccupation with the ends of human activities and the

aims of human institutions. And for men to-day, social ideals are preëminently ideals of change, ideals in the light of which society is to be transformed. In the Middle Ages, in the great Oriental civilizations, such goals were primarily idealizations of the existing order, statements of the values to be obtained in it and served by it; even in classic Greece, where social change was likewise an inescapable fact, the ideals men set up were expressions of the best life that might be lived in the existent city state. To-day every statement of the good life for society involves reconstruction, reform, reorganization, perhaps revolution. Social ideals are either Utopian visions or programs of practical change. Of conservatism, as known in the past, there are now few advocates: no one is prepared to crystallize the recent present. There are reactionaries aplenty, who look longingly backward to the past. There are revolutionaries in great numbers, who wish to make all things new. But no one wants a return to yesterday's travail: the demand of our growing world for organization is too insistent.

And now comes the war, to destroy so many great hopes, and to make all the social programs men have so passionately advocated seem irrelevant and meaningless. In a world ruled by military power, what other social ideal can men set themselves but naked strength? Can we do more than prepare to defend so much as proves possible of our heritage of liberal and democratic ideals, of respect for the individuality and worth of men, in a world dominated by totalitarian methods and physical might?

Assuredly the war makes many hopes impossible, and many distasteful measures imperative. The changes it has already rendered certain will remain inescapable facts to reckon with. But it is scarcely the problem of economic reconstruction it has made irrelevant. If America is to defend its heritage, in the world our worst fears foresee, that problem must be dealt with much more seriously than we have so far dared think. The luxuries of inefficiency, waste, and failure to utilize our resources, human and technological, we can no longer afford. We cannot go on debating whether the social gains of a better organized economic system would be worth the incidental losses: that question has been decided for us. The war has immensely accelerated the long process of adapting our economic controls to the needs of technology, which the depression had already re-

vealed as so acute a problem. Whatever the outcome, the resulting economic organization of Europe will be quite unrecognizable; and the socialized control it will bring in America will make the New Deal look like a business-man's paradise.

In truth, it is not primarily the goal, an organized industrial machine, that is to-day at issue. That organization is being forced upon us whether we will or no. The expanding and aggressive powers have sacrificed more than a few short years ago we dreamed possible to build an efficient economy in support of military might. To meet the challenge, to live in the same world with them, other lands must achieve a like efficiency. The choices are rapidly narrowing as to the kind of "collectivism," of socialized control of industrial society, we must establish. The issue that still remains open, the great question at stake in the present conflict, concerns the method of its establishment. Can we make the most of the marvelous resources of technology with our present political methods? Can we adapt our social structure to the demands of the industrial machine without sacrificing completely the liberal and humane values of our long heritage? Is the democratic ideal compatible with efficient industrial organization?

Such questions cut far deeper than the mere struggle of rival national groups for power and domination — though whether even industrialism can long survive under a merely national organization, and which in the end will prove the tougher, are still doubtful issues. The future of democratic values rests upon whether democratic methods can prove as successful as their rivals in facing the inescapable task of economic integration. No mere defense of the past can prove more than a rear-guard action; only as democratic methods are strengthened and extended can they hope to survive. Hence far from being irrelevant in the present crisis, the social ideals and programs elaborated in the last few generations strike at the root of the problem. Unless we can accomplish the social reconstruction they have all aimed at, we may win the battles but we shall lose the war. We may succeed in meeting the challenge of this or that totalitarian state; but we must do it by performing better in our own way the essential economic task they have set themselves. If we fail, we shall in the end be forced to resort to totalitarianism ourselves.

CONTRASTING TYPES OF SOCIAL IDEAL

Of ideals of social change there are two major contrasting types. There are the absolutistic Utopias, the completely formulated pictures of the perfect society; for those who dwell longingly upon them, they become veritable heavens, capable of inspiring the soul and quickening the heart. They are fighting creeds, generated in the heat of battle or in the aftermath of defeat. But they have also all the defects to which such apocalyptic visions are subject: however inspiring and sustaining, they scarcely reveal how the millennium is to be brought about, and they may even steel the mind against measures of practical amelioration. A perfect illustration of such fervor is contained in the ideal of the I.W.W., as expressed in their preamble:

The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all the good things of life. Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system.¹

In sharp contrast to this type of social ideal, which makes a religion of social revolution and a completed millennium its heaven, is the ideal which, less ambitious but more practical, deals with specific problems in the light of general principles which are themselves constantly open to revision. It is relativistic rather than absolutistic, pragmatic rather than uncompromising, experimental rather than dogmatic. It involves not so much an ecstatic religious faith as a patient and careful scientific technique. It is thoroughly in harmony with that Baconian naturalism that is one of the fruits of the scientific discoveries of the last century. It investigates with an open mind, and carefully tests at every step; and when it advances, its faith is led by a firm knowledge of the complexity of social processes.

These two types of social ideal and social technique have always been in the world, and doubtless will always remain: each contributes much of value in the process of change, the one, the driving and sustaining power, the other, the intelligence and the point of attack. In the eighteenth century, the one was represented by Rousseau, the other by Bentham; both aimed ultimately at the same goal — though characteristically neither

would have admitted it. In our own day the absolutistic attitude has enjoyed great vogue among the more radical critics of the obvious inadequacy, confusion, and contradictory character of the specific measures introduced by democratic governments — like the Hoover régime and the New Deal — to extend the sphere of social control. Its strongest argument has been the conviction, generated by the tenacity with which privileged groups have resisted even such half-way measures, and in the midst of such crises as the depression, that a genuine revolution in economic power is necessary before the drastic changes now demanded can be put through. To succeed against entrenched opposition, it has been held, the strongest kind of fighting psychology is needed in the attackers.

But what industry demands in general is now so clear, and the details, whoever be responsible, are so much a matter of inquiry, investigation, and experimental working out, that the rigidity and fixity, the dogmatism of the absolutist seem less called for than the flexibility and the adaptability of the experimentalist. And after all even revolutions are not caused by revolutionists, as they sometimes hopefully think; they are caused by circumstance, and the revolutionists, if they are lucky enough to survive responsibility, speedily learn to act like practical statesmen. Whatever the faults of Russian communism, undue rigidity of program has not been its major failing. And now the war with its drive for national defense has brought a powerful new motive to the most recalcitrant to accept drastic social change. It is likely that even congenital absolutists will forget their abstract formulas in the more pressing task of trying to push the changes that will come a little more in the direction they favor.

It is not part of our purpose here to describe the rise and development of the manifold social philosophies of the industrial age; above all, we do not intend to sketch the organized movements in which they have been embodied. We shall rather conclude our story of the formation of the mind of the Western world with a picture of some of the most important of these conflicting ideals, in the same spirit and on the same scale employed for the social ideals of the Middle Ages or the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. The student of political and economic movements must look elsewhere for the record of events; here we shall attempt rather to display the leading ideas back of those move-

ments. What were the major beliefs and desires and ideals that have actuated men since 1848? What has been in their minds that found expression in or reflected the practical exertions to which they bent their energies? We shall deal with the major social ideals of the world of expanding technology in search of organization. We shall look first at those ideals to which an individualistic industrialism has consecrated its actual efforts. We shall then examine, in both their middle-class and working-class versions, those in which men have proposed to employ and extend the liberal and democratic methods to reform and reconstruct their society. We shall consider the authoritarian and totalitarian ideals which have impatiently rejected those methods in seeking the same economic end. And finally, we shall touch on the ideals of international relations, in which men have hoped to extend organization beyond the limits of the national state.

MIDDLE-CLASS IDEALS

After 1848 the world belonged to the middle class — the business men and manufacturers with their attendant servants and ministers, the professions. The older upper classes, clergy and landed nobility, who had retained their supremacy, though in places hard pressed, until the French Revolution, and who fought the losing fight from 1815 to 1848, with the spread of the industrial revolution were overshadowed by and absorbed into the commercial and industrial groups. Despite occasional efforts of the landed gentry, the Prussian Junkers or the English landlords, to assert themselves, the history of the Western world has since then been largely the story of the remarkable economic expansion of the middle class and its efforts to protect its position against the rising tide of factory workers. With the establishment of a fair measure of political democracy, and the consolidation of the large national states, consummated in the five years from 1865 to 1870, European civilization entered upon a phase in which business and industry played the dominating rôle. It was the golden age of liberal capitalism, of expanding economies whose national rivalries had not yet broken out into imperialistic war, and whose control was not yet seriously challenged by working-class revolt.

In most lands, to be sure, the farmer has remained numerically

the largest class. But on the whole he has followed the ideals of the business man, and lent a passive support to whatever enterprises the middle class saw fit to undertake. There have been sporadic agrarian movements, in Europe and America; but they have hardly aimed at more than an immediate alleviation of the economic discrimination to which the farmer has been increasingly subjected. The farmer has so far remained too unorganized, perhaps too inexperienced in industrialism, to formulate a social ideal of his own; and middle-class intellectuals have sadly neglected him. In America the party system has often in times of depression linked him in uneasy alliance with the industrial workers. But his pioneer traditions have made him deeply suspicious of the methods of organized labor; he thinks of himself as an independent business man, and his way of life has always allied him with the supporters of middle-class ideals. Proud of his great political power, he has normally allowed it to be manipulated in support of business interests, convinced that commercial prosperity promised him most. In the future the tale may well be different; in the past the farmer has hardly counted intellectually, and has more or less patiently borne the brunt of the struggle between the middle and the working classes.

The middle class came into the ascendancy in England in the eighteenth century. Its philosophy and ideals were formulated by the classic economists and the liberal advocates of individual rights, individual initiative and enterprise, free competition and *laissez-faire*. In this country similar individualistic and libertarian views were first developed not by business men and mill-owners, but by agrarians like Jefferson. The absence of feudalism or any genuine upper class kept them from being identified with a "middle" class, and made them broadly "American." But they proved admirably suited to the temper of the expanding industry of the post-Civil War era; and to this day the business man, the manufacturer, the professional man, the hosts of Suburbia, as well as the mass of the farmers, believe in their hearts in that early nineteenth-century philosophy. To them it still seems the only "American" ideal; they regard it as written forever into the Constitution, as something to be returned to after forced departures and temporary wanderings in heresy like the New Deal. In the face of grave industrial problems, and in response to the constant pressure of the working class, they have

of course reluctantly consented to all manner of modifications in practice; for there are other American traditions as well, above all the strong atmosphere of adaptability and willingness to experiment. But none of these specific measures has altered significantly the underlying ideals of the middle class. It continues to look back nostalgically to the days of normalcy when the "American way" was still possible. It still regards itself as the salt of the earth and the chosen of the Lord, and sees in its own material prosperity the source of good for the whole of society. The claims of James Mill a century ago it would enthusiastically echo to-day — though in America it would speak not of "the middle rank" but of "the business man":

It is altogether futile with regard to the foundation of good government to say that this or the other portion of the people may at this or the other time, depart from the wisdom of the *middle rank*. It is enough that the great majority of the people never cease to be guided by that rank — and we may with some confidence challenge the adversaries of the people to produce a single instance to the contrary in the history of the world.²

SOCIAL IDEALS OF AN INDIVIDUALISTIC INDUSTRIALISM

For several generations, without much serious questioning until the last decade, the social ideals of industrial civilization have been overwhelmingly directed toward business success. Those ideals have been well summed up as three in number: the Country House, Coketown, and Megalopolis. The Country House is the goal of every good business man's aspiration; it is the abode and the life which he desires for himself and his family and his friends. It is the ideal of the gentleman, coming down without much change from the Renaissance; an early picture has already been given in Rabelais' Abbey of Theleme.

We see pretty much the same outlines in the introduction to Boccaccio's *Decameron*; it is elaborately described in terms of that most complete of Country Houses, Hampton Court, in Pope's *Rape of the Lock*; it is vividly pictured by Meredith in his portrait of the *Egoist*. And it is analyzed in Mr. H. G. Wells's cruel description of Bladesover in *Tono-Bungay*, as well as by Mr. Bernard Shaw in *Heartbreak House*. Whether Mr. W. H. Mallock holds the pattern of Country House culture up to us in *The New Republic* or Anton Chekhov penetrates its aimlessness and futility in *The Cherry Orchard*, the Country House is

one of the recurrent themes of literature. . . . Its standards of consumption are responsible for our Acquisitive Society.³

The Country House is concerned not with the happiness of the whole community but with the felicity of the governors. The conditions which underlie this limited and partial good life are political power and economic wealth; and in order for the life to flourish, both of these must be obtained in almost limitless quantities. The chief principles that characterize this society are possession and passive enjoyment. . . . In the Country House possession is based upon privilege and not upon work. . . . Such activities as remain in the Country House — the pursuit of game, for instance, — rest upon imitating in play activities which once had a vital use or prepared for some vital function, as a child's playing with a doll is a preparation for motherhood. The Country House ideal is that of a completely functionless existence. . . . In the Country House literature and the fine arts undoubtedly flourish: but they flourish as the objects of appreciation rather than as the active, creative elements in the community's life. . . . It does not matter very much whether the Country House is an estate on Long Island or a cottage in Montclair; whether it is a house in Golder's Green or a family manor in Devonshire: these are essentially affairs of scale, and the underlying identity is plain enough. The ideal of the Country House prevails even when quarters are taken up in the midst of the metropolis. More than ever the Country House to-day tries to make up by an abundance of physical goods for all that has been lost through its divorce from the underlying community; more than ever it attempts to be self-sufficient within the limits of suburbia. The automobile, the phonograph, and the radio-telephone have only served to increase this self-sufficiency; and I need not show at length how these instrumentalities have deepened the elements of acquisitiveness and passive, uncreative, mechanical enjoyment.

The Country House's passionate demand for physical goods has given rise to another institution, Coketown.⁴

Coketown is the sharp picture of the mill city in Dickens's *Hard Times*.

The center of Coketown's activity was the mill, set at first in the open country near falling water, and then as coal was applied to steam engines, removed to areas more accessible to the coal-fields. The factory became the new social unity; in fact it became the only social unit; and, as Dickens sharply put it, "the jail looked like the town hall, and the town hall like the infirmary" — and all of them looked like the factory, a gaunt building of murky brick that once was red or yellow. The sole object of the factory is to produce goods for sale; and every other institution is encouraged in Coketown only to the extent that it does not seriously interfere with this aim. . . . Coketown is devoted to the production of material goods; and there is no good in Coketown that does not derive from this aim. The only enjoyment which those who

are inured to the Coketown routine can participate in is mechanical achievement; that is to say, activity along industrial and commercial lines; and the only result of this achievement is — more achievement. In the Coketown scheme of things, all that does not contribute to the physical necessities of life is called a comfort; and all that does not contribute either to comforts or necessities is called a luxury. These three grades of good correspond to the three classes of the population: the necessities are for the lower order of manual workers, together with such accessory members as clerks, teachers, and minor officials; the comforts are for the comfortable classes, that is, the small order of merchants, bankers, and industrialists; while the luxuries are for the aristocracy, if there is such an hereditary group, and for such as are able to lift themselves out of the two previous orders. Chief among the luxuries, it goes without saying, are art and literature and any of the other permanent interests of a humane life. . . . Coketown for the workaday week, the Country House for the weekend, is the compromise that has been practically countenanced.⁵

Megalopolis is the largest city of the National State. Its ultimate aim is to conduct the whole of human life through the medium of paper. Books, motion picture films, magazines, newspapers, reports, mortgages, securities, commercial paper of all sorts — it is by these means that the Megalopolitans live their lives and gain their experience.

By its traffic in Coketown's multifarious goods and by its command over certain kinds of paper known as mortgages or securities, Megalopolis ensures a supply of real foods and real staples from the countryside. Through incessant production of books, magazines, newspapers, boilerplate features, and syndicated matter, Megalopolis ensures that the ideal of the National Utopia shall be kept alive in the minds of the underlying inhabitants of the country. Finally, by the devices of "national education" and "national advertising" all the inhabitants of the National Utopia are persuaded that the good life is that which is lived, on paper, in the capital city; and that an approximation to this life can be achieved only by eating the food, dressing in the clothes, holding the opinions, and purchasing the goods which are offered for sale by Megalopolis. So the chief aim of every other city in the National Utopia is to become like Megalopolis; its chief hope is to grow as big as Megalopolis; its boast is that it is another Megalopolis. . . . What is Megalopolis, in fact, but a paper purgatory which serves as a medium through which the fallen sons of Coketown, the producer's hell, may finally attain the high bliss of the County House, the consumer's Heaven? ⁶

⁵⁻⁶ From *The Story of Utopias*, by Lewis Mumford. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Boni and Liveright.

LIBERAL IDEALS OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND SOCIAL REFORM

From the first appearance of Coketowns in the early nineteenth century they have not lacked their critics. Opposition began with nostalgic admirers of the more picturesque poverty of the old agricultural order, outraged at the desecration of England's green and pleasant isle. But by the forties serious programs for the better use of the opportunities of technology had become a political force to reckon with. And for at least two generations there has been in all lands the growing realization that some form of "social reform" is essential. Both because it has seemed to them just and humane, and because it has appeared the part of wisdom for the safeguarding of their position and for the increase of general prosperity, the more thoughtful and enlightened of the middle class have sponsored and put into effect a large mass of so-called "social" or "welfare legislation" designed to regulate the extremes of business competition as they bear upon the less fortunate members of society, and have sought to introduce a great many alleviating elements into the actual conduct of industry. Business men, who a half-century ago honestly felt that a ruthless policy and reliance upon "salutary suffering" would ultimately be most productive of social good, are to-day aware of the follies of Coketown and of Megalopolis, and are more or less convinced that intelligence and social action are necessary checks upon too unregulated a struggle for economic existence. This feeling has taken two more or less blended forms: it has given rise to a series of political measures for utilizing the power of the government for benevolent ends, and to a great wave of primarily religious and humanitarian reform. The first began in England with the Tory reformers and their factory legislation; it was greatly elaborated and applied in Germany as "State Socialism," whence it spread into England as "Neo-Liberalism," into many of the smaller European countries, notably Switzerland and Scandinavia, and has appeared in America in the various "Progressive" movements. The second form, "Social Christianity," arose with the Catholics of France and Germany as "Catholic Socialism" or "Social Catholicism," and has been more recently adopted by the Protestant churches as the "social gospel." The specific measures advocated and enacted by these men need not concern us here; it is rather in the general social ideals lying back of these tendencies that we are interested.

State socialism began in Germany, as in England, with the conservatives and the landholders rather than with the business men. In its inception it was primarily patriotic in intent: it emphasized the activity of the State, not for the benefit of either the business men or the working-classes, but rather for the strengthening and the welfare of the nation as a whole; and throughout it has retained the suspicion of the motives of Plato's collectivism, that the State may be strong in war. Primarily with this aim Bismarck, seeking to avoid the ignorant blunders of the early Industrial Revolution in England, tried to make industry serve rather the good of the nation than the gain of the business men; industry and agriculture alike he fostered by protective tariffs, and sought to develop a healthy, able, and willing citizenry that the State might flourish and the army receive its appointed "cannon fodder." He was influenced also by the general idealistic attitude, already expressed by the patriotic Fichte in his *Closed Commercial State*, and by the Hegelian school, that true liberty can be attained only through state action, and that the State alone can make a free life possible through social reform and regulation. Bismarck was a friend of Ferdinand Lassalle, one of the founders of orthodox socialism, and from him he derived many collectivistic ideas without their complement of political democracy. Bismarck received vigorous support in his policies from economists like Rodbertus, Wagner, Schaeffle, and Schmoller, who in 1872 issued a manifesto against economic liberalism, and by their activity did much to spread the program of benevolent welfare legislation for the advantage of all classes of the nation. The social ideal of these so-called "Socialists of the Chair" is a state in which the friendly hand of the government directs such natural monopolies as the railroads, the telegraphs and telephones, and most municipal services; fosters industry and commerce through protective tariffs and subsidies; protects the working-class from accident and disease and the fear of old age by means of thoroughgoing factory legislation and by various forms of social insurance; and in general shapes economic institutions for the material and educational advance of the whole nation. It differs from liberalism and *laissez-faire* in setting the prosperity of the State consciously above that of the individual business man, in believing that enlightened self-interest must be checked and directed by in-

telligent social control, and in general in subordinating unlimited individual initiative to the collective wisdom and broader horizon of a trained body of experts.

Schmoller struck the keynote of this German State Socialism in his call for the formation of the Union for Social Politics, in 1873.

We are of the opinion that the unrestricted activity of partly hostile and unequally strong special interests is not in accord with the welfare of the community. On the contrary, the demands of the community and of humanity must assert themselves even in economic life, and well considered intervention of the State for protection of the threatened interests of all concerned should be promptly demanded. We do not regard this civic guardianship as a desperate expedient, as a necessary evil, but rather as the fulfilling of one of the highest tasks of our time and of our nation. In serious discharge of this task, the egoism of the individual and the immediate interests of the classes will fall into proper subordination to the permanent and higher destiny of the whole.⁷

Schmoller recognized the ethical duty of the community to look after its members.

We are bound to look into the future, in order to be sensitive to the impression that the tremendous increase of wealth must, at least in part, accrue to the advantage of the previously disinherited classes, and bring to them somewhat more participation in all the higher goods of civilization, in culture and comfort, if we are not to declare ourselves mentally and morally bankrupt. We are bound to see that the lower classes have a right to struggle for these things, that their compact agitation for a better situation is a necessary and just product of our free political life. We are bound, therefore, to perceive that a temporary increase of wages does not solve the social question, but that the kernel of the matter consists in placing the laborer within other conditions of life and work, which shall make of him another man in all respects.⁸

The success of specific measures like social insurance, factory legislation, labor exchanges, government ownership, municipal enterprises, and institutions of technical education, established chiefly with the aid of the Junker Conservatives and the Catholic Centrists, was sufficient to prove that, with the aid of a trained bureaucracy, the active rather than the passive policeman state could interfere with industry without any of the dire results feared by the liberals. Long before 1914 the successful competition of state-guided German business with the individual initiative of the British business man made it clear that directive and

inventive ability did not necessarily suffer when economic life was made the conscious object of social policy, and the results of business enterprise became the concern and the responsibility of experts acting in the presumed interest of the nation as a whole. On the other hand, it seemed to many that such benevolent governmental activity lessened the individual responsibility of the mass of workers, and predisposed them to national enterprises of a questionable character; and it is to be feared that Bismarck and his supporters were working as much for a willing docility on the part of contented subjects as for the private good of those subjects themselves. The collectivistic state, administered by a bureaucracy with little democratic control, was in danger of becoming a servile state; the faults of any benevolent despotism seemed intensified when the system was applied to industrial life; and the building of such a system in the interest of an irresponsible nationalism seemed a threat to the established international order. In the case of Germany these fears were only too well justified; the state socialism begun under Bismarck, strengthened but not fundamentally altered in the tragic years of the Republic, has once more proved itself an admirable instrument for military power.

The ideas and the measures of this State Socialism spread to most European lands, promoted by the nationalistic impulse, the demands of the electorate, the adherence of the more far-sighted business men, and the teachings of representative economists. They secured wide popularity in England in particular; they were adopted by the Liberal-Unionists under Joseph Chamberlain, championed by the Liberal Party during its rebirth of power, 1905-1914, made the basis of the program of the Labour Party, and carried still further by the Conservatives. In the enactment of practical legislation elements of all these parties have coöperated, so that it may be said that for a generation the majority of the British nation has been committed to some form of State Socialism. The chief exponents of this collectivistic philosophy have been Conservatives like Joseph Chamberlain and his sons, Liberals like Lloyd George, Hobson, and Hobhouse, and Labourites like Macdonald, Henderson, and the Webbs. In contrast to Germany, British social legislation has been less benevolently handed down from above, and more a response to a democratic demand. It has not aimed at creating an efficient

and docile military machine. And in the absence of acute pressure it has not undertaken those basic economic controls that have made the history of Germany a steady advance in State Capitalism. An excellent statement of the general social ideal back of a whole generation of British social politics is contained in an apology for the new State Socialism of the Neo-Liberals in 1906:

Without claiming too much for the new program which the Liberal Party has put forward, this, at least, may be asserted with confidence, that it implies a desertion of the old individualist standard and the adoption of a new principle — a principle which the Unionists call socialistic. If it be true that a positive policy of social reconstruction savors of socialism, then, of course, this contention can be justified. The main point is that the function of the State in the mind of the Liberal or Radical of to-day is much wider in scope than seemed possible to our predecessors. The State avowedly claims the right to interfere with industrial liberty and to modify the old economic view of the disposal of private property. Liberalism recognizes that it is no longer possible to accept the view that all men have an equal chance, and that there is nothing more to be done than merely to hold evenly the scales of government. As a matter of fact, the anomalies and the injustices of our present social system have compelled even our opponents to introduce ameliorative legislation. But the Liberal of to-day goes further. He asks that such economic changes shall be introduced as will make it possible for every man to possess a minimum of security and comfort. Property is no longer to have an undue claim; great wealth must be prepared to bear burdens in the interests of the whole community. Our social system must have an ethical basis.⁹

In the United States the teaching as well as the practice of an individualistic *laissez-faire* persisted much longer than in the countries of Western Europe. Down almost to 1914 leading social scientists like William Graham Sumner were still preaching a hard bright gospel of individual initiative, compounded of evolutionary doctrine and classical economics. But the social ideal of regulation and control was steadily winning adherents among economists and other social scientists, following the lead of the pioneer sociologist Lester F. Ward. In the last generation most industrial states, especially those in the West where farmers joined small business and workers to regulate first railroads and then "foreign" industries, began to pass social legislation. Aside from protective and health measures, American state inter-

⁹ From *Democratic England*, by Percy Alden. Copyright, 1906, by The Macmillan Co. Reprinted by permission.

ference has always emphasized the desire of the middle class and small business to preserve "free competition" from the monopolistic tendencies it has developed. Under the leadership of La Follette Wisconsin was a successful pioneer. Theodore Roosevelt carried the ideas of "trust-busting" and social legislation into the arena of national politics, and Woodrow Wilson was the foremost statesman to expound the "New Freedom," whereby the government was to establish the conditions necessary for the economic freedom of the individual.

Human freedom consists in perfect adjustments of human interests and human activities and human energies. Now, the adjustments necessary between individuals, between individuals and the complex institutions amidst which they live, and between those institutions and the government, are infinitely more intricate to-day than ever before. Life has become complex; there are many more elements, more parts, to it than ever before. And, therefore, it is harder to keep everything adjusted — and harder to find out where the trouble lies when the machine gets out of order. You know that one of the interesting things that Mr. Jefferson said in those early days of simplicity which marked the beginnings of our government was that the best government consisted in as little governing as possible. And there is still a sense in which that is true. It is still intolerable for the government to interfere with our individual activities except where it is necessary to interfere with them in order to free them. But I feel confident that if Jefferson were living in our day he would see what we see: that the individual is caught in a great confused nexus of all sorts of complicated circumstances, and that to let him alone is to leave him helpless as against the obstacles with which he has to contend; and that, therefore, law in our day must come to the assistance of the individual. It must come to his assistance to see that he gets fair play; that is all, but that is much. Without the watchful interference, the resolute interference, of the government, there can be no fair play between individuals and such powerful institutions as the trusts. Freedom to-day is something more than being let alone. The program of a government of freedom must in these days be positive, not negative merely.¹⁰

The World War proved an enormous stimulus to concern with social reconstruction. For the first time multitudes of Americans became familiar with ideas and "proposed roads to freedom" known elsewhere for a generation. The leading social scientists had now definitely abandoned *laissez-faire* and the older individualism; they were eagerly exploring the possibilities of democratic methods of social control. In practical life busi-

¹⁰ From *The New Freedom*, by Woodrow Wilson. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Doubleday, Page & Co.

ness was still to enjoy an Indian summer of freedom; but even in those days social legislation steadily advanced in the industrial states. With the first pinch of the depression business turned to the government for help; and under the New Deal America began to catch up with Europe.

As a series of legislative measures put into effect, the New Deal has been a very mild form of the social regulation that other industrial lands have long adopted. It represents hardly more than the extension to a national scale of minimum guarantees and standards enjoyed in the industrial states of the Union for several decades, together with certain economic controls possible only on a federal basis. It has stood for the broad humanitarian ideal that society must step in to assist those who suffer most severely from the creakings of our economic system, that government can and must do something about its worst maladjustments. Beyond that, it has notoriously embodied a wide variety of hardly consistent economic programs, ranging from the old trust-busting to the corporate syndicalism of the N.R.A. Which program would come out on top in any particular legislation has depended on the strength of pressure groups and on the most insistent political demands of the moment. This multiplicity of counsel is a natural expression of the fact that in America there has been no clear-cut and crystallized body of opinion advocating an integrated program of economic reconstruction. Americans, even those convinced that such reconstruction is demanded, have not been agreed on any single plan. The result has been greater flexibility in dealing with specific problems, a flexibility consecrated in American experimental social philosophies, and almost widespread enough to be called the American social ideal. At the same time this experimental attitude, this willingness to try anything once, has exasperated all those business interests forced to make long-term commitments, and made it very difficult for them to plan for the future.

Yet if the New Deal has had no clear social vision of where it wanted to go, it has stood for certain definite ideals of how to get there. And to-day these ideals of political method are doubly important: because they are so widely shared as to be characteristically American, and because with the goals largely set by the nature of technology itself it is the methods of organizing its control that are at issue in our present crisis.

First, the New Deal mobilized in the service of the federal government the large fund of detailed knowledge amassed by a generation of careful social inquiry. Never had such a body of social scientists been collected at Washington; and on each of the specific problems an effort was made to secure the advice of much further expert opinion. Nor was this merely the technical skill of a trained bureaucracy; it was the best social intelligence of our society that was brought to bear.

Secondly, this social intelligence was translated into practical action through the political processes of compromise between various group pressures; it was not enforced from on high. The political skill was not perfect; plenty of mistakes were made; unnecessary antagonism was generated by too much talking in sweeping terms. But on the whole the New Deal was successful in carrying with it the mass of public opinion. And the very political imperfections made it clear that it was not a method that depended on a miraculous genius as a political leader. But it involved much more than the familiar devices of representative government and party and pressure politics. Many of the administrative agencies set up managed to enlist a wide co-operation among those vitally concerned. In the countless committees and boards of the agricultural administration, and to a lesser extent in the N.R.A. and other bureaus, men were called on to work out in responsible coöperation the details of solutions to their own problems. All in all, democratic methods had a chance to show what they could do, and they did not fail in the test. The resulting compromises and adjustments, the stopping short before insistent interested pressures, the necessity of bowing to an uninformed public opinion, were all intolerable to the absolutist, who could criticize quite rightly the destruction or distortion of many a program developed with admirable consistency and thoroughgoing logic; but they represented a workable democratic method.

Thirdly, the most serious question of the absolutists has been answered, and not in their favor. The "State" — which in American parlance becomes the Supreme Court — has not proved immune to influence by political methods. It has not stood permanently blocking the way to experimentation in social control, demanding a revolutionary "capture." The tactics that finally broke the dam were not particularly happy as poli-

tics, though they had good precedents in the history of representative government. But the net result was to remove the most serious obstacle in the face of democratic methods of social reconstruction.

The wisdom, the success, or the adequacy of the various devices by which the New Deal met its most unavoidable problems may seem largely irrelevant to-day. In our new crisis the important thing is that it did have a method for meeting problems. And that method — the experimental application of social intelligence to specific demands, under democratic control and with democratic responsibility — is what America has to offer as an alternative to the authoritarian and totalitarian political methods of other lands. It is at bottom close to what we mean by democracy: it is the American social ideal.

RELIGIOUS AND HUMANITARIAN IDEALS FOR AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Of great influence in breaking the hold of the older individualistic ideas and creating a body of public opinion willing to support the social legislation of the past generation have been the humanitarian teachings of sensitive and fore-sighted religious leaders. Catholics and Protestants alike have brought the prophetic visions of religion to bear on modern society; they have condemned the old economic order as unjust and incompatible with the ideals of Christian brotherhood and love. Such religious crusaders have tried to enlist the religious idealism of the churches in practical movements to "Christianize" the social order; the various formulations of "Social Christianity" have played an important part in getting men to realize the need for social reconstruction.

In France this tendency grew naturally out of the efforts of the liberal Catholics of the 1848 period. Under the Second Empire, so largely dominated by clerical influence, Le Play, an engineer and a pioneer sociologist, gave wide popularity to a movement for supplanting the older individualistic liberalism of the middle class by a call to the Church to perform in the modern age the earthly mission she fulfilled in the thirteenth century. Opposed on the one hand to the orthodox economic liberalism, and on the other to the various forms of socialism, he saw in intelligent coöperation under religious guidance the all-

important hope of social peace. Relying somewhat on state interference, but more on the development of a coöperative spirit between masters and workmen, fostered by a new emphasis on that model of coöperation, the family group, he tried to promote under distinctively Catholic principles that benevolent industrialism that was advocated also by Saint-Simon and Comte. His ideal was completely paternalistic: the only salvation of the working classes must come from above, from some authority, some noble, landlord, employer, or local official. Its keynote is, "The master owes something to the worker beyond his mere wages."

More feasible and more influential has been the program of the Action Libérale, virtually the Catholic socialist party of France, founded by the Comte de Mun. It consciously seeks to re-establish in modern society the guild and corporative organization of the Middle Ages, under the aim and guidance of the Church — a modern version of the medieval vision of the City of God upon earth. Such a society, professing the Catholic faith, founded upon human brotherhood under the Father, in its hierarchical organization of social units would provide an equal life for all because all would be equally serving God in their industrial stations. "The corporations which would be set up under the ægis of religion would aim at making all their members contented with their lot, patient in toil, and disposed to lead a tranquil, happy life."¹¹ Aside from its paternalism, such a program resembles Guild-Socialism and Syndicalism, and on many occasions the Action Libérale and the French Syndicalists worked together against the individualism of the bourgeois Third Republic. This ideal of a neo-medieval order of "corporations" embracing both employers and workmen seemed in Latin lands a welcome alternative to the bitter class-conflict of proletarian syndicalism. It furnished much of the language and some of the inspiration to the Italian Fascist ideal of the "corporative state," and has provided a *modus vivendi* between the Church and secular Fascist dictatorships. In recent years, under the fear of Communism and under great political pressure, Catholic corporativism and Fascist movements have been drawing closer together. With the collapse of the Third Republic the two seem to have coalesced in France.

Similar ideas, medieval in origin and guild-socialistic in their

working-out, were taught in Germany by Bishop von Ketteler, Canon Moufang, and Hitze, and in Austria by Karl Lüger, founder of the powerful Austrian Christian Socialist Party. Industry should be gradually taken over by creative guilds and regulated by them on religious principles.

The solution of the social question is essentially and exclusively bound up with a reorganization of trades and professions. We must have the medieval régime of corporations reestablished — a régime which offers a better solution of the social problem than any which existed either before or after. Of course times have changed, and certain features of the medieval régime would need modification. But some such corporative régime conceived in a more democratic spirit must form the economic basis.¹²

This program was actively pushed by the Austrian Christian Socialist Party, which ruled the destinies of the Austrian Republic after 1922, and endeavored to create a clerical corporative state.

In less thoroughgoing form Cardinal Manning, the great English prelate, supported social legislation and the labor movement in many a crisis. Guild Socialism received considerable attention from English and Irish Catholics, notably Chesterton and Belloc. In England and America, where the Church draws largely upon the working classes, it has naturally included strong tendencies toward social reform — though they have remained distinctly minority movements and have received little encouragement from the hierarchy.

The stamp of official approval on all these movements was given by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, in 1891. Affirming against socialism the justice of the right of private property, and the necessity of mutual coöperation in place of the class struggle, it nevertheless advocated clearly the main principles of Catholic Socialism, social legislation, and above all the formation of unions of workingmen like the older guilds.

The State is the minister of God for good ¹³ [Leo quoted from Paul]. Employers and workmen may themselves effect much in the matter of which we treat, by means of those institutions and organizations which afford opportune assistance to those in need, and which draw the two orders more closely together . . . Workingmen's organizations should be so organized and governed as to furnish the best and most suitable means for attaining what is aimed at — that is to say, for helping each

individual member to better his condition to the utmost in body, mind, and property.¹⁴

On the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*, in 1931, Pope Pius XI reaffirmed its principles, condemning materialistic and secular socialism and calling for a fairer distribution between capital and labor.

In the hopeful post-war atmosphere of 1919 the American National Catholic War Council proclaimed this social ideal.

The present system stands in grievous need of considerable modifications and improvement. Its main defects are three: Enormous inefficiency and waste in the production and distribution of commodities; insufficient incomes for the great majority of wage-earners; and unnecessarily large incomes for a small minority of privileged capitalists.¹⁵

As remedies, universal living wages, industrial education, harmonious relations between labor and capital, participation in management, and coöperative selling associations, were proposed.

The full possibilities of increased production will not be realized so long as the majority of the workers remain mere wage-earners. The majority must somehow become owners, at least in part, of the instruments of production . . . Though involving to a great extent the abolition of the wage-system, this would not mean the abolition of private ownership. The instruments of production would still be owned by individuals, not by the State.¹⁶

Under the able leadership of Father John A. Ryan, the National Catholic Welfare Council has continued to raise its voice in the same terms. During the depression years its criticisms and its proposals have been distinguished for their acumen and sanity. But save for a few outstanding leaders, notably the late Cardinal Mundelein, they cannot be said to have awakened the whole-hearted enthusiasm of the hierarchy; the Church remains divided.

A similar "social gospel" has waxed strong among Protestants; though naturally it has not taken as definite a political and clerical form as in Catholicism. Indeed, the social gospel has come for most liberal Protestants to be the very core of religion, taught in the seminaries, preached in many a sermon, and embodied in many organizations and institutions. Most of the Protestant churches have established "social settlements" in the

slums, following the pioneer example of Canon Barnes of Toynbee Hall in London in 1884. From such practical philanthropic efforts to more comprehensive proposals for a thoroughgoing "Christianizing of the social order," has been for many an easy step; nor must it be forgotten that much of the drive for liberal and progressive collectivism in Protestant lands has come from the attempt to follow the teachings of Jesus. The British Labour movement, in most of its older leaders, derived its moral inspiration from Christian ethics; and in general the Protestant social gospel has been much more radical and thoroughgoing than Catholic Socialism, if at the same time less definitely religious. In England the High Church party founded, under Bishops Westcott and Gore in 1889, the Christian Socialist Union, which has obtained a large following among the clergy in the industrial centers. In America many a voice has been raised for the Kingdom since the eighties, in the last generation notably those of Josiah Strong, Richard T. Ely, George D. Herron, and Walter Rauschenbusch, with a growing chorus since 1918. At the close of the World War many of the churches adopted extensive plans for social reconstruction. A quotation from one of these will bring out the general social ideal of liberal Protestantism.

According to the Christian conception of God He is the Lord of all life and of both worlds, the material as well as the spiritual. He is the creator of the physical universe and has made for the use of man all that it contains. Mankind in all its relations, therefore, must be organized according to the will of God, as revealed in Christ. The entire social order must be Christianized. The world as a whole is the subject of redemption. . . . It emphasizes the moral and spiritual factor as having its own independent contribution to make to the solution of economic problems. And it puts the problem of present industrial reconstruction in its true setting as part of the larger enterprise of the establishment of the Kingdom of God, extending beyond this world into another.¹⁷

Three principles are laid down for the Christian ideal of society: every personality possesses sacred worth as a child of God; brotherhood is the primary relation between man and man; loving service and mutual helpfulness is the fundamental law of Christian life. The resulting Kingdom of God upon earth

would be a coöperative social order in which the sacredness of every life was recognized and everyone found opportunity for the fullest self-expression of which he was capable; in which each individual gave himself gladly and whole-heartedly for ends that are socially valuable; in

which the impulses to service and to creative action would be stronger than the acquisitive impulses, and all work be seen in terms of its spiritual significance as making possible fullness of life for all men; in which differences of talents and capacity meant proportional responsibilities and ministry to the common good; in which all lesser differences of race, of nation, and of class served to minister to the richness of an all-inclusive brotherhood; in which there hovered over all a sense of the reality of the Christ-like God, so that worship inspired service, as service expressed brotherhood.¹⁸

Such sentiments have inspired countless sermons, and elicited among ministers and laymen alike the most sincere and self-sacrificing devotion. They have helped to color the immense reservoir of humanitarian idealism that constitutes the core of American religion, and can be mobilized for so many a cause, both worthy and dubious. Their indirect effect in creating a temper willing to ameliorate the worst injustices and cruelties of industrial society has been inestimable. How far they have been an effective religious driving force, save in the hundreds of individuals they have contributed as leaders in practical social and economic movements, is more doubtful. Church bodies have been willing enough to endorse resolutions presented by zealous crusaders for social justice. But how seriously the mass of their membership has taken forthright and devastating religious critiques of our social disorder is open to question. In recent years there has undoubtedly spread a deep-seated and profound religious revulsion against any traffic with war. But it has been far easier to oppose war than to come to grips with the painful task of reconstructing capitalism.

The depression turned thoughtful religious leaders to a greater concern with the ills of our economic system than ever before; from them has come an increasing stream of realistic, penetrating, and thoroughgoing critiques. But it is significant that their programs had pretty well coalesced with secular efforts, and no longer showed much distinctive religious character or guidance. The social gospel was now not so much a definitely religious ideal as an emotional driving force behind secular ideals. And during the depression official religious bodies adopted few of those sweeping programs for industrial reconstruction that were so popular in the optimism of the post-war years. The issues had

¹⁸ From *The Church and Industrial Reconstruction*, by W. A. Brown. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Association Press.

been more tightly drawn; they had grown too practical and too serious for wide agreement. In the reaction against a too easy identification of the function of religion with the furtherance of some particular social program, many of the more radical religious leaders have come to distinguish sharply between the relative social ideals to which they are personally committed, and the transcendent Christian ideal of the Church itself. Christian idealism will not soon cease to be a major social momentum behind the drive for social reconstruction in America. But that drive is not likely to be influenced in its details by any distinctively Christian ideal.

WORKING-CLASS IDEALS

We have dwelt at length upon these middle-class social ideals, because that class has been more able to express its aspirations, because it is still largely dominant in present-day society, and hence it is towards its aims that social forces have been mainly directed, and because in consequence such ideals, in every Western nation, have been shared by the great majority, whatever their class. The ideals of the large body of industrial workers have been in the main but modifications of these fundamental modern goals. What radically different social aims have been put forward by representatives of the laboring classes are diverse and conflicting, and at best seem as yet the expression of distinctly minority opinions. Nevertheless, since in the Western democracies these classes are growing rapidly in political and economic power, and unless the democracies are overwhelmed are likely to dominate the future — that pledge has already been given to British Labour, and in any event seems impossible to prevent — their aims demand the most serious consideration.

The fundamental ideal of the great body of workers, caught in the meshes of the industrial system — what corresponds in them to the ideal of material prosperity for the business man — is simple and direct: it is a living wage and security of position, getting and keeping a job. What the worker wants above all things is a secure position in society with the means to support a standard of living not markedly disproportionate to that of his neighbor; what he fears most of all is the loss of his job and the lowering of that standard, unemployment and destitution. The

effect of the Industrial Revolution has been twofold; it has materially raised the real income of the masses, though middle-class optimism is not fully aware of the very large numbers still hovering around the bare subsistence level, and constantly in danger of falling below it with every disorder in the complex and easily upset industrial order. But at the same time the enormous multiplication of the material goods of life, with its rapid rise in the possible standard of living, has in effect, comparatively and psychologically speaking, made the worker seem worse off than ever before; the very uniformity of intellectual life, enforced through newspaper, magazine, and photoplay, has made the disparity between what might be and what is seem all the greater. And, above all, the modern economic régime has involved an almost complete loss of that security of position attained in an agricultural society, and has given the haunting fear of unemployment, for skilled and unskilled labor alike, a poignant and pressing immediacy. For the most part the individual worker is too preoccupied with getting a job and retaining it to look much farther into the future or much more widely around him at the body of society. Hence the readiness with which the promise of commercial prosperity, held out by the business men, secures his vote; in prosperous times at least he is more sure of a satisfactory job, and he must be fairly well off or else in desperate straits indeed before he will hazard any fundamental change against the certainty of the full dinner-pail.

With a fairly good wage and a fairly secure tenure, the next aim of the worker is to rise individually and achieve success, to lift himself or his children into the middle class, business or the professions. First to rise in Coketown, then in Megalopolis, and finally to attain a Country House of his own — this is the typical ideal of the worker still, sedulously fostered by the business man who wants able lieutenants, and who wishes to draw off the most pushing of the workers into his own circle. While the industrial machine was being created, it is probable that the ablest men did thus rise, especially in America; but the ladder has become harder and harder to climb with a class of the hereditary wealthy waxing in numbers and power. In practice, there are very few, in our society, who do not in their hearts desire to imitate the Avenue; and the self-made man is notoriously most out of sympathy with the group aspirations of the workers from which he rose.

SOCIAL IDEALS OF ORGANIZED LABOR

Partly to gain security and a higher standard of living, partly because they have lost the hope of ever rising from their class, the workers have, in the last fifty years, increasingly sought rather to raise the general standard and position of the laboring group as a whole — or at least of their particular occupation. Labor organization, the trade-union movement, probably represents to-day the social ideal of the majority of the working-class; though nowhere is an actual majority of the workers organized, and in this country the Labor Movement includes at most a scant six million. But this is probably due primarily to the opposition of the employers: for there is no occupation in which that has been overcome that has not organized at least ninety per cent of its members. The fundamental aim of labor organization is to attain better conditions and greater security, not for the isolated individual, but for the group as a whole; and increasingly it has been forced upon the unions that the area within which individual competition must cease must be constantly widened if that organization is to achieve its ends. Hence, for example, the shift, in some way or other, from the trade to the industry as the basic unit, and the growing feeling of working-class solidarity against the business man. This means that the ideal of the workers has become more and more a genuinely social ideal, embracing the whole body of the workers, and envisaging the totality of the industrial system in its aim.

The primary aim, then, of organized labor in all lands is to get higher real wages with better working conditions; and it involves more or less of an equalizing process within the working-class itself. By collective bargaining, itself resting ultimately upon economic power, the right to withdraw labor or to strike, the unionists are seeking for more and more of the good things of life; and by bitter experience they have learned that they must act as a unit, subordinate private aims to the welfare of the group, enforce a uniformity of working conditions and a standardization of wages, and substitute coöperative endeavor for competition within the working-class. There are still great divergencies of interest between different union groups, divergencies that have long prevented the skilled craftsmen from organizing the workers in the mass production industries, and that have broken out in the bitter conflict between the A.F.L.

and the C.I.O.; but it is becoming increasingly clear that if the fundamental aims of organized labor are to be achieved, these conflicts must be harmonized.

What are these fundamental aims? For the majority of unionists, they are simply, more of what the business men have; but for a growing minority, they involve radical changes in the whole industrial ideal. The older generation of labor leaders, schooled in the bitter struggle for the very right to exist, stands for the first; but in every group men standing for the more radical aim, and the more broadly social vision, are coming to the fore. Orthodox unionists conceive their aim as the organization of a monopoly in labor and the selling of it to employers, as a business proposition, in return for a secure and improved status. Thus in 1895 John W. Sullivan welcomed the American Federation of Labor in these terms:

We run the largest local business enterprise on the American continent. This enterprise is to "bull" our labor market. We succeed. We keep wages up right along, twenty-five per cent above the level they would be were employers to have their way. In some cases we put them up fifty per cent. We thus retain for our own use half a million dollars which without our unions would go to enrich capitalists and monopolists. Twenty-six million dollars a year! That's our joint dividend, no less. We retain this wealth justly because we produce it. We retain it because we have the power to do it. We are well-organized, well-disciplined, well-led. We boast therefore in our chosen leaders the greatest Captains of Industry in this metropolitan center. Their equals in this community cannot be named.¹⁹

With somewhat broader social vision Samuel Gompers expressed the same basic ideal:

The American Federation of Labor is guided by the history of the past. It draws lessons from history in order to interpret conditions which confront working-people so that it may work along the lines of least resistance to accomplish the best results in improving the conditions of the working men, women, and children, to-day, to-morrow, and to-morrow's to-morrow, making each day a better day than the one which went before. This is the guiding principle, philosophy, and aim of the labor movement. We do not set any particular standard, but work for the best possible conditions immediately attainable for the workers. When these are obtained then we strive for better. The working people will not stop when any particular point is reached; they will never stop in their efforts to obtain a better life for themselves, for their wives, for their children, for all humanity. The object to attain is complete social justice.²⁰

The present leadership of the A.F.L. has not departed from the aims of their founder; and though John L. Lewis differs from them on many points, most significantly in seeing the opportunity for increasing labor's power through organizing the mass production industries, he is no more concerned with the details of the eventual outcome.

But this initial aim of "more" demands the organization of economic power, which is increasingly used to exert a large measure of control over industry itself; and the very possession of this power of control makes necessary a further formulation of what "complete social justice" consists in. Hence in countless ways organized labor is taking more and more thought for the basic ends of industry, a tendency fostered on the one hand by the trend towards industrial organization, which makes possible planning in terms of an industry as a whole rather than of a mere isolated trade; and on the other, by the recognition of thoughtful employers that in order to awaken the workers to a sense of responsibility in the conduct of industry, it is necessary to enlist their direct coöperation in industrial management. The experience of the N.R.A., brief as it was, was profound in educating the labor leaders as well as the employers who took part in its counsels. Much of the success of the C.I.O. has been due to that training. From whatever causes and motives it springs, in England and America, as formerly in Germany, the aims of the labor movement have with its growing power expanded from a merely negative and limiting control over processes to a positive coöperation in the direction of those processes. It is no accident that when Britain was forced to make a serious effort to organize her economy on the most effective war basis, it was to leaders of Labour that she turned. The greater power organized labor attains, the greater its responsibility becomes, and the more prone its leaders are to set up aims for "complete social justice." For these reasons, elaborate formulations of widely social ideals are increasingly in vogue, and command much interest among the more thoughtful rank and file.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

These ideals of extensive social reorganization extend from the present type of collective bargaining to such radical programs as syndicalism and guild-socialism. Organized labor has already

been the largest single body that has adopted and enacted the legislative program of State socialism; its lobbies and its votes have furnished the driving power behind the theories of middle-class liberals. The core of its more radical plans has been the conviction, however, that whatever be the function of the government, primary control over industry must be vested in large part in the organized workers themselves. This is the ideal of "industrial democracy," which by and large is the most widespread of present-day working-class ideals, exemplified in innumerable specific proposals and patiently being worked out in many experiments. The pioneers of industrial democracy, perhaps, have not always realized that it involves all the difficulties and problems which a half-century of political democracy has brought forth, on a greatly magnified scale because industry is much more complicated and much broader in scope than political government; they have been perhaps too optimistic. Yet political democrats at the outset shared these too fervent hopes, and only in practice have they realized the long and patient experimenting that must still take place before genuine democratic government can hope to be successful. The advocates of industrial democracy believe that the cure for the ills of democratic government is more democracy, democracy in all the interests of human life; and such an ideal seems at the basis of most working-class social philosophies to-day. Various detailed proposals have been worked out in both England and America in the past decades. Expressive of American experience was the Plumb plan, developed first for the railroads, and later elaborated for industry in general.

We are proposing a plan for the reorganization of industry on a basis of democracy. The principles that must govern such reorganization are the same as the principles that govern all human action and all human relations. . . . American democracy has builded into its foundations the principles upon which industry can be established upon a firm basis of economic efficiency and individual and social justice. . . . Our governments are instituted "for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people." How can government secure to the people industrial liberty, and the right to enjoy the gains of their own industry? How can it protect the safety and happiness of the people, with regard to their industrial activities and interests? It can do these things by exercising the sovereign powers conferred upon it by the people, to provide such policy and organization for all industry

as will secure to every individual the right to the free disposal of his own labor and of the fruits of his labor; that will reconcile and balance the interests of consumers and of the owners of labor and capital; and that will coördinate the several functions that are active in production, so that industry may serve its true purpose of supplying the economic wants of all the people. These purposes are industrial and economic purposes, and therefore can be achieved only by industrial organization and methods. . . . The corporation is the most efficient form of industrial coöperation that has ever been devised, and industrial corporations are public agencies, created for the performance of public services. . . . It is apparent, therefore, that if we can reorganize corporations so that there will be in coöperative industry an equal protection of rights and interests, and effective coördination of productive functions; and if we can devise a policy under which the corporation may be applied to all forms of coöperative industry, we shall have solved the problem of efficient and democratic industrial organization.²¹

The closest approach in this country to a concrete experiment with such democratic self-government of industry was the N.R.A., together with the more modest administration for bituminous coal. But the N.R.A. did not last long enough to determine whether in the struggle for control between big business and the government, anything would be left of democratic participation by the workers.

Industrial democracy, then, accepts the results of a century of large-scale industry, that the corporation is the best form for controlling the machine. But it disagrees with the business men in maintaining that the corporation must be democratically rather than oligarchically organized, and that its ends must be broadly social rather than the private interests of the controlling directors. This is an ideal that is deeply imbedded in the very function of labor organization; only the necessity of the struggle with industrial autocracy has warped and twisted this implicit aim. It must be confessed that any organization of American economic life would seem to demand a very great degree of decentralization or federalism, and a widely distributed initiative. American labor has always distrusted political control, though like business it has been free enough in demanding specific measures. But this implicit democratic syndicalism, like all the more theoretical proposals for decentralized administration of industry by the producers, has come into sharp conflict with the

²¹ From *Industrial Democracy*, by Glenn E. Plumb. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, The Viking Press.

insistent practical demand for integration and planning on a national basis. Like the guild-socialism and political pluralism of the post-war decade, industrial democracy has been pushed into the background as a program by the problems of the centralized control of the industrial system as a whole. Just as the revolutionary syndicalism of Latin Europe has been incorporated in but rigidly subordinated to the totalitarian state, so the necessities of national planning have elsewhere taken precedence over concern with the democratization of industrial processes themselves.

COLLECTIVISTIC VISIONS AND PROGRAMS

For several generations strong working-class movements have set themselves, in most countries, still further social ideals of an absolutistic and millennial type. There have been those who hoped to use the power of the political State to control directly and bureaucratically the processes of production and distribution: Marxian Socialism, in its older orthodox and revisionary forms and in present-day Communism, expresses their faith. There have been those who, generalizing from the aims of organized labor, have painted pictures of a control of industry through the democratically organized groups of those participating directly in it: Syndicalism illustrates the extreme form, Guild Socialism the broader and more theoretical program. It is not part of our task to analyze these proposed roads to freedom, or to recount the story of those many social Utopias that have played so important a rôle in the thought of the last few generations. The tale is familiar, nor can we here attempt to remove the many prejudices that have gathered about them. They are, moreover, even in the minds of their adherents, rather visions of perfection than programs of action; and our concern is primarily with the latter, as depicting the goals that men to-day actually and seriously set themselves.

These programs are really embodiments of two fundamental and distinct ideals: State action for the control of industry, and group action for the self-government of industrial units. The one is the outgrowth of the rapid spread of State Socialism and collectivistic economic regulation. It is basically political in its attitude and temper, and has expressed itself in socialist parties. It thinks in terms of the industrial machine as a whole, and treats

it as something to be manipulated from a center, in the interest of some political end. Neither this end nor the administration of control need be democratic at all, as the most spectacular embodiments make clear. The end may be mere economic efficiency or sheer military power, the administration may be highly centralized and authoritarian. The other ideal is the outgrowth of the organized labor movement. Its attitude is industrial rather than political, and it often distrusts state action and bureaucratic control; it prefers direct economic pressure. It thinks in terms of particular industries, pluralistically and specifically, and often neglects the problems of their coördination. But it is inherently democratic, for it springs, not from the desire to manipulate industry for some good end, but from the craving to have some voice, to count, in the work one is doing. With their diverse backgrounds these two ideals have often clashed. Politically minded socialists and communists are always irritating genuine trade unionists by trying to capture labor organizations for ulterior political ends. But both ideals emphasize important problems; and in any working program for the administration of industry, like those practically adopted by Russian Communists and by the British Labour Party, both have had to receive some solution.

In the last few years the more political ideal of socialism has received the lion's share of attention. The declining economy of the past decade, in forcing more and more actual state intervention; the rapidly increasing economic nationalism and autarchy; the impressive example of the Soviet Union — all have combined to emphasize state control. And the triumph and success of revolutionary socialism in Russia increased the appeal of the Communist method. Elsewhere on the Continent evolutionary socialism temporized until it was crushed; even the British Labour Party during its two periods of governmental administration failed to go beyond the well-worn paths of social legislation. In the midst of the chaos of the depression, the ideal of a "planned society," managed in the interests of the masses by a devoted and disciplined minority, fired the imagination. In Russia state industries were conducted by syndicates and trusts under experts; they were all directed and controlled by a hierarchy of councils and associations, culminating in the State Planning Commission (the *Gosplan*). Here at last had been

realized a rationally coördinated and regulated economic system. Here the profit motive was replaced by the consecrated enthusiasm of an entire society valiantly striving to build a new social order. Here the chaotic pricing system of a market subject to all the raids and forays of irresponsible private interests had given way to intelligent allocation of resources and planning of production. So appealing was the ideal that generous minds found it easy to overlook how deeply entangled this centralized economic control was with a political dictatorship — easy, that is, for middle-class intellectuals and radicals; British and American labor were profoundly suspicious from the start, and in those lands the tiny Communist parties can scarcely be called working-class movements at all.

Whether a planned economy can succeed only under a political dictatorship, whether it is possible with democratic methods, or would in the end bring dictatorship in its wake, are much debated questions that can scarcely be settled by argument and logic. The experiment has not been tried, in Russia at least; it surely will be elsewhere. For the ideal of a planned industrial system has appealed to many who are firmly committed to democratic methods and resolutely opposed to even temporary dictatorship. In their vision of the new order British socialists differ little from the Communists; they too aim at a classless society and a centrally planned economy. The difference is not of final objective but of method — though there is great doubt whether means and ends can be so neatly dis severed, or whether non-democratic methods can ever reach a goal embodying the democratic quality of life. In Communism the emphasis is on centralization and dictatorship, in the Labour Party, on distributed and democratic control. The Labourites look forward to an industrial democracy of state-coördinated industries administered by expert boards subject to democratic control within industry, and ultimately to Parliamentary determination of policy. The basic program of the Labour Party grew out of its war experience, and was adopted in 1918:

The first principle of the Labour Party is the securing to every member of the community, in good times and bad alike (and not only to the strong and able, the well-born or the fortunate), of all the requisites of healthy life and worthy citizenship. We are members one of another. No man liveth to himself alone. If any, even the humblest,

is made to suffer, the whole community and every one of us, whether or not we recognize the fact, is thereby injured. Generation after generation this has been the corner-stone of the faith of Labour. Thus it is that the Labour Party to-day stands for the universal application of the Policy of the National Minimum. . . . Secondly, it demands the full and genuine adoption of the principle of Democracy. The first condition of Democracy is effective personal freedom. . . . Hence the Labour Party insists on Democracy in industry as well as in government. It demands the progressive elimination from the control of industry of the private capitalist, individual or joint-stock; and the setting free of all who work, whether by hand or brain, for the service of the community, and of the community only. . . . What the Labour Party looks to is a genuinely scientific reorganization of the nation's industry, no longer deflected by individual profiteering, on the basis of the Common Ownership of the Means of Production; the equitable sharing of the proceeds among all who participate in any capacity, and only among these, and the adoption, in particular services and occupations, of those systems and methods of administration and control that may be found, in practice, best to promote, not profiteering, but the public interest. . . . Thirdly, the Labour Party stands for a revolution in national finance; for such a system of taxation as will yield all the necessary revenue to the Government without encroaching on the prescribed National Minimum Standard of Life of any family whatsoever; without hampering production or discouraging any useful personal effort, and with the nearest possible approximation to equality of sacrifice. . . . Finally, one main Pillar of the House that the Labour Party intends to build is the future appropriation of the Surplus, not to the enlargement of any individual fortune, but to the Common Good. It is from this constantly arising Surplus that will have to be found the new capital which the community day by day needs for the perpetual improvement and increase of its various enterprises. . . . From the same source must come the greatly increased public provision that the Labour Party will insist on being made for scientific investigation and original research, in every branch of knowledge, not to say also for the promotion of music, literature and fine art, which have been under Capitalism so greatly neglected, and upon which, so the Labour Party holds, any real development of civilization fundamentally depends. . . . Although the Purpose of the Labour Party must, by the law of its being, remain for all time unchanged, its Policy and its Program will, we hope, undergo a perpetual development, as knowledge grows, and as new phases of the social problem present themselves, in a continually finer adjustment of our measures to our ends. If Law is the Mother of Freedom, Science, to the Labour Party, must be the Parent of Law.²²

In the immediate post-war years British Labourites were much interested in pushing the ideal of "workers' control." This was partly a result of the active propaganda of the Guild Socialists

for "self-government in industry": they advocated handing over the administration of each industry to the whole body of workers engaged in it. It was due still more to the long experience of Labour in actual trade union practice, the expression of the labor movement's implicit aim. But the long slump proved unfavorable to any such demand by the unions; while political success, and more recently the growing fear of fascism, have turned them to ways and means of strengthening rather than of decentralizing the democratic state. In their detailed plans for the socialized administration of particular industries, of which many have been seriously offered, notably for coal; and still more in the various boards and authorities actually set up — like the Central Electricity Board — the general structure of existing management has been retained, with government-appointed directors instead of representatives of private shareholders. Democracy within industry has come to mean, not direct control, but the presence of advisory Works Councils — as in progressive private plants. The problems of democratic control seem at the moment to be more pressing in connection with the central planning and coördinating bodies than in the separate industries.

NON-DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN METHODS

The goal an industrial society can hope to achieve is largely determined by the inherent nature and structure of technology itself. The detailed form its economic organization will take will depend on patient and critical inquiry into that structure, and on much painful experimentation, under whatever auspices. The basic issue is hence as to the methods used to attain that organization. By now we have had enough experience of collectivisms and planned economies to realize that the method whereby they are instituted is of supreme importance. For that method will profoundly color the kind of life lived under them, and the character of men they produce; it cannot easily be exchanged for another when its task is done. So far we have been examining the social ideals of men who cherish the sense of coöperative work, the give and take of human intercourse, the sense of dignity, of self-direction, of counting, that make up the democratic quality of life. We now turn to those of men who have sacrificed these values to the promise of a speedier and more

effective method. It is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the totalitarian state that are challenging democratic processes to-day.

Communism stands for the socialist ideal of a planned economy and a classless society, the great objectives that have emerged out of industrial society. The achievements of the Soviet Union in its fervent devotion to these ideals are impressive and enlightening; they deserve the warmest sympathy and the most careful study. But Communist parties, in Russia and elsewhere, stand also for a certain political method, the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the consequences of that method have been continuing and permeating. The phrase is Marx's, but the development of the method in practice belongs to Lenin and his successors. Marx regarded the "State" of German political theory as essentially an organ of the capitalists in the class-struggle, the force by which they kept the exploited proletariat in subjection. By definition the "State" meant for him those functions of government that stand in the way of the interests of the proletariat, and are exercised for the benefit of the other side. The proletariat must therefore "capture" the State: when your side has won control, the government will then have no further function you do not like. Hence, as Engels put it, the State will "wither away," leaving only a good government or administration, not a hostile government or "State."

Wherever possible Marx favored constitutional methods for the capture of the capitalist State. But he accepted violent revolution when the occasion demanded, as in 1848 and again during the Paris Commune. After the capture he and Engels looked forward to a transitional period, during which the workers would control a government of almost unlimited power. Under this dictatorship of the proletariat they would consolidate their position, defend themselves against counter-revolution, and build up the institutions of a classless society. Gradually this working-class "State" would wither away; neither Marx nor Engels elaborated on what would be left. Engels's most precise statement is: "The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production."²³

Lenin, adapting this program to Russian conditions, and drawing on the pre-1848 writings of Marx's most revolutionary pe-

riod, pushed the idea of a transitional dictatorship of the proletariat still further to the dictatorship of the Socialist — or Communist — Party on behalf of the proletariat. In his pamphlet *What is to be Done?* he laid down clearly in 1902 the functions and methods of a disciplined Marxian party. Industrial workers tend to become trade unionists spontaneously; but to be made into class-conscious socialists they must be indoctrinated with Marxist theory from outside by middle-class intellectuals.

We said that [in the 1890's] *there could not yet be* Social Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e., it may itself realize the necessity for combining in unions, to fight against the employers and to strive to compel the government to pass necessary labor legislation, etc.²⁴

A small, compact core, consisting of reliable, experienced and hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organizations of revolutionists, can, with the wide support of the masses and without an elaborate set of rules, perform all the functions of a trade-union organization, and perform them, moreover in the manner Social Democrats desire.²⁵

The Communist Party thus becomes a picked body, absolutely devoted to Marxist principles, whose function is to gain the leadership of all working-class movements and steer them in the correct direction. "The Communist Party is the lever of political organization, with the help of which the more progressive part of the working class directs on the right path the whole mass of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat."²⁶ It must be subject to the most rigid discipline of action and opinion. When the Party has once reached a decision, there can be no further dissent; above all, there must be no tampering with the letter of Marx. "To belittle socialist ideology *in any way*, to *deviate from it in the slightest degree*, means strengthening bourgeois ideology."²⁷

When Lenin with great skill gained control of the Russian Revolution, the Party naturally became the governing class of the new proletarian dictatorship. Its tight discipline over its members was not relaxed; all Communists — which meant all responsible government officials — were subject to the direction and the decisions of the Political Committee of the Party. The

proletariat alone controls the government, the Party alone controls the proletariat — and it is little wonder that the Party control itself has become more and more centralized. Lenin was no democrat, and regarded majority-rule as a “constitutional illusion”; but with his fixed principles he combined an extraordinary gift for opportune compromise. His successor has not been so skilled in the arts of persuasion. Since the adoption of the program of “Socialism in Russia,” the Soviet Union remains at class-war with the rest of the world, and will so remain till the delayed world revolution is consummated. Hence the disappearance of the class and party State has been postponed to the indefinite future. As Stalin explains:

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the weapon of the proletarian revolution, its organ, its most important stronghold, which is called into being, first, to crush the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and to consolidate its achievements; secondly, to lead the proletarian revolution to its completion, to lead the revolution onward to the complete victory of socialism . . . The seizure of power is only the beginning. For a number of reasons, the bourgeoisie overthrown in one country remains for a considerable time stronger there than the proletariat which has overthrown it . . . We must therefore regard the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition . . . as an entire historical epoch . . . “The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin, “is a persistent struggle — sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative — against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a terrible force.”²⁸

The dictatorship of the totalitarian state was consciously modeled on the proletarian dictatorship. As political methods they have much in common; their present uneasy military alliance against the democratic world need have occasioned little surprise. Italian Fascism and German National Socialism also exhibit the same single-party control of all political life, the same dictatorship over the party, the same regimentation of opinion, the same inculcation of a secular political religion, the same effort at an organized economy. The striking difference is that for them the national state replaces the class as the object of supreme loyalty, and international conflict and hatred take the place of the class-struggle. In Italy, nationalism is combined with syndicalistic ideas in the ideal of the corporative state; in Germany, with developments of the indigenous state socialism.

Since the postponement of the world revolution and the soft-pedaling of the Communist International, totalitarian dictatorship has seemed the more dangerous to the outside world; the remarkable economic and military achievement of Germany has now made that danger a vivid reality. It is the curse of aggressive nationalism to be contagious; and despite its excellent record for peace, Russia, like every other nation, has at last been driven to act nakedly to protect its national interests, as the repository — also like every other nation — of the future hope of civilization.

The totalitarian state arose as the desperate answer to the breakdown of party government in the face of disruptive, long-drawn-out, and indecisive class conflict. Hence it has sought at every point to elevate the political power and the religious, moral, and emotional appeal of the national State. In support of this practical program it has drawn freely on the Hegelian doctrine of the organic totality of nation and state, already widespread in the thought of Central Europe. The Fascists, claiming that the State creates the nation (and seeking a colonial empire) have found the voluntaristic Hegelianism of Gentile and his followers congenial; the Nazis, anxious to consolidate all Germanic groups, have appealed rather to a mystical doctrine of race and racial instincts as the basis of the nation, of which the State is but the organ and agent. Both condemn the materialism alike of the Marxists and of individualistic liberalism with its defense of private freedoms. "The paradox of democracy and Marxism lies in the fact that both represent the most brutal, honorless materialism, and purposely support all the tendencies that favor anarchy, while at the same time they boast of their humanity and love for the oppressed and exploited."²⁹ For happiness fascism substitutes duty, for freedom, authority and discipline, for equality, hierarchy, and for numbers, quality.

Fascism, now and always, believes in holiness and in heroism; that is to say, in actions influenced by no economic motive, direct or indirect. And if the economic conception of history be denied, according to which theory men are no more than puppets, carried to and fro by the waves of chance while the real directing forces are quite out of their control, it follows that the existence of an unchangeable and unchanging class-war is also denied — the natural progeny of the economic conception of history . . . Fascism denies the possibility of the materialist conception of happiness, and abandons it to its inventors, the economists of the

first half of the nineteenth century: that is to say, fascism denies the validity of the equation, well-being is happiness, which would reduce men to the level of animals, caring for one thing only — to be fat and well-fed — and would thus degrade humanity to a purely physical existence.³⁰

The Italian Charter of Labor of 1926 begins: "The Italian nation is an organism having ends, life, and means of action superior to those of the separate individuals or groups of individuals which compose it. It is a moral, political, and economic unity that is integrally realized in the Fascist State."³¹ As Mussolini puts it: "For the fascist, all is comprised in the State, and nothing spiritual or human exists — much less has any value — outside the State. In this respect fascism is a totalizing concept, and the Fascist State — the unification and synthesis of every value — interprets, develops, and actualizes the whole life of the people."³² In practice this conception supports whatever control the State may find necessary or desirable, whatever co-ordination of individuals and groups it may judge to serve its purpose. Fascism takes as its motto: "Everything for the State; nothing against the State; nothing outside the State." This opens the way for a total reconstruction of culture on a national — or racial — basis. Every value, economic, moral, or cultural, is a national value; the State, as the all-inclusive ethical end, must regulate them all in the interests of its own strength. Every organization, every institution is an organ and a creature of the State. To find one's true self in its service is the highest moral idealism. And every measure that can weld the nation into a solid monolithic block behind the single end of efficient military power bears all the momentum of a new religion.

Fascism has to be sure carried over much of the old syndicalist program: many of its leaders have been ex-syndicalists. It recognizes the reality of functional association, and the necessity of according it an appropriate place in the organized life of the nation. It has slowly worked out the institutions of the "corporate State"; the syndicates or unions of employers and of employees in each industry are united, with equal representation, into a corporation. These corporations are conceived as the next order of reality under the State; through them, under the State, the life of the nation is expressed. But even here nationalism has captured syndicalism. The corporations are not to be

spontaneous and autonomous, with a life of their own; they are creatures of the State and subordinate contributors to its unitary life. In theory as in practice the corporative state is a device for securing the national control of industry rather than for industrial self-government.

For the actual government of this all-embracing State, every principle of parliamentary democracy is frankly repudiated. The State is controlled by the Party, and the Party avowedly by its Leader. For the person of the Leader expresses the collective will of the nation far better than any merely quantitative and "mechanical" device like the ballot. Human nature in politics is basically instinctive and irrational: fascists have drawn on the theories of all the voluntaristic anti-intellectualists from Nietzsche to Pareto. At best the masses of men have an instinctive sense of national welfare, enough to select and follow a leader, but not enough to judge the wisdom of his policies. They must be guided at every turn from above, by an élite, ordered in an ascending series of personalities. This principle the Fascists call "hierarchy"; the Nazis identify it still more frankly with the discipline of the old Prussian army.

Fascism insists that the government be entrusted to men capable of rising above their own private interests and of realizing the aspirations of the social collectivity, considered in its unity and in its relation to the past and future. Fascism therefore not only rejects the dogma of popular sovereignty and substitutes for it that of state sovereignty, but it also proclaims that the great mass of citizens is not a suitable advocate of social interests, for the reason that the capacity to ignore individual private interests in favor of the higher demands of society and of history is a very rare gift and the privilege of the chosen few. Natural intelligence and cultural preparation are of great service in all such tasks. Still more valuable perhaps is the intuitiveness of rare great minds, their traditionalism and their inherited qualities.³³

In the old parliament, Authority and Responsibility were in reverse order. Responsibility went from top to bottom, and Authority went from bottom to top. That was a sin against natural law . . . Here however the old principle holds good: Authority goes from top to bottom, but Responsibility always from bottom to top. Each is responsible to him who is called to stand next above him. The Leader carries final Responsibility. What the Leader wants will be done. His will is law for us."³⁴

There can be no appeal to intelligent public opinion, to critical judgment. The masses live in the realm of feeling and will, not

of intelligence; to govern them one must awaken fanaticism and even hysteria. And so fascist leadership employs consciously and avowedly all the devices of propaganda, from the shrewd counsels of Machiavelli to the latest techniques of modern advertising, to bend the masses to its will. Judicious terrorism has its recognized political function; for as Gentile points out: "Every force is a moral force, for it is always an expression of will; and whatever be the argument used — preaching or applying blackjacks — its efficacy can be none other than its ability finally to receive the inner support of a man and to persuade him to agree to it."³⁵ Even truth is an organ of the State: it is "the revelation of that which makes a people certain, clear, and strong in its action and knowledge."

The old idea of science based on the sovereign right of abstract intellectual activity is gone forever. The new science is entirely different from the idea of knowledge that found its value in an unchecked effort to reach the truth. The true freedom of science is to be an organ of a nation's living strength and of its historic fate.³⁶

This unconditional devotion to the nation is an ideal of extraordinary power. It obviously makes possible whatever economic organization men may have the wit to work out, and whatever military adventures they have the strength to endure. It makes many things possible, and many others impossible. It offers the same psychological sense of security, the same sense of belonging to a great creative movement, the same emotional fusion with others, the same religious consecration and consolation, that Communism is capable of inspiring. But unlike the proletarian dictatorship, it holds out no hope for the future: it does not even pretend to be a transition to a more generous and humane world. And among the things it makes impossible are most of these goods most deeply embedded in our long moral tradition, disinterested inquiry, for instance, and democratic responsibility. Those things one must renounce to be strong.

Common to all the social ideals of our age is the conviction that modern society can no longer be left to develop and function without guidance. Intelligent control of its forces is fundamental, and such control must be devoted to the welfare of the entire community. Men must discover the best kind of life that can be lived with the resources and the compulsions of

industrialism; and they must consciously plan, in the light of scientific knowledge and practice, how best to bring it nearer to man. In the hope of meeting this inescapable demand, great nations have unified themselves with fanatical faiths, and entrusted their destinies to self-appointed élites and dictators. In our troubled world, the goals are set for us. Can we advance towards them in our own way and by our own methods? No man yet knows the answer, for it depends upon ourselves.

IDEALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In a world whose passionate hopes for peace have been so rudely disillusioned by the resurgence of sheer brute force, it may seem futile to speak of any ideal of international relations, save to have enough tanks and bombers to take on all comers. In retrospect, it appears that no group really believed in anything else but the international anarchy of military force, believed in it enough to modify their policies one iota — no one, that is, save multitudes in every land whose leaders have failed and betrayed them. But black as is the immediate future, for those with the detachment, and the courage, to take a longer view, the prospect is not wholly dark. If the failure of the last twenty years to achieve our high hopes has made anything clear, it is that our international anarchy cannot endure. It may be that sheer force itself will put an end to it, and Europe be organized under another iron *Pax Romana*. It may be that the Soviet Union will extend to the Atlantic. It may be that a new League of Nations will arise, or some other more closely integrated European union, profiting by the old mistakes and ready to make new ones. But what of Europe survives when the present conflict is concluded will be organized politically and economically; for there can be no conclusion until it is.

Looking back over the past century, we are confronted by the fact that the ideal of the sovereign and irresponsible national state, formulated by Machiavelli and Grotius in the harsh times of the break-up of medieval Christendom, has lost none of its force. The nineteenth-century wave of nationalism and economic imperialism served merely to intensify it and to carry it round the world. And to-day the totalitarian states have consecrated to it a fanaticism and a power never before equaled. Yet there have been vigorous alternatives. Eighteenth-century

cosmopolitanism has been kept alive, and various forms of the internationalism of 1848 have developed growing strength. The ideal of international organization is so obviously rooted in a technological society, and so clearly demanded if our industrial machine is to function efficiently, or even to endure at all, that it cannot die: in some form it seems bound to come. Here too, as on the national scale, the method of its achievement raises the chief issues. The first great experiment, the League of Nations, begun amid such high hopes and such generous sentiment, was after all founded on force and dedicated to the forceful suppression of change. Perhaps the next will tell us whether it failed merely because its force was not strong enough.

In 1848 patriotism was primarily a liberating and progressive drive, looking forward to an international society of diversified and mutually coöperating nations. But with the achievement of independent and unified national existence, it was everywhere captured by interested economic groups, and bent to their private ends. "My country, right or wrong," came to be the creed of short-sighted business men and imperialistic greed, the chief and most potent instrument for uniting the masses behind a policy of commercial and industrial expansion reckless of its train of dissensions and wars. In those nationalities still subject to alien peoples, both before and since 1918, it retained indeed much of its earlier glamour; and here most men felt, and still feel, that its ends justify wars of liberation and defense. So strong was its appeal that the right of self-determination of small nationalities was written into the Versailles settlement; those whose oppressors had chosen the wrong side were set up as national states. The resulting Balkanization of Europe, with all its fresh oppressions, its unending dissensions, and its economic follies, has in the end merely made easy German and Russian absorption. The welter of small national states, strong enough to provoke their neighbors, yet too weak to resist and too jealous to unite, has proved an impossible principle of European organization. And the contrast in the larger powers between the earlier appeal of patriotism and its later fruits — between the Germany of 1848 and the Germany of 1914 and 1940, the Italy of Mazzini and the Italy of Mussolini, the patriotism of the Revolution and the patriotism of Poincaré, the self-sacrifice of both North and South in America in 1860 and the sad

record of American imperialism in the Caribbean — has led many to conclude that, whatever its incidental spiritual and cultural values, patriotic nationalism is at present overwhelmingly a disserviceable and a sinister trait. These have come to agree with Veblen:

The chief material use of the patriotic bent in modern populations appears to be its use to a limited class of persons engaged in foreign trade, or in business that comes in competition with foreign industry. It serves their private gain by lending effectual countenance to such restraint of international trade as would not be tolerated within the national domain. In so doing it has also the secondary and more sinister effect of dividing the nations on lines of rivalry and setting up irreconcilable claims and ambitions, of no material value but of far-reaching effect in the way of provocation to further international estrangement and eventual breach of the peace. . . . Into the cultural and technological system of the modern world, the patriotic spirit fits like dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings. Its net contribution to the outcome is obscurity, distrust, and retardation at every point where it touches the fortunes of modern mankind. Yet it is forever present in the counsels of the statesman and in the affections of the common man, and it never ceases to command the regard of all men as the prime attribute of manhood and the final test of the desirable citizen. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no other consideration is allowed in abatement of the claims of patriotic loyalty, and that such loyalty will be allowed to cover any multitude of sins. When the ancient philosopher described Man as a "political animal," this, in effect, was what he affirmed; and to-day the ancient maxim is as good as new. The patriotic spirit is at cross-purposes with modern life, but in any test case it is found that the claims of life yield before those of patriotism; and any voice that dissents from this order of things is as a voice crying in the wilderness.³⁷

PATRIOTIC NATIONALISM

Whatever its origin and its ultimate value, patriotism is beyond doubt the most widespread social ideal of the day; it is the modern religion, far stronger than mere Christianity in any of its forms, and to its tribal gods men give supreme allegiance. Nationalism is almost the one idea for which masses of men will still die. Commercial and industrial expansion afford it large scope, but it is in war, in devotion to military glory and heroism, that it finds its chief rituals. Nationalism has been taught in schools, emphasized in newspaper, magazine, and book, and

³⁷ From *The Nature of Peace*, by Thorstein Veblen. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, The Viking Press.

preached and mocked and sung into men, until to fail to feel the sweeping force of its appeal is to fail to belong to the modern world, to be an outlaw and a wanderer upon the face of the earth, that dreadful thing, a man without a country. Necessarily, so mighty a force enshrines priceless values; yet its present prostitution to unworthy and ignoble ends seems to many to counter-balance whatever of good it may include.

For many reasons this modern nationalism reached its first climax in the Germany of the Hohenzollern empire; but it numbered a majority in all other lands as well, if its exponents were not, on the whole, quite so frank and outspoken. Patriotism is, in practice at least, invidious: it lives by hatred of the foreigner. And the German chauvinists were merely consistent in seeing in war its highest expression. Many a man in every land has felt, if he has not often dared to express openly, what Treitschke said:

It is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while materialism condemns them. What a perversion of morality to wish to eliminate heroism from humanity! It is the heroes of a nation who are the figures that delight and inspire youthful minds; and among authors it is those whose words ring like the sound of trumpets whom as boys and youths we most admire. He who does not delight in them is too cowardly to bear arms himself for the fatherland. All reference to Christianity in this case is perverse. The Bible says explicitly that the powers that be shall bear the sword, and it also says: "Greater love hath no man than this, that he shall lay down his life for his friends." Those who declaim this nonsense of a perpetual peace do not understand the Aryan peoples; the Aryan peoples are above all things brave. They have always been men enough to protect with the sword what they had won by the spirit. . . . We must not consider all these things by the light of the reading-lamp alone; to the historian who lives in the world of will it is immediately clear that the demand for a perpetual peace is thoroughly reactionary; he sees that with war all movement, all growth, must be struck out of history. It has always been the tired, unintelligent, and enervated periods that have played with the dream of perpetual peace. However, it is not worth the trouble to discuss this matter further; the living God will see to it that war constantly returns as a dreadful medicine for the human race.³⁸

The State is the people legally united as an independent power. . . . The State is Power for this reason only, that it may maintain itself alongside of other equally independent powers. War and the administration of justice are the first tasks of even the rudest barbaric State. But these tasks are only conceivable in a plurality of States permanently existing alongside of one another. Hence the idea of a World-State is odious;

the ideal of one State containing all mankind is no ideal at all. The whole content of civilization cannot be realized in a single State; in no single people can the virtues of the aristocracy and the democracy be found combined. All peoples, just like individual men, are one-sided, but in the very fullness of this one-sidedness the richness of the human race is seen. The rays of the divine light only appear in individual nations infinitely broken; each one exhibits a different picture and a different conception of the divinity. Every people has therefore the right to believe that certain powers of the divine reason display themselves in it at their highest. Without overrating itself a people does not arrive at knowledge of itself at all. The highest moral duty of the State is to safeguard its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for a higher community, of which he is a member; but the State is itself the highest in the external community of men, therefore the duty of self-elimination cannot affect it at all. The Christian duty of self-sacrifice for something higher has no existence whatever for the State, because there is nothing whatever beyond it in world-history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself for anything higher. If the State sees its downfall confronting it, we praise it if it falls sword in hand. Self-sacrifice for a foreign nation is not only not moral, but it contradicts the idea of self-preservation, which is the highest thing for the State. Thus it follows from this, that we must distinguish between public and private morality. The order of rank of the various duties must necessarily be for the State, as it is power, quite other than for individual man. A whole series of these duties which are obligatory on the individual, are not to be thought of in any case for the State. To maintain itself counts for it always as the highest commandment; that is absolutely moral for it. And on that account we must declare that of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against the Holy Ghost.³⁹

"War is the only remedy for ailing nations." The moment the State calls "Myself and my existence are now at stake!" social self-seeking must fall back and every party hate be silent. The individual must forget his own ego and feel himself a member of the whole; he must recognize what a nothing his life is in comparison with the general welfare. In that very point lies the loftiness of war, that the insignificant individual disappears entirely before the great thought of the State; the sacrifice of fellow countrymen for one another is nowhere so splendidly exhibited as in war. In such days the chaff is separated from the wheat.⁴⁰

To hold the balance even, it is only fair to quote from an Englishman also; for before 1914 such passages might have been duplicated in any European country, or even in the United States. Nor can we forget that it was a brave American hero whose classic toast has so often served as the epitome of modern nationalism: "My country! In her foreign policy may she

always be in the right — but my country, right or wrong!” Though set down in 1913, the following passage has especial pertinence to-day:

One explanation of this extraordinary paradox in human history — the persistence of war in spite of what seems its unreason — is that there is something in war, after all, that is analogous to the heroism of Scott in the Antarctic zone, something that transcends reason; that in war and the right of war man has a possession which he values above religion, above industry and above social comforts; that in war man values the power which it affords of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the ideal. In all life at its height, in thought, art and action, there is a tendency to become transcendental; and if we examine the wars of England or of Germany in the past we find governing these wars throughout this higher power of heroism, or of something, at least, which transcends reason. Now for what have these wars been fought? Can one detect, underneath them, any governing idea, controlling them from first to last? I answer at once: There is such an idea, and that idea is the idea of Empire. All England's wars for the past five hundred years have been fought for empire.

Is it possible to form any clear conception of what “Empire” has really always meant to England? . . . To give all men within its bounds an English mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the standpoint of an Englishman; to diffuse within its bounds that high tolerance in religion which has marked this empire from its foundation; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness of life and death characteristic of our great poets and our great thinkers; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever-higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly, we associate with the temper and character of our race wherever it is dominant and secure. That is the conception of Empire and of England which persists through the changing fortunes of parties and the rise and fall of Cabinets. A government or a minister may seem to have the power arbitrarily to provoke a war which involves the suffering and deaths of thousands; but it is neither for government nor minister that the soldier falls. Lying there in agony, sinking into darkness, he has in himself the consciousness of this far greater thing, this mysterious, deathless, onward striving force, call it God, call it Destiny — but name it England. For England it is. To give all men within its bounds an English mind — that has been the purpose of our empire in the past. He who speaks of England's greatness speaks of this. Her renown, her glory, it is this, undying, imperishable, in the strictest sense of the word. And how is it thinkable that an English Shah Jehan should ever arise to imperil by bigotry the continuance of the British Raj? At moments, indeed, this empire seems to resemble a vast temple, with the vaulted skies for its dome and the viewless bounds of this planet for its walls. And within that temple

what prayers arise, in every accent, and what sound of hymns to every god that, down the long centuries, the human imagination has created or adored! But in this is one's final hope: that the English nation and race as a whole shall gradually perceive that if the task of internal organization is ever to be carried out in that tranquillity and security of spirit which is necessary for all high tasks in politics, England must take upon herself the fulfilment of her destiny, depending upon herself alone for the realization of a destiny that is *her* destiny.⁴¹

With two such ideals in the world, the outcome was inevitable.

And if the dire event of a war with Germany — if it is a dire event — should ever occur [written in 1913], there shall be seen upon this earth of ours a conflict which, beyond all others, will recall that description of the great Greek wars:

Heroes in battle with heroes,
And above them the wrathful gods.

And one can imagine the ancient, mighty deity of all the Teutonic kindred, throned above the clouds, looking serenely down upon that conflict, upon his favorite children, the English and the Germans, locked in a death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of that struggle, the heroism of the children of Odin the War-god! ⁴²

After four years of war such sentiments were no longer popular; and among the victors there have been few so bold as to speak since in the terms earlier common enough. Even in Germany for years opinion was overwhelmingly a passionate "*Nie wieder Krieg!*" But to those who were suffering from the Versailles Treaty — and this included Italians convinced that they had "won the war but lost the peace" — the successful Allies seemed to take every opportunity to convince them that they were condemned, not because their claims were not just, but because their arms had not been strong enough. And despite their sincere efforts to discourage aggression and change through the League of Nations, none of the former Allies in fact abandoned its nationalistic policies. The pressure of economic problems even drove them to a swiftly intensified economic nationalism. The Italian Fascists were the first to boast openly again of the "sacred egoism" of their national state. For their international policy has depended on bellicose threats, just as internally they have stridently appealed to all the military virtues. For years the most eloquent idealizations of war have been reiterated in Mussolini's speeches. In and out of season

he has preached: "War alone brings all human energies to their highest tension and sets a seal of nobility on the peoples who have the virtue to face it." ⁴³ Fortunately the Italians are too civilized a people to have absorbed this lesson or to have ceased to require this repeated exhortation. But the Germans have learned only too well that when they spoke of justice, they were rebuffed; when they rattled tanks and bombers, they got what they wanted. The Nazis have built on their deep sense of humiliation a more ardent military nationalism than any since the days of Napoleon; but even the Nazis could scarcely have done it without outside help.

COSMOPOLITANISM

What other ideals of international relations have men turned to? There is, first, the continuance of the cosmopolitanism of the Age of Reason, when the fact that "war transcends human reason" was not looked upon as a cogent argument in its favor. Such an ideal has been widely taught, and much less widely practiced, by two groups: first, the bankers and business men who have seen in national boundaries and above all in wars elements disturbing to trade; secondly, the working class, to whom all patriotism and war have seemed but the cloak of business greed and political and economic reaction. The first of these has descended from the Manchester cosmopolitanism of Cobden and Bright, with its evangelical and Quaker overtones; it has at times controlled the British Liberal Party, and such "Little Englanders" have even deprecated imperialistic expansion. This ideal has been ably represented by Thorstein Veblen and J. A. Hobson, and by a host of English liberals after 1918. Norman Angell before 1914 proved conclusively that neither imperialism nor war could bring prosperity to any but a small class of profiteers, while the nation suffered in every way. In *The Great Illusion* he tried to show that the belief that economic prosperity depends on national power "belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed; that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon the expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation's political and economic frontiers do not now necessarily coincide; that military power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one nation to

seize by force the wealth or trade of another — to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that, in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.”⁴⁴ After 1918 Angell was able to say, “I told you so”; and in spite of the business opportunities in national tariffs and in colonies, a vast number of business men, the much-abused “international bankers” at their head, came to feel that in economic coöperation rather than in rivalry lay the greatest prosperity and profits. Indeed, to many the League of Nations became a commercial ideal, in which investors of all nations could coöperate in brotherly fashion in exploiting the “backward portions of the globe.” In America this cosmopolitanism of liberal capitalism reached its height during the twenties; Herbert Hoover was its leading exponent, though even he did not dare to take the consistent step of tariff reduction. Even to-day multitudes of business men and economists attribute all our evils to the breakdown of international free-trade. If only the barriers could be removed!

But the trend toward economic autarchy has been irresistible. It can be said that, broadly speaking, since economic life has had to be organized, it has had to be organized on a national basis; the multiplicity of controls set up has made impossible the old ideal of free-trade for the individual trader, and concentrated what international commerce remains under the close direction of governmental policy. Business cosmopolitanism seems to belong to a bygone stage of economic development. As yet no international economic organization has tied together the national organizations so far achieved. Even the arguments of Norman Angell are built on the presuppositions of an international order that has passed away. Mussolini says, “Political power creates wealth”; Hitler proclaims, “The German plow follows the German sword.” Secretary Hull is crying in the jungle to those who follow the jungle’s law.

For their part, all the more radical workers’ movements have looked beyond national boundaries and seen in the “capitalist class” the only enemy; for them, loyalty and struggle run along class, not national lines. In 1848 Marx wrote:

The working-men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must

constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word. National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.⁴⁵

And Marx closed his *Manifesto* with the ringing words, "Working men of all countries, unite!" But the power of patriotism proved too much for this generous cosmopolitanism, and in 1914, with few exceptions, radicals were persuaded or forced to the colors. The fascists were quick to learn the lesson that intensified national feeling would wean the great mass of the workers away from the class-conscious minority. Their very aggressiveness has given a vital new meaning to international boundaries. With the world divided between fascist and non-fascist nations, for the democratic worker conflicts have become far more than the mere struggle of rival economic empires. The freedoms of liberal capitalism can no longer be taken for granted: they demand a passionate defense. And it is not easy to-day to hate Hitler and Mussolini and remember one's brothers, the German and Italian workers, so busily engaged in bombing and torpedoing. Indeed, the very depth and sincerity of the desire for peace in the last decade has ironically reconciled millions to the supposed necessity of waging war against fascist aggression, as the greatest threat to peace in our world.

Communists, relying on Lenin's interpretation of the World War, and on the wealth of support it brought to their position, have reiterated the Marxist principles. In "imperialist" wars the masses have no interest, save to turn them if possible into civil wars. But wars in behalf of oppressed nations — like India — wars against fascist aggression — like that of China against Japan, or the struggle against Italy in Ethiopia and Spain — and above all wars in defense of the workers' state against counter-revolution, all fall in a different category. The strength of the Soviet government has come in fact to depend more and more on Russian patriotism. And since the policy of a "united front" with the liberal parties in the democracies was abandoned, the Soviet Union has acted in defense of its own interests exactly like any other national state. In spite of all professions of world-brotherhood, the workers remain easily attracted by the patriotic appeal.

INTERNATIONALISM AND PACIFISM

The second of the ideals opposing nationalism to-day is the heir of the internationalism of 1848, of Mazzini. It seeks not to destroy but to build upon existing national states. It was found liberal, compromising, and conciliatory in the programs for Leagues of Nations and World Courts, and the many other schemes for international organization with which the World War flooded the world; though recognizing weakness and grave defects, it continued hopefully to support the League even when all hope was gone. It has been found resolute and uncompromising among pacifists to whom war is the worst of evils and nationalism, uncoordinated in an international order, scarcely better. Such an attempt to unite the spiritual values of devotion to one's country with the higher values of devotion to all mankind has been framed by Santayana:

A man's feet must be planted in his country, but his eyes should survey the world. What a statesman might well aim at would be to give the special sentiments and gifts of his countrymen such a turn that, while continuing all vital traditions, they might find less and less of what is human alien to their genius. Differences in nationality, founded on race and habitat, must always subsist; but what has been superadded artificially by ignorance and bigotry may be gradually abolished in view of universal relations better understood. There is a certain plane on which all races, if they reach it at all, must live in common, the plane of morals and science; which is not to say that even in those activities the mind betrays no racial accent. What is excluded from science and morals is not variety, but contradiction. Any community which had begun to cultivate the Life of Reason in those highest fields would tend to live rationally on all subordinate levels also; for with science and morality rationally applied the best possible use would be made of every local and historical accident. Where traditions had some virtue or necessity about them they would be preserved; where they were remediable prejudices they would be superseded.⁴⁶

The liberal internationalists have wished some form of federation of nations, with no theoretical limitations upon national sovereignty. This proving quite unworkable as the League developed, they resorted to the earlier idea of a league to enforce peace, under the appealing guise of "collective security." This too has now gone down in the débâcle; its difficulties had not been unsuspected by critics since the days of Versailles. It is likely that the next attempt at international organization, whether under a *Pax Germanica*, or under a chastened Britain,

will be much less solicitous of sovereign rights. Before sheer self-defense absorbed all other energies, opinion seemed to be crystallizing in favor of much closer European union. Any such European superstate would be likely to succeed in the measure that it emphasized not the mere enforcement of peace, but the peaceful administration of changes that would otherwise break out into open war.

The more uncompromising and pacifist internationalists, rejecting the idea of suppressing war and aggression by military force, have concentrated rather on making it unnecessary by providing adequate and workable substitutes. They have approached the problem of international organization in terms of developing genuine processes of government rather than of setting up a system of courts and an international police force. In 1838 William Lloyd Garrison formulated a declaration of principles that on the negative side might well stand to-day:

We cannot acknowledge allegiance to any human government. . . . We recognize but one King and Law-giver, one Judge and Ruler of mankind. . . . Our country is the world, our countrymen are all mankind. We love the land of our nativity only as we love all other lands. The interests, rights, and liberties of American citizens are no more dear to us than are those of the whole human race. Hence we can allow no appeal to patriotism, to revenge any national insult or injury. We register our testimony, not only against all wars, whether offensive or defensive, but all preparations for war; against every naval ship, every arsenal, every fortification; against the militia system and a standing army; against all military chieftains and soldiers; against all monuments commemorative of victory over a foreign foe, all trophies won in battle, all celebrations in honor of military or naval exploits; against all appropriations for the defence of a nation by force and arms on the part of any legislative body; against every edict of government, requiring of its subjects military service. Hence, we deem it unlawful to bear arms, or to hold a military office.⁴⁷

But pacifist internationalism is not merely negative; as Jane Addams made clear, "People are not obliged to choose between violence and passive acceptance of unjust conditions for themselves and others, but moral courage and active good-will will achieve more than violence."⁴⁸ A contemporary formulation of principles puts it: "Peace is more than an absence of war. It is a vital principle which must be applied to all human relations. Peace is to be attained only by free coöperation for the common good. To achieve international and internal peace, machinery

for free coöperation must be set up and expanded.”⁴⁹ It is significant that from Versailles on such pacifists have pointed out the probable consequences of the structure and the policies of the League of Nations. To them, it has seemed a fatal flaw to attempt to preserve peace by threatening a collective war against the proponents of change. And in fact much of the failure of the League was due to this internal contradiction: its support came from those who, hoping that the mere threat of war would be enough to prevent it, were not prepared psychologically or materially for the war that would make that threat effective. To pacifists the path to the abolition of war depends upon renouncing war as an instrument of international as well as of national policy. But the renouncing of one instrument demands the substitution of others equally effective. It calls for the much more difficult and complex working out of methods that will accomplish what war secures in the redistribution of power. Pacifist internationalists have been in the forefront of this insistent task. But even the sheer refusal of public opinion to entertain the possibility of war can have a tremendous influence in forcing governments to face the problem.

The great pacifist internationalist Romain Rolland, during the equally tragic days of the last conflict, penned a statement that is pertinent to-day:

Humanity is a symphony of great collective souls; and he who understands and loves it only by destroying a part of those elements, proves himself a barbarian and shows his idea of harmony to be no better than the idea of order another held in Warsaw. For the finer spirits of Europe there are two dwelling-places: our earthly fatherland, and that other City of God. Of the one we are the guests, of the other the builders. To the one let us give our lives and our faithful hearts; but neither family, friend, nor fatherland, nor aught that we love has power over the spirit. The spirit is the light. It is our duty to lift it above tempests, and thrust aside the clouds which threaten to obscure it; to build higher and stronger, dominating the injustice and hatred of nations, the walls of that city wherein the souls of the whole world may assemble.⁵⁰

In one sense, we have completed our survey of the beliefs that, coming from the past and operating in the present, go to make up the contents of the minds of men to-day. We have traced those streams of thought and aspiration which have gone to swell the flood of ideas and ideals which dominate the present.

There is no final picture, no possible harmonization of tendencies into one great symphony of the mind. Such a unity belongs, if anywhere, at the beginning of our story, in the Middle Ages; since that time, and increasingly in the last century, the tale has been rather of multiplicity and diversity. There is hardly a belief of the past that does not enter, in some form, into the modern world as the object of passionate allegiance. And to-day it is more difficult than for generations to point to any beliefs or ideals the future will surely adopt as its own. For we are convinced, and not without good reason, that our civilization is at a genuine crisis. We cannot go on evading the problems of organizing our economic life and our international anarchy. If we do not soon resolve to face them, we shall succumb to those who will. Can we succeed by democratic methods, by following the lead of experimental intelligence to the conclusions it imposes as best? Or must we too resort to authoritarian and irrational faiths, to the methods of compulsion and military force? If we must, we must say good-bye to the democratic release of the powers of human nature, and to the free and inquiring life of the mind. For democratic ends demand democratic methods for their realization, and it is not by blind submission that men can attain further truth.

Yet on the chaotic diversity of the modern mind this issue imposes its own unification. It selects what beliefs and what aims we must choose. Our science has brought us knowledge and power; our philosophy has delivered us from the search for a cosmic sanction to use that science for human ends. And we have generated a faith of our own, a faith in the efficacy of the methods of experimental intelligence, in the service of a freedom which is coöperative and a coöperation which is voluntary. The task is difficult, but even in these times it is not impossible. For we have faith, and we have intelligence, and these two will determine our future.

The world has need of a philosophy, or a religion, which will promote life. But in order to promote life it is necessary to value something other than mere life. Life devoted only to life is animal without any real human value, incapable of preserving men permanently from weariness and the feeling that all is vanity. If life is to be fully human it must serve some end which seems, in some sense, outside human life, some end which is impersonal and above mankind, such as God or truth or

beauty. Those who best promote life do not have life for their purpose. They aim rather at what seems like a gradual incarnation, a bringing into our human existence of something eternal, something that appears to imagination to live in a heaven remote from strife and failure and the devouring jaws of Time. Contact with this eternal world — even if it be only a world of our imagining — brings a strength and a fundamental peace which cannot be wholly destroyed by the struggles and apparent failures of our temporal life. It is this happy contemplation of what is eternal that Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God. To those who have once known it, it is the key of wisdom. By contact with what is eternal, by devoting ourselves to bringing something of the Divine into this troubled world, we can make our own lives creative even now, even in the midst of the cruelty and strife and hatred that surround us on every hand. . . . Wisdom and hope are what the world needs; and though it fights against them, it gives its respect to them in the end.⁵¹

This is Faith; and whatever storms betide, it will remain a precious heritage of man. But there is one thing of even greater worth than Faith; and that is Thought.

Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth — more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tried wisdom of the ages. Thought looks into the pit of hell and is not afraid. It sees man, a feeble speck, surrounded by unfathomable depths of silence; yet it bears itself proudly, as unmoved as if it were lord of the universe. Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world, and the chief glory of man.⁵²

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